PHILOSOPHY OF DAYANANDA

Pt. Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya, M.A.

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GOVINDRAM HASANAND

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[1925-2024]



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
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
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Svami Dayananda Sarasvati



"Svami Dayananda has given us a bold philosophy of life, philosophy of reality of God, reality of man and the reality of the universe in which man has to live in. His is a philosophy of bold actions and not of idle musing."

This book is the only book that eloquently summarizes the basic tenets of Vedic Philosophy while presenting a comparative analysis of the other religions in English.

—Pt. Ganga Prasad Upadhyay

GAṄGA PRASĀD UPADHYAYA

Born September 6, 1881, at Nadarai (Kasgunj) on the river Kali in the Etah District, U. P. parents' home—Marthara (Etah District); graduated 1908. M. A., 1912 in English Literature and Philosophy in 1923 (Allahabad University); resigned Govt. service for taking part in social work, 1918; principal, D. A. V. High School, Allahabad 1918-39; president Philosophy Section, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan's, Jhansi Session, 1931; president, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, U. P, 1941-44; vice-president, International Aryan League, Delhi, 1943-45; general secretary, International Aryan League 1946-51; missionary tour to South Africa 1950; cultural and missionary tour to Burma, Thailand and Singapore 1951.

Recepient of Mangala Prasad Prize of Hindi Sahitya Sammelan on *Astikavada* or *Theism*, 1931; Amritdhara Prize on *Vedic Culture*, 1950; and U. P. Govt's Prizes on *Communism*, 1951; *Aitareya Brahmana*, 1952; and *Jeevan Chakra*, 1955.

Author of *Reason and Religion* (1938), *Swami Dayananda's Contribution to Hindu Solidarity* (1939), *I and My God* (1939), *Origin, Mission and Scope of Arya Samaj* (1940), *Worship* (1940), *Christianity in India* (1941), *Superstition* (1941), *Marriage and Married Life* (1942), *The Light of Truth* (English version *of the Satyartha Prakash*) (1946), *Landmarks of Swami Dayananda's Teachings* (1947), *Vedic Culture*(1949), *Catechism of the Elementary Teachings of Hinduism* (1950), *Life After Death* (1950)

Also author of Hindi books : *Hindi Shakespeare, 6 Volumes* (1910-12), *Jivajantu, 14* Volumes (1913-17), *Vidhava Vivah Mimansa* (1920), *Angrez Jati Ka Itihas* (1922), *Arya Samaja* (1924), *Astikavada* (1926), *Advaitavada* (1928), *Shankara Ramanuja Dayananda* (1930), *Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Keshavachandra Sen, Dayananda* (1931), *Dhammpada* (1932), *Jeevatma* (1933), *Sarva-darshana Siddhanta Sangraha* (1938), *Ishopanishad* (1940), *Bhagvat Katha* (1943), *Shankara Bhashyalochana* (1947), *Ham Kya Khaven* (1949), *Arya Smriti* (1949), *Mukti-Punravriti* (1949), *Communism* (1950), *Aitareya Brahmana* (1950), *Sanatanadharma aur Arya Samaja* (1951), *Aryodaya Kavyam* (1951), *Arya Samaj aur Niti* (1951), *Dharma Sudha Saar* (1954), *Jeevan Chakra* (1954).

I would like to
dedicate the publication of this book to
the memory of my father
late **Dr. Radhey Mohan Sharma,**
retired Dean Post Graduate Studies,
Haryana Agricultural University (Hissar)
who dedicated his whole life to the
betterment of his children.
We are forever indebted to him.

—Dr. Rajinder Mohan Sharma

21 Valley Ridge Street
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada



Dr. Radhey Mohan Sharma

PREFACE

The present work is the fruit of an inner urge, a very strong urge to bring the thoughts of Svami Dayananda to the notice of modern thinkers. Svami Dayananda claims no newness to his philosophy. He has frankly told us that he is following the footsteps of ancient sages. But a cursory glance at his works will convince the reader that his interpretation of the history of philosophy is peculiarly his own. He has tried not only to put the old wine in new bottles, but has so coloured the wine that it may suit the types of bottles which the modern world is manufacturing. My feeling is that the world needs Dayananda and will be benefitted by the study of his thoughts.

The modern philosophy which is unphilosophically called as *western* philosophy traces its lineage to Plato and Aristotle and a few of their unimportant predecessors, covering a period, hardly longer than three thousand years. During this period several religions and philosophies have sprung up in the western Asia and Europe whose influence has spread all over the world. Judaism, Christianity and Islam and the contemporary philosophies which have coloured and have been coloured by these religions appear very recent as compared with the ancient philosophies of India. The philosophies of Yajnavalkya and Janaka are much older than those of Gotama Buddha and Mahavira. The different strata of Upanishadic thought

point to a very hoary antiquity. Latest scientific researches have shown it clearly that humanity is much older than a few thousand years and it is not reasonable to conclude that long ages which elapsed before Thales or Anaximander were totally devoid of any philosophies, or religions. What we call pre-historic age is pre-historic only in the sense that we are not conversant with its history. Even in the philosophy of early Greeks, we find the traces of sometimes grand ancient philosophies which in course of time dwindled into vague and meaningless formulas. For instance, Thales thought that "water is the original substance, out of which all others are formed." We can laugh at the crudeness of the idea. Bertrand Russell says :—

"The statement that everything is made of water is to be regarded as a scientific hypothesis, and by no means a foolish one. Twenty years ago the received view was that everything is made of hydrogen which is two-thirds of water."* But in ancient Indian Philosophy we come across synonyms of water '*apah*' or '*salila*' which also stand for an original substance which is much finer than hydrogen. In the *Rg Veda* we find that the world is made of *apah*, which is by no means the water composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Radhakrishnan says :—

"In X. 121 (*Rg Veda*, *Mandala* X, *Sukta* 121), we have an account of the creation of the world by an Omnipotent God out of *pre-existent matter*: *Hiranya-garbha* arose in the beginning from the *great water* which pervaded the universe."† Without discussing the accuracy of Radhakrshnan's translation of the *Rg Vedic* verse, we simply mean here to hint that

* History of Western Philosophy p. 44-45.

† Indian Philosophy Vol. I. p. 100.

the word *apah* (आपः) which has been translated here as 'water' with its adjective *brihati* (बृहतीः) does not mean ordinary water, but materia-radica which *pervades the universe.* Who can say that the word used by Thales and translated into English as '*water*', was not akin to Sanskrta *apah* or *salila** of Rg Veda, X. 121 or X. 129 ? Svami Dayananda holds that the Sanskrta words found in the *Vedas* and early *Vedic* literature have undergone great changes not only in medieval Sanskrta literature but its equivalents in other allied languages have also met with the same fate. Thus it is not unreasonable to suggest that the early Greek philosophers were not originators but successors (better or worse) of old philosophies which either deteriorated or became extinct. Thilly in the "Introduction" of "A History of Philosophy" writes:—

"A universal history of philosophy would include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however, have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of oriental peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist in the main, of mythological and ethical doctrines and are not thorough-going systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith."†

It is true that "all people have not produced real systems of thought." Neither every man is a philosopher nor all peoples, philosophic. But it is too difficult to believe that mythologies and ethical

* Apraketaṃ Salilam (अप्रकेतं सलिलम्) (Rg Veda X. 129. 3) has been translated by Maxmuller as "a sea without light," though it means "*matter, homogeneous,*" the origin of all substances.

† (p. 3).

doctrines have had no philosophic background, and therefore no philosophic history. Are mythologies deteriorated forms of systematic philosophies or precursors of later philosophies.? The first position is as maintainable as the second. Philosophies may emerge out of mythologies ; they may also spring up independently. But no mythologies can shoot up without any philosophical back ground. Mythologies are misplaced 'metaphors'' and no metaphors can grow without actual experiences. Mythologies follow history. All Gods and Goddesses, whether of Greek mythology or of Hindu or Chinese were either historical persons or were in some way allied to them. This is a point which has not received a due attention from the writers of histories of philosophy. To believe that there was a chaos, black and blank, before Thales etc. is to break the link between them and the past history of mankind and to believe in a miracle or a fortuitous start of philosophical consciousness in man. No doubt most philosophical speculations 'have shot through poetry and faith.' But this means only this much that when a society degenerates, its essentials are pushed into the background and fineries come to the forefront. Philosophy is much more serious than poetry or faith and when philosophies decay, poetry and faith linger. Philosophical glimspses which we often see in the poetry *of some nations* go to show that they are the remnants of some decayed systems existent in the past. It will be sheer vanity to think that we of modern times, are the originators of all good things and that millions of generations which preceded ours were all banal and barren. In many cases we find that our discoveries are only rediscoveries. Svami Dayananda's belief in the eternality of the soul and the eternality of the stream of creation urges him to hold that the truths which we discover to-day

are not the monopoly of our ages. Ancient sages can be equally credited with such achievements. Thus if Svami Dayananda does not claim to give us a purely new system, his contribution to philosophy cannot be belittled. His reference to the past and reverential treatment of the past are both commendable. He has linked the present with the past and opened the way for future, thus maintaining the continuity of human thought. The peculiarity of Svami Dayananda is that while he criticizes opposite views with uncompromising boldness, he does not claim finality for himself, always giving a due right to his adversary to differ. His reverence for the past does not make him sceptic for future. His conception of the laws of nature is cyclic. The Sanskrta word *Sansarā-Chakra* (world-cycle) is indicative of the old idea that "history repeats itself", not the history of man only, but of the whole universe. The graph of soul's progress is not an ever-rising straight line, but a curve, now ascending and now descending, now rising and now falling, according to the inexorable *Law of Karma* of free souls. Svami Dayananda does not share the vanity of the moderner who has scanty regard for his past, nor he shares the despondency of the traditionalist who believes that our fall has no chance of resurrection. We have made our destiny and we can make our destiny again.

I was initiated into Svami Dayananda's philosophy when I was a mere stripling, by Pandit Kriparama Sharma who later on became a *Sanyasin* and assumed a new name Svami Darshanananda. The word 'Darshananda' means one who takes great pleasure in the study of *Darshana* or philosophy. The Pandit was well versed in six systems of Indian Philosophy and his study of Svami Dayananda's works was very profound. His method of lecturing was such that he could easily create

an interest for philosophy in the hearts of young men. I was one of a small band of young men who listend to the Pandit with rapt attention. This led me to the choice of philosophy as my optional subject for college classes. I had read something about De Cartes in Huxley's 'Lay Sermons' in my pre-college days. I still remember my pouring over Berkeley's Dialogue and trying to catch the fallacies which often eluded my grip and left me puzzled. My connection with the Arya Samaj drew me closer to the thoughts of Svami Dayananda and when later on I studied Shankara and Ramanuja, my reverence for Svami Dayananda grew more.

Svami Dayananda's works are mostly in Hindi, a language which though national, remained neglected for a long time due to foreign political domination. The Arya Samajic leaders on whose shoulders fell the mantle of the founder of the Arya Samaj became too busy with social and educational uplift and the elucidation of Dayananda's Philosophy was left to a few Pandits of old type. The first book on Dayananda's philosophy written in English was 'A critical study of Dayananda's Philosophy' by my eldest son, Dr. Satya Prakasha, D. Sc. of the Allahabad University, full half a century after Svami Dayananda's death. It was a very good book, but the agency that published it took no interest in its publicity and it could not come out of obscurity. Svami Dayananda's philosophy has many aspects and its elucidation needs the love and labour of eminent scholars. It is a pity that very little has been done to attract the attention of the thinking world to such an original thinker. The diffidence which I felt in taking such an important task is the reason that I could not take it up earlier. If in the closing days of my life, I have ventured to contribute my mite to this noble cause, it is simply because I feel

the burden of debt that I and the world owe to Dayananda.

It sounds odd to thank my own children for the help they have given me through filial devotion. But there is another way. I am thankful to God for having blessed me with children who are ever ready to make my cause their own. There is hardly any book worth the name, which I have written in these thirty years and in which my eldest son Dr. Satya Prakash, D. Sc., of the Allahabad University has not rendered a substantial aid. In this book too he has seen proofs and prepared the Index besides other suggestions. My third daughter-in-law Shrimati Suman, M. A. (Mrs. Shri Prakash) who is a lecturer of Psychology in the D. A. V. College, Kanpur, read a great portion of the manuscripts and offered valuable suggestions. My second son Shri Vishwa Prakash, B. A. LL. B. and his eldest son Shri Vimalesh M. A. have been very helpful in seeing the book through the press and arranging for the get-up and other accessories.

I am also thankful to the International Aryan League, Delhi; Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Panjab; Shri Govind Svami of Delhi, and several other friends whose financial aid has facilitated the publication of the present edition.

The book gives only a few glimspses of Svami Dayananda's system of thought and I shall deem my efforts fully paid up if eminent thinkers of the world turn their attention to the works of Svami Dayananda and fuller and more detailed books are written on the subject.

Daya Niwas
13, Lakhpatrai Lane,
Allahabad.
September, 1, 1955.

Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya

CONTENTS

Chapter I.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

1. Svami Dayananda* was born in Tankara (Gujerat) in about 1824 A.D. (1881 *Vikram* Era) ; the exact date of his birth is unknown. He died on the 30th October, 1883 (*Kartik* 15, 1940) at Ajmer (Rajputana). These six decades of his life can be divided roughly into three stages of two decades each. The first period is of boyhood which terminates in 1846 when he leaves home in quest for divine knowledge. The second is of hard preparations—search for a real preceptor and culmination of the study at the feet of Svami Virajananda at Mathura (Uttar Pradesh) in 1863. The rest is devoted to the preaching of the truth he discovered and the foundation and strengthening of the Aryasamaj movement.

2. Svami Dayananda appears to have been contemplative from the very beginning. His religious training must have been of stern type. Not content with teaching routine prayers, his father presses him to keep fast the whole *Shiva Ratri* day (13th day of the Dark Half of *Phalgun*) which he does with extraordinary devotion and much intenser keenness than elderly persons evinced regarding the promised appearance (from the stone idol) of god Shiva in person at the dead of night. Sleep overtook all the vigil-keepers

* Dayananda is the main name, and *Svami* (Master) is a title of reverence for a *Sanyasin* or religious renuncient.

except young Mulashankara (his name of boy-hood) whose constant eye was on the idol. But lo ! What does he see? Not god Shiva emanating from the image, but a mouse emerging from a hole, pouncing undaunted on the stone image and audaciously eating away the offerings. The incident was trifling; but have not the potentialities of great seers been roused up by apparently insignificant events? A seed of doubt seemed to be germinating, doubt which is the beginning of all philosophies. The appearance of this trifle was much more than anybody could have measured it at that time. The boy was disappointed—disappointed miserably. When he waked up his father in the extreme anguish of his mind, he got a rebuff, which instead of having an assuaging effect augmented the disease. He broke the fast unceremoniously, pitied the credulity of his elders and set to enquire about the mystery in right earnest.

3. Svami Dayananda himself says in a some-what scanty account he has left of his boy-hood, how in those days his constant anxiety was to find out what god *Shiva* is, in what relation he stands with his image and how the riddle of life can be solved. He consulted all those whom he thought wise in the neighbourhood, but all appeared to be ignorant and indifferent. For an ordinary man, the usual needs of the body are sufficient to engross his whole attention, leaving no margin at all for deeper things. But those who are destined to be great and to do great deeds are of different type. Svami Dayananda was one such. Even at his tender age he possessed an insight to penetrate into the meaning of life. The anxiety to find the truth got a whip from another incident of more serious nature. There took place in his family the tragic deaths of his dear sister and his still dearer uncle. The history of

Gautama Buddha repeated itself. He saw the family weeping and wailing and instead of participating in the mourning by mimic cries, the poor lad grew grimly grave and began to ponder over the ephemeral nature of life itself. When the parents observed an undue moodiness in his looks, they contrived a design to change the course of the current of his thoughts. Marriage is a snare which perhaps seldom fails. They made usual arrangements. But the boy proved too tough. He broke off the fetters before they could be put on his person.

Who quits the world where all temptations try,
And as 'tis hard to combat, learns to fly.

Mulashankara left his home unobserved and though once caught by the servants of his father and brought home, he soon managed to fly again, this time to remoter and more undetectible regions and never again went back home.

4. Here ends the first stage of his life, covering a little more than two decades. The period must have been full of interesting details—his doubts, his studies, his consultations, the struggles of his mind in choosing the best course, his resolutions and aberrations, his successes and failures, his filial obligations and spiritual aspirations. But the material available is so meagre and historical researches made on this subject are so vague that very little accurate account can be given.

5. The second period is a story of abnormally hard struggle. The quest for truth is the most difficult of all the quests. Mulashankara staked all that he had or loved. He became homeless, depending on alms for keeping his body and soul together, and as he was

very rigid in principles and had an unbreakable resolution, he often had to go without food. At times, finding him a lovely young man, of promising potentialities, several heads of monasteries tried to lure him into their snares and offered him a life of ease and comforts with an outer covering of religious pretensions. But he always turned his face from all these. He learnt to practise *yoga* with certain *yogins* and wandered along the river *Ganga* and in the caves of the Himalayas in search of real preceptors. He visited the *Kumbha* fair of Hardwar in search of highly qualified *gurus*. But he was sorely disappointed. Where he expected true renunciation, he found greed and selfishness; where he expected knowledge and learning, he found false pretensions; where he expected sincerity he envisaged fraud; where he expected wisdom, he met with credulity and superstition. His inner yearnings were sorely wounded and at times his heart gave way. The world, as it appears at the surface, had already lost all its charms for him. Things of higher values were not available. Once he thought of ending his life stoically. But some how he bore himself up. To pass full two decades in such an unsettled state of mind is really a torture especially for a man of Svami Dayananda's temperament.

6. At the suggestion of some co-wanderers he had embraced *Sanyasa*. Now he was no longer a *Brahmacharin*. He was a full-fledged *Sanyasin* with Svami Dayananda as his new name. But one thing that was most pinching for him was that he could not as yet discover the truth that might be given to the misguided humanity. He was still conscious of darkness that clouded his self. He sought light but no light was forthcoming. The religion of the Hindus he found peculiarly irreligious. There was laity which was quite ignorant of

the realities of life. Their religion consisted of certain day-to-day rituals which engrossed their whole mind and their all money. They visited temples which were physically dark, socially dark, and morally dark. They believed in endless gods and goddesses whose stone and bronze images were endowed with imaginary powers. The priests were hypocrites. They committed deliberate frauds always trying various ways to ensnare their followers. Then there were philosophers—India has never lacked philosophers——whose idealism had left no room in their mind for worldly progress. The types of philosoply which Svami Dayananda found prevalent among the savants of his times were exclusively ex-worldly. Our philosophers though propounding abstruse theories were still the denizens of this lower world and surrounded by bodily wants that were quite inconsistent with their theories. This dethroned reason from its high pedestal and as far as daily practices were concerned there was hardly any difference between a learned philosopher and an ordinary man. As soon as he came out of his home and took to yellow robes, it began to be dinned into his ears that he was himself *Brahman* and the world he thought he was in, was simply a delusion like a dream or a mirage. For several centuries the philosophy predominant among Hindus has been that of the *Vedanta* with different variations. Shankaracharya the great was a learned man of superb talents. He was the originator of the *Vedanta* or Monism. His dictum was "Only *Brahman* is true, the world is false; the man is under a delusion to think himself other than *Brahman*" and his redemption consists in coming out of this erroneous belief and realizing himself as the pure *Brahman*. This dictum was well suited to Shankara's times and with this broom he could sweep away in one strong brush the un-vedic and anti-vedic influence of the teachings of Gautama Buddha. But

when more sober times came and the Hindus were confronted with those problems which led Buddhists to embrace anti-theistic tendencies, Shankara's philosophy miserably failed. For a man living in this actual world, it was difficult to realize that he was nothing but *Brahman*, at the same time it made it easy for him to neglect the worldly duties which he owed to his family, society or country at large. In these past years we find a sort of dream-like stupour shrouding the Hindus. The Sadhus were one and all monists. They claimed to be *Brahman*. And yet they begged alms to fill their ignoble and unreal belly. Ordinary man thought that whatever he might be or might have been in the absolute sense, he was in a practical world and should submit to all the practices good or bad which his surroundings recommend.

7. Svami Dayananda would often ask himself and his associates that if he was *Brahman* himself and other men too thought the same in their case, where was a room for so many idols, temples, absurd rituals and invidious differences between caste and caste and man and man ? Shankara's philosophy was never followed with consistency, but his profound learning had such a masterly hold upon educated Indians that they never dared to abandon it in its entirety. General dissatisfaction with his philosophical achievements led several learned men to carve a new faith. For instance, Ramanujacharya, himself a man of rare talents, started a new school quite at variance with Shankara's and named it Qualified Monism (*Vishista advaita*). Several others, not satisfied with the teachings of these two philosophers set up rival philosophies. But they could never shake off the influence of Shankara visibly or invisibly. They are all known as *Vedantas* with different labels and external differences. As far as religion of

the masses is concerned, there was very little in them to choose or reject. Thus Hinduism, the religion of this vast *Aryavarta*, peopled by, say, 300 millions or more, was a congeries of different creeds, essentially of the same type and still fighting with each other on trifles. The gods whose images were worshipped in different temples were always hostile to each other and so were their devotees. This sort of affairs had a very pernicious effect on the social and political condition of the country. It was in this chaotic condition of the country that two great invasions were made on the cultural position of the country, one by Christianity and the other by Islam. Though Christianity appears to have crept into India in the very first century of the Christian era under the influence of St. Thomas, one of the twelve disciples of Jesus Christ, it was mostly confined to the southernmost part of the Indian peninsula. The reason was, perhaps, that christian missionaries found a congenial soil in the west. But the moslems who became more powerful in western Asia turned their attention towards the east and when moslem invasions came from the north-west, internally divided Hinduism could not check the storm, and the government of the country passed away, piece by piece, into the hands of the foreigners. Independence once lost does not come back easily. A great portion of Hindus embraced Islam. And when in the end of the sixteenth century Moslem empire fell to pieces due to its internal weaknesses, newly awakened nations of Europe pounced upon India and put the people into a tight bondage.

8. Europe of Svami Dayananda's days was not an old Europe dark and ignorant. For four or five centuries a sort of awakening had taken place; science was advancing and a new sort of civilization had sprung up.

When the British people became the masters of the country, christian influence naturally increased. The British rulers were wiser than their moslem predecessors; times were also different and their hold upon the heart and head of the people became very strong indeed. They systematised education and the next generation which came out of colleges and schools became automatic converts to the christian culture if not to christian religion.

9. Svami Dayananda marked all this. He had left home as a protestant to Hindu way of worship and this protestantism became firmer and firmer as his experiences of the religious world widened. Yet the attractions which came from outside India seemed too ephemeral. He had an instinctive love for the ancient Indian culture. Moreover he loved his country too and did not like that foreigners should thus trample her under their feet; yet he did not know how to help himself and his country.

10. It was in this anxiety that Svami Dayananda spent a decade and a half of his life. This time was passed almost unnoticed by the public. He visited several places and knocked the doors of several preceptors but could get no light. It was in about 1860 that he heard, by the way, of a blind *Sadhu* who was well-versed in *Sanskrta* learning. The Sadhu's name was Svami Virajananda. He was old and blind and was running a small grammar school at Mathura. Svami Dayananda went there and knocked at his cottage. To the utter amazement of Svami Dayananda the blind poor teacher proved to be a treasure of profound learning. Svami Virajananda was a valuable gem buried deep in the mud of Indian ignorance. Nobody had estimated his value. His learning was too

high for mass appreciation. Even the pupils whom this blind teacher taught so far were unfit to grasp anything genuine. Svami Dayananda even at the first visit could probe into the depth of Guru Virajananda's learning and thanking his stars entered seriously into the discipleship of this extraordinary teacher. He remained there for three years continuously with literally oriental devotion to the preceptor. He swept the room of the teacher, brought water from the *Yamuna* for his bath and served him in various other ways. Svami Virajananda too taught him very lovingly. Though himself physically blind, he opened the eyes of his devoted pupil. Several years after when Svami Dayananda heard from some one the news about the demise of his *Guru*, he sighed out. "Oh ! The Sun of *Sanskrta* Grammar has set."

11. Such was the respect which Svami Dayananda had for his teacher. He learnt from him first the *Sanskrta* grammar of Panini with the great commentary by Patanjali called *Mahabhashya*. The manner and method of teaching were quite new, very different from those prevalent in so many *Sanskrta Pathshalas*. These *Pathshalas* were mostly grammar schools. Grammar was taught as a science—supreme science,—science of sciences and *Pandits* devoted their whole life to Grammar for its own sake. This grammar-mania had, for the most part, excluded other branches of religion and theology, except, of course, those which were necessary for doing routine. Guru Virajananda learnt and taught grammar as a key to unlock the *Shastras* or holy books. Panini's grammar or *Ashtadhyayi* (meaning eight-chaptered book) was a key to the long closed book of the Vedas. His Guru Virajananda's love for Panini was very profound. There was one more point which is relevant. The grammar

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generally taught in *Sanskrta Pathshalas* was, no doubt, originally of Panini, 1 mean, *Ashtadhyayi* but the commentaries through which it was taught were full of complexities, involving mythological explanations— e. g., the preliminary key aphorisms (अइउण्, ॠलृक् etc.) fourteen in number, which are called the *Maheshvarani sutrani* were taught to have come out of the dancing music of Lord Shiva to the exclusion of the name of an old grammarian Maheshvara who had invented the formulas. It is not a place to discuss all this in detail. Suffice to say that Guru Virajaṇanda had a strong chagrin for the grammars taught in those days. So much so that there is a story that when Dayananda sought his discipleship, the first condition was that the forbidden books should be beaten with shoes in order to eke out from the mind of the learner all reverence for false books; and the second condition was that all the rubbish in the form of these books should be thrown into the *Yamuna*. Svami Dayananda. of course, fulfilled both these conditions readily. He had himself been tired of this humbug. It had given him no help in discovering the truth. As the lessons proceeded, Svami Dayananda became more and more impressed with his Guru's profound learning. Guru Virajananda had in his youth been as good a protestant as his new pupil was. But physical disabilities held him back from confronting the opposition and converting the intelligentsia to his views. Svami Virajananda suscessfully impressed upon Svami Dayananda's mind that what passed as Hindu religion was an anti thesis of the ancient Vedic *Dharma*, and the prevailing religious scriptures, the *Puranas* and the like, though in holy *Sanskrta* language taught anti-vedic theology and anti-vedic social ethics. There was a heart to heart talk between the teacher and the pupil —a soul conversing with another soul, in all visible and invisible ways, till the

dark cloud over Svami Dayananda's mind seemed to be cleared off and he felt the rays of divine light illuminating his inner self. He was satisfied and at peace with himself.

12. The life at Mathura must have been abnormally hard for Svami Dayananda. Guru Virajananda was an old and emaciated man, all-bones and no flesh. He had suffered terrible privations. His school was a mere hovel, his pupils came from poor families with no means of support except charity. Guru Virajananda's idiosyncracies could not win the patronage of the rich; his real worth was hidden even from *Pandits*. What material help could a pupil expect from such a *Guru*? Not only was Virajananda unable to undertake the responsibility of maintaining Dayananda, he also refused to receive the latter in his pupilage until there was some satisfactory arrangement for his permanent stay at Mathura. Dayananda was a *Sanyasin* and *Sanyasins* in India are notorious wanderers. How can a wanderer receive education? It is useless to waste one's energy on such itinerants.

13. Svami Dayananda was in a great predicament when luck came to his help. For sometime one Durga Khattri gave Dayananda parched gram. But soon after Amarlal Joshi (known as Joshi Baba) took pity on him and made arrangement for his boarding and lodging. He was provided with a cell on the ground floor of Lakshmi Narayana temple on the Vishramaghata and he used to take his meals at the house of Joshi Baba himself. "One Hardeva gave Dayananda two rupees a month for milk, and Govardhana Sarraf four annas a month for oil."

All this gave Svami Dayananda a sense of satisfaction. He always remembered these benefactors with

gratitude, as it was this help, howsoever meagre in quality or quantity, that could enable him to reap all the benefits of the teaching of Svami Virajananda. He would grudge no sacrifice, howsoever self-denying, as long as his guru was agreeable to teach him. And, doubtless, Virajananda was pleased with his pupil. Though blind, he could instinctively judge the worth of his talented pupil and never spared pains to teach him Vedic lore.

14. Svami Dayananda worked assiduously for three years. He was now a new man, not that dejected and worn-out wanderer that had come to Mathura three years before, hoping against hope and utterly depressed. Svami Virajananda had not only opened his eyes, but imbued him with new hopes. This was the period in which Svami Dayananda got new enlightenment and when Dayananda asked the guru leave, with a token present of half-a-seer of cloves (लवंग) which Virajananda was fond of, the preceptor was highly pleased and said, "I demand from you something else as *dakshina*. Take a vow before me that so long as you will live you shall work incessantly to spread *Arsha literature* and a true knowledge of the Vedas, and condemn works which teach false doctrines and tenets, and that you shall even give up your life if necessary in re-establishing the Vedic religion. This is my *Dakshina*.*"

Dayananda bowed his obeisance and left Mathura. That was in 1863. This ends the second stage of Dayananda's life.

15. Now we come to the third stage, *the stage of actual action*. He had taken a vow to resuscitate

* Harbilas Sarda—Life of Dayananda Sarasvati, p. 39

Vedic religion. He had a sincere and rational faith in it and also in the necessity and obligation to preach it to the world. But the task was almost Herculean. The whole world would rise against him. Even in India there were hundreds of sects and sub-sects each of which had its own vested interest. Priest-craft in all countries has been inamenable to correction, and it has a sackful of devices to keep the mass-mind under its control. Temples are fed by mass charity. They have endowments of perpetual kind. The only beneficiaries are priests. If priests are told that idolatory is wrong and is not sanctioned by the Vedas, it means that they lose the only means of livelihood which they can count upon. Idle, and in most cases fraudulant life that priests are encouraged to live is too great a temptation for any possibility of reform. Hindus have a general belief, rooted in the depth of centuries' practice that the Vedas sanction not only idolatory but several other evils, social and theological, and any one who thinks of reforming the society is a heretic and is to be subdued, discarded, discredited and pushed to the wall at any cost.

16. Many a time were efforts made in past centuries to introduce religious reform but they all met with tremendous opposition. Some three decades before this, when Svami Dayananda was a mere boy, Raja Ram Mohan Roy of Bengal had raised his voice against idolatory. He had written several treatises on the religion of the Upanishads and had proved to the hilt that not only idolatory was prohibited by the Vedas and Upanishads, but such social tyrannies as *Sati* system (burning of the widow alive along with the body of her deceased husband) were anti-vedic, irreligious and sinful. This roused all orthodox Bengal against

the reformer and his task was left incomplete by his sudden death in England.

17. Svami Dayananda was conscious of all these difficulties and yet he was bent upon doing his best. After leaving Mathura he took several months to make a definite project. He was a *Sanyasin,* which meant a mendicant. He had neither home nor followers. He could not go abegging like other *sadhus.* He could not cajole the rich. He had to make a sort of surgical operation on defying patients. He started work from Agra and administered a shock to Hindu Pandits by writing a pamphlet against the most popular religious book *Bhagvata Purana* and inviting an open discussion on the efficacy of idol-worship as a means of attaining salvation. In the beginning the great pandits ignored him, but when they saw that his unique orations and impressive arguments attracted a large following they had to take up the gauntlet *Volens nolens.* But they found their position untenable, so strong were Svami Dayananda's pleadings ! There was hardly a week when there was no religious discussion. In utter dismay the orthodox pandits appealed to Banaras, the famous ancient centre of *Sanskrta* learning. In the meantime Svami Dayananda had made several converts even from eminent Sanskrtists. Encouraged by his successes, and having fathomed the depths of learning of Banaras luminaries, he resolved to invade Banaras himself, so that the battle be fought to the finish. It was in 1869. (October 25, or 26th) that Svami Dayananda entered Banaras and made his abode in Anandbagh. A sensation overtook the whole city and it was ablaze with curiosity and opposition. Nobody before him had even dared raise a finger at Banaras. The awe and reverence which people had for *Kashi-Pandits* were uniqe. After a long struggle,

it was settled that there should be a discussion between the great *pandits* of Banaras on one side and Svami Dayananda on the other under the presidentship of the Raja of Banaras.

18. Tuesday the 16th of November 1869 will go down to posterity as a historic day when the great *Shastratha* took place. It reminds one of the meeting at Worms of Martin Luther and the learned representatives of the Pope of Rome on this very point of idolatory, with, of course, one difference. At Worms Martin Luther was called by warrant to clear his position before the learned judges of Christendom. Here Svami Dayananda had gone on his own accord to face the lion in his den and to bend him to the knees. This brief sketch of Svami Dayananda's life which is meant only as an introduction to his philosophy is not a proper place for giving the details of the *Shastrartha*. The fight was very grim. Svami Dayananda stood alone and undaunted, his adversaries were many and strongly aided. It was difficult for the Raja president to curb the irregularities of his *pandits*, the mob had intentionally come to disturb, and the situation soon became unmanageable. Svami Dayananda by his sheer courage could come out safe. The whole city resounded with the victory of the *Pandits* and utter defeat of the infidel Dayananda. But the sane element which was there could not congratulate the learned pandits of Banaras on hollow trumpettings. Svami Dayananda became bolder and bolder. He visited Banaras seven times, each time throwing out an open challenge which there was none to accept.

19. After this memorable event, Svami Dayananda traversed the whole of Indian Peninsula from north to south and east to west, preaching his new doctrines and

holding discussions with all he came across. He founded the Aryasamaja in 1875 and wrote his magnum opus *Satyartha Prakasha* (Light of Truth) propounding his philosophy and expounding the doctrines of the Vedas and the Upanishads. His religious discussions were not only with Hindu pandits of all sects, but with Moslem molvis and Christian missionaries. Svami Dayananda was a philosopher and missionary combined in one. From 1875 up to the 30th October 1883, when he breathed his last at Ajmer, he was constantly busy spreading and strengthening the cause of the Aryasamaja and putting it on a stable basis.

20. Svami Dayananda is more known as a theologian than a philosopher. The reason is that he has written no separate book on philosophy and his followers have been too busy with social, educational and political activities to bring his philosophy before the English knowing public. But it must be remembered that India is a cradle of philosophies. Here all religious creeds have had a philosophy to rest upon. Svami Shankaracharya who is regarded as the foremost of philosophers in the east and the west was also a Vedic missionery and it was with his philosophical teachings that he could expel Budhism from India. Buddha himself was a philosopher and he was followed by eminent philosophers who spread Budhism in Burma, Ceylon or China. Shri Ramanujacharya who propounded a Vedanta philosophy rival to Shankara's was also an eminent philosopher, and so was Madhavacharya. Religion and philosophy have always gone combined in India.

In the west too philosophy has not been altogether unallied to Christianity. Berkeley was a clergyman and he propounded his philosophy simply to save Christianity from materialism.

21. In this book we propose to cull passages from Svami Dayananda's books, which expound his philosophy, and give them a formal shape.

In brief, we may say that Svami Dayananda is a realist. He is neither an empiricist, nor an idealist. His philosophy covers both, experiences and a *priori* methods and establishes a close relation between them. He takes life as a whole, analyses it into parts and synthesises details thus obtained in a particular system, making it a consistent whole. Philosophy for him is not a pastime. It is an outcome of sincere inner yearnings of the soul, as a means to live a succesful life. Theory and practice go hand in hand with him. If there is a doctrine, however logical, which cannot be brought into practice, there is something wrong with the way in which it has been arrived at. In this respect he is at variance with those who hold that our senses deceive us and we have been placed in a sort of enchanted island. His epistemology leads him to his metaphysics and his metaphysics to physical sciences. If truth has any meaning then the ways through which we arrive at it must be consistent. And if philosophy is a quest for truth, philosophical fabric should be so woven as to cover the whole life. Svami Dayananda's philosophy is neither romanticism like that of Roussau or Schopenhauer nor rationalistic like that of the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He does not follow Shankara or other idealists who divided life into *paramartha* or absolute and *vyavahara* or relative. For him, such duality of *paramartha* and *vyavahara* is inexplicable and unwarrantable by all canons of reasoning. For him, life is not a congeries of varying, warring or even unconnected departments. His theology, his morals, his economics, his politics are all inseparably connected with each other and all these combined he calls *dharma* grossly translated into English as religion. His

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philosophy is not based on the principles of human understanding alone, though human understanding plays an important part. Mind is not exclusively human; other living beings also possess mind and therefore, they cannot be altogether ignored in any systematic philosophy. What is common among all living beings is *life*. And what is *life* ? That is the subject of all philosophical investigations. If the riddle of life remains unsolved, or is solved in such a way that the confusion gets worse confounded, surely it cannot be true philosophy, whatever else it may be. It is not very easy to agree with Bertrand Russell when he says that "the most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies", or that "a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false."* Or perhaps he only means that an inconsistent philosophy can have partial uses, which are due to the partial consistencies of that philosophy preponderating upon inconsistencies, just like a table with a broken leg which manages to anyhow remain erect on sound legs. Such philosophies which satisfy the intellectual curiosities of a few minds, but do not take into account the workings of unsophisticated and vulgar minds are sure to fail as philosophies. They contain flaws which though indetectible in recognized forms of language or by established canons of logic are still there and have to be found out. Svami Dayananda claims to propound such a philosophy as might accommodate all needs of men and other living beings, taking into account the whole human mind, without ignoring any aspect of it.

22. For reference the reader is recommended to read Svami Dayananda's *Satyartha Prakasha* (Light of Truth) and other books of reference given in the appendix.

* The History of Western Philosophy, p. 637.

Chapter II.

KNOWLEDGE, HOW TO ACQUIRE IT ?

23. Philosophy as the Greek etymology testifies means "love of wisdom." And it is hardly necessary to prove that wisdom is superior to unwisdom. Philosophy in this general sense is the most valuable thing for man and a man is successful only to the extent that he is a philosopher or has a sound philosophy. Pursuit of philosophy, or in other words, pursuit of knowledge is, therefore, as necessary as pursuit of food. A fool may have food and may die simply because he has no knowledge as to how to use it.

But this sense of the word 'philosophy' was found too general and had to be consequently abandoned. The philosophers, Plato says, "are those who are able to grasp the eternal and immutable"; they are "those who set their affections on that which in each case really exists."* The question as to what *really exists* and what does not exist but *appears to be existing*, is rather subtle and those who undertook the task of finding this out came to be known as philosophers. Thus the scope of philosophy became narrower and more definite. Since the time of Aristotle another word has come to be used as synonymous with philosophy. After dealing with several branches of knowledge, he makes a separate list of some abstract subjects which he calls metaphysics (*meta*-beyond) or non-physics. meaning those subjects which according to him did not come within the

* Republic. Ency. Brittanica.

purview of physical sciences. Thus metaphsics which is only a negative term came to be used for philosophy as distinguished from natural sciences. It includes psychology, epistemology or theory of knowledge, logic, aesthetics and ethics. Later on 'philosophy' was extended to politics and history too.

24. The Sanskrta word for philosophy is '*darshana*' (दर्शन) which as its root signifies, means. '*seeing*.' "Seeing" here has been used for insight, or finding out the ultimate nature of things as distinguished from superficial observation. The Upanishad divides knowledge into two classes *para* and *apara* (परा विद्या and अपरा विद्या). While Aristotle starts with physical sciences and gives a negative name 'metaphysics' to those sciences which stand higher in degree and value, the *upanishad* starts with *para* or 'knowledge of ultimate reality' and all that remains uncovered by the above, it calls by the negative term *apara* (not *para*). *Para Vidya* (पराविद्या) has been defined as that "by knowing which everything else becomes known"*. When you have grasped that 'two and two make four', here is a general rule which is applicable to all things, marbles, chairs, horses etc. Thus when a child handles 'marbles' in his play, he sees marbles but does not see them in the sense of a philosopher. But when he realizes the truth 'two and two make four' his mind leaves the marbles alone and is in possession of a general law. This is a step towards philosophy. He is initiated into philosophy as he has grasped a law by knowing which all else will become known. He applies the law of 'two and two make four' to those cases also which have never before come into his experience. It is just the beginning of *para vidya.*

* येन विज्ञातेन सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति ।

This has to be developed and extended to its farthest limits.

What is *vidya* or knowledge? Svami Dayananda defines it in these words :–

"वेत्ति यथावत् तत्त्वपदार्थस्वरूपं यया सा विद्या। यया तत्त्वस्वरूपं न जानाति भ्रमादन्यस्मिन्नन्यन्निश्चिनोति यया साऽविद्या' ।"*

"Knowledge consists in knowing a thing exactly as it is and nescience consists in knowing a thing differently from what it is."† Quoting from Mundaka Upanishat, Svami Dayananda defines *para vidya* or philosophy as that which gives us the knowledge of that which is unperishing or eternal."‡

25. This description of knowledge or philosophy anticipates these questions :—

1. Is there any such reality which has the *capacity to know*?

2. Does it always know correctly?

3. Can it have erroneous knowledge too? If so, under what conditions?

4. Does the knower know all that is knowable directly, without any means? Or does it need some apparatus?

The answer to these questions needs an enquiry. It is the function of philosophy to deal with this enquiry in all its details.

26. "Knowledge," says C. E. M. Joad, "is to be interpreted as awareness by the knowing mind of some-

*This Sanskrta statement he translates himself into Hindi :—
"जिससे पदार्थों का यथार्थ स्वरूप बोध होवे वह विद्या और जिससे तत्त्व स्वरूप न जान पड़े, अन्य में अन्य बुद्धि होवे वह अविद्या कहाती है।"

† Light of Truth, Chap IX para 3.

‡ अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते। (ऋग्वेदादिभाष्यभूमिका—वेद विषय विचार)।

thing other than itself, and as life evolves, this awareness comes to be directed upon different kinds of objects."*

This, too, means that we should start from the knower, be it mind or something else. If there is no knower, to go further is futile. Let it, then, be an axiomatic truth that there *is* some agency that *knows* or has the capacity to *know*. You may not like to build on this supposition, but you cannot help it. You have at least to postulate such an existence, which you can reject later on if there are strong grounds for it.

27. Svami Dayananda starts with this assumption, when he says:—

"The inner self of man is the knower of truth and untruth; but through selfishness, stubbornness, malevolence and ignorance he leaves truth and inclines towards untruth."† Here 'self' is the knower. He knows the truth and he knows the untruth. Untruth is not the absence of knowledge, but wrong or false knowledge. The knower of untruth is also a knower; he has an awareness. A knower may make a *mistake*, *i. e.*, take a thing in place of another, but still he is a knower. All enquiries about knowledge must begin here.

28. Let us take an instance of knowledge and let us set to analyse and investigate it.

Let us take the case of an unsophisticated child. He is playing with a doll. He knows the doll. He says that he *knows* it. If you ask him about something unknown to him, *e.g.*, the pole star, he would say that *he does not know it*. In

* Matter, Life and Value, p. 1.

† मनुष्य का आत्मा सत्यासत्य का जानने वाला है, तथापि अपने प्रयोजन की सिद्धि, हठ, दुराग्रह और अविद्यादि दोषों से सत्य को छोड़ असत्य में झुक जाता है।

(Light of Truth, Introduction, para 5)

both cases there is one thing common, *i.e.*, 'I' the knower. Hence the necessity of starting with *self.* It is not a forced assumption. It is what our very nature warrants. The child may not put in formal language that he exists but if you try to examine him closely you will find that he always *means* it. If you say to him, "You do not exist" and if he is fit to understand your language, he will look vacantly at you, meaning thereby that your question has no meaning for him.

Does every child *know* that he exists? The question is not whether he *exists*. The question is whether he *knows* that he exists. Philosophers with their minds affected by so many theories of knowledge may find the question difficult to answer. But in the mind of a child or an ignorant and uneducated man the answer is clear. He *knows* that he is. The knowledge may not be explicit. But doubtless implicit it is.

29. I think it is the soundest ground for philosophical superstructure and philosophers in India have always rescognized its value. The knowledge of *Atman* or 'self' Svami Shankaracharaya calls self-luminous. Just as to see a lamp we do not need another lamp or to see the sun we do not need another sun,* similarly the *atman* or self should not need any proof whatsoever. The validity of proofs whatever their kind or nature

* Shankara's Commentary on the Vedanta I. 1.1 and II. 3. 18.

सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति "ननाहमस्मि" इति। यदि हि नात्मास्तित्व-प्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नाहमस्मीति प्रतीयात्।

"Every one has a feeling "not that I am not" If there were not 'I', all men would have had a feeling, 'I am not'.

"अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति"

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् ४।३।६

वेदान्तसूत्र, शाङ्कर भाष्य २।३।१८

"The soul is self-luminous".

will depend upon the *Atman* and not vice versa. Proofs may be compared with spectacles which help the eye to see things or see them distinctly. But if there is no eye, of what avail there would be spectacles. Spectacles do not *want* to see. They simply help that which has a *desire* to see. Why does the eye *desire to see*? Or why does the self *desire to know*? Such questions will lead to *Regressus ad Infinitum* and have to be abandoned. The most unfortunate thing for some of the philosophers has been that they failed to recognize this fact. They wanted a basis that might serve as the basis of this basic truth and their investigations led them to nowhere. The Rishis of Upanisats always warn the seeker of truth against this mistake. Whenever confronted with the question of ultimate reality their warning is "So far and no further, lest thy head should fall" (मूर्धा ते पतिष्यति)

30. Speaking of the *relativist* view of mind, as evinced by evolutionists, C. E. M. Joad has given a valuable hint. "If mind itself," says he, "has been evolved in the struggle for existence, if it is a provisional and practical faculty which develops and changes in the lifetime of a single individual, why should it be credited with the capacity for grasping absolute truth or for giving us correct information about the nature of reality? 'The forceps of our mind are crude', said Bergson, 'and they crush the delicacy of reality when we attempt to hold it' ".*

31. What is true of mind is much more true of self. Mind according to Svami Dayananda is the sixth sense. Whenever he speaks of senses, he enumerates

* Matter, Life and Value p, 17.

six and not five,* because the feeling of pain and pleasure is obviously the function of mind and not of any other sense. If mind is analogous to spectacles and not to the eye, it is clear that any enquiry, whether in logic, or psychology, or metaphysics which starts from mind, *leaving self alone*, must end in confusion. The word Indriya (इन्द्रिय) which is Sanskrta equivalent of 'senses' has a significant etymology. Indriya is that which belongs to Indra. Indra means self or soul. Senses including mind are instruments which help the self in the attainment of knowledge.

32. Anybody who is busy investigating the functions of the senses and mind must find that he cannot stop there. These very senses drag him deeper ; they invite him to their source, just as the sight of a motor-car prompts you spontaneously to find who is its owner. While modern psychologists have a tripartite division of functions of mind into cognition, affection and conation, the ancient Indian psychologists added one more to the list. That is *ahankara*. (अहंकार) or ego-consciousness. They call it *antahkarana chatustaya* (अंतःकरण-चतुष्टय) or *four-functioned-internal-organ*. This *ahankara* is different from the feeling of pain or pleasure, different from the knowledge of things, different from the active or conative attitude. It is some-what akin to Berkeley's *notion* of self as distinguished from "ideas". Professor

* जो श्रोत्र, त्वचा, चक्षु, जिह्वा, घ्राण और मन का शब्द, स्पर्श, रूप, रस, गन्ध, सुख, दुःख, सत्यासत्य विषयों के साथ सम्बन्ध होने से ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है उसको प्रत्यक्ष कहते हैं।

"The knowledge which we get by the contact of ears, skin, eyes, tongue, nose and *mind* with sound, touch, form, taste, colour, pleasure, pain, truth, untruth etc. is perception.

(Light of Truth, Chap. VII, para 8.)

William James's following statement is suggestive of the same thing :—

"Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always, at the same time, more or less aware of *my self*, of my *personal existence*. At the same time it is *I* who am aware ; so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which for shortness we may call one the *Me* and the other, the *I*. *I call these discriminated aspects, and not separate things*, because the identity of *I with me* even in the very act of their discrimination is perhaps the most ineradicable dictum of common sense."*

33. Following Gotama, the author of the famous *Nyaya Sutras* and Kanada, the author of the *Vaisheshika Sutras*, Svami Dayananda enumerates following attributes of the soul or self :—

"Soul is that which has the following attributes, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and knowledge."

Or

(1) Inspiration or *drawing* the air *in* with the breath ; (2) expiration or *drawing* the air *out* in the breath, (3) downward nictation, (4) upward nictation, (5) life or *sustenance of breath*, (6) mental faculty, *e. g.* congnition, (7) intended motion, (8) sensation or the vitalization of the senses in the grasp of their objects, (9) internal modification, such as hunger, thirst, fever, pain etc., (10) pleasure, (11) pain, (12) desire, (13) aversion and (14) energy. These all are the discriminants, *i. e.*, actions and attributes of the soul."†

* Psychology, page 176.

† Light of Truth, Chapter VII, para 63.

34. The discriminants detailed above may be the *passing* states of consciousness and not the unchanging self. In this connection, James says :

"And the question immediately comes up. What is the thinker ? Is it the passing state of consciousness itself, or is it something deeper and less mutable ? The passing state we have seen to be the very embodiment of change. Yet each of us spontaneously considers that by 'I', he means something always the same. This has led most philosophers to postulate behind the passing state of consciousness, a permanent substance or agent whose modification or act it is. This agent is the thinker ; the 'state' is only its instrument or means. 'Soul', 'transcendental ego', 'spirit' are so many names for this more permanent sort of thinker."*

35. Svami Dayananda is one of the philosophers referred to above. In order to give the correct view of Svami Dayananda, I would like to replace 'thinker' by 'knower' in the above passages and 'to postulate' 'by 'to believe'. James had, perhaps, no idea of Dayananda. He might have in his mind Descartes with his dictum of *cogito*. In fact, the Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) is more logic than psychology and has led to many philosophical jumblings. The validity of the inference has been questioned by many philosophers and those who accepted the dictum met with disastrous inconsistencies. 'Sum ergo cogito' would have been a better start, but the great French philosopher had no contact with the Indian thought.

36. When we have once made it certain that there *is* a knower, we proceed further with our enquiry.

* Psychology, p. 196.

We wish to know if there is anything else than the knower. If the knower is the only reality and nothing else exists, then it is futile to proceed further. All that was to be known has been known. There remains nothing else. But are we satisfied? Does our philosophical instinct accept it? Does our unsophisticated self agree It was '*ahankara*' (a part of our own self, so to speak) that gave us the certainty of our being. But there are other functions too of the internal organ (the well-known three functions) which carry us further. They revolt at solipsism. They compel us to find out the flaw in our philosophy.

37. Many philosophers formulated various methods and suggested various hypotheses to solve the knot. The most important and perhaps the most profound is Shankaracharya's dictum of *nescience or Maya*. But of this later. At present we are concerned with the scope and value of the apparatus of knowledge.

38. As soon as we embark upon the enquiry about the apparatus of knowledge, our first thought goes to the crux of all philosophy, *i.e.*, "is there any such thing as non-ego, the thing other than the knower?" The apparatus of knowledge, if there is any such thing, must be non-ego, the *apparatus* to be used by the knower and not the knower himself. This problem presents itself as soon as we begin our life. The child sees his doll. But when he shuts his eyes, the doll disappears. Again he opens his eyes and again he becomes conscious of the doll's presence. Thus he knows that he has *eyes* and they help him to *see*. They are his, but do not constitute the "he"; *they are other than his self*. Similarly he becomes, gradually as he advances, conscious of his other senses, touch, smell, sound and ṭaste. This is

the grossest apparatus of knowledge. These senses have often been called 'gate-ways of knowledge', though the metaphor is rather clumsy. If you simply open the gates, the knowledge does not automatically rush in. Knowledge is not an unwelcomed guest. It does not force itself upon you unless you are prepared to receive it. The child's ears are open, and there are different sounds all round him, not one, but myriads; but he hears none of them as long as he is busy playing with his dolls. His mamma calls him again and again and yet he does not hear her. Why? Because he is busy elsewhere. His mind is attending to something else. Thus there is another truth that flashes upon the enquirer. There is mind, too, which should be included in the apparatus. It is a very important factor. Without its help, the senses would not function. That mind is also included in the apparatus. It is not the agent itself. It does not know; it simply helps the knower in the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore, Svami Dayananda says, 'The knowledge which we get by the contact of ears, skin, eyes, tongue, nose and mind with sound, touch, form, taste, colour, pleasure, pain, truth, untruth etc. is perception.'*

39. The examination of this apparatus bristles with difficulties. The whole science of epistemology or theory of knowledge is full of complexities which could never be solved to the satisfaction of all philosophers. The thing appears to be so easy. And yet it is the most difficult. So many schools of philosophy with numerous divergent views owe their differences to epistemological differences. The testimony of this apparatus has been accepted by some, sweepingly rejected by others, and admitted with different qualifications by many. Svami

* Light of Truth. VII, 8

Dayananda belongs to the first category, though he recommends certain safeguards to ensure the fullest utility of the apparatus. Svami Dayananda says, :—

"Now let us note that the perception which we get *through senses and mind* is of attributes and not of the substance.........and the soul with the help of the mind perceives earth and other substances."*

40. This sentence, read with the above account of perception shows that :

(1) senses coming in contact with outside objects give us *sensations*;

(2) these *sensations* assimilated by the mind give us *perception of attributes*; and

(3) this perception ultimately crystallized by the self or soul, gives us the knowledge of the substances wherein the attributes reside. Sensations made by external objects on one's senses are just the beginning of the process, like knocking at the door and giving a notice to the receiver to wake up for reception. Also, it is not unilateral, not alone the business of the objects, nor merely of the subject. It is a meeting of the host and the guest, a peculiar relation between the knower and the known.

41. This theory has been objected to by many philosophers. They say that it is unphilosophical to pre-admit the reality of the self, the reality of the senses and the reality of the external objects. This is the thing which it ought to be the function of philosophy

*अब विचारना चाहिये कि इन्द्रियों और मन से गुणों का प्रत्यक्ष होता है गुणी का नहीं।...

गुणी जो पृथ्वी उसका आत्म-युक्त मन से प्रत्यक्ष किया जाता है।

(सत्यार्थप्रकाश, समुल्लास ७)

(Light of Truth, Chapter VII, para 8.)

to enquire. Besides, if knowledge is a relation, then relation is a rope hanging between two pegs. That which has no substantial ground of its own can never be expected to hold others. Reality ought to be something beyond relationship, absolute. The theory of knowledge which starts with relativity is likely to lead us nowhere.

42. The first dart comes from the prince of philosophers, the great Shankaracharya. It is perhaps the strongest dart leaving the victim sorely wounded. His very first sentence with which he begins his commentary on the Vedanta is significantly forceful. He says:—

"The subject and the object, the knower and the known are opposite in their natures like light and darkness and their coming into contact with each other is quite incompatible. They have no property in common which might make it possible to affect each other."*

If the knower and the known are as contradictory as light and darkness, then no relation is possible between them and therefore, no knowledge. What is, then, that which we call knowledge in common parlance?

"All the socalled testimonies of knowledge including scriptural authority are nothing but ignorance."†

"Cattle like is the attitude of the people about the means of knowledge and things known.",‡ *i.e.* sheer stupidity.

* युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौसिद्धायां तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः ॥

† अविद्यावद् विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च ।

‡ समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाण-प्रमेय व्यवहारः ।

43. Should, then, the reality be quite free from relationship, *absolutely* absolute, unrelated and unrelatable with any thing else ; not *known*, not *knowledge*, not even *knower* ? What is that, then ? and what logical, psychological or epistemological grounds for such a hypothesis, much less for such a doctrine ? How to presuppose that the knower is as opposite to the known as light to darkness ? When I say that I know a table, are the conception of 'I' and conception of table as opposite as light and darkness ? It is true that the table is not I, nor I the table, yet there is a relation, a positive relation between them, which does not exist between light and darkness. The simile used is highly inappropriate and unwarranted and any superstructure built on such a slippery foundation cannot but be shaky.

44. What Bertrand Russell says about Hegel's system is roughly equivalent to Shankaracharya's theory :—

"Knowledge as a whole has its triadic movement. It begins with sense-perception in which there is only awareness of the object. Then, through sceptical criticism of the senses, it becomes purely subjective. At last it reaches the stage of self-knowledge, in which subject and object are no longer distinct. Thus self-consciousness is the highest form of knowledge. This, of course, must be the case in Hegel's system, for the highest kind of knowledge must be that possessed by the absolute, and as the absolute is the whole, there is nothing outside itself for it to know."*

45. Barring the conception of '*the whole*', the rest is applicablc to Shankara's system as well. The absolute has nothing else to know and therefore the enquiry into

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 761.

the methods of knowing is futile and needless, unless we mean to prove only the futility. And where to get proofs for this demonstration, as we have already demolished the ground on which these proofs could have stood? The *sceptical criticism of senses* has led us to a vacuum, which is not only un-intelligible, but highly confusing. The funniest thing is that there are many who disbelieve the *testimony* of senses, but there is hardly any who might disbelieve in the existence of senses. All sensations begin with senses, and all theories about sensations imply the belief that *senses exist*. But there is a set of philosophers who doubt the veracity of the senses. Commenting on the *Karika* of the *Mandukyopanishat* by Gaudapada Shri Shankaracharya argues in this way :—

(1) जाग्रद् दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यम् (प्रतिज्ञा)

(2) दृश्यमानत्वात् (हेतु)

Whatever we see in our wakeful state is unreal. Why? Because *they are seen*.

The perceptions received in our wakeful state are all illusory and the reason given here is their perceptibility. This means that any knowledge which our senses give us is unreal, simply because it has come to us from senses. Senses are notorious cheats. They are unfailing cheats. They always cheat us. And therefore whatever comes from them must be unallloyed cheating.

46. The one characteristic of our wakeful state is the workability of senses. In our wakeful state we are in the midst of cheats and our first attitude is that we should unceremoniously reject what they say. But what about senses themselves? Do they exist? Do our cheats exist? If they do not, what is this talk of cheating about? No cheats, no cheating. Then we shall have to account

for all these false appearances. A very knotty point indeed.

47. Svami Dayananda goes to the very root of the problem. True epistemology should explain not only how we acquire knowledge, but also why we get erroneous knowledge. *Avidya* in Sanskrta does not mean *absence of knowledge*, but *erroneous knowledge.*

Defective knowledge is ignorance.*

Svami Dayananda says :—

"The inner self of man is the knower of truth and untruth, but through selfishness, stubbornness, malevolence, and ignorance, he leaves truth, and inclines towards untruth."†

"Ignorance is due to a defect in the senses or in associations."‡

What Shankaracharya calls cheating of senses is for Svami Dayananda a case of *some disease in the senses, or in mind, or in the self even.* We use instruments to do something. If the instrument has any defect the work cannot be done. Or if the worker is wanting in determination due to any internal causes, even then the work will not be done. Similarly, if one fails to get a correct knowledge through senses, it does not mean that senses as such are deceivers. The senses may be defective, or the user of these senses may have some inner defect. The eye sees, and sees correctly. This

* तद् दुष्टं ज्ञानम् ।

(Light of Truth III. 72.)

† मनुष्य का आत्मा सत्यासत्य का जानने वाला है। तथापि अपने प्रयोजन की सिद्धि, हठ, दुराग्रह और अविद्यादि दोषों से सत्य को छोड़ असत्य में झुक जाता है। (सत्यार्थप्रकाश भूमिका)

(Light of Truth, Introduction, para 5.)

‡ इन्द्रियदोषात्संस्कारदोषाच्चाविद्या ।

(Light of Truth III. 72.)

is the function of the eye. But if the eye is diseased, it will surely fail to work. Or even if the eye is healthy, when the seer is evil-willed, or ill-disposed, he will not be able to see properly. It does not mean that the senses are untrustworthy. It only means that there are certain conditions which render the apparatus inefficient.

48. You can say one thing about this way of thinking. It goes against monism or oneness of the reality. It leads to dualism. There is duality between the knower and the known. But the only answer is "why hanker after monism which cannot stand?" No monistic theory could ever explain the existence of error, either apparent or real. Those who argue that error is not real, but apparent, have yet to explain why there are two opinions. Why should a thing appear different from what it really is? What does "appear" mean?

49. If we just analyse the idea of 'appearance', and distinguish it from 'reality', we are confronted with another psychological question. If there are many enquirers of a thing, they being many and perhaps differently qualified and differently interested, will look upon the same thing from different angles. The thing will *appear* different. They may be partially right. One of them may be the most accurate. All may be wrong. This will all depend upon certain conditions which are *sine qua non* for seeing correctly. If there is one and only one reality and nothing else exists, then the question of different appearances does not arise at all. Error of any kind implies that there is duality—nay, plurality. When myriads of examinees tackle the same question differently, they may all be wrong or only one way of tackling may be right. All cannot

be correct. But it does not mean that there is no correct answer or that there is no reason why different incorrect answers are so many. If you just set to scrutinize only erroneous judgments and proceed with their examination scientifically, either through the well-established canons of logic or psychology, you will find yourself working in a special branch, i. e.. psychiatry, which deals with existent factors as much as other branches of science. In the beginning of the 9th chapter of the *Satyartha Prakasha*, Svami Dayananda quotes from the Yajurveda a verse which clears his ideas.

विद्यांञ्चाविद्यांञ्च यस्तद्वेदोभय ꣳ सः ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ।

He who understands well, what is knowledge and what is ignorance side by side, crosses mortality through the *knowledge of ignorance* and attains self-realization through the knowledge of knowledge.

50. This shows that the knowers are many. Some have only a superficial idea of knowledge. They know a thing, but cannot differentiate it from other things. They do not know how ignorance arises. Their knowledge is muddled. They are victim to scepticism. Therefore they are confounded. This confounding is death. If they avoid the conditions which prevent them from knowing correctly, they arrive at accurate results. This is what scientific experimenters always do.

51. While explaining perception or *pratyaksha*, Svami Dayananda says :—

Ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose come in direct (i.e., without any medium) contact with sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, and these senses come in contact with *manas* (mind) and mind with *atman* (soul).

The cognition produced by this contact is named *pratyaksha* or intuition (perception). But this knowledge should not be the result of the relation which exists between name and the thing which this name stands for. For example, somebody said to a man, "Bring water." He brought water, and said, "Here is water." Here the object which the mono-syllable 'water' stands for is observed neither by the man who ordered for water, nor by him who was ordered to bring water. The object of intuition is "*water itself*", *i.e.*, the object, of which the word 'water' is a name. The knowledge arising from a word is the subject of *testimony*, or verbal knowledge (*shabda pramana*). The second condition of intuition is that it should be *avyabhichari* (अव्यभिचारी). For instance, some-body seeing a pillar at night mistook it for a man. When he saw it at day, then the knowledge of man disappeared, and there remained in its place the knowledge of pillar. The knowledge which can so vanish is called व्यभिचारी *Vyabhichari* (changeable), and cannot come under the category of intuition (i. e., it should be confirmable). The third condition is *vyavasayatmaka* (व्यवसायात्मक) i.e., convincible. Somebody saw from afar the sand on the river's bank, and said, "Are clothes spread there? or is it water? Or something else?" Or (somebody says) "Is he Devadatta standing or Yajnadatta?" The knowledge cannot be called intuition until it is convincing. Thus intuition (*pratyaksha*) is only that which is free from these three defects, i.e., first it should *not be a knowledge arising from names*, secondly it should *not be changeable*, and thirdly it *should be convincing*".*

52. This is for all obvious reasons empiricism,

* Light of Truth Chap. III. para 49.

It begins with sensations or impressions of outer objects on our senses and this sensation-material is received and assimilated by the mind. But it is not the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley or Hume. Svami Dayananda does not mean that our mind is a blank paper or *Tabula rasa*, on which are stamped sense impressions. If that were so, the *Pratyaksha* or perception would not have the definition qualified by the three conditions described above, *i. e.*, it should not be a knowledge arising from *names*, it should not be *changeable* and it should be convincing. Those theories of knowledge which start from a blank mind and do not care to go behind or beyond mind have a bad start. Svami Dayananda and those former philosophers of India from whom he takes his cue all start with the conviction that we have a soul, a soul which has the capacity to know and which has also the apparatus to know. If this apparatus is rightly used, it gives knowledge; if it is wrongly used it gives erroneous knowledge, which itself is a knowledge, though defective and has to be corrected.

53. Though a little digression, I may point out that in all Indian philosophy (say, Hindu philosophy) we start with the knower. Our enquiry into the human understanding begins with the apparatus of knowledge and the valid ways of using the apparatus. Gotama's Nyaya Sutras examine sixteen categories beginning with testimonies of knowledge called *Pramana* and ending with *Nigrahasthan* (निग्रहस्थान) or conditions in which the knower might be dislodged from his position in respect of claiming accuracy for his knowledge. But Gotama leaves alone the knower. For him the knower is an axiomatic truth, needing no investigation. If later on, he includes '*atman*' under the category, *Prameya* or knowables, he does so only to remove certain

mis-understandings which might have arisen during investigation. *Pramata* (प्रमाता) or knower is the well-founded thing on which the whole enquiry of truth stands.

54. It is rationalism too, as it takes cognisance of the material of sense-impressions and accepts or rejects it by means of reasoning. Before Svami Dayananda, since the rise of Shankaracharya's monistic philosophy, sense-impressions had been held in disrepute. Their significance as an apparatus of knowing had ceased. Senses were treated as cheats, sources not of knowledge, but of nescience. Only that was supposed to be knowledge which came to the *atman*, by itself, say, *a priori*. Even the word *Pratyaksha* which has a reference to *aksha* or eye was taken by Shankara and those who came after him as immediate knowledge, knowledge not coming through the medium of senses. That left no place for scientific progress as physical sciences had all to begin with sense-earnings and their reliability.

55. Svami Dayananda while not denying the soul's capacity of grasping *a priori* knowledge to a certain extent, does not reject sense-data altogether. If mind is a blank paper, it becomes too passive. It has to receive impressions *nolence volence*. But according to Svami Dayananda, mind helps the senses to receive their data. The senses are not open gates through which all impressions might rush in. Our eyes do not receive all sights; our ears do not hear all sounds. There is a sort of selective control being exercised by some inner force. That force can be traced backward and backward when we come to the knower itself. This capacity of the knower to know is to begin with *a priori*. The knower is motivated to use his apparatus

of knowledge by something of its own, call it *will* or anything you like. When there is an internal urge from within, the child extends its hand to touch a thing and tries to know whether it is soft or hard, cold or hot. In many cases he will not be prepared to receive his guests in the form of sense-data and he will not hear even when you are calling him loudly. Even when he is forced to receive certain data, he does not receive all. Of all the un-invited guests some are welcomed with preference over others. All these things have to be taken into account in ascertaining the reliability, limits and scope of the apparatus of knowledge, outer-senses and internal organ.

56. That the mind of man is not a blank paper (I avoid using *white* purposely) is quite evident from even Locke's description of it. "Our observation," says he, "employed either about external sensible objects, or about the *internal operations* of our minds, *perceived and reflected by ourselves*, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. Those two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."*

Here Locke has endowed his "*white paper, void of all characters*" with the power of reflecting. "All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here ; in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection has offered for its contemplation". (Bk II, chap. I, 24). How can a 'white paper' reflect all that? Locke while denying the existence of "*innate ideas*" has admitted the capacty of mind to reflect *internally* with-

* Locke's Essay, Bk. II Chapter I, 1, 2.

out the help of external sensations, and by this reflecting capacity to turn the sense-data into perception.

57. How does the knower with all this apparatus of knowledge (external senses and internal mind) avoid errors and turn the perception into a faultless, reliable perception, is a question for all theories of knowledge to solve.

58. One more fact has to be taken into consideration. *Neither we all have all knowledge*, nor we have no knowledge at all. Our knowledge varies; it may be true, it may be untrue, it may be partially true. This fact reflects upon the nature of the knower and must reflect upon the theory of knowledge also.

Svami Dayananda says,—

(1) "The knowledge of the soul is limited. It is not the seer of the three times (past, present and future)."

(2) "The mind with which one thinks cannot hold more than one awareness at the same time."*

59. These truths are such as no body will demur to accept. The knower's capacity to know is very limited. It cannot know everything and whatever it once acquires it cannot retain for all times. What we learn today, we forget or partially forget tomorrow. The second thing is that the mind cannot have more than one awareness at one time. No doubt the mind runs very fast and sometimes it appears that it holds not two but many awarenesses simultaneously. But if

* (१) जीव अल्पज्ञ है त्रिकालदर्शी नहीं ।

(२) जिस मन से ज्ञान करता है वह भी एक समय में दो ज्ञान नहीं कर सकता ।

(Light of Truth, Chapter IX, para 49.)

we analyse closely we find that the contents of the mind change swiftly and the mind has only one content at one time. This fact affects the use by the mind of the senses. The senses refuse to function without the help of the mind, and the mind can attend to only one business at a time. The swift shifting of the mind from one business to another helps in the adjustment of the functionings of the senses. But all senses cannot work simultaneously.

60. This is the apparatus of knowledge which we have. Good, bad or indifferent. We cannot have any other apparatus. And it is on the strength of this apparatus only that we have to determine our achievements. If there is a set of thinkers who are not satisfied with this state of things, they may do whatever they like. They may hypothesize anything and build on such slippery hypotheses any superstructure ; but this is not likely to impart more satisfaction to them.

61. The definition of perception or sense-knowledge as given above makes us confront with certain difficulties. Perception is a sense-knowledge; but mind and soul are co-operators. Mere senses do not work, rather cannot work. The help of mind is necessary. But here too in order to be valid the definition contains three limitations. The 'Name condition' is simple enough. When I hear 'fire' and understand thereby something which burns, my auditory sense simply gave me the knowledge of the *sound* 'fire'. It had nothing to do with the *object* fire. The sense-knowledge was confined to the knowledge of 'sound' only. The rest I got from elsewhere. We perceive, through symbols and signals. Symbol is an arbitrary name standing for an object, e.g., 'cup' stands for an object like a cup. Different languages give different

names for the same thing. That is why a symbol is an arbitrary name. It has no direct connection with the object it denotes. Signal is a stimulus emanating from an object. It has a direct relation with the object which it signifies, e. g., the sound of an aeroplane is directly related to it. We have the meanings of symbols and signals through experience. Therefore so far as the knowledge of the sound is concerned, it is a valid *pratyaksha*. But not the knowledge of the object. This means that senses give only one aspect of the object. Our main object in trying to know a thing is not what *only senses give us*. That is too inadequate for our use. My ultimate desire is to know things. Hence the necessity of not only a mind, but a trained mind, that will help me in using the sense-data ; for instance, if I see something in darkness and hypothesize that it is a man, this hypothesis has further to be verified. If in the light of the lamp, it turns out to be the stump of a tree, then the appearance of 'man' in the darkness is wrong knowledge as it has been sublated by further verification. My eye was the same. It first gave me the knowledge of a 'man' and then of a 'stump'. Which is true? Both are sense-data, the eye-data, the same-eye-data. Here the fact is that the eye-datum is the same; there are not two eye-data. The eye did not give you either 'man' or 'stump'. It gave you certain sensations which are common to 'man' and 'stump' both. Who told you that the thing seen was 'man'? Not the eye. Who told you later on that it was 'stump' and it was not 'man'? Not the eye. It was 'mind', not blank mind, but mind with myriads of past associations which helped him to decide that the first knowledge was not valid and the second was valid. An infant uses its eye, a baby uses its eye, a boy uses his eye, a well trained grown-up uses his eye. The sense-data are almost the

same, but their value in the acquisition of knowledge increases. This increase is due to the workings of the mind and the soul. The soul is the ultimate court of appeal. It decides finally what is true and what is false. Therefore all the three conditions are necessary.

62. This theory of knowledge does not say that reality and appearances are contradictory or as antagonistic as light and darkness. What the theory emphasizes is the inadequacy of appearances in giving us true knowledge. The appearances have to be read and correctly interpreted before we can obtain truth. Those who create a gulf between reality and appearances do so because they take the senses singly and exclusively. They take one part of the apparatus singly and separately and then criticize and condemn its achievements. If you take this attitude, then every reality becomes unreal, every beauty becomes ugly, and every virtue appears to be vice. The value of each part lies in being the part of the whole and the value of sense-data lies in providing the whole knowledge-gaining-apparatus with due material.

63. Commenting on the doctrine that all appearances are false, Svami Dayananda says—

Neo-vedantist*—The world is unreal like a dream, or like mistaking a rope for a snake, mother of pearl for silver, mirage for water, or like fairy-land or magic. Brahman (God) alone is the reality.

S. D.—What do you mean by unreal ?

* In this dialogue Neo-vedantist (or Neo-V.) stands for one who thinks that all appearances are false.

S. D. stands for Svami Dayananda whose epistemology we are considering here.

Neo. V.—That which does not exist, but appears to exist.

S. D.—How can that thing appear which does not exist ?

Neo. V.—By super-imposition.

S. D.—What is super-imposition ?

Neo. V.—'वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपमध्यासः ।" "अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते ।" Inflicting the existence of one thing upon another thing is called super-imposition, and its undoing is called '*apavada*' or "reversion". By these two processes (of super-imposition and reversion) we can impose 'changeful worldliness' over "changeless God".

S. D.—You have fallen into the net of this error by regarding rope as a thing and snake as a no-thing. Is not the snake a thing ? If you say that the snake does not exist in the rope, never mind. It does exist elsewhere and its impression is in the mind. Therefore the snake is not nothing. The same is the case with mistaking a stump for a man, or a mother-of-pearl for silver. And whatever you see in the dream, does exist elsewhere and its impressions in the mind. Therefore in dream too there is no imposition of no-thing on a thing.

Neo. V.—We see in dream unseen and unheard of things, e.g., our own head cut and we weeping, or a current of water going up. Such things never happened, nor anybody saw them. How can they be real ?

S. D.—This illustration also does not support your view, for there is no impression unless you see or hear a thing, and there is no memory without an impression. Without memory, the appearance of a thing is impossible. When a man sees or hears that the head of such and such person was cut in the fight, and his brother or father

was actually weeping, or he hears or sees that the water of a fountain is going up, then its impression remains in the mind. When the seer is separate from the objects which he saw while awake, then he sees in his own mind what he had seen or heard previously. Or an artist draws from memory the representation of an object whose impressions lie in the mind. There is one thing. Sometimes we see in dreams things that we can recollect, *i.e.*, we can refer them to our past experiences, *e.g.*, I see my tutor. And sometimes we dream things which were heard or seen long ago; we cannot recollect when or where we heard or saw such and such things. There is no regularity or sequence in dreams as it is in wakeful state. Then there is one thing to be noted. *A man born blind does not see in dream any sights.* All this shows that your definition of superimposition is wrong."*

64. The position of Svami Dayananda is so clear that it needs no further elucidation. How is it that you mistake a rope for a snake and a stump for a man, and not a rope for a man and a stump for a snake ? If the rope, the stump, the mother-of-pearl are real and the snake, the man and the silver are unreal, then while all reals are different, existent and untransferable, all unreals are the same and any unreal could have been superimposod upon any real. But that is not so. Therefore it is clear that what you call unreal or appearance is also real and existent, and it is only the seer who muddles in assimilation. As the doctrine of the neo-vedantist is that only God is real and everything else is unreal, Svami Dayananda's further dialogue is worth noting :—

* Light of Truth, Chapter XI, para 33.

65. *Neo. vedantist.*—Without the basis of super-imposition a super-imposed thing cannot make its appearance as there is no appearance of snake possible, unless there exists a rope. The snake is non-existent in the rope in all the three times (*i.e.* it was not in the rope in the past, it is not in the rope in the present, and it will not be in the rope in the future), but partial darkness and partial light mixed together create in the mind a suspense about snake and we begin to tremble. When with the help of the lamp we become certain (that it is rope), misgivings disappear. Similarly we see the really non-existent (unreal, false) world in *Brahman*. When we realize *Brahman*, that appearance of the world vanishes and the real existence of *Brahman* becomes clear, in the same way as the conception of the snake vanishes and that of the rope remains.

S. D.—Who mis-saw the world in God?

Neo. V.—The soul.

S. D.—Where did the soul come from?

Neo. V.—From ignorance.

S. D.—Where did ignorance come from? And where does it reside?

Neo. V.—Ignorance is beginningless and it resides in God.

S. D.—Was Brahman mistaken for Brahman? Or for something else? And who mistook it.?

Neo. V.—The shadow-consciousness. (चिदाभास)

S. D.—What is the nature of this shadow-consciousness?

Neo. V.—Really speaking it is Brahman (God). God mis-sees himself and forgets his own nature.

S. D.—What is the genesis of this forgetfulness?

Neo. V.—It is due to ignorance.

S. D.—Is this ignorance the attribute of the

omniscient Brahman or of the localized soul (the soul of limited knowledge) ?

Neo. V.—Of the finite soul.

S. D.—According to your beliefs, does any conscious being exist other than one infinite, omniscient God? Where did this finite soul come from ? If you believe in the existence of the finite soul, distinct from God, it is all right. If Brahman is ignorant of his own nature at one place, ignorance will prevail all over. Just as a boil in a part of the body renders the whole body unfit, similarly if Brahman is ignorant and in pain at one place, the entire Brahman will be ignorant and unhappy.

Neo. V.—It is all a function of limitation (*upadhi*) of Brahman.

S. D.—Is this *upadhi* (limitation) conscious or unconscious, real or unreal ?

Neo. V.—Indescribable. We cannot say whether it is conscious or unconscions, real or unreal.

S. D.—This statement of yours is quite absurd.*

66. Thus those who give no value to sense-data come to absurdity. And those who believe that sense-data are everything also come to a similar absurdity. It was to overcome this difficulty that the famous German philosopher Kant thought out a solution, which may come nearer Svami Dayananda's theory of knowledge, with, of course, one differenee which I shall shortly hint at. I am quoting, from Bertrand Russell's 'History of Western Philosophy' :—

"According to Kant, the outer world causes only the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand experience.

* Light of Truth, Chap. XI, para 34 and 35.

Things-in-themselves which are the causes of our sensations, are unknowable; they are not in space or time; they are not substances, nor can they be described by any of those other general concepts which Kant calls 'categories'. Space and time are subjective, they are part of our apparatus of perception. But just because of this, we can be sure that whatever we experience will exhibit the characteristics dealt with by geometry and the science of time. If you always wore blue spectacles, you could be sure of seeing everything blue (this is not Kant's illustration). Similarly, since you always wear spatial spectacles in your mind, your are sure of always seeing everything in space. Thus geometry is *a priori* in the sense that it must be true of everything experienced, but we have no reason to suppose that anything analogous is true of things in themselves, which we do not experience".*

67. Thus Kant denies the outside existence of space and time, I mean, outside the knower's mind. But if space and time are not the things known, but only a part of the apparatus (*e.g.* blue spectacles), geometry and arithmetic will not be the sciences of space and time. Our conceptions *a priori* of the objects of knowledge and of the apparatuses of knowledge are quite distinct, and our concepts of time and space belong to the first kind and not to the second. Bertrand Russell criticizes the theory in these words:—

"There is here, as throughout Kant's theory of the subjectivity of space and time, a difficulty which he seems to have never felt. What induces me to arrange objects of perception as I do rather than other wise? Why, for instance, do I always see peoples' eyes above their mouths and not below them? According

* Page 734.

to Kant the eyes and the mouth exist as things-in-themselves and cause my separate percepts. But nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception. Contrast with this the physical theory of colours. We do not suppose that in matter there are colours in the sense in which our percepts have colours, but we do think that different colours correspond to different wave-lengths. Since waves, however, involve space and time, there cannot, for Kant, be waves in the causes of our percepts. If on the other hand, the space and time of our percepts have counterparts in the world of matter, as physics assumes, then geometry is applicable to these counterparts and Kant's arguments fail."*

68. In another context Svami Dayananda offers also the same sort of criticism to the doctrine of the *Yogachara Buddhists* who believe in external nothingness of all things including time and space. He points out that if space and time have no counterparts in the matter outside, then "the mountain should be within us. If you allow that the mountain is in reality within us, then within us there should be space as big as to contain the mountain which is not".‡

Svami Dayananda means that if there is no such thing as space existing externally the "*bigness of a mountain*" would be meaningless. *Akasha* (space), and *kala* (time) do exist outside us and are "beginningless and imperishable in their causal form."†

69. We can look at this *perceiving apparatus of ours* from another angle. We have seen above that it is an

* Page 741.
‡ Light of Truth, chapter XII, para 10.
† Light of Truth, chapter XII, para 17.

apparatus distinct from ourselvers. Yet it is ours. It is not we. We use it as an apparatus. This apparatus is constructed out of that matter which is the object of our perception also. Our eyes, ears and other sense organs are all material. Yet the organs themselves are not senses. They become senses when they help us in knowing things. Thus this apparatus is a link between the knower and the known, inhering the properties of both. How does it happen? Says Bertrand Russell: "Empiricism and idealism alike are faced with a problem, to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution. This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself, and the operations of our own minds."*

70. I do not think the tussel can ever end so long as queer questions will continue arising which our own nature does not warrant, nor there are adequate reasons to raise these questions. When we raise these questions we mean to presume, without any data for presumption, of course, that 'minds can know only minds' and *not matter which is other than the mind.* In other words the knower can know himself and not other things. What is the basis of this dictum? If you put this question before an unsophisticated man, he would simply laugh. The fact is that the table has no capacity to know either itself or anything else. It cannot know its own kind. A man is not a table. The table is not of his kind. Still as he has capacity to know, he knows the table. To say that only the like can know the like is a fact which no theory of knowledge can explain. It is the difficulty created by philosophers themselves, not warranted by facts. The

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 635.

oriental philosophers have classificd things into *chit* (sentient) and *achit* (not-sentient). The *chit* has the capacity to know. It knows the *chit* and the *achit* both. The *achit* has no capacity to know. It knows neither *achit* nor *chit*. Therefore, the question "why mind does or can know matter which is not mind" is very improper. It is the quest for golden fleece which is bristled with untold difficulties and does not promise to succeed. The *organ* eye which is material cannot see the table which is material as long as it is not inspired by the seer which is nonmaterial. It was to obliterate the dualism between *chit* and *achit* that the question was raised by some thinker and the cue was taken by others, stranding philosophy in a muddle. If this superstition is set aside, many theories of knowledge, proposed from time to time, discussed with all heat, and left undecided in the end, will vanish. Neither there is a question of superimposition of mind over matter, nor vice versa. There is a very ancient formula that all *Indriyas* are *ati-indriyas* (इन्द्रियाणि अतीन्द्रियाणि) *i.e.*, the senses cannot sense themselves.

71. In this connection there may arise a question. If space is outside us and is a part of matter outside us how can we use the word *contact*, which is only a term of material world in connection with perception? Did we not say that percept is the result of the contact of the knower with the known, through our senses, of course? But I do not think it an unsurmountable difficulty. When we say that space and time are outside us, we mean only that they are not the properties of the knower; they exist distinctly and separately. It does not follow, therefrom, that the knower has no connection whatsoever with space and time. We cannot say that the knower is nowhere and yet he knows or

that the knower is nowhen and yet he knows. When I say that I am in the body and lift my hand or see with my eyes, I am really *in* the body and yet distinct from the body. I am a spirit and space or body is matter and yet I am connected with this matter.

72. How this connection takes place of the *spirit* which is *not matter*, with *matter which* is *not spirit* has often set philosophers 'a-thinking. The advancement of science in the nineteenth century of the Christian era offered a solution. Psychology was regarded as a hand-maid of physiology and human mind or human soul was regarded *only an epiphenomenon*, a kind of temporary shadow cast by the brain. But "the development of *reflection* since the time of Huxley has brought into clear light the complexity of the problem of the relation of mind and body, and the fact that it constitutes one of the central enigmas of thought, hitherto an insoluble one. The epi-phenomenal theory has lost ground with serious thinkers and the prevailing views are forms either of *parallelism* or *interactionism*, i. e., that the two series, mental and physical, run on side by side without affecting each other or that consciousness and the body act upon each other, neither, being the creation of the other. To this development we must now add the consequences which seem to follow from the new departures in physical theory. So far as their general effect can be estimated, they lend support to the view that consciousness is fundamental in the universe and cannot be derived from or wholly dependant upon the material order. There is, we may, suggest, a sharp change of direction in scientific thought. Whereas upto the end of the nineteenth century, on the whole it lent support to the prejudice of common sense that consciousness is the product of matter, it

tends now to support the opposite view"*

73. But even this radically 'opposite view' will not do. "The pendulum has," no doubt, "swung rather hastily from the materialistic to the idealistic extreme." "The change is largely due to the new conceptions of matter. The displacement of the old hard impenetrable pebbles by electric charges, or wave radiations, inclines some people to think that matter has lost its materiality and assumed a new spirituality. This reminds one rather of a story told by an eminent ecclesiatic about a young lady who having strayed so far from the path of virtue as to have a baby, pleaded in mitigation that it was only such *a wee* little baby! Matter, however, refined, is matter still, not mind. Moreover some eminant physicists, like J. J. Thomson, do not accept the non-substantial view of matter in its entirety"†

74. I should like to add that whatever be the oscillations in the minds of thinkers, today or tomorrow, neither matter is to lose its materiality, nor spirit its spirituality. Duality must persist, not water-tight duality but an inter-acting duality, duality which renders perception perception. Our apparatus of knowledge is the apparatus of this interaction. We are not here interested in various physiological theories which lead to the cooperation and interaction of mind with auxiliary mental phases and brain with its neorophysical processes. Suffice to say that mind and body can inter-act and do inter-act, and while no psychological researches are possible without understanding the physiology of brain, there cannot be any

*An Outline of Modern Knowledge: A Philosophic and Scientific Retrospect, by A. Wolf, p. 78.

†Ibid p. 590.

physiological activities without the cooperation of mind.

75. So much about perception. This is the threshold of knowledge. Threshold only, because it is through perception that we enter the house of knowledge. Perception is not everything. When I first see the object 'cat', I perceive it. It is perception. When I see the same cat again, there is a fresh perception. There are two perceptions. What connects them? What says that it is the *same* cat that I perceived the other day? According to the definition of 'perception' as given above, the process of perception has ended when the contact ceased. The contact gave us perception. But if perception were everything, the perception should vanish as soon as the contact ceases. But that is not so. Otherwise there would have been no difference between an experienced knower and the fresh-knower. How does knowledge accumulate? The perception which I got through the eye did not die out. It was deposited somewhere, not of course in the eye. Mind has a store-house called *memory* where all the experiences are deposited and on their manipulation depends the development of further knowledge. There is a Yoga Sutra to this effect:—

"Memory consists in not-losing the past experiences, *i.e.*, preserving them."*

76. Svami Dayananda has referred in the twelfth chapter of his Satyartha Prakasha to the doctrine of a school which says :—

"We believe only in that existenee which comes within our perception. Without perception, inference

*अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषः स्मृतिः (१।११)
(Yoga Sutras I. 11)

etc. are impossible. Therefore as compared with perception, inference etc. are secondary and we do not admit them."*

Svami Dayananda criticizes this theory in these words:—

"Just as the eye sees other things and not itself, similarly the observer cannot make a sense-observation of himself. A man sees pots, clothes, and other articles with his eyes and his eyes (not with eyes but) with intellect. The *seer* is always *seer* and never *seen*."†

77. Svami Dayananda means that if only 'perception' is admitted and other testimonies are rejected, the knowledge of the perceiver by himself will be impossible. Even the knowledge. of the eye which is the basis of all perceptions is impossible. The eye sees *other* things and not itself. Hence the importance of other testimonies. In fact the knowledge of unperceived objects far exceeds the knowledge of perceived objects. In a very short space of life that is given us, with all the limitations of our knowledge-apparatus our contact with objects is awfully meagre. If we have only *Pratyaksha* or perception and no other way then we should know woefully little. But that is not the case. How do we get the knowledge of unperceived objects? It is a truism that we proceed from known to unknown. In other words we proceed from the perceived to the unperceived through the instrumentality of the perceived.

* Light of Truth, XII-para 4.

† जैसे आँख सबको देखती है परन्तु अपने को नहीं, इसी प्रकार प्रत्यक्ष का करने वाला अपने को ऐन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्ष नहीं कर सकता। जो अपनी आँख से सब घट पटादि पदार्थ देखता है वैसे आँख को अपने ज्ञान से देखता है। जो द्रष्टा है वह द्रष्टा ही रहता है दृश्य कभी नहीं होता।"

(Light of Truth Chapter XII—4.)

78. How? One testimony is that of *inference* or *anumana* (अनुमान).

"Inference is that knowledge of an unperceived object, whose one part has been perceived from a far distance and the other part has been inferred on the ground of the whole object or a part having been perceived *formerly* at some time or place. Thus inference has perception as its precedent, just as you infer the existence of the father, when you see his son or you infer the existence of fire when you see smoke on a hill, or you infer previous life when you observe pleasure and pain in this world.

"This inference is of three kinds :—

79. "*First*—Inference forward or inference of the effect from the cause; for example, the inference of clouds, or of children from the observation of a wedding, or the inference of mature learning from the observations of a student's studies.

80. "*Second*—Inference backward or the inference of a cause from the observation of an effect. For example, from a flood in the river you infer that rains have taken place upon the mountain. Or you infer the existence of the father from the observation of the son. Or you infer the existence of the eternal original material cause or of eternal God, the creator, from the observation of the Universe. Or you infer the existence of righteous and unrighteous deeds, when you see pleasure or pain. This is all inference going backward.

81. "The *third* is concomittant inference. In this, the datum and the part inferred are not related as cause and effect. But they have some sort of concomittance. For example, nobody can reach another place

without going. Similarly, he should infer that others also cannot reach another place without going. For inference the sanskrta word is *anumana*. *Anu* means *after*. The knowledge which is obtained *after* the *perception* is called *inference*. For instance, the existence of fire cannot be inferred until you see the smoke."*

82. The validity of inference has been assailed by many philosophers on logical as well as psychological grounds. To infer from cause to effect or *vice versa* involves us with the intricacies of the meaning of causality. The protagonists of 'flux' maintain that all events are momentary and they have no connection between them which may be called continuous or permanent. If so, event A is as different from event B as from C, and event A has no more claim for being the cause of event B, than event C. Of the two events the event just preceding is called the cause of the event just succeeding. But this definition is so faulty that nothing can be made out of it. The striking of one bell is followed by a number of bell-ringings, neither of which can be the effect of the previous event. Then there are numerous events which constantly take place whether we perceive them or not. Hume says, "We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been *always conjoined* together...We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction."‡

83. Svami Dayananda holds that the idea of causality is not given to us by sense-data, but by our *intellect*.†

* Light of Truth, Chapter, III, para 51.
‡ Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, p. 691.
† Light of Truth, III, 56, chapter XII, 25.

The sense-data are only recorded impressions. They do not say in what relation they stand to each other. The ticket-collector at a railway station only notes who is passing after whom. It is not his business to note what relationship one passenger holds with another. If you want to know that, you must use some other agency. But you have no grounds to say that all the passengers are unrelated. Similarly you mark a pageant of sense-impressions passing hurriedly. They do not directly tell you that they are related to each other. But you have no ground whatsoever to claim that all these impressions *are quite unrelated.*

84. This doctrine of *unrelated impression-atomism* which is alleged to have given a death-blow to the law of *causality* is itself open to several flaws and it is worth-while to examine them to a certain extent. "The idea of causality is subjected to a destructive criticism" in the book of Sextus Empiricus entitled "Aganist the Mathematicians."*

Sextus Empiricus was perhaps the most potent sceptic of ancient western philosophy, whose echo we find in still more vivid form in by no means a lower personality than of David Hume. In India, Svami Shankaracharya's school of the Vedanta and several Buddhist writers, have smashed the idea of causality to pieces. They have unfabricated the warp and woof of causality, torn every thread to small bits and thrown it to the winds. Then, another of subtlest of Indian philosophical treatises, the *Khandana-khanda-khadya* has added lustre to the achievements of his predecessors. But no mathematician seems to have cared a fig for Sextus Empiricus; and mathematics and other sciences which are based upon the inexorable law of causality have gone on the

* History of Philosophy, by Rogers, p. 165.

paths of advancement with accelerated pace. Hume himself admits that his philosophy has miserably failed in affecting his daily life. The study of the *Khandana-khanda-khadya* has always been limited to the abstruse brains of hair-splitting tendencies. The reason is that there is something vitally wrong with these philosophies. Svami Dayananda appears to hold that the idea of causality comes to man *a priori*. Descartes thought that the principle of causality "was a thing manifest and self-evident by the same natural light, which assured us of the existence of the self, that there must be in every cause at least as much reality as reveals itself in the effect. Otherwise we should have a portion of the effect arising out of nothing."*

85. Locke too maintained that there are truths that are necessarily and universally true, and causation is one of such truths, which are due to *some capacity of the mind that goes beyond the mere collection of its past experience.*†

86. The students of philosophy know too well how Hume criticised *the idea of cause* by disposing of the idea of *contiguity*, *succession* as well as constant conjuction. Hume's influence was far reaching. "Nevertheless, there was still present, to steady men, confidence in the power of reason to reach grounded truth—a confidence which received its most powerful support from the notable success of science. But if that same empirical study of facts, on which men prided themselves really carried with it the logical conclusions which Hume maintained, then reason itself was no

* Rogers, p. 270.
† Rogers, p. 339,

longer to be depended on. And with reason, science too must fall, all its certainty and necessity vanish, and man's knowledge reduces itself to a mere expectation that things will happen as they have been wont to happen in the past, with no surer ground for it than the bare fact that we *are* accustomed so to believe."*

87. Hume's presuppositions on which his criticism is based were examined from the very root by many thinkers, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Sir William Hamilton and then, by that most important philospher of his age Kant. Kant holds that if "a judgement is thought with strict universality, so that there can be no possible exception to it, it is not derived from experience, but is absolutely *a priori*".†

88. In fact, if we closely follow the details of onslaughts made on the principle of causation, we find much in them which proves that causation is not a mere customary superstition. There is something in our nature which tells us at least in common cases what is the cause and what not cause but a mere sequence or concommittance. For instance, if you shoot at a man and he dies and simultaneously to shooting, there is another event, say, my putting down my pen on the table, then, any common man would say that my putting down the pen is not the cause of man's death while the action of shooting is. The fault lies in defining causation as invariable precession of an event, and then criticising it.

89. With so much, though not quite adequate, about causation, we come to the testimony of inference

* Rogers, p. 384.

† Rogers, p. 417

propounded by Dayananda on the basis of *Nyaya Sutras.* It is based on causation and concomittance. We infer cause from the effect, effect from the cause, and one thing from its concommittant. The law of concommittance is also ultimately based upon the law of causation, as there should be strong ground for two things to be invariably found concommittant.*

90. The third testimony is by *analogy*. Svami Dayananda says :—

"*Comparison* or *analogy* is the knowledge of an object from the *well-established* points of resemblance existing in some other object. For example, somebody says to his servant: "Bring Vishvamitra here." He says, "I have never seen him." His master replies, "As is this Devadutta, so is that Vishvamitra." Take another example: a cow resembles a wild ox. The servant goes and finds a man resembling Devadutta. He concludes that he is Vishvamitra and brings him. Or a man goes to a jungle and concludes that whatever animal resembles a cow is a wild ox. This is all *analogy* or comparison."†

91. Resemblance between two things is strictly speaking very misleading and pure logic should not admit its validity. There are no two things which have no common property. An elephant and an ant do have some common property. So has a lion and a piece of paper. But the testimony of analogy as enunciated by Gotama in the *Nyayasutra* (I. 1. 6.) and adopted by Svami Dayananda does not admit such common properties. Psychologically speaking there is always a peculiarly striking resemblance which enables even a

* Light of Truth, Chapter III, para 50.
† Light of Truth, Chapter III, para 51.

common man to say that these two persons or things resemble each other, and having perceived one in former times he is able to recognize the other which has never been perceived before, not because they are related as cause and effect, nor because they were invariably found together, but because they have a very striking resemblance; the resemblance which strikes the knower unfailingly. To recognize a person, never before seen, by seeing his picture is a testimony of analogy. *Prasiddha sadharmya* (प्रसिद्ध साधर्म्य) or *striking resemblance* is the key word which elucidates the meaning of the analogy.

92. "The fourth proof (testimony) is *authority* (or word,) or *verbal knowledge.*

*Aptopadeshah shabdah.**

The teachings of an *apta* (or true realizer) are called *authority*. The *true realizer* is he who is fully learned, righteous, interested in the welfare of others, truthful, active, self-controlled, is prompted to teach others by the pure motive of doing good to them, and teaches them only that which he has himself realized and found beneficial for the self. The real teacher is he who has realized all knowledge beginning from the earth right upto God. The Vedas come under the head authority as they are the words of God. The words of those men are also authority who are true realizers in the above sense".†

93. This brings us to another disputed point and it is essential to see what Dayananda means. No man can have immediate perception of everything. All

* आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ।

(Nyaya Sutra, I. 1. 7)

† Light of Truth, Chapter III, para 52.

men do not possess equal opportunities or capabilities *to perceive* equal number of things directly. Yet we desire to know about things which are beyond our ken. For their knowledge, we depend upon the testimony of others. Who are such others on whom we can confidently depend? This has been out-lined by Svami Dayananda in the above paragraph. The text of the *Nyayasutra* mentions the word *apta* (आप्त) An "*apta*" should have two qualifications, power of realization and strict honesty. An honest fool is as misleading as an interested realizer. The former *cannot* guide, the latter *will* not guide. We cannot get all knowledge by ourselves and the knowledge we directly gather is horribly insufficient. Hence our dependence on the knowledge of others.

Knowledge grows and develops through communication of minds. The learner is a novice in this world. Perhaps he gains much more through the suggestions of *competent* persons, *i. e.*, authorites than through his meagre individual effort. Authority is as natural as necessary in the give-and-take of knowledge.

94. No doubt there are difficulties in seeking a true *apta*. Does it not anticipate in our own poor self a knowledge so vast and so deep that we may be able to recognize a true *apta*? There are many, who claim to be *aptas* and force their opinion upon others. There are so many books which claim revelatory character and there are numerous credulous people who can and do confide in any clever fellow. But the fact is that this *source of knowledge* cannot be brushed aside in discussing a theory of knowledge. All the store of knowledge which humanity possesses this day could not have been acquired without the help of *authority*. How little is a single man's own contribution

to the vast knowledge he possesses and what a small fraction of this he can directly verify. And yet, his behaviour testifies to the confidence which he has on his knowledge. There are, no doubt, some pitfalls. But none-the-less we have to depend upon it. This involves one very difficult question. Svami Dayananda believes in the divine revelation of the Vedas, as all orthodox Hindu philosophers do. Then there are rival revelations too, not one but so many. Even Jains who do not believe in God and therefore, in the *divine* revelation, do believe in the super-normal experiences, called *manahparyaya* or "super-normal faculty acquired after great spiritual development," and *Kevala* or "the ideal reached after complete emancipation."*

We do not want to be dragged to theological discussions. It is beyond the scope of this book. But it is quite clear that the testimony of *shabda* or *aptopadesha* cannot be under-rated in the realization of truth.

95. There are four more testimonies,—minor ones which Svami Dayananda has enumerated along with the above four, namely, tradition, presumption, probability and negation (ऐतिह्य, अर्थापत्ति, सम्भव, अभाव). But he has devoted only a passing attention to them as they can easily be put under the above four testimonies, tradition being covered by *authority* and the other three by *inference*. There are other systems of Hindu philosophy wherein only three testimonies have been mentioned, analogy being put under inference. For instance, the Yoga mentions only three, *pratyaksha* (perception or intuition) *anumana* (inference) and *agama* (*shabda* or authority).

* Panchastikayasara of Sri Kundkundacharya,—Introduction by Prof. A. Chakravartinayanar, p. XLIV.

96. The scope of *pratyaksha* or intuition is very wide. As far as empirical knowledge is concerned, it applies to all that senses can give us, the external material objects as well as pain and pleasure which we feel through our mind. Besides, the self when fully developed and trained to free itself from sense-limitations and work independently, has the power of realizing higher truths, which transcend all sense-knowledge. The knowledge of one's own self is one such and that of other selves or Supreme Being, another. Of all this, we shall say in other chapters.

97. Some thinkers deny the existence of higher things on the very ground of these testimonies. They say that when the basis of all testimonies is *pratyaksha* (प्रत्यक्ष) or sense-perception and sense perception can lead us only to sensuous objects, where is, then, left the ground either to postulate or prove the existence of super-sensuous objects? What testimonies have you to posit such beliefs? This has led to atheistic or sceptic tendencies. Either there is no God, or there is no proof for such a Being. The line of argument is this:—

(1) God cannot be *sense-perceived*, He being alleged to be super-sensuous.

(2) Inference, analogy and other testimonies which imply law of causality are all based upon sense-perception and therefore God is beyond the purview of these testimonies.

(3) Authority or Shabda (शब्द) depends upon the belief in God and to base His existence upon the authority is arguing in circle.

Hence belief in God is a mere fiction of mind and so is the belief in so many other super-sensuous objects.

98. The discussion which we have so far had on the validization of testimonies, specially perception, shows that this line of argument has certain flaws. First of all, pure empiricism is inadequate to explain or account for perception. Empiricism as empircism cannot stand on its own legs. Our material sense-organs are not senses unless they work as instruments and anything based on that hypothesis is sure to lead us astray. Besides, the law which we deduce from *inference* is not material, though the *material* of the inference is material, no doubt. A drop of water, a grain of sand or a blade of grass when it becomes the object of knowledge gives to the knower much more than its isolated self. It tells him of myriads of relations which cannot be perceived by senses alone. Modern physics while analysing the material objects and pointing out their relations lifts us up from material world and makes us enter into supersensuous regions. Therefore, it is futile to say that the testimonies of knowledge which we have delineated above do not enable us to infer from material events their immaterial causes. It will be too gross a view of the instruments of knowledge to confine ourselves to isolated blocks of matter only. For instance, when we see a potter making an earthen pot and thereby conclude that the potter is the cause of the pot, we do not mean by the cause the material body of the potter, with its definite form, colour, size or definite configuration. Infact we mean something immaterial, which knows what a pot is, what its relation with clay is and how clay can be converted into a pot. This inference can safely and legitimately be applied to material effects and their immaterial causes.

99. There is one more point which needs some consideration at this stage. What is the place of scep-

ticism in the epistemology of Svami Dayananda? It is not that we never have a *doubtful* knowledge. But it does not mean that we are *always doubtful*. 'Doubt' is one of the epistemological diseases of which divers cures have been suggested above. We have shown above that *scepticism* as an *ism* is a dangerous doctrine. It leads to intolerable absurdities. It is a double-edged knife, not sparing your own nose when you think you are cutting the nose of your adversary. Svami Dayananda has condemned scepticism by suggesting antidotes to erroneous or doubtful knowledge.

100. In Indiana philosophy the Jain theory of *syadvada* or *saptabhangi* needs some passing reference. The literal meaning of *syadvada* is a *may-be* theory. It is called the "Doctrine of the Assertion of *Possibilities*" or "the saptbhangi or the heptagonic form of our ontological enquiry" by the author of "An Epitom of Jainism." (p. 117). Jain authors have extolled this theory in very high sounding words. "Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of *conditional* predication." "This *saptabhangi* is a powerful organon in the hands of *syadvadins* who avoided the *nihilism* of the Buddhists as well as the *absolute monism* of the *Vedantists*, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the *Charvakas*, and the ludicrous idealism of the Nayavadins."*

101. The reader will be naturally anxious to know what this panacea for all philosophical ills is. Shri Kundakundacharya describes the Pramana Saptabhangi in these words:—

सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।
दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ।

*Panchastikayasara, pp. LXVIII and LXXXV.

Its Sanskrta rendering is as follows:—

स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवक्तव्यं पुनश्च तत्रितयं
द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन सम्भवति ॥
(पंचास्तिकाय समयसार १४)

According as *Dravya* is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions:—

(1) *स्यादस्त्येव* सर्व्वमिति संदशकल्पना विभजनेन प्रथमो भंगः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain sense* the jar exists.

(2) स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्व्वमिति पर्युदास कल्पना विभजनेन द्वितीयो भङ्गः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain* sense the jar does not exist.

(3) *स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति* क्रमेन सदंशासदंशकल्पना विभजनेन तृतीयो भङ्गः as स्यात् अस्ति नास्त्येव घटः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain* sense the jar exists as well as in a sense it does not exist.

(4) *स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति* समसमये विधिनिषेधयोरनिर्वचनीयकल्पनाविभजनया चतुर्थो भङ्गः as स्यादवक्तव्य एव घटः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain sense* the jar is *indescribable.*

(5) स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिप्राधान्येन युगपद् विधिनिषेधानिर्वचनीयख्यापना कल्पनाविभजनाय पञ्चमो भङ्गः as स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य घटः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain sense* the jar *exists* as well as in a certain sense, it is indescribable.

(6) *स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति* निषेधप्राधान्येन युगपन्निषेध विध्यनिर्वचनीय कल्पना विभजनया षष्ठो भङ्गः as स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादावक्तव्यः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain sense,* the jar is not, and *indescribable* in a certain sense as well.

(7) स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेव इति क्रमात् सदंशासदंशप्राधान्यकल्पनया युगपद्-विधिनिषेधानिर्वचनीयख्यपना कल्पना विभजनया च सप्तमो भङ्गः as स्यादस्त्येव नास्त्येव अवक्तव्यः ।

May be, partly or *in a certain sense* the jar is and is *not* and is *indescribable* as well in a certain sense.*

*An Epitom of Jainism, pp. 118—135.

102. This *syadvada* or theory of seven fold *perhaps* has met with strong criticisms. Shankara says :—

(1) It would be contrary to reason to accept the Jaina doctrine. Why ? Because of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory attributes in one. Just as a thing cannot be hot and cold simultaneously, so *being* (अस्तित्व) and *non-being* (नास्तित्व) cannot, at the same time, belong to one-thing.

(2) *Suchness* (तथारूप) and *unsuchness* (अतथारूप) of the seven predicaments would also be equally indeterminate like *diffidence or doubt*.

(3) How can the predicaments be *indescribable* when, they have been actually described?

(4) *Jiva*, *ajiva* etc. whose nature the Jains claim to have ascertained will relapse into absolute indetermination.*

103, Ramanuja says—

Contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jains) called *Paryaya*—are different things (*padartha*) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence.

104. Jaina writers have advocated a strong defence :—

(a) If we remember the two different aspects of self-relation and other relation, we can see that the objection does not hold good. Very

* Vedanta, II-2. 33.

often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes, which are in the abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son. The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual. Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its own species may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus.

(b) If by definiteness Shankara means unconditional and absolute assertion, indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of *syadvada*.

(c) Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing,..............since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of *ambiguity* we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

(d) He (Ramanuja) clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *paryaya*, substance and mode. He also perceives that *paryaya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of *syadvada* is based upon these two different aspects *dravya* and *paryaya*. The proper course for the critic (Ramanuja) having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine (of syadvada)..............What he proves is that *asti* and *nasti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According

to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly it cannot have. Jaina logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects——and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

(c) Then what becomes of the one in the many? He (Ramanuja) proposes the *purva paksha* for the Jaina, "But how can you maintain that *Brahman*, although one only yet at the same time is the self of all." He (Ramanuja) answers the *purva paksha* thus:—"The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *parinama* of the *Brahman* and this is what Ramanuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe or his rival (Jaina) would be justified in asking whether the *parinama* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commentary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of Shankara's, and if the former, he is bound to admit the *syadvada* point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the person and many from the point of view of *parinama* or his body.*

105. While appreciating the defence of the Jainas, Radhakrishnan criticizes the theory as

* Panchastikayasara Introduction, pp. LXXX.—LXXXIII Extracts.

follows:— "Yet in our (Radhakrishnan's) opinion the Jaina logic leads us to a monistic idealism and so far as the Jainas shrink from it, they *are untrue to their own logic*". "The theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute. It is true that the law of contradiction on which Jaina logic takes its stand involves that *distinction* is necessary for thought but a thing which is *absolutely distinct* from others is as unreal to thought as a thing which is absolutely one with others. *Thought is not mere distinction but it is also relation.* Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from others." "The Jainas cannot logically support a theory of pluralism".*

106. But the Jainas do not accept the charge lying:—They admit that "the Absolute is the ultimate unity of thought which expresses itself as *Jiva* on the one side and correlative of the subject as *Ajiva* on the other side..............But this conception of the Absolute has to be distinguished from the absolute beyond the relative of the Vedantins. These philosophers hold that our intellect deals with the relative only. The world of experience is the world relative only. So the absolute lies beyond the world of the relative—beyond the world of phenomena.—we (Jainas) hold, however, that absolute is not beyond the phenomena rather all phenomena are but particular aspects or phases of this all inclusive unity which is absolute,—the whole and the aspects of the whole." "If you begin with the absolute separation, between unity and plurality, then you must either deny plurality like Shankara or deny unity like Kanada...........And we, the Jainas therefore reject this disjunction altogether. From our point of view, all differences are differences of a unity, which is

* **Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 305, 308.**

expressed in the differences. One is One not apart from the Many; but One is in the Many. So plurality must be taken as the self-expression of this unity, ——the absolute. To conceive of the absolute as the One is not to conceive the facts of experience as illusion——*Maya* (माया). Or, the Many is real in as much as the Many is *galvanised* into life by the One; because Many is the self-expression of the One. The absolute is a unity, but the unity which *is immanent in the Many*. The Many, in Jainism, do not vanish in the luminosity of the One like clouds before the rising sun as taught in the philosophy of Vyasa or Vashistha rather the Many is vitalised by the One and is as real as every other facts of experience. In Jainism, One is shown to come out of its own privacy as it were and appears itself as Many. The Many vanishes in the One (Shankara): but the One presents itself to us as the Many (the Jainas). The One reveals itself in the Many and the Many is the self-expression of the ultimate unity. In our philosophy the ordinary disjunction of 'either-or' falls to the ground. The two aspects of one truth do not exclude each other. The concrete whole is the abstract which is One in the Many and Many as grounded in the One."*

107. We do not quarrel with those whose philosophic sense obtains gratification with this labyrinth of argumentation. The currents and cross-currents of logical reasoning whose relevant specimens we have quoted above with due care that nothing important should be missed are sufficient to neutralize each other, without enabling the inquisitor to know whether the reality is one or many, or both or neither. It is for the Jainas to answer as to what *that Absolute, that One* is

* An Epitome of Jainism, pp. 161—166.

which *galvanizes* the Many or is *immanent* in the Many. The Jainas do not believe in God of any type or any conception. Even if it be admitted that a thing *is* in a certain sense, and *is-not* in another sense, why should you use *syad* (स्यात्) or *perhaps* in all cases. With all the logical hair-splittings and round-about pleadings the charge of *doubt*, indetermination or even ambiguity cannot be cleared off. "The tree is moving and not moving" or "the same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y"; neither of these examples proves that the two conflicting attributes can reside in one thing. Fully worded the sentences will run thus :

(1) The branches of the tree are moving and the root of the tree is not moving.

(2) One is *father to X*. He is *son to Y*.

The branches are not the root, nor the root the branches. 'Moving' and 'unmoving' are contradictory; but the 'motion of the branches' and 'immobility of the root' are not contradictory. These two attributes reside not in *one* thing, but in two different things. Similarly though, 'father' and 'son' may be contradictory, 'the father of X' is not contradictory to 'the son of Y.' I do not know why great Jaina authors chose these two faulty guns to meet the objections of Shankara and Ramanuja. The criticism which Radhakrishnan has advanced in his "Indian Philsophy" vol. I. under the caption "Value of Jaina Logic" is from one who has monistic leanings. The Jainas and the critic both admit that ."Thought is not mere distinction, but it is also relation". But 'distinction' and 'relation' both imply *"manyness"* or pluralism, realistic pluralism and not ephemeral. Distinction and relation in two *different* substances is our daily experience and can never be sublated.

There is one more point in this connection.

There is a difference between *existence* (*satta* सत्ता) and *attribute* (*guna* गुण). Existence is not an attribute. Non-existence is simply the negation of existence. This has been indicated by Kanada in his Vaisheshika I. 2. 7.

सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता ।

The use of the word 'is' (present tense of the word 'be') in connection with a substance, attribute or action signifies *existence*. It holds good in case of all existent objects.*

When we say 'the jar *is*', it means that the jar *exists*. When we say that the jar is big or round or oval, we give its attributes. When we say that the *jar is not white* or the *jar is not a cloth*, we negate the attributes *whiteness* or *clothness* in connection with the *jar*. But when we say that the *jar is not white*, we do not negate the existence of the jar, but of whiteness only. Thus neither all things have the same attribute or attributes, nor one thing has all attributes, though all things, (substances, attributes or action, द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म) have *existence*.

108. Svami Dayananda in commenting upon the *Saptabhangi* or Syadvada of Jainas does not advance those objections which Shankara or Ramanuja have made or their followers repeated. For instance, it was not proper for Shankara to criticise the Jaina *indescribable* (अवक्तव्य) when he himself upholds the theory of *indescribable Maya* (अनिर्वचनीय). The Sanskrita suffixes *tavyat* (तव्यत्) and *aniyar* (अनीयर) make no difference of sense. Moreover, *satta* or existence is not an attribute; it is wrong to say that the '*Jar is*' and the '*Jar is not*' make two contradictory *attributes* reside in one thing at the same time. When the Jainas resent the charge of "indetermination" against the nature of

*Light of Truth, Chapter III, 70.

things admitted by them, I wonder why they adumberated such a theory of *perhaps* this and *perhaps* that. Svami Dayananda has put the whole criticism in a plain and simple manner in these words :

"The whole case can be simplified into reciprocal negation in *similarity* and *dissimilarity*. To give up this simple method and assume a round-about way is only to entrap the ignorant people. A soul is always non-present in no-soul, and no-soul in soul. Similarly, soul and no-soul are similar on the point of existence (i. e., they both exist) and dissimilar on the point of one being conscious and the other non-conscious. This means that soul is not inanimate and inanimate things are not conscious, or in other words the soul is conscious and no-soul is unconscious. This is a very simple way of expressing the above truth. What is the use of raising such a pompous superstructure over such a simple thing ?"*

109. Svami Dayananda's remarks can be very well understood if you read long chapters on 'syadvad' in 'An Epitom of Jainism' by Puran Chandra Nahar and Krishna Chandra Ghosh, or Shri Kundakundacharya's *Panchastikayasara*. (Prof. A. Chakravarti Nayanara's Introduction and Translation) or *Saptabhangi Tarangini*.

110. As to the Vedanta Sutra II. 2-33 which is said to have called forth the criticisms of Shankara and Ramanuja, it is a question whether Vyasa ever had the Jaina theory of Saptabhangi when he made this aphorism. At least the text of the Sutras throws no light upon the point, nor Svami Dayananda had

*Light of Truth, Chap. XII-20.

made any mention of it. It is an independent question and need not be discussed here.

111. The doctrine of Saptabhangi seems to have been arbitrarily constructed by some Jaina leader and then elaborated devotedly by his successors without examining it critically. Kumarila Bhatta has rightly observed that

सप्तभंगी प्रसादेन शतभंग्यपि जायते

"When seven principles are admitted then there may also be hundred."

This remark is fully warranted by the gloss which different Jaina commentators have made over it. For instance commenting upon the 'fourth bhanga' a writer says:—

"There is no word which would bring out the implication of both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time. *Avaktavya* should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then *avaktavya* itself would become meaningless, It only refers to the impossibility of finding an *idea* which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time."*

112. Here I think that the writer means 'word' by the terms 'idea'. The explanation is equivalent to saying that there is no one word which might convey the two senses, '*Socrates is a man*' and '*Socrates is not a parrot*'. When it is said that *perhaps* the thing is beyond description, the word 'perhaps' which is a sort of permanent epithet also implies that 'perhaps it is describable." You could have added one more *bhanga*, syadvaktavya (स्याद्वक्तव्य) or 'perhaps it is describable', thus making the number eight.

*Panchastikayasara, p. 13.

113. The doctrine of *Bheda-abheda* (unity in diversity and diversity in unity) however attractive to those who love indefiniteness does not solve philosophical complexities. It is but an apology for the unfitness of philosophy to explain anything. Similarity never means identity. When we say that A is *similar* to B it means that A is not *identical* with B. If there are more things than one, they will be similar and dissimilar both. It is a very simple thing, as Svami Dayananda says. When we translate similarity as unity and dissimilarity as diversity and on this basis affirm or deny the reality of oneness or manyness, we are guilty of confusing terms in their meaning and application and give rise to many philosophical tanglings. We shall have ample opportunities to examine these things in connection with other philosophical problems.

Chapter III.

GOD

114. Svami Dayananda's philosophy is a theistic one. He believes in God. But his conception of God is peculiarly distinct from that of other theists. And this conception colours his theology through and through.

115. God, as is commonly understood, is a spirit, a great spirit which exists at *all* times and which is alone that exists at all times; which means that only God is eternal and no other things are eternal except him. He is the creator of everything else, of lower spirits and of material objects. To be able to create such a wonderful universe he has been credited with several qualities such as omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence, besides myriads of other qualities which are corollaries to the main ones.

116. Philosophies of the world are usualy divided into two groups, theistic and atheistic, with a third one dangling between the two which is neither this nor that. The motto of this last one is "O God, if there be a God, help us if you can." They are neutrals; you can call them sceptics.

117. Svami Dayananda parts company with all the three. He is not a sceptic. He has full faith on the human instruments of knowledge. He is a great supporter of sciences. The Gita says that a sceptic

perishes (संशयात्मा विनश्यति) and Svami Dayananda concurs with the author of the Gita. Scepticism is a great enemy of actionism. No action is possible for a man who is sceptic and to the extent that he is sceptic. Hume was the most notable sceptic. But fortunately for him, his scepticism was not even skin-deep. You can say in other words that the philosopher was not a philosopher for all twenty-four hours. He shook off his scepticism when he entered his worldly and non-literary pursuits. Other upholders of scepticism were also of the same type except perhaps those few who were declared incorrigible and hopeless and for whom it is difficult to say that they did not perish.

118. Against the theistic philosophers of the type we have mentioned above, Svami Dayananda has a volley of charges. If God is the only eternal being and there is nothing else co-eternal with him, then there must have been a time when only God existed and nothing else. This is what theists generally hold. Them Svami Dayananda asks, "What do these words omniscience, omnipresence and omni-potence mean ? Instead of saying all-knower, all-present and all-powerful, you should say nothing-knower, nothing-pervader and possessor of no power. What did he know when there was nothing ? Where was he present when there was no *where* ? What does the superlative most powerful mean when there was none to compare with ?"

119. Then again, such a God must have, through all eternities, been lonely, loveless, desireless, actionless and shorn of all the attributes which came to be attached to him when the universe was created. What prompted him to create this world ? Why and for whom ? What caused the bolstering up of this tiny bubble in His oceanic majesty which has vacuum before and vacuum

after, rising from nothing and vanishing into nothing, with no purpose either of the creator or of the creation.

120. Pious devotees look upon such questions as heresies. But a philosophically inclined mind should enquire into these things, and should not *entertain beliefs that are merely dogmatic or uncertain.* Atheists have frequently put these charges against the door of theism and have discarded the belief in God in disgust. They say that there is nothing in the present world to warrant the existence of such a God, which is only the fiction of diseased brain. Svami Dayananda feels the weight of these objections, but does not support atheism because atheists have no better explanation of the existence of the world which we are actually living in and which we cannot afford to deny. He admits that existence of such a God as described above cannot be proved from the existing creation; but what alternative philosophy have atheists to offer ?

121. Atheists deny the God of the theists, the all-powerful God who could do anything at will and would create the world out of nothing. Such God our universe does not warrant. But if such a creator is denied, how to account for the universe? Nature and chance are the two great substitutes which anti-theistic philosophies have offered. The most typical of ancient Indian atheists is Charvaka whose views have been summarily noticed by Svami Dayananda. He quotes the following saying :

अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं शीतस्पर्शस्तथाऽनिलः ।
केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात्स्वभावात् तद् व्यवस्थितिः ॥

Fire is hot, water is cold, air is likewise cold to touch. By whom is it made (*i.e.* by none) ? Therefore it is clear that all this is the *work of nature.*

122. To this verse Svami Dayananda has appended a note. "Charavakas, Abhanakas, Buddhists and Jainas believe in the *natural* creation of the world. Natural propensities draw elements together, and they combined make the objects of the world. There is no such being as the creator of the world."*

123. Nature is, thus, the first alternative. The second alternative is *chance* which leads to scepticism more than to atheism. "Chance philosophers" are few and far between. 'Chance' is a candid denial of law and leaves no place for scientific progress. Even daily life is impossible with chance. It leaves humanity afloat on the surface of a vast ocean, boatless or rudderless, the most hopeless and painfully pitiable of all situations. There is something within human nature which abhors such thoughts. Even the most pessimistic of human beings, who finds all miseries and no pleasure in the world, finds a ray of hope brightening his inner self, if not of this world, of at least some future world, which is almost invisible to him, but beckons him towards it.

124. But *nature* seems to have come to stay. It does not deny 'law'. It sponsors science better than any theology known to us ever did. It calls away our attention from distant, indistinct and almost imaginary next world to the nearer events of life and presents even to any ordinary mortal more tangible comforts of life. It is more popular.

125. But when we enter into a philosophical investigation of "nature", we are confronted with many difficulties. What is *nature*? Is it a collective name

* Light of Truth, XII. 6.

for the universe and its detailed events? Or something distinct? If the former, it is no explanation. If the latter, it is no improvement upon the theologian's views. If you begin to call the creator of the universe by a new name 'nature' and discard the old name 'God', is it an improvement? When we say that fire is hot and water is cold, we only describe 'what' and not 'why' and 'wherefore'. "Lifeless objects," says Svami Dayananda, "drawn towards each other by their own nature cannot be combined with that regularity which might cause the creation of the world, unless there be an intelligent God to bring about the production. If it were all by mere nature, how is it that a second sun, a second moon, and a second earth etc. do not come into existence automatically?"*

126. Here Svami Dayananda draws the attention of the seeker to two things.——First, we do not see inanimate objects drawn towards each other automatically. To presume such a thing is to put a premium upon human intelligence. All scientific inventions which have changed the surface of the world and the affairs of the universe imply an intelligence which deliberately and studiously applies itself to the changes of the affairs. There is nothing automatic. We have to draw fire and water closer to cook our food. In every event we see the interference of our intellect. We not only aver it, we have confidence over it and we wish to emphasize it in all walks of life.

Try, Try Again.

That is our slogan. If the theory of automatic action is once accepted, we do not know what the world will come to. Even Buddhists and Jainas who

* Light of Truth, XII. 6.

do not believe in 'theos' or 'god' are as good theologians as god-believing religions and emphasize human adventures and human intellectual pursuits.

127. The second point which Svami Dayananda raises is still more important? He appeals to nature itself. If a piece of wood can automatically turn into a table without the interference of an intelligent carpenter, by sheer propelling of its nature, then how is it that every piece of wood does not become a table? If an object has a natural property to work in a line it must have its way and if it does not, there must be found some agency to check it. No-body wants to deprive natural objects of their properties. But there must be some explanation for the adjustment of warring elements. Fire is hot and water is cold. But how and why do these opposites come together and form new objects? Fire does burn, but it does not itself rush into a railway engine to convert water into steam. The constituents which make a bee-hive do have natural properties, but they do not automaticaly come to make a bee-hive and no bee-hives are possible where there are no bees. Still more. We can, if we possess greater intelligence and stronger will than those of bees, check the activities of the bees or expedite them. This shows that natural properties are quite inadequate to explain the universe without postulating an intelligent and willing agency, whatever its attributes or qualifications.

128. Note the following extract from Svami Dayananda's *Satayartha Prakasha* or Light of Truth :

Question : The creation of the world is due to the nature of things, *e. g.*, food and water coming together produce germs. The combination of seed, clay and water produces grass, trees, stones etc.

The sea and the air produce waves, and waves produce *Samudraphena* (a foam-like substance visible on the surface of water in oceans). Turmeric, lime and lemon-juice combined make *rori* (red-powder). Similarly the whole world is produced by the natural qualities of the elements. There is no such being as the creator of the world.

Answer : (Svami Dayananda's answer). If it is in the nature of elements to produce the universe, then the destruction of the universe will be impossible. If you say that it is in the nature of elements that the universe be destroyed, then production will be impossible. If you say that production and destruction are due to a cause, then this cause must exist apart from the objects produced and destroyed.

If production and destruction be due to the nature of elements, production and destruction both cannot take place at the same time.

If production be due to nature, why do not another earth, another sun, another moon come up side by side with the present ones ? Grass, trees, germs etc. are produced only from the God-made seed, food, water etc. and not without them.

Turmeric, lime and lemon-juice placed at different places do not come by themselves. Somebody brings them and then mixes them. Then again *rori* (vermilion) is produced only, if they are mixed in right proportions. Similarly no inanimate things can be produced for any particular use without the materia-radica, the knowledge of atoms (elements) and their proportionate mixture by God.

Therefore it is evident that the creation of the universe is the result not of the *nature* of the elements but of the *creative power of God*.*

* Light of Truth, VIII, 33.

129. Science bases itself upon the natural properties of elements. But science is much more than a collective name for those properties. These properties existed long before this era of science, but they did not constitute science. Science is a *conscious awareness* of those properties by intelligent beings plus all that the awareness leads to. Science is *knowledge*, a systematized knowledge and implies the existence of a *knower*, a systematized knower. For Svami Dayananda, science is not an anti-theistic something which believers-in-God should be suspicious about. Svami Dayananda rather exhorts people to study science and promote their living thereby.*

130. To obviate the necessity of believing in a creator some thinkers are of opinion that the universe was never created. The following questions and answers will clear Svami Dayananda's position.

Question : There was no creator of the universe, nor there is, nor there shall be. The world has been going on in this way from eternity. Neither was it ever created, nor will it ever be *no more*.

Answer : No action and nothing which is the outcome of an action are possible without the doer. The earth and other objects which exhibit a designed combination can never be beginningless. Whatsoever is produced by composition does not exist before the production and does not remain after the dissolution. If you do not agree to it you can break, melt, or burn even a hard stone, diamond and other things and see for yourself whether

*The *artha-veda* means economics or study of art and craft, industry, commerce, and everything that is related to the material well-being of the people.

Light of truth, III, 86.

they have been composed of many particles. If they are combined, they will also be separated in due course.*

131. Let us now return, after a brief visit to the land of atheism to the region of prevalent theology and see how various theologians have tried to solve the knotty question, as to why the all-perfect and nothing-lacking God could be brought round to create our present world with all sorts of miseries and entanglements.

132. One of the most profoundly scholarly philosopher-theologians of medieval India, the greatest that the world has ever seen, was Shankaracharya. His influence not only in India, but outside is very great. His philosophic acumen is wonderful. He was remarkably successful in not only suppressing shrewd Buddhist philosophers of his day, but as a theologian, he expelled Buddhist religion from India. He made India again theistic.

133. How does Shankara meet the difficulty? Shankara says that there is God, absolute Brahman. He is the only reality. All else is *appearance*, a phenomenon, not existing but merely *appearing to exist*. He is not the *creator* of any *real* universe. Absolutism does not admit of any action whatsoever. He is above and beyond all this. He never created the world. Its appearance is due to *avidya*, or nescience,

"There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connection (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, *is assumed*, just as we assume the ether to enter

*Light of Truth, VIII, 34.

into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like, and just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as the hollow (space) of a jar etc. are generally current although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the *false* notion that there are different spaces, such as the space of a jar and so on, so there prevails likewise the *false notion* that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different, a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the self, *although in reality the only existence*, imparts the quality of self-hood to bodies and the like which are not a self is a matter of observation, and *is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception*. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like."*

134. "All these passages, with many others, declare *Brahman* to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of knowledge or of nescience. As long as it is the object of nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion and the like."†

135. "Scripture declares that the self, although *eternally unchanging and uniform*, reveals itself in a

* *Vedanta* I. 1. 5, *Shankara's commentary*, English translation by Dr. George Thibaut, (Italics our own). pp. 51, 52.

† Ibid I. 1.11, p. 62.

graduated series of beings, and so *appears* in forms of various dignity and power."*

136. If the creation is unreal, then the questions about the unreal world are also of no importance. It is, *perhaps*, the easiest way of disposing of the objections. It is like pleading *alibi* in a criminal case. When the alleged criminal was non-existent or non-present, the question of the crime does not arise. And if the crime is only unreal, assumed, and outcome of ignorance then also the case has lost all grounds.

137. But Svami Dayananda protests strongly against this view. He has tried to prove that Shankara's position is untenable either by scriptures or by arguments. Apart from the scriptural texts which have been interpreted differently not only by Svami Dayananda but also by ancient commentators, Shankara's arguments are based upon following analogies :—

(1) As ether being an indivisible one *appears* to be divided into jar-space, etc., so are the different forms of the universe ephemeral and unreal; only God is real.

(2) As in a dream, one sees many things which do not exist outside the dreaming brain, just so the world full of many diversities *appears* only and is thus unreal.

(3) Just as in semi-darkness we impose the *appearance* of snake upon a rope, so we impose wrongly the appearance of the universe upon our own dreaming self. It is mere imposition and no reality.

(4) Just as in the case of a mirage, there is a delusion of water on a sheet of sand, similarly

*Ibid, p. 63.

the world only *appears* through our delusion. It is not really existent.

(5) Just as a magician creates through his artifices an illusion of many unreal and non-existent things, the same case holds good with the world also.

138. Shankara's Guru's Guru Gaudapadacharya put the whole thing in the following logical form:—"Nothing is produced either by itself or by another, nor is anything in fact produced, whether it be being or non-being, or either".*

139. Shankara comments on this thus. "In fact the being produced by something is impossible to establish in any manner. Nothing is born of itself, i. e., from its own form. Nothing can reproduce itself, as a jar a jar. Nor is anything produced from something else, as cloth from a jar; and another cloth from the first; and nothing can be born both of itself and of another, for obvious reasons; for a jar and a cloth can not together produce either the one or the other."†

140. These arguments are an echo of the much older Buddhist views, especially of the *Madhyamikas*, who did not believe in God and had no responsibility of explaining God's perfection or imperfection. The above mentioned analogies also appear to have come down from them.‡ But Shankara

*Karika Chapter IV. 22.

†Radhakrishnan's Translation, History of Indian Philosophy Vol II p. 455.

‡क्लेशा : कर्माणि देहाश्च फलानि च ।
गन्धर्वनगराकारा मरीचिस्वप्नसन्निभाः ॥

Madhyamika Sutras of Nagarjuna.

गन्धर्वनगराकारादिवन् निः स्वभावा वेदितव्याः ।

(Comment of Chandrakirti).

should not have repudiated the creativeness of God so easily. Whether this was the view of the author of the *Vedanta* sutras has been hotly disputed by many authors of repute. Ramanuja has condemned the *Maya* or nescience theory of Shankara outright. So have Nimbarka and Vallabha. Radhakrishnan's following paragraph vividly represents the puzzle which upset the brains of the great theologions of the post Buddhist India:—

141. "How are unintelligent things and intelligent souls to be related to the one supreme? Are we to regard them, as the *Gita* does, as the higher and lower manifestations of the one reality? The *Sutra* does not give a clear lead. The vagueness of the *Upanishad* view of creation remains in it. *Brahman* itself uncreated and eternal (II 3. 9) is the cause of the whole universe. Every material element is created by *Brahman* (II 3. 7) If through the activity of the primary elements, the evolution of the world takes place, even then it is *Brahman* that conferred the power through the exercise of which the evolution takes place. As it is said, *Brahman* after creating the elements enters them; and it is *Brahman* dwelling in the elements that effects the production of other things. (II. 3, 13)"*

This shows clearly that the createdness of the world and the creatorship of God have been both admitted.

142. "Badrayana says that the soul is *Jna*" (ज्ञ) which Shankara interprets as intelligence, while Ramanuja takes it as an intelligent knower. Vallabha agrees with Shankara while Kesava thinks that the soul is both intelligence and knower. The individual

*Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 437.

soul is an agent (*Karta*) (II 3. 33-39) Birth and death refer to the body and not the soul, (II. 3. 16) which has no beginning. It is eternal (II. 3. 18). The *Jivatma* is said to be *anu*, of the size of an atom. Ramanuja Madhava, Kesava, Nimbarka, Vallabha and Sri Kantha accept this view. Shankara is of opinion that the soul is all-pervading or *Vibhu*, though it is considered to be atomic in the worldly condition. (II. 2. 19-24) Badarayana holds that *Brahman* is in the individual soul, though the nature of *Brahman* is not touched by the character of the soul (I. 2-8). As the *Jiva* and *Brahman* are different as the light of the sun and the sun, and as when the light is covered by clouds, the sun is not affected, even so, when the *Jiva* is subject to pain, *Brahman* is not. (II 3. 46 see Kesava on it). The embodied self acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is effected by pleasure and pain, while the highest self has an opposite nature and is free from all evil. (I. 1. 17) (see also II. 1. 22). The statements, "That art thou," and "This *atman* is *Brahman*," attempt to show that the two, *Brahman* and *Atman*, God and man, are in reality one. If *Brahman* be the cause of everything, it must be the cause of the individual soul as well. The absolute divine essence is present in all its manifestations. Every individual shares in the spirit of God. It *is not clear*, from Badrayana's account, in what exact manner, the individual is related to *Brahman*, as a part (*amsa* अंश) or reflection. (*abhasa* आभास) of the universal self (II. 2. 43, 50). Badrayana points out that Ashmarathya, Audulomi, and Kaskritsna take up different positions with regard to the relation of the individual soul to *Brahman*. Ashmarathya thinks that the soul is a part of *Brahman*, even in a spatial sense. Audolomi holds that, in deep sleep, the soul is temporarily in union with *Brahman*. Kasakritsna, whose opinion Shankara upholds believes that *Brahman*

exists whole and undivided, in the form of the individual soul, and Badrayana simply mentions their different opinions, but does not say which view he supports. (I. 4. 19. 22). The passage that the *Jiva* is a part (*amsa*) of the highest reality is taken by Shankara to mean, "a part as it were (*amsa iva*)." (II 3. 4 3. S. B.), since Brahman, who is not composed of parts, can not have parts in the literal sense. Bhaskara and Vallabha assert that the *Jiva* is a part of the Lord because there *is difference as well as identity* between them. Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Baladeva and Sri Kantha think that the *Jiva* is a real part of *Brahman*, even as the light issuing from a luminous object like the fire or the sun is a part of that object. The view that the *Jiva* is *both different and not different* from the supreme, even as a serpent is both different and not different from its fold (III 2. 27) is refuted. Ramanuja, however, takes the sutra, as dealing with the relation of *Brahman* to matter, and disputes the view that matter is only a different posture of *Brahman*, and not different from it, even as the folds of the serpent are only a different position of and not different from the serpent. Ramanuja contends that both *Jiva* and matter are parts of *Brahman*. Kesava argues that matter is both different from and one with *Brahman*, even as the serpent and its fold are different, and also not different when the serpent is viewed as a whole. Matter is identical with *Brahman* in as much as its very existence depends on *Brahman*, and it is different from Brahman, since it has *name and form*. The *Jiva* is also different and not different from *Brahman* and the difference *is certainly real*. (Kesava on III. 2. 27-28). There is strong support for the view that Badrayana looks upon the *difference between Brahman and the individual soul as ultimate*, i. e. something which persists even when the soul is released. The *Jiva*, though minute in size, pervades the whole body even

as a little sandal ointment refreshes the whole body. (II. 3. 23)."*

143. The passage given above is a beautifully drawn picture of different Indian philosophers struggling hard, though unsuccessfully, to solve the gordian knot as to why the perfect God should create the world. All conceivable analogies, though irreconcilable with each other, have been applied to prove that the world in which we live and which philosophers strive to interpret philosophically is created by the only really existent God, one without the second. They cling to the thesis that God is perfect. He is the only eternal reality lacking nothing, and having no other co-eternal existence and yet is the creator of the universe. One says that the world is false, another that the world is a part, another that it is a reflection, and still another that it is identical with *Brahman* as non-different as a snake from its coil, or its hood. All these analogies have been borrowed from the false world, as false as the world itself and yet they are the bases of different theses. If you just analyse the nature of these analogies they will lead you to a bewildering chaos, making the confusion worst confounded. Why to cling to the non-duality of real existence inspite of so many logical inconsistencies or psychological complexities? Simply because it is not a fashion in philosophical circles to postulate duality. Is it not a philosophic fad?

Svami Dayananda has struck quite a new path, a path hitherto unexplored by any prevalent theology.

144. First let us see how he finds flaw with these theses.

*Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 440.

Thesis No. 1. Void (Zero) is the only reality. There was void before the creation. There shall be void after the creation. Whatever exists in the present will at the end become non-existent and turn into void (*absolute nihilism*).

S. Dayananda's remarks:—If you mean that non-existence is the only reality, well, the knower of non-existence can not be non-existent.*

145. Thesis No. 2. Existence comes out of non-existence e. g. no sprout comes out without the decomposition of the seed. If you break the seed you will find no sprout there. When the sprout was not visible, it follows that existence comes out of non-existence.

Svami Dayananda's remarks:—That substance which decomposed the seed was already in existence within the seed, otherwise the coming out of the sprout would have never taken place.†

*Light of Truth, VIII 24.

†Light of Truth, VIII 25,

Cp. Shankara's refutation:—

(1) If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares, and the like, i. e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seed only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts etc. originate from the horns of hares, etc.—a thing certainly not actually observed.

(2) If existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics.

146. Thesis No. 3. Things are produced without any cause. The thorns of Acacia Arabica (Babul tree) and other trees are sharp (though their cause is not thorny).

Svami Dayananda's remarks :—How is it that thorns do not grow on trees that are not thorny ?*

147. Thesis No. 4. The world is unreal like a dream, or like mistaking a rope for a snake, mother-of-pearl for silver, mirage for water, or like fairy land or magic. *Brahman* (God) alone is reality.

Svami Dayananda's remarks:—

Dayananda—What do you mean by "unreal" ?

Neo-Vedantist—That which does not exist, but *appears to exist*.

(3) Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving,

(4) In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case ef seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earliar condition in so far as it is destroyed but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition).

(Shankara's commentary on Vedanta, II. 2. 26, 27. Thibaut's translation pp. 415-18.)

Cp, also the common saying that if a seed destroyed gives rise to a sprout then a parched seed should also give rise to a sprout, but it does not. It follows that the sprout came out of the non-destroyed part of the seed as the outer covering of the real seed.

Is it not a matter of surprise that Shankara who is not a respector of law of causality should take the help of causality in controverting the thesis that existence comes out of non-existence ?

*Light of Truth, VIII, 27.

Dayananda—*How* can that thing appear which does not exist ?

Neo-Vedantist—By superimposition.

Dayananda—What is superimposition ?

Neo-Vedantist—*Vastuni avastu-aropanam adhyasah* (वस्तुनि अवस्तु आरोपणं अध्यासः) *Adhyaropapavadabhyam nisprapancham prapanchyate* (अध्यारोपापवदाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते) Inflicting the existence of one thing upon another thing is called superimposition, and its undoing is called *Apavada* or reversion. By these two processes (of superimposition and reversion) we can impose worldliness over changeless God.

Dayananda—You have fallen into the trap of this error by *regarding rope as a thing* and *snake as a nothing*. Is not the snake a thing ? If you say that the snake does not exist in the rope, never mind. It does exist elsewhere and its impression is in the mind. Therefore the snake is not nothing. The same is the case with mistaking a stump for a man, or a mother-of-pearl for silver.*

148. Here Svami Dayananda maintains that what you call an unreal appearance is the mistaking of *one thing* for *another thing*, a rope for a snake. This shows three things (1) There exists somewhere something called rope. (2) There exists somewhere something called snake. (3) There is a seer who has some defect some where, on account of which he mistakes one thing for another. This does not prove the non-existence of the world, but *the existence* of the two things between which a confusion has taken place and it also proves the existence of the seer along with his defective-

Svami Dayanada calls the followers of Shankara Neo-Vedantists, as distinguished from original Vedantists of Badarayana type.

*Light of Truth, IX. 33

ness. Thus the analogies employed by Shankara or his disciples do not prove the thesis enunciated by them, but just the opposite. They say that *Brahman* or God is the real existence and there is no other real existence besides him. Thus it means that God is the seer. Then again they say that God is pure intelligence (fully perfect). It means that his eye-sight is flawless. He *sees correctly*. Then he should not make mistake. He should see a rope a rope and a snake a snake. The Shankarites see the *mistake* and shut their eyes against the *mistaker*. This fallacy pervades through all their chains of reasoning. Even *appearance*, Svami Dayananda maintains, proves that there is some perceiving agent, who *through some defect* sees one thing for another. If there were *no perceiver* there should have appeared nothing. If there were only a perfectly correct observer, even then there should have been no false appearance. The falsity of appearace proves that there is a correct way, also, of seeing things, on the basis of which the falsity has been insinuated and there is some one, besides, who having the power of observing things, *has also the weakness of making mistakes*.

149. Neo-Vedantist—The world is unreal like a dream.*

Dayananda :—Whatever you see in the dream *does exist* elsewhere and its impressions exist in the mind. Therefore in dream too there is no imposition of *nothing on a thing*.†

150. Dream looms large in almost all the theories of Idealism. The argument is that just as dreams *appear* although they are *unreal*, similarly does the world *appear*

* Light of Truth, XI, 33.

† Light of Truth, XI, 33.

though it is *unreal*. This analogy has been exploited by the nihilists or Buddhist Madhyamikas for denying the existence of anything. They say it is all void. The same analogy has been used by neo-Vedantists to prove that the world, as we see it or call it, is unreal.

151. "Gaudpada," says Radhakrishnan, "urges that dream experiences are on a par with the waking ones. If the dream states do not fit into the context of the general experience of our fellow men or of our own normal experience, it must be understood that it is not because they fall short of absolute reality, but because they do not conform to our *conventional* standards. They constitute a *separate class* of experiences, and, *within their order, they are coherent*. The water in the dream can quench the thirst in the dream, and to say that it does not quench the real thirst is irrelevent. To say so is to *assume* that waking experience is real in itself and is the only real. The two, waking and dream states, are equally real within *their own orders* or equally unreal *in an absolute sense*. Gaudapad recognizes that the objects of waking experience are common to us all, while those of dreams are the private property of the dreamer. Yet he says, "as in dream, so in waking, the objects seen are unreal".*

152. To this Radhakrishnan has added a footnote, quoting a parallel passage :—†

"When I consider the matter carefully, I do not find a *single characteristic* by means of which I can *certainly* determine whether I am awake or whether I dream. The visions of a dream and the experiences of my waking state are so much alike that I am

* Mandukya Karika II. 4.

† Descartes' Meditation. p. 1.

completely puzzled and I do not really know that I am not dreaming at this moment".

And also, "Pascal is right when he asserts that if the same dream came to us every night we should be just as much occupied by it as by the things which we see every day. To quote his words ; 'If an artizan *were certain* that he would dream every night for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe that he would be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours that he is an artisan.' "*

153. The language is rather poetic than philosophic. Dream experiences and wakeful experiences the same ! With no distinguishing characteristics ! Even Shankaracharya is not ready to admit this. It will not be irrelevant to quote *in extenso* his commentary on Vedanta II. 2. 29. (वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्) (English Translation by Dr. Thibaut) :—

Text :—"And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.

Shankara's commentary—We now apply ourselves to the refutation of *the averment made by the Bauddha,* that the ideas of posts and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external object, just as the ideas of a dream, both being *ideas* alike. The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on *the same footing, on account of the difference of their character.*

154. They differ as follows—The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man; no such meeting took

* Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 454.

place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the false idea arose'. In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic, illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. Moreover, the *visions of a dream are acts of remembrance*, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness, and the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognized by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false, because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness, for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown."

155. Shankara has, here, with his chracteristic argumentative acumen refuted the theory that the dream experiences are similar to those of wakeful state, though it jeopardises his own thesis that the world is unreal. The later commentators of Shankara finding this a very weak link in the chain of Shankara's arguments have tried to explain it away in two ways:—

(1) That Shankara refers here to the view of another School. (S. B. I. 1-9).*

(2) That Shankara distinguishes the empirical world which is logically established, from dreams and illusions.†

Both these defences are rather poor. Nowhere does Shankara say so, nor is this evident from the original aphorisms. In the aphorism I. 1. 9 (स्वाप्ययात्) the word *Svapi* refers to sound sleep and not to dreams. Then, if the reality of the empirical world is once established, one has to explain why there should be two worlds, one empirical and the other absolute. If *Brahman* is the only existence, how can there be something which should *make an unreal world appear real* ?

156. Gaudapada says that dreams are also coherent in their order. This is not invariably true. Sometimes the dreamer sees the incoherence himself while in dreams and remembers that incoherence when he wakes up. Besides, when the experience is the same, how is it that there should be two distinct orders, one *dream order* and the *other wakeful order* quite unconnected by each other; and why should the dreamer, on waking up, feel that the new wakeful experiences have negated the dream experiences ? If I go from Mathura to Agra and find Agra buildings different form those of Mathura,

* Ibid p. 492. Infra

† Ibid p. 491.

I feel that I see another set of things but do not feel that Agra buildings have negated (बाध) the Mathura buildings. But every dreamer when waking up feels that the brother whom he was seeing in the dream is no longer with him and therefore not that the brother has gone away but that the dream appearance was unreal. Similarly Pascal's hypothetical sentence, 'If an artisan were *certain*' takes away the reality of the surmise and clearly implies that the difference between dream experiences and wakeful experiences is real and not imaginary.

157. Descartes, Pascal, as well as Gaudapada have made a serious mistake in equating dreams with wakeful states and Gaudapada's theory of the unconnected distinct orders is utterly wrong. Besides wakeful and dreaming states, there is a third one called *Sushupti* (सुषुप्ति) or *sound sleep* wherein one is almost unconscious. Is it to be supposed a *third order* and are these three to be valued on the same plane and which will be more *reliable* to Gaudapada ? Besides, the continuity between dream state and wakeful state is quite evident in cases when one dreams some shocking experience and its effect is visible in wakeful condition also in the form of actual beatings of the heart. Had the dream experiences and wakeful experiences belonged to two exclusively different orders, the shock felt as a dream should not have lingered in the wakeful state. This proves that the dreams are only confused forms of wakeful experiences.

158. The absurdity of the "two-orders-theory" can easily be brought home by the fact that relationship of brother, sister, father etc. has been taken from the wakeful state and not from the dream state. When I see my brother or father in the dream, sometimes

confusedly and at other times distinctly, the idea of brother-hood or fatherhood did not spring up in the dream. The father whom I saw in the dream with particular features, name etc. had the same features, name etc. in the wakeful state. Had there been two different orders as mentioned above, my father in the dream should have been quite different from my father in the wakeful state. All this shows that the protagonists of the two-orders-theory have somehow caught hold of a very unreliable plank while floating over the sea of indecisiveness.

159. In this connection, Svami Dayananda's arguments go to the very root of the question. We quote them here:—

Neo. V.—We see in dream unseen and unheard of things, e. g., our own head cut and we weeping, or a current of water going up. Such things never happened, nor any body saw them. How can they be real?

S. D.—This illustration also does not support your view, for there is no impression unless you see or hear a thing, and no memory without an impression. Without memory the appearance of a thing is impossible. When man sees or hears that the head of such and such person was cut in the fight and his brother and father were actually weeping, or he hears or sees that the water of the fountain is going up, then its impression remains in the mind. When the seer is separate from objects which he saw while awake, then he sees in his own mind, what he had seen or heard elsewhere; when he can see these things in his own mind, he can see his own head cut or himself weeping or a current of water going up. *This also is not an instance of imposing nothing upon a thing.* It is just like a painter painting on paper from memory, the things seen

or heard previously, or an artist, drawing from memory the representation of an object whose impressions lie in the mind. There is one thing. Sometimes we see in dreams things that we can recollect, i.e., we can refer them to our past experiences, *e.g.*, I see my tutor. And sometimes we dream things which were heard or seen long ago. We cannot recollect when or where we heard or saw such and such things. *There is no regularity or sequence in dreams as it is in wakeful state.* Then, there is one thing to be noted. A man born blind does not see in dream any sights. All this shows that your definition of superimposition is wrong.

160. The illustration often given by the neo-vedantists to prove their *Vivartavada* (phenomenalism), that just as there is a mere appearance (unreal, without real existence) of snake in the rope, similarly there is a mere appearance of the world in *Brahman* (God), is also untenable.

161. Neo. V.—Without the basis of superimposition a super-imposed thing cannot make its appearance, as there is no appearance of snake possible unless there exists a rope. The snake is non-existent in the rope in all the three times (*i.e.*, it was not in the rope in the past, it is not in the rope in the present, and it will not be in the rope in the future) but partial darkness, and partial light, mixed together create in the mind a suspense about snake and we begin to tremble. When with the help of a lamp we become certain (that it is rope), mis-givings disappear. Similarly we see the really non-existent (unreal, false) world in *Brahman*. When we realize *Brahman*, that appearance of the world vanishes, and the real existence of *Brahman* becomes clear, in the same way

as the conception of the snake vanishes and that of the rope remains.

162. S. D—Who mis-saw the world in God ?

Neo. V.—Soul.

S. D.—Where did the soul come from ?

Neo. V.—From ignorance.

S. D.—Where did ignorance come from and where does it reside?

Neo. V.—Ignorance is beginningless and it resides in God.

S. D.—Was *Brahman* mistaken for *Brahman* ? Or for something else ? And who mistook it ?

Neo. V.—The shadow of consciousness (*Chidabhasa* चिदाभास)

S. D.—What is the nature of this shadow of consciousness ?

Neo. V.—Really speaking it is *Brahman* (God). God mis-sees himself and forgets his own nature.

S. D.—What is the genesis of this forgetfulness ?

Neo. V.—It is due to ignorance.

S. D.—Is this ignorance the attribute of the omniscient *Brahman* or of the localized soul (the soul of limited knowledge) ?

Neo. V.—Of the finite soul.

S. D.—According to your beliefs, does any conscious being exist, other than one infinite omniscient God ? Where did this finite soul come from ? If you believe in the existence of the finite soul, it is all right. If *Brahman* is ignorant of his own nature at one place, ignorance will prevail all over. Just as a boil in a part of the body renders the whole body unfit,

similarly if *Brahman* is ignorant at one place the entire *Brahman* will be ignorant and unhappy.*

163. Let us go a little further.

Neo. V.—Are our illustrations of rope-snake or dream wrong ?

S. D.—No, your argumentation is wrong. We have already made it clear. Well, then, please tell us onething. Who gets ignorance at the outset ?

Neo. V.—*Brahman* (*God*).

S. D.—Is God all-knowing or with limited knowledge ?

Neo. V.—Neither all-knowing, nor having limited knowledge. For infinititude and finiteness of knowledge are found in an object which is under limitations.

S. D.—Who is under limitations. ?

Neo. V.—*Brahman.*

S. D.—Then it is *Brahman* that has infinite or finite knowledge. Why did you then deny it ? If you say that *limitation is unreal and imposition,* then we ask,—"Who is the imposer ?"†

164. This shows that according to Svami Dayananda, Shankaracharya, while advocating the cause of *Vedic theism,* has miserably jeopardised it. It might have been a consolation to those who in that age of Buddhistic domination were sick of atheistic ideas and were seeking some outlet, of whatever nature.

There was one thing more. Shankara's philosophy though presented with profound scholarship was kept confined to high philosophic circles only and as

* Light of Truth, XI, 33-34.

† Light of Truth, XI, 39.

Shankara allowed himself a loop-hole in the form of admitting that Absolutism does not interfere with the phenomenal world and that the worldly affairs would go on as they do (dream-like affairs in the dream-like world), common people went their way, converting Hinduism into mythological ritualism. In Berkeley's words, they thought like philosophers and lived like herds. There was in fact no link between the Absolute *Brahman* and the *Ishvara* of the phenomenal world, who could take any form, or be conceived by the devotees as anything or being.

165. Thus we see that the Hindusim which rose upon the ashes of banished Buddhism was merely a congeries of fanciful creeds. Coming to philosophic circle Shankara's shrewd arguments did not satisfy his successors. The *Maya theory*, though profoundly fortified by the disciples of Shankaracharya in well arranged and exquisitely worded commentaries, elicited a strong protest from Ramanuja, Madhava, Ballabha, Nimbarka and other thinkers, and mostly on theistic grounds.

166. "The speculations of philosophers," says Radhakrishnan, "which do not comfort us in our stress and suffering, are mere intellectual diversion and not serious thinking. The absolute of Shankara, rigid, motionless, and totally lacking in initiative or influence, cannot call forth our worship. Like the Tajmahal which is unconscious of the admiration it arouses, the Absolute remains indifferent to the fear and love of its worshippers, and for all those who regard the goal of religion, as the goal of philosophy—to know God is to know the real, Shankara's view seems to be a finished example of learned error.

They feel that it is as unsatisfactory to natural instincts, as to trained intelligence." "The world is said to be an appearance, and God a bloodless Absolute dark with the excess of light..............Shankara does not deal justly with the living sense of companionship which the devotees have in their difficult lives."*

167. Svami Dayananda did feel likewise. But so did Ramanuja and others several centuries before Svami Dayananda. Ramanuja argued 'that God is indeed real and independent; but the souls of the world are real also, though their reality is utterly dependent on that of God. He believes in a spiritual principle at the basis of the world, *which is not treated as an illusion.* He insists on the continued individual existence of the released souls. Though the world of matter, and the individual souls *have a real existence of their own*, still neither of them is essentially the same as *Brahman.* For, while *Brahman* is eternally free from all imperfection, *matter is unconscious*, and the individual souls are subject to ignorance and suffering.'†

168. But Shankara's error was a *learned error*, and could not be set aside so easily, All these philosophers were *advaita-vadins* (or non-dualists) with several qualifying adjuncts prefixed to their names. Shankara's intellectual domination even on his adversaries was so profound that they could not detect the root mistakes in his arguments.

For instance Bhaskara "though he was opposed to Shankara, it was only so far as Shankara had introduced the *Maya* doctrine, and only so far as he thought that

* Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 659.
† Ibid p. 660.

the world had sprung forth not as a real *modification of Brahman* but only through *Maya*".*

169. Ramanuja also refutes only those parts of Shankara's philosophy which came in direct conflict with his theology. The rest, perhaps, did not concern him. Ramanuja, Venkatnath and others belonged to a particular theological class of Southern India. They were the followers of *Bhakti Marga* or Path of Devotion. They did not give uppermost place to reason. And whenever and wherever they criticised Shankara, it was only to make their way smooth. Many knotty points of Shankara's philosophy were never tackled by them. In their zeal for monism (I mean, non-dualism) they never examined the root-position taken by Shankara, or the *Upanisat* text interpreted by him.

170. Ramanuja held that the "individual souls and the material world form the body of God (शरीर)."†

In one way it is an improvement on Shankara. It allows the world a more real position than a mere illusion. But then, the question arose, what does body (शरीर) mean ? It looked very well, it sounded beautiful, to say that God is the soul and we souls and the material world in which we live are all God's body. But 'body' connotes many things. The *Vaishnavites* themselves had only a misty idea of the word *body* and many contentions arose giving rise to various schisms on the definition of the body. The definition of *Nyaya* Sutras चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् (Nyaya I. 1. 11) "that the body is the support of effort (चेष्टा), senses (इन्द्रिय) and enjoyment (अर्थ) of the soul" was summarily rejected, as this made

*A History of Indian Philosophy, by Surendra Nath Das Gupta, Vol. III para I.

† Ibid p. 297.

God dependent on body. But then how to define 'body' inorder to ensure full perfection of God plus his creativeness? The hair-splitting polemics that followed has an interest of its own.

171. Anantarya 'refuses to accept the view that the notion of body (शरीर) involves a class concept (जाति), for though the notion of a body is found applicable to each specific instance of a body the existence of such a notion is always associated with one or other of those specific instances, and as such it does not justify the assumption of the *existence of a separate category as a self-existent universal bodiness*.'* To put it in simpler language, the notion of body, in connection with God is quite different from the class notion of 'bodies' as we generally have, because the class-notion of body always includes some characteristics of *individual* bodies.

172. Then, there is another definition :—A body is that "which is liable to be held or controlled in its *entirety for the purpose of spirit*, and is thus merely a means to its end."†

This shows that the world has been made by God entirely for His own purpose. This does not redound to the all-perfection of God.

*Ibid p. 297.

न चेदं शरीरमिदं शरीरमितित्यनुगत-प्रतीतिरेव तत्साधिका। अनुज्ञाता-प्रतीतेर्बाधकविरहे जातिसाधकत्वादितिवाच्यम्। सिद्धान्ते अनुगतप्रतीते संस्थान-विषयकत्वेन तदतिरिक्तजातिसाधकत्वसंभवात् (शरीरवाद of अनन्तार्य MSS.)

† चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं शक्यं तच्चेष्टैक-स्वरूपञ्च तत्तस्य स्वरूपम्।

173. "A second definition of *Sharira* (शरीर) has been suggested in the *Bhashya* (भाष्य) of Ramanuja. According to this definition, a body is said to be that which may as a whole be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts of a spirit."*

174. "But an objection may still be raised against such a definition, as it cannot explain the usage which regards the souls as being the bodies of God (यस्यात्मा शरीरम्). The souls have no weight and as such it is absurd to suppose that God prevents them from falling down, and in that way, they are related to Him as bodies. The definition may, therefore, be modified to the extent that a body is that which is wholly held together in a contactual relation with a particular spirit through its own volition."†

175. "But a further objection may also be raised against this modification, for the definition, even so modified, fails to include time and other entities which are all-pervasive. Now the contactual relation subsisting between two all-pervasive entities is held to *be eternal and uncaused.* So the contactual relation of God with time and the like cannot be held to be caused by the volition of God, and if this be held to be the connotation of the body, time etc. cannot be *regarded as the body of God.* So a different definition has been given which states that a *body is a substance which is wholly dependent upon and subservient to a spirit.* Depen-

* यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना धारयितुं शक्यं तत्तस्य शरीरमिति कृति-प्रयुक्त स्व-प्रतियोगिक-पतन-प्रतिबन्धक-संयोग-सामान्यवत्त्वं शरीरपद-प्रवृत्ति निमित्तम्। (शरीरवाद MS.)

† पतन-प्रतिबन्धकत्वं परित्यज्य कृति-प्रयुक्त-स्व-प्रतियोगिकसंयोग-सामान्यस्य शरीर-पद-प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तत्व स्वीकारेऽपि क्षति विरहात्। (शरीरवाद)

dence and subserviency are to be understood in the sense of productivity of a *special excellence*. Now in the present context the special excellence which is produced in the spirit is its determination either as a cause or as an effect. When Brahman is regarded as cause, such causality can be understood only in relation to its association with the subtle constituents of matter and individual souls, and its evolution into the effect-stage as the manifold world is intelligible only through the transformation of the subtle matter-constituents in gross material forms and the spirits as endeavouring towards perfection through their deeds and rebirths. Brahman as such, without its relation to matter and souls can be regarded neither as cause nor as effect. That it can be viewed as cause and effect is only because it is looked at in association with the causal or the effectuated states of matter and souls. The latter, therefore, are regarded as His body because *they by their own states serve His purpose in reflecting Him as cause and effect*."*

176. Thus the created world fulfills the purpose of the creator which would have remained un-accomplished if there had been no creation. Perfect God lacking in something the accomplishment of which forms the purpose of the universe ! Strange, very strange. Inspite of all our beating-about-the-bush; we are just where we started and with all the wranglings of the Advait and Vishishtaadvaitvadins (Monists and qualified-monists) the knot remains unsolved. A simple Upanishat-text *yasyatma shariram* (यस्यात्मा शरीरम्) has got centred round it a tremendously huge controversy leading us to nowhere.

* Surendranath Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy III, 297-99.

177. The text referred to above is from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and Svami Dayananda with his characteristic clarity of vision approached it in a direct and straight forward manner.

"*Ya atmani tisthan atmanontrao yamatma na veda, yasyatma shariram.....*

य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरम् ।

This is a passage from the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.* The sage Yajnavalkya says that...........God exists in the soul, but is distinct from it, the foolish soul is unaware of His existence within itself, the soul is, so to speak, the body of God. Just as the soul resides in the body just so does God reside in the soul."*

178. The point is simple. The word 'body' or *Sharira*† (शरीर) has been used by analogy to express *pervasiveness* of God. All the embellishments that Ramanuja and other commentators imposed upon this ordinary poetic expression with a flourish of learning was due to their ill-conceived theology. They neither wanted to abandon monism nor the inner urge of the soul i.e., devotion of God. While floating adrift they caught hold of a straw which proved as shaky as any thing. The language of the upanishads is invariably devotional and poetic. It is very seldom syllogistic

* Light of Truth, VII, 47.

† It is unintelligble how the verse quoted by Svami Dayananda is not found in the editions of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad available, or in Shankara's commentary of this Upanishad. After a long search, I found it in the 14th chapter of the Shatpatha Brahmana which is the original form of the Brihadaranyaka The omission is significant because while other pieces of this Upanishad mention earth, water and other things as the body of God, this verse especially emphasizes that the soul is the body of God. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् and यमात्मा न वेद, i. e. God resides in the soul and the soul does not know Him. This proves duality and disproves non dualism. (Author).

and we have to see the spirit if we want to derive from them any consistent doctrine.

179. Svami Dayananda's view of God may be summed up as follows :—

(1) Whatever is moveable in this universe is pervaded by the great ordainer called God. (L. T. VII-3).
(2) He creates and substains all that is in the universe. (L. T. VII-5).
(3) He is everywhere (L. T. VII-9).
(4) He is all-powerful, which simply means that He does not require the assistance of any body else in creating, sustaining, and dissolving the world and in managing the system of awarding pain and pleasure for good or bad deeds of the souls. (He accomplishes all His work through His infinite capacity) (L. T. VII-12).
(5) He is beginningless, i. e., has no cause or time of his beginning (L. T. VII-13).
(6) God is unborn and indivisible (L. T. VII-33).
(7) He pervades all and is bodiless (Ibid VII-33).
(8) Souls are never born. They are uncreated. God and matter are eternal. God creates the body and the sense organs, but they are all in the subordination of souls. (L. T. VII-39).

180. The language is rather theological. But it clearly puts the philosophical aspect. This is the kernal of Svami Dayananda's metaphysics. God, soul and matter are three eternal, and co-existing, though of different attributes. Theology is a science which treats of God in all aspects. When you believe in God you cannot say that theism is a mere belief in the existence of God, irrespective of His attributes and his other

relationships. Therefore, the conception of God is not an un-related single and isolated conception. In fact we cannot hold any conception of anything whatsoever which may be altogether isolated from everything. An attribute-less, actionless and relationless God is inadmissible to Svami Dayananda—quite inconceivable, a logical jugglery, a fiction. "Had God been action-less, how could He create, sustain and dissolve the universe?"*

181. I think that no philosopher who has theistic tendencies could afford to have an absolute connection-less conception of God. Whenever they attempted to have such a conception, they met with stumbling blocks which proved almost irremovable. In addition to an absolute God, they had to conceive of another entity, called practical God, God of the world, the devotees' God, who could easily be made an object of worship. Such accommodation between philosophy and worship led to innumerable imaginary mythologies. They deified persons, animals and even inanimate objects. They endowed them with the qualities of their own whims and thus became the creators of gods and goddesses. Svami Dayananda holds that it is no theism, no philosophy even. It is degrading philosophy to very low depths. You do not seek truth, you seek your convenience. You wish to create God in your own image (say, imagination). Svami Dayananda wanted that the gulf between theology and philosophy may be filled up. If philosophy is the seeking of truth, theology is the realizing of that truth in our living. If there is anything like truth in the world and if it is worth seeking, it should be such that we may be able to live it in our life.

* Light of Truth, VII, 27.

182. The Bharata preceding Svami Dayananda's advent was struggling between these two extremes, monism with its various variants and emotional religion mainly polytheistic. The latter never cared to think as to how it stood intellectually. There arose a number of teachers (saints and others), who taught that religion had nothing to do with reason. It was the subject of faith only. God knews our hearts, though we did not know Him. God knows that we are devoted to Him, whatever be our conception of Him. We may be wrong, but as long as we are sincere, He is sure to embrace us. All ways lead to Him. This latitude left free the worshippers in choosing the way of worship, the form of the worshipped and the media of the worship. *Bhavana* (भावना) or faith became supreme and men formed *bhavana* according to their own personal aptitude, and mostly, to convenience. This was perhaps, thought necessary to ease the tension, and to allow sufficient margin for worldly progress. All the points of the circumference are equi-distant from the centre of the circle and is it not feasible to suppose that every heart is a point on the circumference of this universe, God being its centre ? Apparently this was a conciliatory measure and it was hoped that by so doing, our mundane affairs will be free from unnecessary religious bickerings. But the result was not always the same. Religion remained a dominant factor of life and religious heads called saints and preceptors held sway over their separate dominions. This led to superstition, fiction and sectarian rivalries. Faith divorced from reason became too self-indulgent and woefully prostituted. Fetish-worship, idol-worship, star-worship, tree-worship, image-worship, symbol-worship, they are all the different shades of the same license. Svami Dayananda has devoted one whole chapter of his book Satyartha Prakasha, Chapter XI (the

biggest of all the 14 chapters) to the denunciation of these religious practices which were the result of this theistic chaos. Pantheism, which hangs loose between the two pegs, monism and polytheism, is but a vain effort to give a philosophical tinge to popular faiths.

183. The theological struggle that raged in the east has had its counterpart in the west too. We know very little about the philosophical thought of the western world before the Greek influence. It is altogether a dark period, dark in the sense that we know nothing about it. Whether all the nations that flourished before the Greeks and whose names have been quite washed off from the surface of the world were dark in the philosophical sense is a question. Who can say that when the same sun shone over ancient people, they did not have their great philosophers and grand philosophies ? The interests of newly-sprung-up religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam which each claim for themselves a new and unprecedented illumination of the world, no doubt preclude such assumptions; but reason is not altogether on their side. We have grounds to believe that the gropings in the dark, of early Greeks had not sprung up all of a sudden. They were the results of many ups and downs of previous human history.

184. But leaving aside all this, let us start with Homer.

"The first notable product of the Hellenic civilization was Homer. Everything about Homer is conjectural, but there is a widely held opinion that he was a series of poets rather than an individual. According to those who hold this opinion, the Iliad and the Odessey between them took about two hundred years to complete, some say from 750 to 550 B. C., while others hold that Homer was nearly complete at the end of the eighth

century. The Homeric poems in their present form, were brought to Athens by Peisistratus who reigned (with intermissions) from 560 to 527 B. C. From his time onward, the Athenian youth learned Homer by heart, and this was the most important part of their education."*

185. Let us see what religious views these Greeks learnt from Homer.

"It must be admitted", says Bertrand Russell, "that religion, in Homer, is not very religious. The gods are completely human, differing from men only in being immortal, and possessed of superhuman powers. Morally, there is nothing to be said for them, and it is difficult to see how they can have inspired much awe. In some passages, supposed to be late, they are treated with Voltairean irreverence. Such genuine religious feeling as is to be found in Homer is less concerned with the Gods of Olympus than with more shadowy beings such as Fate or Necessity or Destiny, to whom even Zeus is subject."†

186. Here there is a close affinity between Greek and·Hindu Gods. Zeus is a variation of the Vedic *Dyau* (द्यौ). All mythologies run almost parallel. They are based upon deification or dragging God down to the level of man and attributing human weaknesses to supreme beings. Similes and metaphors try to create an artificial levelizing between the things compared. When a beautiful face is likened to the moon, it is lifting the face up and dragging the moon down. Similarly when we deify a man, we raise him too high and drag down the Supreme Being too low. And if

* Bertrand Russel's History of Western Philosophy, p. 28.
† Ibid p, 29.

truth is thus manipulated for the sake of expediency, political or material or even moral, it cannot be an object of just admiration.*

* Comparing the Tamil poet Kamban with the ancient Sanskrta poet Valmiki, Shri Rajgopalachari (the great living statesman and literateur of India) says (The Leader of Allahabad, July, 18, 1954) :—

"The difference between Valmiki and Kamban—or between Valmiki and Tulsidas for that matter—is that with the latter poet Rama is God at every turn, while in the Valmiki though Rama is undoubtedly, recognized as an Incarnation of Vishnu, yet the treatment of character and incident throughout is only as of *a good and valiant prince* and the Godhood is forgotten as it were. By the time Kamban and Tulsidas came to sing the Ramayana, Rama *had become* God Himself and so completely *deified* for generations with temple and rituals dedicated to His worship, that it would have been wholly artificial for Kamban or Tulsi to do as Valmiki did and to tell the story of Rama as just a heroic romance. The men, women and children who were to hear Kamban knew Rama only as God incarnate. To try to undo the work of ages and to undeify Rama and Krishna in India would be as *futile* as *positively mischievous.* In them are rooted our whole living culture, a culture of which we may be proud. We cannot cut off a vital organ and hope to live. Deceived by the glamour of the superstructures, let us not shake the foundations of rough-hewn granite on which the house we live in rests........"

This shows that Rama was not deified or at least fully deified when Valmiki wrote the Ramayana, or that form of Ramayana was written which is in our days known as Valmiki's Ramayana, and it must have taken long and many generations to complete the deification of Rama by the time Kamban and Tulsidas came to sing the Ramayana which they did in quite a different way and converted Valmiki's heroic romance into a story of God incarnate. While eulogzing Kamban and Tulsidas on the ground of poesy, Shri Rajgopalachari dubs those efforts as "futile" and "mischievous" which seek to undeify the heroes and to present them as superb men instead of *super men.* I do not think it fair to retain a historical or philosophical error simply to maintain the supposed foundation of a culture. Svami Dayananda was not unpatriotic nor an enemy of old Bhartiya Culture when he held that the old Aryan Culture could not remain secure on so shaky and unstable foundation as deification.

187. Xenophanes has almost the same opinion about the God-making process which prevailed in ancient Greece. The following quotation from his writings as given by Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy is significant:—

"Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries, and deceiving of one another... Mortals deem that gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form.........yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds......The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say, theirs have blue eyes, and red hair." He believed in one God, unlike men in form and thought, who "without toil swayeth all things by the force of his mind."*

188. All this shows that Xenophanes felt similarly as Svami Dayananda. What was the force of the Greek philosopher's protest is not known. But Svami Dayananda dedicated his whole life to correcting the error which Hindu mythology and therefore Hindu theology fell victim to. Though Indian horses and Indian oxen were incapable of painting their gods 'in the image of their several kinds', Hindu theologians filled the gaps by giving their gods all the conceivable forms such as elephant, lion, fish, tortoise, and besides, fantastic mixture of man and animals. And these gods are still worshipped in Hindu homes and Hindu temples under cover of symbols, and other philosophized forms. Svami Dayananda thought that these degraded theo-

*p. 59.

logies were vitally contradictory to the theism of the Vedas and Upanishads.*

*The following question and answer given in the Satyartha Prakash Chapter XI, paras 68 and 69 are worth quoting.

Question:—When God is all pervading, He is in the idol also. Why is it not, then, proper to worship Him by supposing Him in any object ?

न काष्टे विद्यते देवो न पाषाणे न मृन्मये।
भावे हि विद्यते देवस्तस्माद् भावो हि कारणम् ॥

God is neither in the wood, nor in the stone, nor in any earthen article. He is a thing of conception. He is realisable wherever (in whatever form) you conceive Him.

Answer—When God is all pervading, then to suppose or *conceive Him in one article in exclusion with others* is just like depriving a world-emperor of his vast empire and confining him to the ownership of a small cottage. What a great disrespect ! Are you not, similarly dishonouring God by your idol-worpship ? When you hold Him all-pervading, why do you pluck flowers and leaves from the trees and offer tham to the idol ? Why do you apply sandal paste ? Why do you offer incense ? Why do you ring bells and play at cymbals and other musical instruments ? He is in your hands, why do you fold hands before Him ? He is in the food and in the water, why do you offer these things to Him ? He is in water, why do you give Him a bath ? We admit that He exists in all objects. But the question is--Do you worship that which *pervades* or that which is pervaded ? If you worship the *pervader*, then it is meaningless to offer sandal, flowers etc. to a block of wood or stone ? And if you worship the *pervaded* then why do you speak the false-hood that you are worshipping God ? Why do you not tell the truth that you are the worshippers of stones etc.

Now take the question of supposition (*Bhavana*). Is supposition true or false ? If true, then God will be in the bondage of your supposition. Why do you not suppose the existence of gold, silver etc., in a clod of earth, of diamond or sapphire in a stone, of pearls in the sea-froth, of butter, milk, curd etc. in water, of flour or sugar in dust ? And why do you not derive the same advantage from them ? You never suppose the existence of pain, then why do you get it ? You always think of pleasure. Why do you not get it ? Why cannot a blind man see by supposing that he has eyes ? You never think of death. Why do you die ? Therefore your theory of

189. The protagonists of *Bhava* (भाव) or supposition theory retort that even the existence of God is more or less the result of human supposition. We do not see or perceive God. We have only supposed that there is some entity called God and once a supposition has been made, we have built up further conceptions making them conform to logical laws. It simply means that we theorize logically on unlogical (if not illogical) beginnings. If we have a right to *suppose* beginnings where is the unfairness in allowing *Bhavana* or supposings at later stages? You first suppose that God exists, He is the cause of the universe; but if we suppose later on that God has such and such form or such and such attribute, you hurl at us logical laws and find flaws in our thinking. If you are consistent, you will find yourself anything but theists.

190. Commenting upon *atomism* of Leucippus and Democritus and *purposism* of Aristotle and etc., Bertrand Russell has given an interesting dissertation :—

"The atomists, unlike Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, sought to explain the world without introducing the notion of *purpose* or *final cause*. The "*final cause*" of an occurrence is an event in the future, for the sake of which the occurrence takes place. In human affairs, this conception is applicable. Why does the baker make bread? Because people will be hungry. Why are railways built? Because people will wish to travel.

supposition is quite wrong. The true conception is the conception of a thing as it actually is. To think fire as fire and water as water is true conception. To think fire as water or water as fire is wrong conception or mis-conception. To think a thing as it is, is knowledge. To think it otherwise is ignorance. Therefore you are calling conception as misconception and mis-conception as conception.

(Light of Truth, XI, 68-69)

In such cases, things are explained by the purpose they serve. When we ask "why?" concerning an event, we may mean either of two things. We may mean: "What purpose did this event serve?" Or we may mean: "What earlier circumstances caused this event?" The answer to the former question is a teleological explanation, or an explanation by final causes; the answer to the latter question is a mechanistic explanation. I do not see how it could have been known in advance, which of these two questions science ought to ask, or whether it ought to ask both. But experience has shown that the mechanistic question leads to scientific knowledge, while the teleological question does not. The atomists asked the mechanistic question, and gave a mechanistic answer. Their successors, until the Renaissance, were more interested in the teleological question, and thus led science up a blind alley."

191. "In regard to both questions alike there is a limitation, which is often ignored, both in popular thought, and in philosophy. Neither question can be asked intelligibly about reality as a whole (including God), but only about parts of it. As regards the teleological explanation, it usually arrives, before long, at a creator, or at least an artificer, whose purposes are realized in the course of nature. But if a man is so obstinately teleological as to continue to ask what purpose is served by the creator, it becomes obvious that his question is impious. It is moreover, unmeaning since to make it significant, we should have to suppose the creator created by some super-creator whose purposes He served. This conception of purpose, therefore, is only applicable within reality, not to reality as a whole."

192. "A not dissimilar argument applies to

mechanistic explanations. One event is caused by another, the other by a third, and so on. But if we ask for a cause of the whole, we are driven again to the creator, who must Himself be uncaused. All causal explanations, therefore, must have an arbitrary beginning. That is why it is no defect in the theory of the atomists to have left the original movements of the atoms unaccounted for,"*

193. The student of Dayananda's Philosophy is naturally tempted to ask as to where Dayananda stands as a theist between these two theories, one mechanistic and the other teleological. Svami Dayananda nowhere mentions either Aristotle or Democritus. Perhaps he never heard of them. He was not a student of the history of philosophy. A philosopher is not necessarily a student of philosophy much less of history of philosophy. He has only referred to those Indian philosophies, which he thought necessary to elucidate his own point. He believes in the existence of atoms, the most primary units of non-spiritual matter (whatever their nature or attributes), but he is not an atomist as distinguished from a spiritualist. He believes in the teleology or purposiveness of the natural events of the universe, but he is not a teleologist like Plato or Aristotle. To him these notions appear one-sided and therefore misleading. Bertrand Russell is quite right in saying that *atomism* "left the original movements of the matter unaccounted for." One is equally right to make the same remark about teleologists, that they also left the teleology of the first creator "unaccounted for." You cannot, in fact, account for these divergences, if you begin at a certain point of the eternally-going universe, say, at the birth

* History of Western Philosophy, 86-87.

of the present sun or the present earth. If at some fine afternoon, you begin to ponder upon the philosophical explanations of that day's happenings and take a vow not to peep into the pre-sunrise conditions of the world, you will fail to interpret correctly the events of the day. You can take any one event and trace it back to explain its genesis and growth and stop at the first forefather of that event in the morning. But then? There is an abyss, total darkness into which you are afraid to enter. You do not want to find what was the condition of your bodily or mental state before sunrise either through the previous night or the day preceding that night. You quite ignore the pre-sunrise time. You start at sunrise. You trace some events to your bodily mechanism and then stop. A friend of yours, with perhaps the same determination to confine his thoughts strictly to the events of the day, may trace other events to your mental teleologism and then stop. The result will be a hotch-potch, divergences unexplained and riddles unsolved. It is unphilosophical and irrational. Science can begin any where, at any stage, and refuse to go further. You can take any part of the tangible nature. and examine it to the extent which serves your purpose and refuse to go further. Take another case by way of illustration. A state has several departments, postal, police, judiciary etc. If I am interested only in the postal matters, I shall pursue my investigation upto the fundamentals of the post office. When I have reached the bottom of it, I shall stop. I shall not care to explain the why's and wherefore's of the relations of the postal department with other departments. That was the boundary I fixed for myself. But if there is a man who examines the whole machinery of the statecraft, he should go deeper into the nature of things and their relations. Similarly you cannot say that

the world as we view it is not a mechanism, nor you can say that it is bereft of teleology. Is there any mechanism which or whose any part does not serve any purpose or has no purpose at all in its origin? And how can the requirements of any teleology be fulfilled without any particular mechanism? *Purpose* is a non-material something which is to be fulfilled in future, but only through certain processes which in their turn need a machinery and its mover. If there is a mechanism, its origin can be traced to primary *units*, (atoms or even radio-activity charges,) whatever their attributes, but somethings non-spiritual. You cannot say, nor any advocate of mechanistic theory has, perhaps, upheld that a machine works arbitrarily, unmethodically or at random. Such a postulate will not enable evén mechanistic philosophers to go any further. How can you go even upto atoms, without any belief and firm belief too, in the orderliness of the events? To seek the origin of any event presupposes a belief that the matters have moved *orderly* and that order has to be found out and pursued. That is, so to speak, bridging over the gulf between mechanistic and teleological doctrines. While commenting upon the so-called differences of the six well-known philosophical systems of Indian philosophy, Svami Dayananda has emphatically stated that these systems, though different, are not at all antagonistic, as they start at different points and pursue their differently marked roads and thus confine themselves to their separately fixed boundaries.*

194. Bertrand Russell has given a rough sketch of Aristotle's theism as follows:—

"God exists eternally, as pure thought, happiness,

* Light of Truth, VIII, 38.

complete self-fulfilment, without any *unrealized purposes*. The sensible world, on the contrary, is imperfect, but it has life, desire, thought of an imperfect kind and aspiration. All living things are in a greater or less degree aware of God, and are moved to action by admiration and love of God. Thus God is the final cause of all activity. Change consists in giving form to matter, but, where sensible things are concerned a substratum of matter always remains. Only God consists of form without matter. The world is continually *evolving towards a greater degree of form*, and thus *becoming progressively more like God*. But the process cannot be completed, because matter cannot be wholly eliminated. This is a religion of progress and evolution, for *God's static perfection moves the world only through the love that finite beings feel for Him*. Plato was mathematical, Aristotle was biological; this accounts for the differences in their religions."*

195. Let us consult Thilly on the same subject. "The problem of metaphysics", he says "is the discovery of ultimate principles. How shall we explain the world, what is it in essence ? Democritus and his school had reduced it to moving material atoms, Plato to transcendent ideas, which somehow influence formless matter. Aristotle rejects both answers, and seeks to mediate between them. The *idea or form cannot be a self-existent essence, apart from matter* as Plato has it; a *quality cannot exist apart from* its object; there can be no form without matter. Nor can the changing reality perceived by us be explained by mere purposeless matter in motion, as the materialists hold; there can *be no matter without directing purpose or form*. Plato regarded the objects of concrete experience as mere incomplete

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 191-192.

copies of the universal idea, as accidents, and the form as the substance; Aristotle on the other hand regards the particular objects or individual beings as real substances. But the essence or true nature of the particular concrete being is constituted by its *form*, by the general qualities belonging to the class to which it belongs; so that after all, the form or idea, is for him, too, the most essential element.

"The particular object, however, changes or grows; all that is perceived is changeable; it is and it is not; it can be and not be; it assumes now these qualities, now those; it is now seed, now sapling, now tree, now fruit. How shall we explain the process of becoming? There must be something that changes; something that persists in the change, something that has the different qualities of which we have spoken. This is matter (*ule*), matter persists, matter itself cannot disappear. Matter must always have some qualities; we never experience a formless matter; hence matter and qualities or forms exist together, so that when we say an object changes its form we do not mean that the form itself changes or becomes different; no form as such can change into another. *Matter assumes different forms*, a series of forms, one form following another, matter persists, the form it first had does not change into another form, but a new form fashions the matter. The different forms have always existed; they do not suddenly come into being. Hence neither matter nor forms arise or disappear; *they are the eternal principles of things*. In order to explain change or growth we must assume a substratum (matter) that persists and changes and qualities (forms) which though never changing, are responsible for the rich and growing world about it."*

*Thilly 82—83.

196. A good deal here is merely a groping in the dark, an attempt to catch at the eloping reality. Just note the following points and try to find relevancy between them.

(1) Eternal God without any unrealized purposes.
(2) The imperfect sensible world with thought, desire and aspiration ever stirring and striving to fulfil a purpose either sprung up suddenly out of a void, or emanating from the above-mentioned God. Why ? How ?
(3) Form unable to exist apart from matter; a quality apart from the object.
(4) No matter without directing purpose or form.
(5) Matter assumes different forms.
(6) The different forms have always existed. They do not spring up suddenly. Are they qualities, standing apart like Plato's ideas ?
(7) Matter and form are eternal principles of things.
(8) Evolution a process to seek an end, or fulfil a purpose; whose ? and what ?

197. To solve these riddles and to bring an order out of this chaos have been the efforts of all the philosophers succeeding Aristotle and working these two millinniums or more in the west. Aristotle rightly pointed out flaws in the doctrines of Plato, but could not redress the wrong.

198. Plotinus (A. D. 204-270), the founder of *Neoplatonism* believes in a Holy Trinity. The One, Spirit and Soul. These three are not equal, like the persons of the Christian Trinity, the One is supreme, Spirit comes next, and Soul last.

"The One is some-what shadowy. It is some times called God, sometimes the Good ; it transcends

Being, which is the first sequent upon the One. We must not attribute predicates to it, but only say, "It is." (This is reminiscent of Parmenides.) It would be a mistake to speak of God as "the All"; because God transcends the All. God is present through all things. The One can be present without any coming: "While it is nowhere, nowhere it is not. Although the one is sometimes spoken of as the Good, we are also told that it precedes both the Good and the Beautiful. Sometimes, the One appears to resemble Aristotle's God. We are told that *God has no need of his derivatives and ignores the created* world. The One is indefinable, and in regard to it there is more truth in silence than in any words whatever."*

199. If God has no need to create the world, it is obvious that the world has not been created by Him. Then what is God? And how do we know Him or about Him? And why should we try to know Him at all? Svami Dayananda does not believe in such a God. His God too transcends the world, but not in the sense of Plotinus. *God is not nowhere, but everywhere.* In every "where" and also "there" where you cannot conceivably apply the term "where". As regards the need which actuates God to create the world, Svami Dayananda's philosophy is remarkably his own. Either God is needy or not? If needy, He is imperfect and therefore no God. If not needy, He need not and does not create the world. That, too, comes to the same thing. Some eastern theists invented the theory of "sport" (*Lila* लीला). The sportists hold that God does create, but not in a serious need of anything. He needs nothing. He creates in sport *i.e.*, just as children play. They quote an aphorism

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 312.

of Vyasa's Vedanta:—*Lok vat tu Lila Kaivalyam.* (लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्)*

This Sutra has led to very many divergent theories, many man-Gods or God-men, God's incarnations with different adventures and exploits. Purposeless or needless sportiveness can lead to anything, serious or silly, much more the latter than the former. Seriousness and sportiveness do not go together.

200. It is here that Svami Dayananda's metaphysics comes into play. He attaches a pecular meaning to "need". An ordinary man *needs to* cook food when he is hungry. But a charitable man cooks food even when he is not hungry, but when another man is hungry. This need is not the need of an imperfect selfish being. He cooks the food not for himself but for others. This shows that even a perfect and needless being does something, in order to help others. Such action does not emanate from the imperfection of the agent, but from the perfection of one who, being perfect Himself, tries to remove the imperfections of others. The following passage from Svami Dayananda's works is worth noting:—

201. *Question*—What is the object of God in creating the world?

Answer—What would have been His gain, had He not created the world?

Question—Had He not created the world he would have been saved so much botheration (remained happy) and the souls would have been free from the turmoil of pleasure and pain.

Answer—These are ways of the idle and inactive and not of energetic beings. And what

*Vedanta Sutra, II. 1. 33.

pleasure or pain is there for the souls in the state of dissolution ? If you compare the pleasure and pain of the world, *happiness many times exceeds the pain* and many pure souls earn the bliss of salvation by constant practice of virtuous actions. In the state of dissolution they lie unconscious as in the sound sleep. Besides, the actions done by the souls in the creation last preceding remain unrewarded and the souls deprived of the enjoyment of their fruit. If anybody asks you, "What is the object of your eye ?" You will naturally say, "seeing". Well, when God possesses the knowledge, the power, and the potentiality of creativeness, *how can* He justify himself except by creating the world ? You have no answer to this question. Besides, justice, power of sustenance, mercy and other attributes of God cannot find their justification unless God makes the world. His infinite power can justify itself only through creation, sustenance, dissolution and government of the universe. Just as seeing is the natural function of the eye, similarly it is the natural function of God to *do good to the souls* by granting them innumerable objects after creating this world".*

202. A *really* charitable person extends his charity to the needy spontaneously and automatically without calculating any gain whatsoever of his own. He cannot do otherwise. It is his nature. The eye sees because it is its nature to see. Not seeing makes it uneasy and unnatural. The eye is happier when it sees than when it does not see. Similarly God creates unselfishly and automatically for the good of imperfect and needy souls. No action is a botheration when it flows from the doer automatically. The aphorism of Vyasa referred to above (*i. e. Lila* or sport-

* Light of Truth, VIII, 116.

iveness) emphasizes *spontaneity* of God's action in creating the world and *absence* of botheration. It has nothing to do with the purposiveness of the action. In the aphorism preceding it (न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्-Vedanta II-1.32) has been negated the *selfish purpose* of God's own and not the purpose or teleology of the Universe. The Universe is a sum-total of numberless events, each having a purpose of some one. Souls are many. So are the things of the universe. Each thing serves the purpose of some one, now of this soul, then of that soul. What is useless for me is useful for another brother soul. Thus everything, and every event are meant to fulfil the needs of somebody in some circumstances.

203. This has been the subject of an aphorism of Patanjali's yoga* :—

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात्

"Though it has ceased to exist as regards the spirit whose purposes have been accomplished, it has not ceased to exist entirely because it is common to other spirits." (*Ganganatha Jha's Translation*).

When I get down the railway train at the end of my journey, my purpose is fulfilled and the train ceases to exist for me as soon as the journey ceases but there are other fellow travellers for whose purpose the train moves on unceasingly. The crux of Svami Dayananda's metaphysics is the eternality and plurality of infinite number of finite imperfect spirits or souls whose requirements are the purpose of the creation. Aristotle's vague teleology goes only half-way. The creation has a purpose. But whose? Had it been of God and God alone, it could have come to termination at some point. This would have given rise to

* Yoga Sutra, II. 22.

interminable questions. We shall deal with the attributes of souls or spirits in some later chapter.*

Here we have discussed only the purposiveness of the all-perfect God's creation, which is the knottiest point in whole theistic realm.

204. As a typical instance I should quote Spinoza's view on theism :

"Everything, according to Spinoza, is ruled by an absolute logical necessity. There is no such thing as free will in the mental sphere or chance in the physical world. Everything that happens is a manifestation of God's inscrutable nature, and it is logically impossible that events should be other than they are. This leads to difficulties in regard to sin, which critics were not slow to point out. One of them, observing that according to Spinoza everything is decreed by God, and is therefore good, asks indignantly : Was it good that Nero should kill his mother ? Was it good that Adam ate the apple ? Spinoza answers that what was positive in those acts was good, and only what was negative was bad; but negation exists only from the point of view of finite creatures. In God, who alone is completely real, there is no negation, and therefore, the evil in what to us seem sin does not exist when they are viewed as parts of the whole. This doctrine, though in one form or another, it has been held by most mystics, cannot, obviously, be reconciled with the orthodox doctrine of sin and damnation. It is bound up with Spinoza's complete rejection of free will."†

205. Here also we have the same difficulty. Not

* Section 236.

† Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, page. 594.

admitting free will, (and surely he could not have admitted it, not believing in free and eternal existence of intelligent souls, or free-willers) he was bound to seek explanation for the criticism levelled against his beliefs. Even his critics could not have answered further criticism; because if God is believed to be an automatic creator, without any beings for whom to create, Nero and Adam were just puppets of God to do as he ordained with the mental set-up which He arbitrarily endowed them with. Thus Spinoza and his critics started at a wrong point and were at a loss to find answers to the awkward position to which they were led by their vague doctrines.

A Few Theological Conundrums.

206. Theistic and atheistic philosophies of India have often been mixed up with theological discussions, which, though not of purely philosophical interest, throw some light on the existence and nature of God. In his book the Satyartha Prakasha (Light of Truth), Svami Dayananda has dealt with a few conundrums hurled at the theists of the past by contemporary Jain writers. We quote them below in extenso.

207. Chandrasuri has given in his book "*Aptanishchayaalankara*" the characteristics of the *Adi-deva* (First God) :—

1. *Sarvajño vītarāgādī doshas trailokyapūjitah.*
   Yathā sthitārthavādī cha devo arhan parameshvarah.

The *Tautati's* have also written the same thing :—

2. *Sarvajño dṛshyate tāvan nedānīmasmidādibhiḥ.*
   Dṛṣṭo nachaikadesho-asti liṅgam vā yo-anumāpayet.
3. *Na chāgamavidhiḥ kaschin-nityasarvajñabodhakaḥ.*
   Na chā tatrārthavādānām tātparyamapi kalpate.
4. *Na chānyārtha pradhānais tais tadastitvam vidhīyate.*
   Na chānuvāditum shakyaḥ pūrvamanyair abodhitah.

1. The *Arhat Deva,* who is free from the blemishes of attachment etc. is object of worship in the three worlds, is the true speaker of the realities, is all-knowing. The self-same *Arhat* is the Supreme Being.

2. As we do not observe any, the existence of an omniscient, beginningless God is not proved by perception. When perception is not applicable in case of God, inference too cannot hold good. There can be no inference unless a part of it is perceived.

3. In the absence of perception and inference, authority (scriptures) also cannot prove the existence of an eternal, beginningless, all-knowing supreme self. When these three proofs fail, then there is no question of other evidences such as *arthavada* (praise, dispraise, or narrative of another man's character) or history.

4. The proof of imperceptible God's existence cannot be similar to the compound *bahubrihi* wherein a third thing not signified by the members of the compound, is implied. (That is to say, God cannot be proved by implication).

Anuvada or repetition is also not possible in case of God, because unless we first hear about God from teachers, there is no question of repetition.

208. *Criticism.* 1. Had there been no beginningless God, who could have created the mould of the bodies of the parents of the Arhan Deva? Without a contriver it is not possible to create a body, completely fitted with exact number of parts and having the capacity of functioning most appropriately. The elements of which the body is made are inanimate (and inert) and they cannot make such a superbly designed body. They have no consciousness of organising themselves into a properly functioning body. That entity which was at first subject to the defections

of desire etc. and then became free from them cannot be God; as the cause which led to salvation being non-eternal, they can cease to exist and bring about a fresh bondage. A finite and fallible being cannot be infinite and infallible. The attributes, tendencies and temperaments of the soul being limited, it cannot be the true speaker of realities in every sense of the term. Therefore, your *Tirthankaras* cannot attain to God-head.

2. Do you believe in the existencc of only those objects which are perceived by senses? Do you not believe in the existence of those things which cannot be perceived? Just as an ear cannot see the shape nor an eye can perceive the sound, similarly we can perceive the truly beginningless God only with our internal organ (inner sense), made pure by knowledge and practices of *Yoga*. Just as we perceive the attributes of the earth and thereby conclude that the earth exists, similarly God is also perceived by perceiving the peculiar design of His. Besides when a man intends to do some evil, he feels within himself fear and shame. This feeling is actuated by God. (The feeling of fear, suspense etc. is so to speak, the inner voice of God). This is another proof of God's existence. When God's existence is proved by the proof perception, there is no reason to bar the application of inference and other proofs.

3. When the validity of peception and inference is agreed upon, scriptural evidence can also be brought forward to prove the eternal, uncreated, and all-knowing God. Therefore, scriptural evidence is also maintainable in favour of God's existence. When the soul can realize God by all the three proofs (perception, inference and authority), then arthavada is not untenable, i. e., we can praise the attributes of God. The eternal things have eternal qualites, eternal

actions and eternal nature and there is nothing to check us from singing in its praise. Just as in human affairs, no work can be done without a doer, similarly for this stupendous work (of the creation of the universe) there must be some creator. When it is so, even a fool can believe in the existence of the creator without any doubt. When we shall hear about God from our teachers, we shall easily repeat it (with our mouths).

Therefore, it is wrong on the part of the Jainas to refute the existence of God on the ground of the evidences such as perception, inference etc.

209. *Question—*

1. *Anādcrāgamasyārtho na cha sarvajñaādimān.*
Kṛtrimena tvasatyena sa katham pratipādyate.
2. *Atha tad vachanenaiva sarvajño-anyaiḥ pratīyate*
Prakalpeta katham siddhir anyo-nyāshrayayo-stayoh.
3. *Sarvajñoktatayā vākyam satyam tenatadastitā.*
Katham tadubhayam sidhyet siddhamulāntarādrte.

1. The omniscient who has had a beginning cannot be the subject of a beginningless scripture. Moreover, how can he be proved by a false artificial thing?

2. If the proof of God's existence is God's own word, then eternal scripture is proved by eternal God and eternal God by eternal scripture. This is a fallacy of *Petitio Principii.*

3. For the Vedas are true because they are the word of the Omniscient God. And the same Vedas prove the existence of Omniscient God. What a funny proof ! There should be a third thing to prove the validity of the Vedas and the existence of God, otherwise there will be *regressus infinitum.*

Answer.—We believe that God and His attributes, actions and nature are eternal. The question of *Petitio*

Principii does not arise in the case of beginningless eternal substances. We know of the cause from the effect and of the effect from the cause. The nature of the cause resides eternally in the effect, and the nature of effect resides eternally in the cause. Similarly God and God's infinite attributes, such as knowledge, being eternal, the question of regressus infinitum does not arise in the case of God's word, *i. e.*, the Vedas.

And you believe the *Tirthankaras* to be Gods. This is untenable. Their bodies cannot come into existence without the parents. How can they, then, get the knowledge of austerities, penances and of salvation* (without any other source)?

All conjunctions have a beginning. There is no conjunction possible without a previous separation.

Therefore, it is necessary to believe in a beginningless creator, God. Remember, that however perfected a man may be, he cannot be fully conversant with the knowledge of the make of our bodies. When a perfected soul enters the condition of sound sleep, it has no consciousness whatsoever. When a soul suffers pain, its knowledge also deteriorates. Nobody but foolish Jainas can believe such finite and localised beings as God. When you say that the Tirthankaras were born of their parents, (we ask) who were the parents of those parents? Go on asking further and there will be a case of *regressus infinitum.*

210. A Dialogue on Theism and Atheism.

Now we give below the second part of the "*Prakarana Ratnakara*" a dialogue on theism and

* When they owe their bodies to the parents, they owe their knowledge also to some other source.

atheism, which well known Jaina scholars have accepted and published in Bombay.

Atheist.—God's will can do nothing. Whatever happens is caused by action.

Theist.—If everything is caused by action, how is action caused? If you say that action is caused by the soul, then how are caused ears etc. different instruments with which the soul does action? If you say that they are from eternity and produced by nature, then eternity being impossible to be got rid of, there will be non-existence of release (salvation) in your religion. If you hold, it is beginningless but terminable like pre-negation, then there will be the release of the actions of all beings without any effort.

If there be no God to give the fruit of the action, then the soul will never submit voluntarily to the suffering due to sins. Thieves etc. never submit voluntarily to the punishment for theft or such other crimes. They have to be punished by the government. Similarly the souls get the fruit for their good and evil actions through God's government, otherwise there may be confusion in actions and one may suffer for another's actions.

Atheist.—God is inactive. If He were the doer of an action, He would suffer the fruit of the action also. Therefore, we hold that the souls who have acquired perfection and got release are action-less. You should also accept the same view.

Theist.—God is not inactive. He is active. When He is sentient, then why not active?

If He is active, He cannot be separate from activity. You believe in an artificial God, the soul that has reached the position of the *Tirthankara.* No wise man can believe in such a God-head. If God-head is an acquired thing then God will be non-eternal and dependent; as He was an ordinary soul before

reaching God-head, He acquired godhead with some means. He would again be reduced to the position of the soul. Soul-ship being His nature, how can He get rid of it ? He has been a soul since eternity and will remain a soul for eternity.

Therefore, it is proper that we should believe in an eternal and self-existent God. Now see. The soul at present does a good or a bad action and enjoys its fruit, pleasure or pain. But God can never do so.

Had God not been active, how could He have created the world?

You hold the actions beginningless and terminable like pre-negation (*Pragabhava*). This theory will lead you to the following philosophical difficulty. There will be no relation of inherence between the action and the actor. This will mean that the actor and the action have the relation of conjunction between them. This relation is always non-eternal.*

You do not believe in any activity in salvation. (This is also open to objection).

Are the emancipated souls conscious beings or unconscious beings?

If you say they are conscious, then they are

* The Jaina theory is :—

(1) There is no God.

(2) The universe is caused by action.

(3) Action is beginningless but terminable, just as non-existence of jar was beginningless, but it terminated when the jar came into being. Svami Dayananda points out a flaw in this theory. He says that two things are related either by the relation of inherence (*samavaya*) or conjunction (*samyoga*). If action is terminable, then the relation of inherence does not exist. It follows that the action and the soul have conjunction between them. Now everybody will admit that conjunction is non-eternal. Therefore, actions cannot be beginningless. And they cannot cause the universe to come into being.

conscious of the terminability of the action (for you have already held the theory that actions are terminable). (When there is no activity left in emancipation) they become inert like a stone, lie at one place, without any motion whatsoever.

Such a salvation would mean falling into a chaos and bondage,

211. *Atheist.*—God is not all-pervading. If He is all pervading why are not all things sentient? And why are these different stages, the highest, middling, the lowest of the *Brahmanas*, Kasttriyas Vaishyas, Shudras and others? When God is with all, there should be no difference of smallness or greatness.

Theist.—The pervader and the pervaded can never be identical. The pervaded is localised and the pervader is omnipresent, *e.g.* ether is everywhere, while the things through which ether pervades, such as the earth, jar, cloth etc. are localized. Similarly God the pervader is sentient, while other objects are not.

The educated and the uneducated, the virtuous and the vicious cannot all be equal. Qualities such as knowledge, actions such at truthfulness, and temperament, such as mannerliness make distinctions. This is the cause of differentiation between the *Brahmanas*, *Ksattriyas*, *Vaishyas* and *Shudra* (For the system of *varnas* vide Chapter IV).

Atheist.—If God is the cause of the universe, then where is the need of the mother and the father?

Theist.—God is the author of Nature and not of Art. God does not do what souls should do. This should be done by souls. For instance God has created tree, fruit, herbs, corn ete. If men do not take the material, do not grind corn or bake bread, or eat,

God will never do these things for souls. If the souls do not do these things, their lives cannot go on. Therefore, in the beginning of the creation God makes the bodies like moulds. Thereafter to procreate children becomes the duty of men.

Atheist.—When God is eternal, beginningless, perfect in consciousness, bliss and knowledge, why does He fall into the botheration of creating the world and suffering pain? Even an ordinary man will not like to quit the position of bliss and come into suffering. Why did God do such a thing?

Theist.—God does not fall into a botheration or suffering. Nor does He quit bliss. Only a localized being can be subjected to botheration and pain. An all-pervading being cannot. If the eternal, happy and all-knowing God would not make the world, who else will then do this work? Souls have no capacity to make the world. The lifeless matter has no fitness to mould its own self. This proves that God alone makes the world and He remains always happy. Just as God creates the world out of original matter, similarly it is He Himself who has ordained the law that mother and father should be instrumental in continuing the generation.

212. *Atheist*.—Why did God abandon the happiness of salvation and take upon Himself the burden of creating, sustaining and destroying the universe?

Theist.—God is by nature eternally emancipated. He is not like your *Tirthankaras* to whom emancipation has come through some means as an acquired object, who are localized, and whose salvation is restricted. He does not submit Himself to any bondage even when He creates, sustains and dissolves this great universe. Release and bondage are relative. No

release without bondage, no bondage without release. God was never in bondage. Therefore, it cannot be said of Him that He *got* release. Only localized souls can be sometimes in bondage and sometimes in emancipation. The infinite, universal, all-pervading God does not fall into the cycle of bondage or acquired release like your *Tirthankaras*. God is ever-released.

Atheist.—Souls can enjoy the fruit of their actions by themselves, like the inebriation produced by the intoxicating drug *bhang*. There is no need of God's intervention.

Theist.—Just as without the king, robbers, thieves and other criminals do not, by themselves, undergo the punishment of execution, imprisonment etc., it is the goverment which catches them by force and compels them to undergo the punishment, similarly it is God who according to His laws compels the souls to suffer the fruit of their evil actions. No soul likes to undergo punishment for its own evil actions.

Therefore, the intervention of justice-maintaining God is indispensable.

213. *Atheist.*—There is no one God in the universe. All emancipated souls are Gods.

Theist.—This statement is absurd. He, who was at first in bondage and has now got his release, must go back to the bondaged condition again, as his release is not natural or eternal, *e.g.*, your twenty-four *Tirthankaras* were at first in bondage, then they became released. They must fall back to the position of bondage again.

If Gods are many, they would quarrel amongst themselves just as many souls do.

Atheist.—O fool, there is no creator of the world. The world is self-existent.

Theist.—How mistaken are these Jainas! Can there be any activity without an actor and any deed without an activity? It is just like saying that wheat grows itself in the field, and it itself turns into flour, flour itself turns into bread and bread itself goes into the bellies of the Jainas; or, that cotton, thread, cloth, coat, wrapper, loincloth, turbans etc. are made by nobody. If it is not so, then how can the world with its multiplicity of designs and all sorts of complex substances come into existence without God, the creator? If you insist on believing in the self-created world, you should also show us the self-created bread and self-created dress. But when you cannot do so, how, then, can wise men subscribe to your invalid reasoning?

214. *Atheist.*—Is God detached or attached?* If detached, why did he have the botheration of creating the world? If attached, He cannot have the capacity to create the world.

Theist.—Detachment and attachment are inapplicable in the case of God. He who is all-pervading can neither quit anything nor grasp it. There is nothing better than God. There is nothing which God lacks. Therefore, God can have no attachment towards anything. The question of detachment and attachment can arise only in the case of souls; not of God.

* Attachment (*moha*) is a desire to get anything. Detachment (*viraga*) is the renunciation of such desire. These words are used for men. The *viraktas* (detached) are those who have ceased to have anything to do with the world. The *mohitas* are those who are engrossed in the world. Desire and aversion are sentiments attendant upon the lack of a desirable thing or presence of an undesirable one. Svami Dayananda means that God has neither of these. Those who raise an objection of this type are labouring under the anthropomorphism of a very vulgar type.

Atheist.—If you will look upon God as the creator of the world and giver of the fruit of the actions of the souls, He will be unhappy owing to world botheration.

Theist.—When a virtuous adminstrator of justice who does all sorts of work, and gives the fruit of the actions to different beings, does not involve himself into sufferings, then how can God, who has infinite powers feel bothered and unhappy? You ignorantly think God like yourself or your *Tirthankaras*. This is your folly. If you wish to free your-self from the failings of ignorance, then come to the Vedas and other true scriptures. Why are you wasting time in superstitions and erroneous beliefs ?*

* Light of Truth, XII, 24-31,

Chapter IV.

SOULS AND LIFE

215. In the last chapter we delineated the conception of God in Svami Dayananda's philosophy. Svami Dayananda does not look upon God as some existence, absolute in itself being in no way connected with our life and with the world in which we live. If there were such a God, it was nobody's business to take note of it. It was neither possible nor useful. We have seen in the last chapters that Svami Dayananda's philosophy starts with common life, examines it in all its details and deduces conclusions which logically and psychologically flow from them.

216. It is commonly stated that life is a riddle, the knottiest and most insoluble riddle. Yet man has never taken this riddle, lying. His constant endeavour has been to solve it and to solve it at least for his own satisfaction, if not for all men. This endeavour gave birth to philosophy and it is this endeavour which has kept it alive.

217. "I see a tree". This is a common event, one of the events which make life. What are its implications ? Is it all a physical action ? A physicist would explain it by propounding all the theories about light and will conlude that matter, or some variant of matter works in such a way that the result is the phenomenon called "seeing a tree." But a little thought will persuade us to go further. Light is not pure radiation. It is

visible radiation. So physics has carried us only half way and left us in the midst of the densest and darkest part of the woodland. When I was seeing the tree, physical radiation was busy all round me. The waves of light were assailing me from all directions. But out of one thousand and one objects that exist about me I see only the tree. Who selects that one thing for me and who rejects the others ? What makes radiation light, *i. e. visible radiation* ?

218. The radiations strike against other objects too; say, the table. The radiation is there. But the table does not say, "I see this or that." What makes me say so ? It is an important question.

219. The old answer to the question was that I am a soul, a spirit, a something non-material which has the capacity of seeing. The man in the street still holds the same belief. Is it a belief ingrained in hls nature ? Or does he follow the tradition ? Or has he thought it out for himself ? It is not easy to answer these questions. But it is a common belief, very old, perhaps as old as humanity itself. But it has long since come under dis-repute among philosophers as well as scientists.

220. The main cause was the excrescenses that wove round this belief. When it was asked "What is it that you call soul or I ?", it led to a good deal of vagueness and conjectures. Shankaracharya in his commentary of the Vedanta has suggested following mutually dis-agreeing answers:—

(1) Mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the self.

(2) The organs endowed with the intelligence are the self.

(3) The internal organ is the self.
(4) The self is a mere momentary idea.
(5) It is the void.
(6) There is a transmigrating being different from the body and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruit of action).
(7) That being is enjoyer only, not actor.
(8) That in addition to individual souls there is an all-knowing, all-powerful God.
(9) The Lord is the self of the enjoyer (*i. e.* of the individual soul whose individual existence is *apparent only*, the product of Nescience).*
(10) The soul is God Himself, as it pervades.

221. Gautama Buddha, confounded with all that the Brahman Pandits of those days said, laid foundation of the *anatta* (anatma) or no-soul theory, comparing life with an ever flickering and unpermanent flame,

*Thibaut's English Translation. (The Sacred Books of the East Vol. XXXIV, page 15-16.)

Original Sanskrta Texts—

(1) देह मात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मा ।
(2) इन्द्रियाणि एव चेतनान्यात्मा ।
(3) मन इत्यन्ये ।
(4) विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके ।
(5) शून्यमित्यपरे ।
(6) अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्त्ता भोक्ता ।
(7) भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्त्ता ।
(8) अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित् ।
(9) आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे ।

(वेदान्त सूत्र १ । १ । १ शांकरभाष्ये)

(10) जीवो ब्रह्मैव, आत्मत्वात्, ब्रह्मवदित्यादियुक्तेः

(रत्नप्रभा, वेदान्त शांकरभाष्योपरि)

which later Buddhist philosophers developed into a highly elaborate philosophy of flux.

222. The Jainas gave birth to a parallel philosophy, atheistic as they called it, as they denied the existence of the maker of the universe, and yet spiritualistic or half spiritualistic in a sense, as they held that the soul (*Jiva*) is different from matter (or *pudgala*), though having an atomic size.

"Every organism or a Samsari Jiva is an organic unity of the two distinct entities, *Jiva* and *Pudgala*, soul and body....................soul is *chetana* (consciousness), *amurta* (non-corporeal), *arupa* (non-sentient), whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case.*

जीवा अणाइणिहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।
सब्भावदो अणंता पंचग्गगुणप्पधाणा य ।†

Its Sanskrta rendering:—

जीवा अनादिनिधनाः सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।
सद्भावतोऽनन्ताः पञ्चाग्रगुणप्रधाना : च ॥

"*Jivas* according to their characteristics have neither beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning but no end. Thus having these five fundamental qualities they are as existences infinite in number.‡

"This superphysical principle is our soul-substance. But such an admission of the soul-substance as distinct from dead dull *pudgala* involves dualism of spirit and matter, *Jiva* (जीव) and *Ajiva* (अजीव)."¶

223. The Bible says :—

"And the Lord God formed man of the dust of

* Panchastikayasara, Introduction, p. XXXVI
† Svami Shri Kundakundacharya's Panchastikaya Sara Verse 59
‡ Prof. A. Chakravartinayanar's Eng. Translation.
¶ An Epitom of Jainism, p. 276.

the ground and *breathed into his nostrils* the breath of life, and man became a living soul''.*

224. Almost similar is the statement of the Quoran of Islam that God made the body of Adam out of dust (*Salsal*) and breathed his own breath into the body (*Nafakhto fi he min ruhi*).†

225. What was the nature of this breath ? Was it God Himself with all the qualities which God is said to possess ? Or a spark of the great fire called God, and though finite, a part only, yet possessing nothing ungodly or undivine in it ?‡

226. There may be several other alternatives upheld by various cults past or present.

In the midst of such varying beliefs it was natural for a thinking being to find himself confused and one of the ways to extricate himself from this puzzle was to deny outright the existence of a non-material spirit or self and to deny with it all implications such as immortality, transmigration, vice, virtue etc. except a few formulas which might help in easy living.

* Genesis, II 7.

† Qoran, Al Hijra, Verses 28-29.

‡ Criticising Locke's theism, A. W. Benn remarks in his History of Modern Philosophy :—

"On examination the proof appears to involve two unproved assumptions. The first is that *nothing can begin to exist without a cause.* The second is *that effects must resemble their cause*.......................on the same principle *matter must have been made by something material*, pain by something that is pained, evil by something that is evil. It would not even be going too far to say that by this logic *I myself must have existed from all eternity*, for to say that I was created by a *not-myself* would be to say that something may come from nothing. pp. 58-59.

227. The first protest came from the scientists. It was Tyndall who in his presidential address to the British Association of 1874 predicted that the future science will enable us to survey the "ultimate purely *natural* and *inevitable* march of evolution from the atoms of primaeval nebula to the proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science."*

228. Science did advance and its long strides are visible in every walk of life. Various theories were propounded to explain life, tiny or big, of insects or men, without any reference whatsoever to soul or super-material or metaphysical entity. Life remained life, but desouled or despirited. Theology was totally banished, psychology was traced to physiology and then to physics. Reflexism and behaviourism came to rescue and it was supposed that Tyndall's prophecy would be literally true and matter will reign supreme all over.

229. But fortunately enough, the attitude of the scientists has always been liberal. They have always been ready to change their beliefs in the light of new findings. When they started their analysis, they hypothesized that the objects of the universe are made of very tiny units called atoms, solid in themselves and possessing certain properties. They have an intrinsic capacity to come together in various ways and proportions and the result is the world we see around us, living and non-living. The basic difference between living and non-living is not due to any super-material or non-material separate entity, but only on account of certain compositions, which working in different permutations and combinations give us such a

* Joad's Matter, Life and Value, page. 8.

variety of objects. Lifeless objects, living objects, conscious objects and self-conscious objects, all were arranged in a systematically graduated series and it was proved that there is no serious gulf between these and the former merges into the latter or the latter emerges from the former almost automatically, or, to be more specific, in natural succession.

230. The greatest sufferers at the hands of the scientists were theologians or religionists. Religion has been pervading human life from times immemorial. Every tiny act that a man does is looked upon from religious point of view. All human institutions are based upon religious sentiments. An attack on them was an attack on human life. All religious world rose against science, different segments fighting with different armaments. The vulgar condemned scientists as devils and gave them all the treatment that the devil deserved. Philosophers examined their philosophies and tried to fight the enemy with finer weapons. Berkeley propounded his theory of all "*esse is percipi*," that is, there is no such thing as external matter. All that exists does exist in our minds as our own ideas. He held that there were souls having ideas and there was God the Supreme Soul.

231. Berkeley did rouse an interest in the Christian world. It created a revolution in philosophical and psychological circles; but we do not find any scientist tarrying to take notice of it or halting his work in the light of the new philosophy till Berkeley's doctrines were totally washed away by Hume's agnosticism, which was a necessary corollary to Berkeley's argumentation.

232. It was science's own investigations that made the scientists pause to think. They came across certain happenings which could not be explained by established scientific laws. Something foreign constantly peeped at the door. It could not be driven away by any means whatsoever. When Darwin was propounding his theory of evolution, Russell Wallace repeatedly and persistently hinted that Darwin's explanations though remarkably valuable could not explain Mind.

233. He says........."the most prominent feature of my book is that I enter into a popular, yet critical examination of those underlying fundamental problems which Darwin purposely excluded from his work as being beyond the scope of *his* enquiry. Such are the nature and causes of life itself, and more especially of its most fundamental and mysterious powers, growth and reproduction.................I argue, that they necessarily imply first a creative power, which so constituted matter as to render these marvels possible, next a directive mind which is demanded at every step of what we term growth, and often look upon as so simple and natural a process as to require no explanation; and lastly, ultimate purpose in the very existence of the whole vast life-world in all its long course of evolution throughout the eons of geological time".*

234. *Creative power*, *directive mind* and *ultimate purpose* are the three chief things which A. R. Wallace fails to explain from mere matter. These are undisputedly discriminative characteristics of a living thing. They are markedly visible in a living body

* A. R. Wallace's *World of Life*, Preface, pages. VI·VII.

and significantly absent in a dead corpse. A minute before the death, the behaviour of a living animal showed all these characteristics and no sooner than the death took place, all these disappeared. A lay man says that it was the soul, an invisible non-material something which made the body living, and as it departed, the body is a mere corpse now. The scientist says that death is nothing but upsetting a certain arrangement. Nothing has escaped. All is there. "Life is an *organised* matter". Disturb the organisation and it is death.

235. When we say that life is an "*organised*" matter, the word "organised" betrays the weakness of the proposition. What it proposed to disprove has forced itself into the language. Matter cannot be "*organised*" without the intervention of some organising entity which underlies the above-mentioned triad of Wallace. If matter be self-organised, everything should be living and it would be difficult to account for death.

236. Svami Dayananda holds that the layman's traditional view that it is the soul that makes body living is correct and that the scientists of naturalistic tendencies have erred too much on the side of materialism. Svami Dayananda does not agree with the hotch-potch theories of prevalent theology which give no real status to "souls." He stands between all-materialism and all-spiritualism. He does not deny that matter is organised. In fact everything we come in contact with is organised and it is the business of science to find out the principles which guide this organisation. Water is an organised mass of matter. You can compose or decompose it according to the underlying principle. So are other things, even non-living. It is

this principle which points to the intelligent organiser, *i. e.* God. But a living-body has something else than the above organisation, which distinguishes it from non-living substances. And that "else" is the soul, the soul which not only governs the body in many ways, but enjoys it. Svami Dayananda adopts in toto the Nyaya view of soul with the following six characteristics or distinctive features,* desire, aversion, urge, pleasure, pain and sentience. These cannot be the characteristics of God, the creator of the universe, though in many ways souls resemble Him.

237. In order to understand Svami Dayananda's view of the soul, we shall have to examine other philosophies also, so that we might know on what points they agree and on what, disagree. The chief especiality of Svami Dayananda's philosophy is his views about the nature of the soul. It is the privot on which revolves his ethics and everything that pertains human life. In defining life and death Svami Dayananda says that the soul's contact with the body is "birth" and separation "death."† Birth and death are the two most important phenomena of the living world and they cannot be lightly disposed of. It is only the living body that exhibits pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, activity and intelligence. I think there is no philosopher who might deny these things, though they account for them differently. Even birth and death have been variously accounted for. Every philosophy claims the validity of its position. In order

* इच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्न-सुख-दुःख-ज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिंगमिति (न्याय सूत्र १। १०)

† शरीर के संयोग का नाम 'जन्म' और वियोग मात्र को 'मृत्यु' कहते हैं। (स्वमन्तव्यामन्तव्यप्रकाश ४५)।

(Light of Truth, Beliefs and Disbeliefs, section 45).

to vindicate or at least explain Svami Dayananda's position we must take a due notice of all typical philosophies.

238. Let us start with *naturalism*. "Naturalism is a philosophy of nature." And nature is "an uncounted multitude of things involved in apparent incessant change and strewn through out unfathomed space."* Naturalism "expands the conceptions drawn from natural sciences into a world view." Naturalism denies the existence of anything beyond nature, behind nature, other than nature. But all the definitions that naturalists have given of nature are inadequate to solve the question under discussion. Nature covers both physical and mental life. Chemistry and physics are as much natural sciences as mental and moral sciences such as psychology, ethics or aesthetics. Therefore to confine naturalism to mere material things is not a fair way of explaining life. Technically you can narrow down the scope of a philosophy as much as you like. But it will be unfair to deny all that lies beyond your arbitrarily established confines. If nature covers all that *is* and if naturalism is a philosophy which explains *this all*, then it should be able to explain all that falls within *this all*. Chemistry and physics can explain only the physical side of things. You can explain the composition of water, but how can you explain thirst-for water ? *Thirst* is not the absence of water; it is the consciousness of the absence of water in our constitution plus an urge to recoup the deficiency. Similarly if I break my leg, then the breaking of the bone is a physical action. But the *pain* that accompanies that occurrence is something peculiar and immaterial. You may not like to have to do with anything beyond

* Hocking's Types of Philosophy, p. 40,41.

nature, behind nature, other-than-nature. But then, do you hold that nature is some one solid stone-like unit, denying all within or without it ? I and my body are in nature. Nature does not mean one indivisible something. If it is composit something, you should explain each part severally as well as jointly. For instance, you can explain the structure of my eye and its way of functioning by means of physical and chemical laws. You may possibly explain how light waves affect the retina. But how is it that the same sight causes sometimes pleasure and at others pain, sometimes attraction and at others repulsion ?

239. Efforts have been made to trace these feelling to "*causal laws*", *i.e.* nature is the "the total system of causes, each phase of the universe leading to and explaining the new phase." When you say that you do whatever you *please*, the naturalist would retort that "you can do as you please, but you cannot please as you please." That is, nature has determined the way in which you please; you cannot do otherwise.

240. This seems to me too extravagant a claim. We cannot always do as we please. There are disappointments. This shows that nature did not determine our pleasures so fixedly and so foresightedly that our pleasures might always lead to pleased actions. Secondly, in numerous cases we can check our pleasures or change the direction of our pleasures. My intelligence, my wisdom, my training and my practice of self-government enable me to change the venue of my pleasures. Admitting that nature has been continually working in the same way from eternity and supposing that the preceding sets of laws always determine the way of subsequent working, you cannot explain the variety of animal behaviours. We shall do as we

please, and we shall please as we are compelled to please, leaving no room for individual choice of pleasures and thus denying pleasures at the very out-set. Secondly, we often do, not only what we please to do, but also what we are pained to do. If *pleasing* means a fixed way of working determined by inanimate forces, what would *paining* mean and how to account for this difference ?

241. Svami Shankaracharya puts the whole thing in a pithy formula, "doing", "not doing" and "doing otherwise," (कर्तुं, अकर्तुं and अन्यथा कर्तुं*). A living being is distinguished from a non-living being by his three ways of working. He would do a thing, would stop to do it and would do it in a quite different way. This choosing of one out of the three available paths, which we find in animals of all grades, within their restricted spheres, can not be explained by naturalism, whether it be of *atomism* type or of *energism* type.

242. It is true that what we call mind is very fragile and constantly depends on the physical world. Changes of food, temperature, work, or health affect the state of mind. It is also true that the mind develops with the body and old age brings decrepitude. But it will be too much to say that the mind and the body develop equally and decay equally. We have often observed saints' minds growing and working in just the inverse proportion of their bodily development. Mahatma Gandhi's lean and puny body had a mind more vigorous than what his much healthier body previously possessed.

243. Svami Dayananda's philosophy does not

* Shankara's commentary on the Vedanta, I. 1. 4.

negative naturalism in toto. It simply contradicts its extravagant demands. He does not deny the importance of the brain or the body, whose sound functioning leads to the sound functioning of the mind. He simply restricts the field of its utility. Supplementing the definition of the soul as given by Gotama in the above mentioned *Nyaya Sutra*, he has expressed his agreement with Kanada's *Vaisheshik Sutra* (III. ii, 4) in which some purely physiological functions have been added as characteristics* of the soul; *e. g.* breathing out (*prana* प्राण), breathing in (*apana* अपान), downward nictation (*nimesha* निमेष), upward nictation (*unmesha* उन्मेष), animation (*jivana* जीवन), thinking (*manas* मन:) motion (*gati* गति), sensation (*indriya* इन्द्रिय), inner emotions (*antarvikara* अन्तर्विकार), pleasure (*sukha* सुख), pain (*dukha* दु:ख), desire (*ichchha* इच्छा), aversion (*dvesha* द्वेष), activity (*prayatna* प्रयत्न).†

244. In this respect Svami Dayananda differs from Shankara or other idealists who claim that all bodily movements are nothing but different modes of the soul and that all matter is only a mental phase. If mind were self-sufficient in its activities, there was no need of brain. Neither does

* प्राणाऽपाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तर्विकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेष प्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि । वैशेषिक अ० ३, आह्निक २, सूक्त ४ ।

(प्राण) भीतर से वायु को निकालना, (अपान) बाहर से वायु को भीतर लेना (निमेष) आँख को नीचे ढाँकना, (उन्मेष) आँख को ऊपर उठाना, (जीवन) प्राण का धारण करना, (मनः) मनन विचार अर्थात् ज्ञान, (गति) यथेष्ट गमन करना, (इन्द्रिय) इन्द्रियों का विषयों में चलाना, उनसे विषयों का ग्रहण करना, (अन्तर्विकार) क्षुधा, तृषा, ज्वर, पीड़ा आदि विकारों का होना, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष, और प्रयत्न ये सब आत्मा के लिङ्ग अर्थात् कर्म और गुण हैं ।

(सत्यार्थ प्रकाश समुल्लास ३)

† Light of Truth, III, 3.

Svamī Dayananda agree with the materialist who says that as mind can never be seen separate from the brain, it is as material as brain is. If I have never been seen writing without the pen, it will be bad logic to suggest that the pen is the writing agency. A motion in the brain may accompany thinking process, as the motion of the pen accompanies the motion of the brain while I am writing ; but a motion is one thing and a thought something quite different. We often interchange in common language the 'brain' and 'the mind' and call the typing machine as type-*writer*. But it is difficult to agree with Hobbes that a sensation is only a form of motion and a thought is nothing but a chain of dying sensations and hence a sequence of motions. The French physician Cabaniss's (1757-1808) saying that 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile" is too common. But few people have ever considered that this 'secretion' is not at all chemical. No microscopic inspection of a brain process can ever discover something parallel to love or aversion of my mind.

245. Here there is a question. Soul and mind have been confusedly talked about as synonymous here as well as at many other places. Even if it is admitted that brain and mind are not identical, is there then an identity between the mind and the soul. ?

246. If the soul is not the mind and the mind not the soul, then the mind will be a non-spiritual or material substance, and to talk of mind will be just to talk about a particular phase of matter.

247. Formerly psychology which is the science of mind was supposed to be metaphysics and had

nothing to do with physical sciences. But later on the view changed and psychology came to be associated closely with physiology. Now modern psychological theories have severed their connection with soul or spirit. They do not go beyond consciousness and for consciousness they look to physiological and physical causes.

248. What is the attitude of Svami Dayananda? The Sanskrta equivalent to mind is *manas* (मनः). What is this *manas ?* Material or immaterial? Svami Dayananda following Gotama's *Nyaya Sutras* defines *manas* as that which renders two simultaneous awarenesses impossible.*

युगपज् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिंगम्

249. In Kanada's *Vaisheshika*, the same thing has been given in a different language† :—

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षे ज्ञानस्यभावोऽभावश्च (मनसोलिंगम्)

When the external objects are in contact with our senses and the soul, even then sometimes there is awareness of the object and at others not. What is the reason that even when the object is before my eye and my eye is open, still the awareness of the object is not there? The radiation of light is there and the eye has no defect, why not the awareness of the object then? The philosopher means that between the senses and the soul there is another instrument called *manas* or mind which swifty connects the soul now with this sense and now with that, and only that object yields its awareness whose respective organ of sense is connected with the soul at that particular moment. If you do not posit this connecting link called mind,

* Nyaya Sutra, I. 1.16.

† Light of Truth, III. 64.

then all the organs of the five senses being open and having their contact with the outer world will make themselves cognized simultaneously. But they do not. In common parlance of psychology it is said that we do not congnize all objects because we are not attentive. But what is attention? This explanation does not explain. It only *describes*. Modern psychology while weaning itself from non-material spirit or soul, dispenses with *manas* also. But it has failed to explain why there is no *necessary* parallelism between the external stimuli and internal responses. Ancient Indian philosophers have laid a great emphasis on the position of *manas* among the instruments of knowledge.*

250. Svami Dayananda appears to hold that *manas* has two functions. As a sixth sense it gives the awareness of pain and pleasure. Wherever Svami Dayananda has enumerated senses he has almost invariably included *manas* as the sixth sense. In fact pleasure and pain are different from the sense-knowledge. The stimuli that excite the well known five sense-organs do not give pleasure or pain. The same sight and the same sound may give us pleasure and pain both at different occasions for which our sense-knowledge is not responsible. Even the sense of touch does not give pain. It comes from elsewhere, and the soul gets its awareness not through senses but through *manas*.

251. The second function of *manas* is that which has been given above in the *sutras* of *Nyaya* and

* आलोकेन्द्रिय-मनः-संस्कारेषु हि सत्सु संवेदनमुत्पद्यते इति तदभावे नोत्पद्यते ।

(Bhaskara's Vedanta Bhashya I 1. b.)

Vaisheshika, *i. e.*, it narrows down the awareness to the minimum, *i. e.*, one at a time.

252. Modern physiologists confine the sense functions to the functions of the sense organs which are all obviously material (physical). They have nothing to do with meta-physical or non-material nature of senses. They have reduced all these functions to reflex action and the reflex is conceived as "a motion of some fluid along the nerves from the sense organs to the brain and thence back to the muscles". "Thus the physical force or motion that excited the sense organs set in motion a physical process within the body that resulted in muscular movement." Here there is no question of soul or mind. But pleasure and pain still remain unexplained. Nor is there any reason why out of so many physical forces that assail the sense organs only one should excite the motion and not others. Associated or conditioned reflexes in which the cause of reflex is shifted to auxiliary and indirect stimuli most of which are the results of education or external association, go a long way to show that the moving fluid is not sufficient to explain the reflex action.

253. Pavlov, the famous Russian physiologist had arranged apparatus for the dog's saliva directly from one of the salivary glands, and was giving the animal food to arouse the flow of saliva. He noticed that the saliva began to flow in an *experienced* dog before the food was actually put in his mouth. It flowed at the sight of the dish containing the food or at the approach of the attendant who customarily brought the food, or even at the sound of the

attendant's foot-steps in the adjoining room."*

254. The importance of these psychological researches based exclusively on physiological functions can not be underrated. They are very useful in education, medicine and even in various other departments of life. But their inadequacy in philosophy is glaringly apparent. Experience, imagination, memory, education are terms which if they have a meaning point to something highly non-material or super-material.

255. Is there any physical organ of this *manas* corresponding to the sense-organs ? The organ 'eye' is obviously physical, though the sense of sight is not. A wave of light assails the organ, but does it actually excite it too ? Light is not mere radiation but *visible* radiation. Where does visibility come from ? Vibrations of sound assail our ear constantly. But do they always excite ? Sound is not merely a vibration but an *audible vibration.* What is this audibility due to ? This shows that we should go beyond matter and material processes if we want to know the reality. But this does not mean that we should ignore matter and withhold from the scientists the mead which they rightly deserve.

256. The brain is generally believed to be the physical organ of the mind. Just as the diseased eye obstructs the sense of sight, similarly diseased brain obstructs the functions of mind too. Just as abmormal eye-diseases sometimes present an object in a different colour, size or even number, and sometimes they lead

* *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* by Robert S. Wordworth p 64.

to total blindness, similarly brain diseases too give abnormal illusory magnitude to pleasures and pains and at times make the subject totally unconscious of any pleasure or pain whatsoever. But brain is a very comprehensive term. It includes all the nervous system which connects the brain proper with sense-organs. What is grossly called brain is much more than the material organ of mental faculties. Indian philosophers and with them Svami Dayananda, hold that physically speaking *manas* is an evolute of matter, most rarefied, finer than even the finest nerves which can yield to scientific observations. According to *Sankhya* philosophy (and it is only *Sankhya* which has given due cognition to *matter* as the most original substance of which the world has sprung) *manas* or *mahat-tattva* (magnum elementum) is the first evolute from *Prakriti* (or *materia radica*, the root matter). Counted from the beginning it is the first link and counted from the end, the last link between matter and non-material soul. And the later universe with all its material and spiritual aspects, is a process of evolution in which spirit and matter both advance side by side. Just as a living child enshrouded by lifeless surroudings grows materially and spiritually simultaneously and his surroundings in adult age grow parallel to his mental and non-material development, similarly that *manas* or *mahat-tattva* goes on assuming grosser forms of which sense-organs and other objects are made. *Manas* viewed from spiritual point is nothing else than the thinking soul, just as spiritually speaking the eye or seeing sense is no other than the seeing soul. The soul becomes the *seer* when it works through the eye and *hearer* when it works through the ear. Similarly it is *manas* (feeler, thinker or willer) when it feels pleasure or pain or when it thinks, wills etc. Just as the impressions of light are received by the eye and later

on deposited somewhere so that they may be revived in imagination, memory or dream, similarly the thinking soul deposits thinking material, memory, imagination, emotions and impulses somewhere in the physical organ of *manas*. This is the finest element of brain. Svami Dayananda holds that this mind-organ is constantly with the soul, in dream as well as in sound sleep, even when its connection with the outer world is suspended. It is with the soul even after the death and passes into the next cycle of physical existence commonly called transmigration or metamorphosis. Consciousness, unconsciousness, sub-consciousness of which we hear so much in the psychological world are the functions of this material *manas* through which the soul works. Svami Dayananda writes :—

257. "The soul is happy or sorrowful by perceiving pleasant and unpleasant shapes, sounds, colours, tastes, hardness, softness etc. through the external senses, ears, nose, tongue and skin; similarly, through the four-fold internal organ of the faculties of feeling, knowing, willing, and egoing, the same soul receives the internal experiences of ideation, determination, memory, egotism etc............"*

258. "Let us realize that we are conscious beings. It is why we get knowledge and see our mind. We find out when our mind is tranquil, when disturbed, when happy, and when miserable. We know our senses, and our vital airs, we remember the past experiences, we can know many things simultaneously, and retain them. And we are distinct from this knowledge-apparatus. (The knowledge-apparatus is mere apparatus and not the actual knower). Had we not been distinct

* Light of Truth, IX, 6.

we could not have been free-agents, prompters, and holders (of this apparatus).''*

259. The connection of soul and *manas* is further explained as follows,—in chapter IX, paras 34, 35, and 36 :—

34. There are three states of the soul—wakeful, dreaming and deep-slumbering.

35. There are three bodies:—

(i) *Gross-body* which is visible externally.

(ii) *Subtle body* consisting of five-breaths, five senses, five fine elements, mind and intellect (seventeen factors). The subtle body remains with the soul even at birth and death (This means that the subtle body does not die with the death of gross-body). This subtle body is of two kinds, one physical, made of five fine elements, second natural, *i. e.* consisting of soul's own nature. This second non-physical body remains with the soul even in emancipation and it is with this body that the soul enjoys the bliss of beatitude. This being of the essense of materia-radica is all pervasive and common to all souls.

36. "Besides these, there is the fourth body in which the soul experiences the happiness of God in the *samadhi* condition of *yoga*. The influence of this pure body created out of the inpressions of samadhi is helpful to the soul in emancipation also."

260. It is clear from these quotations that according to Svami Dayananda *manas is spiritual as well as material*. When spiritual, it means the thinking power

* Ibid, IX, 44.

of the self and when material, it means a super-fine body which though made out of the matter, cannot subject itself to the observations and investigations of material instruments, which are obviously grosser and unfit to penetrate into deeper stages of matter. This explanation in many ways fits itself in the system of Svami Dayananda's Realism, as there should be some link between spirit and matter at the very finest stage of affairs.

261. It may appear irksome to some people to infer this finest body, the existence of which is not warranted by laboratory observations of either a psychologist or a physiologist. But unless you posit spiritual monism or material monism (both of which are attended with insoluble knots of very serious type) you can not explain the organic developments of the body and mind which we daily experience. Take, for instance, a just born babe. His body and mind both are undeveloped. The body functions in an imperfect manner, but it does function. He sucks, digests, assimilates and eliminates. But it will be a mistake to suppose that there are present in that baby no germs of mental life. Expert psychologists have discovered in the babes many tendencies which, they think, have descended from former stages of evolution (through what medium? They are silent about it). After this stage the experiments become easy. We see bodily life and mental life developing side by side. The eye develops and the seeing capacity along with it, the former serving the purpose of the latter. Similarly other parts of the body. The strength which the fully developed arms of an adult come to possess would have been meaningless without the correspondingly developed emotions which determine the value of that strength.

262. Now, just as you have traced *forward* the babe's development, you can trace it *backward* to pre-natal stages of most initial type. You can not locate a stage where there were no signs of sucking, digesting, assimilating and eliminating. However rudimentary, the functions are two-fold, known in Sanskrta as *annam* (अन्नं) or food and *annada* (अन्नाद) or food-taker. It is impossible to reduce these to one such stage wherein there is no assimilation and therefore no assimilator and the thing assimilated. The Sankhya duality is constantly present at the root stage, at the branch stage and at the fruit stage. This shows that every subsequent stage of the body gets grosser and grosser and the consciousness-side of our existence becomes fitter and fitter for harnessing the bodily development. *Patanjali's*, yoga philosophy gives following three aphorisms which point at the same thing:—

विशेषाविशेषलिंगमात्राऽलिंगानि गुणपर्वाणि ।
द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रःशुद्धो ऽ पि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ।
तदर्थ एवं दृश्यस्यात्मा ।*

The stages of bodily development are four, described in reverse order:—(1) the grossest wherein different parts of the body and their functions are quite distinct; (2) the next preceding stage wherein these distinctions are vague or indefinite and unscrutable; (3) the stage preceding the second, where very indistinct signs are visible, and the individuation has just started; (4) the last or most initial stage where even indistinct signs are not perceptible. This is the meaning of the first aphorism. The second aphorism says that there is a seer or life-element, which though purely immaterial in essence, inheres the germs of consciousness. The third aphorism points out that all the material development

* Yoga Sutras, II, 19, 20, 21.

is *for the sake of this* seer. This seer is purush (पुरुष) or spirit or soul.

263. There has been a vehement revolt against this soul-theory in the scientific world for these seventy years or so. Several new schools of psychology sprang up which though different in their claims all combined against the doctrine of 'soul' and they all think that they can do without the intervention of any soul-like spiritual or non-material entity.

264. The old Indian philosophy of Yoga was based upon the soul-principle. *Yoga* means an art to control and harmonize mental tendencies by looking into one's own self, trying to find out the nature of those tendencies and investigating their relations by introspection. This *art* of Yoga was the fruit of the *science* of Yoga which observed and classified the inner workings of mind and deduced fundamental principles of thought. *Yoga* was a process of introspection. It asked people to look inward and to explain the outer-world from that point.

265. But sciences in general dealt with the outer world. Their process was just the reverse. They claimed that looking inward leads to vague and chimerical thinking. Wundt and other experimentalists though still adhereing to the method of introspection, denied the existence of soul and confined themselves to *consciousness*. Psychology came to be regarded as the science of consciousness. But Watson who was the pioneer of Behaviourism repudiated even consciousness. He refused to be "content to work with intangible and unapproachables". He thought that the substitution of the word consciousness for the

'soul' of medieval philosophy amounted to "merely replacing one intangible by another."

266. "It is possible to write a psychology, to define it as Pillsbury does, as 'the science of behaviour' and never go back upon the definition; never to use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, will, imagery, and the like........... It can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of habit-formation, habit-integration and the like." "If psychology would follow the plan suggested, the educator, the physician, the jurist and the businessman could utilize the data in a practical way, as soon as it could be experimentally obtained."

267. Behaviorism insists that a man or an animal should be regarded as a *moving* or *behaving* organism. This *behaving* means a particular motor-response to a particular stimulus. This reflex is a psychological element. But mere response to a stimulus is a physical phenomenon. Behaviourists ignore the finer distinctions between a reflex and a reflection, a mere motion and a mental tendency. Behaviourists are not ready to take a due cognizance of consciousness or a conscious being.

268. W. B. Pillsbury (born 1872) says in his "*Essentials of Psychology*":—

"Psychology has been defined as 'the science of consciousness' or as the 'science of experience subjectively regarded.' Each of these definitions has advantages, but none is free from objection.............. Mind is known from man's activities. Psychology may be most satisfactorily defined *as the science of human behaviour*, *i. e.*, 'man may be treated as objectively as any physical phenomenon'. He may be regarded

only with reference to what he does. Viewed in this way, the *end* of our science is to understand human action. The practical end is to determine upon what human capacity depends and, in the light of this knowledge, to discover means of increasing *man's efficiency*."

269. Thus man is as much a physical phenomenon as falling of rain or flowing of a stream. But in treating 'man' objectively the behaviourists forget their subjective existence. They lay too much emphasis on the object and lose sight of the entity that observes and judges whether man's *efficiency* has increased and thus determines the '*end*' of psychology. Behaviourists are too objective.

270. The Existentialists who lay stress upon *experiences* as real-existences as distinguished from *performances* rightly accuse behaviourists to be rather a type of physiologists rather than psychologists though the more accurate claim is of Svami Dayananda who not acquainted with what these psychological *isms* are, posited that *experiences* and *performances* both are manifestations of the same spirit or soul and remain totally unexplained unless you refer both of them, not separately but jointly to an agency which knows, feels and therefore wills and through material vehicles gives vent to those non-material spiritual tendencies.

271. In modern psychology there came a time when the defects of these isolated *isms* or rather psychological communalisms became glaringly manifest and gave rise to the German School of Psychologists called Gestalt psychologists. The German word "*Gestalt*" has been variously translated as 'configura-

tion', 'form', or 'structure'. The school was founded by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), who in 1912 proposed that psychologists should "deal with total structures and the system of their internal forces; eschewing the mental chemistry and the analysis that both introspectionism and behaviourism favoured." The Gestalt psychologists say that, in looking at a square it is the *total figure* that makes the square look square, not parts. A square is more than four black lines. It is four black lines in particular relation to one-another and squareness really depends on the *relation* and not the lines. Four dots will also make a square as will four red lines. The mental chemists dealt with sensations, the parts that made the square; as if the squareness of a red square were different from the squareness of a black square." The knowledge of the square which is fully comprehended only by the knower or self is different from isolated sensations or isolated behaviour. We must try to grasp *inter-related facts*.

272. Of late there has been made further progress especially by American psychologists who in these two or three decades have dropped all these *isms* and have given rise to functional psychology which studies "*mind in use for the organism*" as a matter of course. Now it has been generally accepted that too much analysis gives false results, that wholes are safer objects of study than their parts, that you must always take into consideration enough of the inter-related forces to make you fairly safe about not having omitted any essential. This is a happy sign, as partial treatment of human thinking led to defective analysis always ignoring some important factor and thus not perceiving that which was the most fundamental, I mean, "*self*".

273. Gotama in *Nyaya Sutras* (III. I) has given a good proof of the existence of the soul.

दर्शनस्पर्शाभ्यामेकार्थ ग्रहणात् ।

That is, we apprehend one and the same object by sight and by touch. What impression comes through our eye is not the same as comes through touch. But the faculty within, which inter-relates the two and gives us the idea of the same object is the real knower, the self.

274. The different schools of psychology which sprang up from time to time were useful in their own way as they contributed much to medicine and other departments of life. Under one government there are numerous departments, Post Office, Telegraph, Police, Justice etc. They have their own separate spheres within which they perform their very useful task. But if they are dealt with too isolatedly they would not only destroy the whole government but themselves also. It is necessary to look at the whole machinery as one whole, *i. e.*, gestalt view. When a lovely apple is put before me, my eye drinks in the beauty, and my tongue, the sweet taste; the eye is incapable of enjoying the taste and the tongue is incapable of enjoying the sight; but there are correlating forces which make the *total enjoyment*. These correlating forces belong to the self whose maid servants are both the eye as well as the tongue.

275. Ffor convenience's sake psychologists have distributed their work into separate sections. For instance, there is :—

(1) *Physiological psychology* which studies the functions of the nervous system which control behaviour and consciousness and of other similar mechanisms like the endocrine glands. (2) *Comparative*

psychology which compares the behaviours of different animal species. (3) *Psychology* of *individual difference* which measures and assesses human abilities by the employment of mental acts. (4) *Child psychology* which studies the development of the child, and the effects of heredity and environment upon the child's ability. (5) *Educational psychology* which examines educational problems. (6) *Abnormal psychology* which deals with psychiatry, mental diseases, unconscious motivation and criminal tendencies. (7) *Industrial psychology* which deals with our selection of jobs and measures our efficiencies. (8) *Social psychology* which studies the individual in the group and the relations of groups to one another.

Yet all these make up what we call life. And all these departments of life are nothing if the whole thing is a jumble of unconnected and isolated items.

276. We have said above that *functional psychology* studies "mind in use for the organism". Here we study mind only so far as it is useful for the up-keep of the organism. But it is, again, a partial aspect. Here too we lose sight of a very essential factor. If mind is meant for the sake of the organism, what is the organism meant for ? What is the *end* of the organism if not the mind ? You have studied only one function of the mind, its work for the up-keep of the organism. If I am the occupant of a house, I do function in a certain way so that the house may be well kept-up. This will be the study of my *functioning* for the up-keep of the house. But I am much more than the house-keeping agency. In fact the house is meant for me and not I for the house, though in a limited sense, my being and the house are inter-related. What I mean to say is that though the

functional psychology, as it is in vogue to day may mightily contribute to the well-being of human institutions of various types, the main problem remains unsolved and psychology remains dragged tied to the wheel of physiology. Gestalt psychology, if it had gone far enough in the direction it started, might have hit at the right solution of the problem of life, by discovering the spiritual element without which life is no life.

277. In the beginning of this chapter (section 220) we gave certain alternative suggestions of Shankaracharya as rival propositions to solve the problem of life. We have seen so far how modern psychology has covered the field suggested by the first three items, I mean life which is the resultant of physiological adjustments, *i. e.*

(1) mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is self.

(2) the organs endowed with the intelligence is the self; and

(3) the internal organ is the self.*

We have also seen how these explanations leave us in the middle of the stream.

278. You may perhaps complain against us for our dogged persistence to cling to the idea of self which is mainly responsible for our dissatisfaction. But the fact is that whatever be the nature of the self, whatever its origin and whatever its scope, we can never lose sight of this self. It clings to us like any thing. It is

* (१) देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मा ।
(२) इन्द्रियाणि एव चेतनान्यात्मा ।
(३) मन इत्यन्ये ।

the essence of all our life and of all the enquiry that we are led to make about this life.

279. In this connection it is worth while to quote a passage from C. E. M. Joad's *"Matter, life and value."* "We do not know what life is but only know what it does. We are, therefore, at liberty to define it in any way we please which is consistent with its known behaviour. I do not wish to stress this definition, which only too obviously lacks substance; but I do wish to emphasize the point that if our analysis of reality as we know it definitely *precludes a monistic* interpretation, and drives us as a consequence to introduce at least two distinct entities as a condition of finding our universe workable, then we have *no relationship between them*, even if the precise character of that relationship is something that we cannot envisage. *It is obvious that life interacts with matter*, it follows that however we define life, our definition must be of such a kind as to be compatible with, if not actually to embrace this *fundamental vital characteristic*."*

280. "It follows that living matter is of necessity different *as matter* from matter which is not living, since besides its ordinary material attributes in virtue of which it obeys the laws of physics, *it possesses also the attribute of livingness* which can no more be separated from it than its weight or its shape."†

281. Here the question is what is meant by the *attribute of livingness*. Is it an attribute of matter itself just as its weight or its shape? One very important phenomenon is that of *"death."* What was *living matter*

* p. 140.

† Ibid, p. 141.

no longer remains living when death takes place. If *livingness* of matter cannot be explained simply by laws of physics the phenomenon of death remains still more unaccounted for. Livingness does not cling to matter just like shape. Then again we have to find out the nature of relation between this livingness and the matter which we call *living matter*.

282. The question is very hard and puzzling, but none the less, significant. C. E. M. Joad has hit upon and emphasized the metaphysical notion "of a force or stream of life which is immanent in each and every part". Each cell of the body, each activity of the mind is driven by an impulse which is life itself. In support of this view he has quoted professor Graham Wallas's following statement :—

"A man's hair cooperates with the rest of his organism by protecting his brain and from sudden changes of temperature, but it may go on growing though the *man has ceased to live*. His epithelial cells may begin at any moment to proliferate independently and so cause death by cancer. Red blood corpuscles or patches of skin transfused from one man to another, may both continue their own activities and also co-operate in the wider functions of the new organism of which they are now parts."*

283. Here there are four things given :—

(1) The hair, though meant to help the organism continues to grow even after death.

(2) The *independent* proliferation of the epithelial cell may cause death.

(3) Transfusion of blood or skin into another organism, has given up cooperation with the

* page, 141.

former organism without ceasing to function.

(4) It has begun cooperating with the newer organism.

What bearing has this fact upon the nature of life? When I say that I am a living being, what does this I-ness mean? Does every cell of my body feel this I-ness? What does the notion of *I-ness* mean in its totality? And what does it mean to say that a particular living cell cooperates with the whole stream of life and sometimes so non-cooperates that the whole life ceases to function and we call it death?

Let us follow Joad further:—

284. "*Life exists*; even the strictest physicists are increasingly constrained to admit the fact. As regards some part of the world of our experience it would, I think, be generally conceded that we cannot explain what happens on the assumption that *matter and the forms of matter are the only existents*. How, then, does life come to appear?"

285. "Briefly there are two answers to this question; the first: that it was at a given moment of time suddenly *smuggled* into the universe from outside; the second, that some form of life, albeit unconscious, was *present from the first in all the particles of matter*, and from being latent gradually expressed itself by process of emergence in forms which became increasingly more conscious and more complicated."*

286. The second hypothesis leads us nowhere. If every particle of matter has life latent in it then ultimately we shall have to maintain that life is matter and matter is life and our stream of livingness is simply

*p, 148.

a stream of a collection of particles, call them of matter or of life. *It also fails to explain death.*

287. The first answer is perplexing only so far as it is expressed in the form given above. 'Sudden smuggling' gives rise to several misapprehensions. In a newly established township are constructed a number of buildings, which later on, are occupied by different persons. If you call it "sudden smuggling" of men into buildings which had no men in the beginning, it will be a great travesty of facts. You can explain it in another way. The reality is that there were men. They had requirements. Those requirements were constantly kept in view while planning and constructing the township. Their coming into the houses was neither 'smuggling,' nor 'sudden,' but planned and deliberate. If you extend the analogy, you have to admit that there are souls and there is matter, and that matter becomes living matter when it so changes as to serve the requirements of the soul. Every particle of the body may not have separate soul of its own but it is a living cell because it is motivated by the consideration of the soul of the whole organism. When we say the "*whole* organism", we mean much more than a mere sum of different parts. The mathematical aphorism "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts" is too crude and often misleading. Its algebraical form $a+b+c=c+a+b$ becomes obviously absurd when we see that legs+trunk+head is not the same thing as legs+head+trunk.

288. We are thus compelled to postulate that there is some non-material entity called *soul* which with contact with matter makes the matter living. It is not matter, nor some evolved state of

matter, though there is no doubt that the evolved living matter is evolved from the un-evolved condition to the evolved stage through the presence and functioning of this soul. A dead non-souled matter could not have evolved into a living matter by itself. It is this soul whose characteristics have to be investigated, not the *stages* of evolution but the *agency* of evolution. Even when you examine the different stages you must account for the difference in these stages. After all, the stages do not follow one another arbitrarily. Every effect which follows from out of the cause has some *purpose* and the purpose points at some non-material entity for which a certain change takes place. What establishes a connection between cause and its effect is the purpose which pervades both the cause as well as the effect. Clay is the cause and pot the effect. Pot as pot is not clay and clay as clay is not pot, but the purpose for which clay is converted into pot pervades both the clay and the pot. There are many philosophers who are puzzled at the question as to what is the line of demarcation between the cause and the effect. Any event preceding is named as the cause and that event which follows is called the effect. But it is purpose which links the cause and the effect. The emergence of the effect from the cause is pervaded by purpose and this purpose points to the spirit or the soul.

289. The following passage of Svami Dayananda's Light of Truth (IX. 6) is worth noticing :—

"The body and the internal organ are inanimate. They cannot feel or experience heat and cold. Heat and cold can be experienced only *by a living entity.*—man or animal who tries to touch them. Vital airs (*pranas*) are also inanimate. They cannot feel hunger

or thirst; hunger and thirst are felt by him who is the possessor of these vital airs. Mind is also inanimate; it cannot feel joys and sorrows; joys and sorrows are felt by the soul *through* the mind. The soul is happy or sorrowful by perceiving pleasant and unpleasant shapes, sounds, odours, tastes, hardness, softness etc., through the external senses, eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin; similarly, through the four-fold internal organ the faculties of feeling, knowing, willing and egoing, the same soul receives the internal experiences of ideation, determination, memory, egotism etc., and is honoured or disgraced. Just as the man who commits murder with the sword, is punished and not the sword, similarly the soul which does good or bad deeds by means of the body, the senses, the internal organ and the vital airs gets pleasure or pain as the fruit of these deeds. The soul is not the spectator of the deeds, but their doer and enjoyer of their fruits".

290. The purposiveness of life which is, I think, the universally admitted thesis, implies two things, first that there are some entities which are *imperfect*, *i. e.*, they need certain requirements to be fulfilled; secondly these entities are not material. They are strictly *spiritual*. Purpose is meaningless when referred to mere material objects. Joys, sorrows, pleasantness, unpleasantness, honour, disgrace, feeling, willing, knowing, egoing they are all non-material attributes, though manifested through material vehicles.

Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul.

291. When we have seen that mere matter does

not explain life, materialism falls flat and we have to find out what that element is which along with matter gives the phenomenon of life.

292. There are some who agree with Svami Dayananda so far that he finds fault with materialism. But while opposing materialism they deny matter altogether. We shall take it up elsewhere. But here we wish to deal with the character and function of the soul. Above, we have already given the attributes of the soul as mentioned by *Gotama* in *Nyaya Sutras* and *Kanada* in *Vaisheshika Sutras*. But there is a school of thought which says that there is no soul separate from or other than God Himself. Svami Dayananda is a theist; he believes in the existence of God. This school is also theistic as it too believes in the existence of God. But the question is in what relation, limited embodied soul, which makes this body living, stands with God. In common parlance souls are lower spirits and the highest or supreme spirit is God. But according to the school under discussion (well-known as Vedantic school) this difference between souls (plural) and God (singular) is only apparent, not real. The reality is that there is only one chief spirit called God and there exists nothing else. The difference which we see is mere appearance, a product of nescience or *avidya*, nothing but illusion. Svami Dayananda criticizes this school at a great length, postulating and proving that individual souls are as real entities as God, and are distinct from God, though in other attributes God differs from souls.

293. All religions believe in the existence of the soul (at least human soul), as no worship is possible without a worshipper, and almost all religions

(excluding, of course, Jainism and Buddhism) believe in the existence of God. But, somehow, devotees in their overzeal in devotion, cannot definitely ascertain the relation between the worshipper and the object of worship. It is a common *error* of almost all religions that they bestow upon God every conceivable attribute keeping nothing for any other entity, not even independent existence, sometimes even dependent existence. I call it "error" as in Svami Dayananda's philosophy it *is* error, a great error. What is the relation between the soul and God? The first relation alleged by Shankara and others of his school is that the soul is nothing but God and its separate existence is due to nescience or ignorance. I think myself a limited tiny soul, while in fact I am almighty and all-knowing God.

294. In the last chapter we have given Svami Dayananda's criticism of this view. Nescience or ignorance is always subjective. It means "to know a thing to be as it is not". A child is ignorant when he thinks that two and two make five. The ignorance about an object does not affect the object but the knowledge itself. Therefore to call God as *Satyam* (सत्यं) or real, *Jnanam* (ज्ञानं) or knowledge and *anantam* (अनन्तं) or *infinite* and at the same time to believe that the individual soul is no other than God and that it regards itself as soul through ignorance or illusion is an utter non-sense.

295. There is a school which holds:—

"The soul is the reflection of God. Just as the breaking of the mirror does no harm to the reflection, similarly the soul which is God's reflection in the internal organ lasts only so long as the internal organ

exists. When the internal organ is destroyed, the soul becomes free."

296. To this Svami Dayananda replies :—

"It is all puerile. Only a bodied (corporeal) object casts reflection in another bodied object of *separate existence*. The face and the mirror are both bodied objects and are apart from each other. Hence their reflection is possible. God's reflection is meaningless for two reasons; first, that He is formless; and secondly, He is all-pervading."

297. *Question*:—"But the formless and pervading *akasha* casts its reflection in a deep clear water. Similarly God's reflection falls in a pure internal organ. Therefore it is called *chidabhasa* or life-shadow."

Svami Dayananda says, "All this is false and childish. *Akasha* is invisible, and nobody can see it (or its shadow) with his own eyes."*

The question is obviously childish, but Svami Dayananda has touched it in his philosophy because the word *chidabhasa* or (life-shadow) has been used by Vedantic philosophers with a great flourish. *Chhayavada* or Reflection theory is one of the important theories of the Vedanta philosophy and as Svami Dayananda's Vedantic philosophy is quite different, it became essential for him to take a due notice of it.

298. There is another theory. You may call it "spark theory." Just as small sparks fly off a mass of fire, though they are fire-itself, similarly souls fly off God. They are the part and parcel of God

* Light of Truth, IX, paras 7 and 8.

himself. And just as different rivers running their different courses fall into a great ocean and become the ocean itself, losing their names and forms, so do all souls become or, say, merge into, God in the end. Svami Dayananda has in both cases discovered the fallacy of using wrong analogy by analysing thread-bare the conception of such analogies. Sometimes most charming analogies are most misleading. These analogies, whenever they are used in this context, give a false idea of nature of souls as well as of nature of God. They may be useful in showing the spiritual likeness of souls with God. Both are knowing entities. But God is not a composite substance and cannot be divisible into several parts. Even on this tiny globe there are billions of human souls and such human souls all alike in being capable of possessing knowledge, but at the same time differing from each other in having wrong knowledge or ignorance also which cannot be explained simply by the analogy of sparks or rivulets. Much of behaviour in the world, of these souls, is not only an accumulated manifestation of their knowledge, but of their ignorances also, ignorance being not only the absence of knowledge, but also the presence of wrong knowledge which is the parent of so many follies and sins. Dreams, fallacies, imaginations and erroneous judgments for which human souls are so notorious cannot be conceived in sparks coming out of the pure, perfect and all-luminous Deity, nor vice versa, the rivulets full of of such impurities can lose their identity and merge into that all-pure Great self. It is the rivers that have made the ocean salty and that will be no God whose existence depends upon the totalling up of such souls.

299. The theory that God creates these souls

cannot bear the bront of the criticism that the creation of souls by God out of Himself is absurd, and creation out of nothing as if by magic is magic without logic and not logic without magic.

300. There is a general idea that the Indian *Vedanta* as originated from Vyasa and based upon the *Upanishadic* teachings is pure monism and upholds the fundamental identity of God with the souls. In order to fully understand and appreciate Svami Dayananda's contribution to the exposition of the philosophy of the Vedas, it is necessary to quote the very words of Svami Dayananda even at the fault of being too disproportionate.

301. "The illustration often given by the *Vedantists* to prove their *vivartavada* (phenomenalism), that just as there is mere appearance (unreal, without real existence) of snake in the rope, similarly there is a mere appearance of the world in *Brahman* (God) is also untenable.

Neo. V.—Without the basis of superposition, a superimposed thing cannot make its appearance, as there is no appearance of snake possible unless there exists a rope. The snake is non-existent in the rope in all the three times (*i. e.*, it was not in the rope in the past ; it is not in the rope in the present, and it will not be in the rope in the future), but partial darkness and partial light mixed together create in the mind a suspense about snake and we begin to tremble. When with the help of a lamp we become certain (that it is rope), misgivings disappear. Similarly we see the really nonexistent, (unreal, false), world in *Brahman*. When we realize *Brahman*, then the appearance of the world vanishes, and the real existence of *Brahman* becomes clear, in

the same way as the conception of the snake vanishes and that of the rope remains.

S. D.—Who mis-saw the world in God?

Neo. V.—The soul.

S. D.—Where did the soul come from?

Neo. V.—From ignorance.

S. D.—Where did ignorance come from and where does it reside?

Neo. V.—Ignorance is beginningless and it resides in God.

302. S. D.—Was *Brahman* mistaken for *Brahman*? Or for something else?

And who mistook it?

Neo. V.—The shadow of consciousness (*chidabhasa*)

S. D.—What is the nature of this shadow of consciousness?

Neo. V.—Really speaking it is *Brahman* (God). God mis-sees Himself and forgets his own nature.

S. D.—What is the genesis of this forgetfulness?

Neo. V.—It is due to ignorance.

S. D.—Is this ignorance the attitude of the omniscient *Brahman*, or of the localized soul (the soul of limited knowledge).?

Neo. V.—Of the finite soul.

S. D.—According to your beliefs, does any conscious being exist other than one infinite, omniscient God? Where did this finite soul come from? If you believe in the existence of the finite soul, distinct from God, it is all right. If *Brahman* is ignorant of his own nature at one place, ignorance will prevail all over. Just as a boil in a part of the body renders the whole body unfit, similarly if *Brahman* is ignorant and in pain at one place, the entire *Brahman* will be ignorant and unhappy.

303. Neo. V.—It is all a function of limitation (*upadhi*) of *Brahman*.

S. D.—Is this *upadhi* (limitation) conscious or unconscious, real or unreal?

Neo. V.—Indescribable. We cannot say whether it is conscious or unconscious, real or unreal?

S. D.—This statement of yours is quite absurd. You say it is ignorance. And then you say, you cannot say whether it is conscious or unconscious, real or unreal. It is just like a mixture of gold and brass. If you take it to a tester and ask, "Is it gold or brass?" he will say, "neither brass nor gold, but a mixture of both."

304. Neo. V.—Look here. You see there is jar-enclosed space, house-enclosed space, cloud-enclosed space, and then there is big-space. In reality, there is only one-space. But due to limitations imposed by jar, house or cloud, there appear to be separate spaces. Similary one (space-like) *Brahman* appears in separate and distinct forms to the ignorant people on account of the limitations imposed by nescience (*Maya*), ignorance (*Avidya*), collectivity, individuality, and internal organ. In fact He is one and one alone. The following passage corroborates our statement :—

Agniryathaiko bhuvanam praviṣṭo rūpam rūpam prati rūpo babhūva.

*Ekastathā sarva-bhūtāntarātma rūpam rūpam prati rūpo bahishcha.**

Just as fire pervading through long, broad, circular, small and big objects assumes the form of those objects though it is distinct from them, similarly all pervading God, pervading through internal organs, assumes the forms of those internal organs, though in reality He is distinct.

* Katha Upanisat, V, 9

S. D.—This is also indivisible. Just as you hold jar, house, clouds and space as four separate and distinct entities, similarly why do you not believe that the causal and actual world and the souls are distinct from God and God is distinct from them ?

305. Neo. V.—Just as fire penetrating through different objects assumes the forms of those objects, similarly God pervading through inanimate objects and the souls, appears to the ignorant people as inanimate objects or souls. In reality God is neither these inanimate objects nor souls. If you place one thousand pots filled with water, under the sun, there will appear one thousand suns in those pots, while the sun is only one. If the pots are broken, or the water is moved or it is spilt, the sun will not be broken, nor set in motion, nor spilt. Similarly the shadow of God falls in the internal organs. This we call *shadow of consciousness* (*chidabhasa*) or soul. The soul exists as long as the internal organ exists. When knowledge destroys the internal organs, then the soul becomes God. This shadow of consciousness is ignorant of its own divine essence and imposes upon itself the conditions of doer, enjoyer, happy, unhappy, unrighteous, righteous, birth, death etc. For all this time, it is in the bonadge of worldliness.

S. D.—This illustration of yours is inadmissible. The sun has a form. So have the pots of water. The sun is separate from the water pots and the water pots are separate from the sun. It is then only, that reflection is possible. Had they been formless, reflection too would have been impossible. God is formless and space-like all-pervading. He is not separate from anything, nor is anything separate from Him. Yet on account of the relation of pervader and pervaded, they are distinct from each other. Applying the law

of Agreement and Difference (*Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* अन्वय and व्यतिरेक), the pervader and the pervaded are inseparable and yet distinct. If they be identical, nothing can pervade anything. This has been explained in the *Antaryami Brahmana* of the *Brhad-Aranyaka Upanishad.* No reflection is possible without form; therefore, the reflection of *Brahman* is out of question. Your belief that the *Brahman* becomes soul through the limitations of internal organs is childish. Internal organs are moveable and finite. God is immovable and infinite. If you do not believe in the distinct existences of God and the soul, please meet our objection that wherever the internal organ will move to, the God of that place will become ignorant, and wherever the internal organ has moved from, the God of that place will be left with knowledge. Just as an umbrella moving from one place to another, obstructs the light of the place where it is and sets free the light of the place from which it has gone (causing the reflection at one place and destroying it at another), similarly internal organs will make God learned, ignorant, happy and unhappy at every moment. The indivisible God, being affected by the limitations of one place, will become ignorant all through because He is a conscious being.

306. There is one more point. The thing that the internal-organ-limited God saw at Mathura should not be remembered by the internal-organ-limited God at Banaras, as the things experienced by one man cannot be remembered by another. The *shadow of consciousness* which saw the thing at Mathura does not live at Banaras. That which is the light-giver to the internal organ at Mathura is not the God of Banaras.

If God himself is the soul, and not a distinct entity, the soul should have been omniscient.

If the reflection of God is separate from Him then nobody should have the knowledge of things seen or heard in the past. If you say that *Brahman* being one, memory is possible, then *ignorance or pain* of one place should make the entire *Brahman* ignorant and unhappy.

By giving such illustratious you have made the eternal, pure, knowing, ever-free God impure, ignorant, and bondaged. The indivisible God has been made divisible.

307. Neo. V.—Even a formless thing casts its shadow. The sky casts it shadow in a mirror, water etc. and appears blue or of some deep tint. Similarly falls the shadow of God in internal organs.

S. D.—If the sky has no form, nobody can see it with his eyes. The thing which is not seen by the eye cannot cast in a mirror, or water etc. a shadow which might be visible. Only a thing which has a form can appear deep blue or light, not a formless object.

Neo. V.—Well, then, what is that blue thing which you see above and its shadow in the mirror ?

S. D.—These are the particles of water, earth and fire which have flown up from the earth. If there were no water at a place from where rain falls, how will it rain ? Therefore, whatever appears canopy-like above is a watery sphere. Just as mist appears solid from a distance but thin and canopy-like from near, similarly, it is water that appears blue in the sky.*

* Tyndal was, we believe, the first man to discover why the sky is blue. He found that the blueness was due to the fact that the waves of light from the sun stuck against very minute

308. Neo. V.—Are our illustrations of rope-snake or dream wrong?

S. D.—No. Your argumentation is wrong. We have made it clear. Well, then, please tell us one thing. *Who gets ignorance at the outset?*

Neo. V.—*Brahman* (God).

S. D.—Is God all-knowing or with limited knowledge?

Neo. V.—Neither all-knowing nor having limited knowledge. For infinititude and finiteness of knowledge are found in an object which is under limitations.

S. D.—Who is under limitations?

Neo. V.—*Brahman*.

S. D.—Then it is *Brahman* that has inflnite or finite knowledge. Why did you then deny it? If you say that limitation is unreal and imposition, then we ask, who is the imposer?

309. Neo. V.—Is the soul God? or distinct from God.?

S. D.—Distinct. If the soul were God, then one who imposes falsely cannot be God. How can a false being be true?

Neo. V.—We call both truth and untruth, as unreal (false). Whatever the tongue speaks is also unreal (false).

S. D.—When your thoughts are false, and your speech is false, then why are you yourself not false?

Neo. V.—Never mind. Truth and untruth are both superimposed on us and are the witnessing basis of both.

particles in the air, and became what is known as "polarized light." (The Book of Popular Science, Vol. VIII, p. 25-28).

S. D.—When you are the basis of both truth and untruth, you are both a thief and a banker. You are therefore, not reliable. He alone is reliable who always thinks rightly, speaks rightly, acts rightly, never thinks wrongly, never speaks wrongly and never acts wrongly. When you falsify your own beliefs then you are obviously false.

310. Neo. V.—Do you believe in the eternal *Maya* (Nescience) which rests with *Brahman*, yet veils him ?

S. D.—No. You interpret *Maya* as a thing which is non-existent and yet appears. Such things can be accepted only by those who are blind of intellect. What does not exist can never appear. Can there be a photo of a son of a sterile man ? Your beliefs go against the passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad too. There it is said, "*Sanmulah somyemah, prajah*" (Oh dear, these creations have a real cause).

311. Neo. V.—Do you criticize Vashishtha, Shankaracharya, Nishchaladasa and other learned scholars who were greater than you ? To us Vashishtha, Shankaracharya, and Nishchaladasa appear more learned.

S. D.—Are you educated or uneducated ?

Neo. V.—We are also somewhat educated.

S. D.—Well, then, put the view-point of *Vashishtha, Shankaracharya*, and Nischaladasa before us. We controvert it. Whoever proves his view point is greater. If your view-point and theirs are incontrovertible, why can you not refute our proposition with their arguments ? Then only can their proposition be acceptable and yours as well. Our conjecture is that Shankara-

charya etc. took up this position only to defeat *Jainas*, as most interested learned men often accept things contrary to their personal beliefs in order to win their position at a particular place or time. And if they did believe on the identity of God and the soul, or unreality of the world, or denied the reality of worldly affairs, then, they were decidedly wrong. As regards the learning of Nishchaladasa here is a sample. He writes in '*Vrtti-prabhakara*' that soul is God because it is conscious. "*Jivo-brahmabhinnashchetanatvat* (जीवो ब्रह्माभिन्न-श्चेतनत्वात्). This is a childish inference. No two things can be identical only by agreement; difference stands in the way, *e. g*, if a man says, "earth and water are identical because they are both lifeless", it will be an invalid inference. The same holds good in the case of Nischaladasa. Finiteness, imperfection of knowledge, falliblity etc. are the attributes of the soul, and they distinguish it from God. And all-pervasiveness, omniscience, infallibility etc. are the attributes of God and they distinguish Him from the soul. Thus God and the soul are not identical. Earth and water are separate entities because smell, hardness etc. are the distinctive features of earth, and taste, fluidity etc. are the distinctive features of water. Similarly God and souls both have their distinctive features. Therefore they were never identical in the past, they are not identical now, and they shall never be identical in future. You can measure from this much the learning of *Nishchaladasa*. As to Vashishtha, who composed the Yoga-Vashishtha, he appears to be a neo-vedantist of recent times. It is not composed by Valmiki, Vashishtha or *Ramachandra*, neither they said it or heard it. They were all the followers of the Vedas. They could not write or say anything against the Vedic doctrines.

312. Neo. V.—The identity of God and the

soul is proved from the Shariraka Sutras which are Vyasa's composition. See—

1. *Sampadyāvirbāhvaḥ svena shabdāt.*
2. *Brāhmaṇā Jaiminir upanyāsādibhyaḥ.*
3. *Chite-tanmātreṇa tadātmkatvad ity Audulomiḥ.*
4. *Evamapy-upanyāsāt purvabhāvād avirodham Vādārāyaṇaḥ*
5. *Ata eva chānanyādhipatiḥ**

1. The soul realizing its own essence; which was previously of the nature of God, manifests itself. This is evident from the word *sva* (self).
2. Acharya Jaimini is of opinion that the soul establishes itself in the form of God for the reason that such passages as "he is the spirit that is free from sinfulness etc." are used.
3. Acharya Audulomi is of opinion that soul remains in salvation in the form of pure intelligence as the passages of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanisad* say that it becomes one with God.
4. Vyasa believes in the non-difference of the soul and God on account of the passages which refer to high powers mentioned above.
5. The Yogin with his occult powers attains to his divine essence having no master above him. He becomes the master of all. This is his position in salvation.

313. S. D.—The Sutras do not mean this. Their real interpretation is as follows:—

1. As long as the soul does not free itself from all impurities and realize its own pure essence, it cannot attain God and enjoy bliss.

* Vedanta IV, 4, I, 5—7, 9.

2. Acharya Jaimini is of opinion that when the *yogin* is free from sins and attains high powers, then alone he can enjoy the bliss of beatitude in the close contact with God.
3. When the soul is free from ignorance and other defects, and is the pure essence of intelligence then only he finds himself truly related to the essence of God.
4. When he gets high powers and pure essence even in this life (emancipation before death) then he recovers his former pure nature. This is the opinion of Acharya Vyasa.
5. When the yogin has true contemplation, then he realizes God and enjoys the happiness of salvation. There he is quite independent. In salvation there is no such thing as superiority and inferiority. All emancipated souls are alike.

314. If you will not interprete these aphorisms as we have done, it will not be consistent with the following sutras:—

1. *Netaronupapatteḥ* (1.1.16).
2. *Bhedavyapadeshachcha* (1.1 17).
3. *Visheṣaṇabheda vyapadeshabhyām cha netrau,* (1.1.22)
4. *Asminnasya cha tadyogam shāsti.* (1.1.19).
5. *Antas-tad-dharmopadeshāt.* (I.1.20).
6. *Bheda-vyapadeshāch-ch-ānyaḥ* (I.1.21).
7. *Guhām-praviṣṭā-vātmānau hi tad-darshanāt.* (I.2 11).
8. *Anupapattestu na shārīraḥ.* (I.2.3).
9. *Antaryāmyadhi daivādiṣu tad-dharma-vyapadeshāt* (I.2.18)
10. *Shārīrashcho-bhaye-pi hi bhedenainam-adhīyate.* (I.2.20).*

1. The soul which is other than God is not the creator of the universe, The authorship of the universe cannot be ascribed to the

* Vyasa's Vedanta Sutras.

soul which has limited powers and imperfect knowledge. Therefore the soul is not God.

2. There is a passage in the upanishad, "*Rasam hyenayam lahdhva-nandi bhavati.*" (Acquiring God he enjoys happiness). The soul and God are distinct as their distinctive characteristics have been explained. Had it not been the case, it would have been meaningless to say that the soul *acquires* God and *becomes* happy. Soul and God are, therefore, not one.

3. God is different from the materia-radica, and the souls, as in the passage of the Upanishads, God's characteristics have been mentioned as different from those of souls and materia-radica. The passage referred to above is the following :—

*Divyo hyamūrtaḥ puruṣaḥ sa bāhyābhyantaro hyajaḥ, aprāṇo hyamanāḥ shubhro hyakṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ.**

It means :—

God is refulgent, pure, bodiless, all-pervading, inside and outside all, uncreated; free from the bondage of birth, death, incarnation etc., free from the connections of expiration, inspiration, body and mind. He is light. These are His attributes. The soul is finer than the eternal and imperishable materia-radica. But God is finer than the soul, the finest of all.

4. It has been mentioned in the *Upanisad* that the soul comes into contact with the pervading God, and God comes into contact with the soul. Now the word *'contact'* (yoga) shows that God and soul are distinct entities because contact is always between distinct

* **Mundaka, II, 1.2.**

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objects. (The word 'yoga' would be meaningless if God and soul are not distinct.)

5. God's attributes are all-pervading etc. Besides, God is the pervader and the soul is the pervaded. This shows that God and the soul are different. Had they been the same, pervasiveness was out of question.
6. God is different from the soul. Similarly, he is different from senses, internal organ, fine elements (earth etc.), direction, air, sun etc., and from the learned men who are called *devas* and enjoy the above things.
7. The *Upanisad* says, "These two, God and the soul, are entering into the innermost cave, *i. e.*, heart."—such passages are very many in the Upanishads. This shows that God and the soul are distinct.
8. God is not bodied. The soul is bodied. The attributes, activities and nature of God are not found in the soul.
9. God has been mentioned as *antaryamin* (pervading) through mind and senses, through earth and other elements, through all the souls. In the Upanishads God has been called all-pervading etc.
10. The bodied soul is not God, as God is by nature different from the soul.

    These *Shariraka sutras* show that God and the soul are different.

315. The Neo-Vedantist quotes 5 *Vedanta sutras* (IV-iv-1,5,6,7,9), to support his theory that God and the soul are identical. These five sutras deal with true condition of the emancipated soul in the state of emancipation. The emancipated soul being free from worldly engrossments is naturally the

purest and most resembles God. First the dirt of worldliness is shaken off in its entirety, secondly its contact with God is the closest, thirdly it is the happiest. Therefore the Neo-Vedantist concludes that the soul has become identical with God. The distinctive characteristics which distinguished God from the soul have all disappeared. Svami Dayananda shows from those very five sutras that the Neo-Vedantist's conclusion is wrong. However extreme the similarity be, it can never mean identity. Similarity is similarity, however, close it may be. Svami Dayananda also shows that all the distinctive characteristics *have not vanished*. The soul has shaken off its dirt. True. It has the closest contact with God. True. It is the *happiest* and has not a jot of pain. True. But there are many other distinctive characteristics that still exist, *e. g.*, all-pervasiveness, infinitude etc. These characteristics are quite sufficient to prove the negation of identity.

316. Then, Svami Dayananda gives ten more sutras from the same Vedanta (I. i. 16, 17, 22, 19, 20, 21 and I. ii, 11, 3, 18, 20). These sutras contain references to several passages of the Upanishats where the distinction is quite obvious. The very words of the sutras show that the distinction is not only unequivocal and clear, but has been emphasized with all the force possible.

317. The Neo-Vedantists have one more way to support their view-points. It is called in Sanskrta *upakrama* and *upasamhara*, (where you have begun there you should end). You begin with God and end in God. He is so to speak the alpha and the omega. Svami Dayananda refutes this argument also.

"The *Upakrama* (creation) and *upasamhara*

(dissolution) of the Neo-Vedantists are also inadmissible. Their creation begins with God and their dissolution ends in God. When they believe in no other existence, then creation and dissolution both become the functions of God alone. (It means that God is born and God dies). The Vedas and other true scriptures say that God is free from birth and death. Such statements will create trouble for the New-Vedantists for change, creation, ignorance etc. can never be admissible in the case of incorruptible, changeless, pure, eternal and infallible God. Even after dissolution God, souls and materia radica do exist. Thus their theory of dissolution is wrong. There are many other anomalies which are opposed to the Vedas and other Scriptures."*

318. These rather inconveniently long quotations have been given here to show how Svami Dayananda meets the theories of that section of Indian philosophers which is the most influential in India, *i. e.* the Vedanta, and how he smashes their theory of *Maya* or nescienee, of pure monism, and their identity of God and soul. He has shown by arguments as well as scriptural authority that the souls are eternal and immortal. God never made them and they will never die. Birth only means the encasement of souls in material bodies and death means nothing but liberation from them. Svami Dayananda does not touch western philosophers, except a few Christian theologians, whose beliefs about the nature of souls are rather vague and mostly inconsistent. But while dealing with Indian philosophies, he has in a way covered the ground held by various schools of western philosophers also.

* Light of Truth, XI para 34-46.

Chapter V.

MATTER OR *PRAKRTI*

319. This chapter cannot be begun better than by giving a few preliminary quotations from Svami Dayananda's Light of Truth.

"*Janmadyasyatah*".*

That Brahman alone is worth knowing through whom the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the universe take place.

Question—Does this universe originate from God or from anything else ?

Answer—Its agental† cause is God, but its *material* cause is *Prakrti* (materia-radica).

Question—Did not God create the Prakrti ?

Answer—No, it is beginningless.

Question—What is the meaning of the word 'beginning' and how many things are beginningless ?

* Shariraka Sutra, I. 1. 2.

† A pot has three causes :—

(1) The potter *who* makes the pot.

(2) Clay *of which* the pot is made.

(3) The tools *with which* the pot is made, including time, place etc.

In Sanskrta they are called respectively *Nimitta* (निमित्त) *cause*, *Upādana* (उपादान) *cause* and *Sādhāraṇa* (साधारण) *cause*. It is difficult to find English-equivalents for them. Other translators have translated the *(nimitta) as* "efficient", though we feel that in many respects the word is misleading. In fact the efficient cause is that which needs no other cause (material or other). This is the doctrine of Shankara and not of Dayananda. The word *agental*

Answer.—God, soul and the material cause (*materia radica*) of the universe are beginningless.

Question.—What authority (scriptural authority) is there for it ?

Answer.—

(1, *Dvā Suparṇā Sayujā Sakhāyā*
Samānam Vṛkṣam pariṣasvajāte,
Tayoranyaḥ pippalam svādvatty—
*anashnan anyo abhichākashīti.**

(2) *Shāshvatībhyaḥ Samābhyaḥ.*†

1. *Dva.*—God and soul both.

Suparna.—similar in the attributes of intelligence and protection.

Sayuja.—joined together in the sense of pervader and pervaded.

Sakhaya.—reciprocally friendly.

These two are eternal and beginningless.

Samanam Vrksam.—(a similar tree). The material cause is beginningless like the root. The created objects of the world are like branches. In their created stage they are gross. In their dissolute stage they are fine. The whole thing (root and branches) has been called 'tree.' This third thing is also beginningless. The attributes, activities and natures of these three are also beginningless. Of the two God and soul, the latter, *i. e.*, the soul enjoys well

sounds clumsy. But we cannot help it. We have adopted the following three terms:—

Agental cause :—*Nimitta Kāraṇa* or potter-cause.

Material cause :—*Upādāna Kāraṇa* or clay-cause.

Auxiliary cause—*Sādhāraṇa Kāraṇa* or tool-cause.

We have avoided the word 'tool-cause' because the *Sādhāraṇa Kāraṇa* includes temporal, spacial and many other causes. The terminology belongs all along to the art of pottery. For Svami Dayananda's doctrine of creation, this is the best analogy (Tr.)

* Rg Veda, I. 164 20.

† Yajur Veda, 40.8

the fruits of this tree of the world as the reward for his good or bad deeds. But the former, *i. e.*, God, not enjoying the fruit of His actions, brightens the whole thing in and out (supervises). God is distinct from the soul. The soul is distinct from God. The *prakrti* (*materia-radica*) is distinct from both of these. And all the three are *beginningless*.

2. God has revealed through the Vedas, the knowledge of all sciences to His subjects, *i. e.*, the souls which are beginningless and eternal (in the verse the Sanskrta word *shashvati* mean eternal or ever-living).*

320. This is in nutshell Svami Dayananda's philosophy. There are three eternals :—

(1) One *Supreme Being* or God. Greatest spirit, free from all materiality, pure spirit, neither requiring matter for His existence nor for His sustenance, not being in any way influenced thereby, yet predominating all. God absolute as far as his own existence is concerned, yet relative in a sense that there are other things under His incontrovertible sway.

(2) *Souls* (not one, but many) or lower spirits, all non-material, but needing matter for their growth and development; imperfect but progressive; depending upon the spiritual guidance of God, and material instrumentality.

(3) Something inert or non-spirit called *matter* which is a general name given to that dead and inert matter of which the world is made.

321. These are three eternals, *God*, *Souls* and

* Light of Truth, VIII. 2-5.

Prakrti. You can call it Pluralism, because there are many spirits and various units of matter. You can call it *Trinism* or the doctrine of three eternals. You can call it *Dualism* or the doctrine of two substances, one spiritual or nonmaterial and the other matter or non-spiritual, both eternal and inseparably related.

322. To go back to the analogy of *pottery*. There is clay, there is the potter* and there are users for whom the pot is to be made. Clay is different from the *potter* who is an intelligent being. It is different from the users also for whom or to serve whose needs the pot is being made.

323. Some people would say, "It is no philosophy. You have not reached the stage of monism, (oneness), which is the universally acknowledged aspiration of all philosophers. The *Law of Parsimony of Causes* revolts against such a doctrine. Svami Dayananda would reply to this that it is the most unphilosophical attitude to aspire impossibilities. The three eternals numbered above are the irreducible *minimum*; further march is impossible. The *Law of Parsimony* advises you to be reasonably parsimonious. You should not postulate two causes if one cause is sufficient to explain an event. But it does not give you the liberty of overriding all reasonableness and eliminate or ignore the causes which make the whole theory absurd. Arbitrary eliminatiion of any factor is unforgiveable.

324. Idealism which rejects all matter and

* "But, now, O Lord, thou art our father, we are the *clay*, and Thou, our *potter*, and we are all the work of thy hand."
(Bible, Isaiah 64-8)

materialism which rejects all spirit, both make the mistake of eliminating the non-eliminable factor of life and have to look to various makeshifts to explain away real knots. The dissatisfaction which has been smouldering for several centuries among western philosophers has of late given rise to *Neo-realism* to which chief contributors are Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead and others. I do not mean that neo-realists agree on all points. Their methods of approach are different, and so are their conclusions on several points. But Neo-realism of the west agrees with Svami Dayananda on following points :—*

(1) That the objects of knowledge *do not depend on any mind* for their existence or character.

(2) That the world is *many*, and not one.

* Cp. "The realist critique is directed as much against monism as against idealism: its pluralism has no room for an absolute one; it continues the campaign of William James against the Absolute but with certain emphases of its own. *The unity of the world is in one respect meaningless; in another respect immoral.*

It is meaningless: for whatever can be said of all things can logically make no difference to any thing. Mind as we find it in the world is in contrast to things that are non-mental, and gets its distinctive meaning by this contrast. When we try to make mind the substance of everything, we lose this contrast, and therefore the significance of the proposition. The reference of everything to 'mind' becomes in the end tedious and unprofitable; the more so since we can never be quite sure what an absolute and all-inclusive mind would be like.

It is immoral: since it must assume that in the *absolute mind good and evil which are present in* the world on equal terms, are reconciled or made consistent with each other. If the absolute mind is held to be all-good, then the evil of the world must be an illusory appearance which vanishes from the absolute point of view,—and from ours, in proportion as we succeed in attaining that outlook. This to the realist is an encouragement to indifference and moral laxity; an apology for the abominable. "There is always one remaining philosophy,"

325. Svami Dayananda would not have accepted the appellation of "*Neo*-realism" for his philosophy, as he is of opinion (rather he has proved to the hilt) that this was the view of the oldest Vedic philosophers, and it is only with reference to the European philosophies of these two milliniums and a half that began with Plato and flowed on in different channels with various degrees of monistic thoughts, that we can call it '*new*-realism,' as compared with the *old* realism which has often been supposed killed and buried deep by Berkeley, Bradley and others. But the fact is that even in Europe realism never died and though mortally stabbed appeared again and again like the ghost of Julius Caesar till it saw the complete ruin of its enemies. The objective idealism of Plato, with its newer and more improved editions was neither monism nor pure idealism, the very objectivity of its nature belying the claim. Plato's ideas which are the *universal* and *perfect* prototypes of *defective* and *particular* worldly things are real. And they cannot come down to their defective particularity without the help of matter (something else than those ideas), just as the *idea* of a building existing in its purer form in the mind of the engineer cannot take the form of a particular mortal building without the help of bricks and mortar.

326. The following quotation from the Republic will bear me out :—

says Spaulding, "that allows evil to stand at its full face value, and that finds all methods of arguing it out of existence to be invalid,..................Evil is evil, and it cannot be transformed or argued out of existence." It lies in the nature of the Whole that it cannot be partial to any side ; but the moral life is a partisanship and a combat."

(Types of Philosophy by Hocking, pp. 412-413.)

"I understand; you speak of that city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not think that there is such a one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of such a city, and he who desires may behold this, and beholding govern himself accordingly."*

This '*pattern*' exists indpendent of my mind, or your mind, or Plato's mind. We are asked to behold it and found a city similar to it on the earth. How, if not with the help of earth and other *material* available here?

327. Svami Dayananda will, as well, accept Plato's position, if the latter's *ideas* are synonymous with Vedic *Rta* (ऋत) or *eternal laws* which exist eternally in God's mind and which with the help of eternal *prakrti* or matter are reduced to *non-eternal* and *particular* forms of worldly objects. Plato says that there is a *pattern* tiger in heaven, the prototype of all tigers of flesh and bone which are found in the world. But where came this flesh and blood from? Did it also exist in heaven as the prototype? If so, separately or conjointly? If separately, how this conjunction? If conjointly, then, what is the distinction between the particular tiger of the earth and the pattern tiger of heaven?

328. It was difficulties like these which led Aristotle to disagree with his august preceptor and emphasize that "the substance of each thing is that which *is peculiar of it*, which does not belong to any thing else, but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong

* Republic, IX, 592.

to, more than one thing." (compare Vaisheshika's *Samanya* and *vishesha*). Aristotle's distinction, I fear, between form and matter, though up-holding to a certain extent the common sense view is only a confusion verbalized and does not either accept or reject the independent existence of matter.

329. Coming to later times, Berkeley's heroics against *matter* are too well-known. "All *esse* is *percipi*" knocks *matter* down too boldly. In our days Indian idealists of modernized type have received a great inspiration from Berkeley. But much water has flowed from under the bridge of philosophy since then. Berkeley laid down his doctrine of '*all esse* is *percipi*' without explaining what *perception* is, or what about those things which are either not perceived or are yet to be perceived or may not be perceived at all and merely inferred. Bertrand Russell has discussed at full length the dialogue between Hylas (a common-sense exponent) and Philonous (Berkeley's representative) and pointed out the fallacies dexterously committed by Philonous and left un-caught by unwary Hylas. The following quotations will serve my purpose :—

330. (1) Berkeley advances valid arguments in favour of a certain important conclusion, *though not quite in favour of the conclusion that he thinks he is proving.* He thinks he is proving that all reality is mental ; what he is proving is that we perceive qualities, *not things*, and that qualities are *relative* to the percipient.*

* Cp. Dayananda :—"Let us note that the perception which we get through senses and mind is of attributes and not of the substance." (Light of Truth, VII, 8.)

331. (2) Berkeley's argument consists of two parts. On the one hand he argues *that we do not perceive material things*, but only colours, sounds etc. and that they are mental or in the mind. His reasoning is completely cogent as to the first point, but as to the second (*i. e.*, they are "mental" or "in the mind"), it suffers from the absence of any definition of the word "mental". He relies in fact upon the received view that everything must be either material or mental, and that nothing is both. When he says that we perceive qualities, not "things" or "material substances", and that there is no reason to suppose that the different qualities that the common sense regards as all belonging to one "thing" inhere in a substance distinct from each and all of them, his reasoning may be accepted. But when he goes on to say that sensible qualities including primary qualities are "mental", the arguments are of very different kinds, and of *very different degrees of validity*. There are some attempting to prove *logical necessity*, while others are *more empirical*. Let us take the former first.

332. (3) Philonous says. "Whatever is immediately perceived is an idea and can any idea exist out of the mind? This would require a long discussion of the word "*idea*". If it were held that thought and perception consist of a relation between subject and object, it will be possible to identify the mind with the subject, and to maintain that there is nothing "*in*" the mind, but only objects "*before*" it. Berkeley discusses the view that we must distinguish the act of perceiving from the object perceived, and that the former is mental *while the latter is not*. *His argument against this view is obscure*, and necessarily so, since for one who believes in

mental substance, as Berkeley does, there is no valid means of refuting it.

333. (4) He says : "That any immediate object of the senses should exist in an unthinking substance. or exterior to *all* minds, is in itself an evident contradiction". There is here a fallacy analogous to the following :—"It is impossible for a nephew to exist without an uncle ; now Mr. A is a nephew ; therefore it is logically necessary for Mr. A to have an uncle". It is, of course, logically necessary given that Mr. A is a nephew, but not from anything to be discovered by analysis of Mr. A. So if something is an object of the senses, some mind is concerned with it, *but it does not follow* that the same thing could not have existed without being an object of the senses.

334. (5) There is a somewhat analogous fallacy as regards what is conceived. Hylas mantains that he can conceive a house which no one perceives, and which is not in his mind. Philonous retorts that *whatever Hylas conceives is in his mind*, so that the supposed house is, after all, mental. Hylas should have answered ; "I do not mean that I have in mind the image of a house ; when I say that I can conceive a house which no one perceives, what I really mean is that I can understand the proposition, 'there is a house which no one perceives' or better still 'there is a house which no one either perceives or conceives'. This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know ; but I am sure that it can not be shown to be self-contradictory. Some closely similar propositions can be proved. For instance,

the number of possible multiplications of two integers is infinite, therefore there are some that have never been thought of. Berkeley's argument, if valid, would prove that this is impossible.

335. (6) The fallacy involved is a very common one. *We can, by means of concepts drawn from experience, construct statements about classes* some or all of whose members are not experienced. Take some perfectly ordinary concept, say, "pebble." This is an empirical concept derived from perception. But it does not follow that all pebbles are perceived, unless we include the fact of being perceived in our definition of pebble. Unless we do this, *the concept "unperceived pebble" is logically unobjectionable,* inspite of the fact that it is logically impossible to perceive an instance of it.

336. (7) Schematically, the argument is as follows : Berkeley says : "Sensible objects *must* be sensible. A is a sensible object. Therefore A must be sensible." But if "must" indicates logical necessity, the argument is only valid if A *must* be a sensible object. The argument does not prove that from the properties of A other than its being sensible, it can be deduced that A is sensible It does not prove, for example, that colours intrisically indistinguishable from those that we see may not exist unseen. We may believe on physiological grounds that this does not occur, but such grounds are empirical; so far as logic is concerned, *there is no reason why there should not be colours where there is no eye or brain.*

337. (8) Now to Berkeley's empirical arguments. To begin with, it is a sign of weakness to combine empirical and logical arguments, for the latter, if valid, make the former superfluous. If I am contending that

a square can not be round, I shall not appeal to the fact that no square in any known city is round.

338. (9) The first of the empirical arguments is an odd one. That heat cannot be in the object, because 'the most vehement and intense degree of heat (is) a very great pain" and we cannot suppose "any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure." There is an ambiguity in the word "pain" of which Berkeley takes advantage. It *may mean the painful quality of a sensation or it may mean the sensation that has this quality*. We say a broken leg is painful without implying that the leg is in the mind; it might be similarly, that heat *causes* pain, and that this is all we ought to mean when we say it *is* a pain.

339. (10) The argument about the hot and cold hands in lukewarm water strictly speaking, would only prove that what we perceive in that experiment is *not hot and cold*, but *hotter* and *colder*.

340. (11) In regard to tastes, the argument from pleasure and pain is repeated. Sweetness is a pleasure and bitterness a pain, therefore both are mental............very similar.........about odours. Since they are pleasant and unpleasant, "they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind." Berkeley assumes, here and every where that what does *not inhere in matter* must inhere in a mental substance, and nothing can be both mental and material.

341. (12) (Now) *primary qualities*, viz. Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion and Rest. The argument, naturally concentrates on extension and motion. If things have real sizes, says Philonous,

the same thing cannot be of different sizes at the same time, and yet it looks larger when we are near it than when we are far off. And if motion is really in the object, how comes it that the same motion may seem *fast* to one and *slow* to another. Such arguments must, I think, be allowed to prove the subjectivity of the perceived space. But this *subjectivity is physical*. It is equally true of a camera, and therefore does not prove that shape is mental.

342. (13) "Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas." He ought, not of course, to make an exception for spirits since it is just as impossible to know spirit as to know matter.

343. (14) There is a theory, which he (Berkeley) rejects, that perception is a relation between a subject and a percept......what, then is meant by calling something a percept ? Does it mean anything more than that the something in question occurs ? Can we turn Berkeley's dictum round, and instead of saying that reality consists in being perceived, say that being perceived consists in being real ? However this may be, Berkeley holds it logically possible that there *should be unperceived things*, since he holds that some real things, viz. *spiritual substances are unperceived*. And it seems obvious that when we say that an event is perceived, we mean something more than that it occurs.

What is this more ? One obvious difference between perceived and unperceived events is that the former, but not the latter, *can be remembered*.

344. (15) It remains to be asked whether any meaning can be attached to the words "mind" and "matter." Everyone knows that *mind* is what an idealist

thinks *there is nothing else but*, and *matter*, is what a materialist thinks the same about.

345. (16) My own (Bertrand Russell's) definition of "matter" may seem unsatisfactory; I should define it as *what satisfies the equations of physics*. There may be nothing satisfying these equations; in that case either physics, or the concept "matter", is a mistake. If we reject substance, 'matter' will have to be a logical construction. Whether it can be any construction composed of events—which may be partly inferred—is a difficult question, but by no means an insoluble one.

346. (17) As for "mind," when substance has been rejected a *mind must be some group* or *structure of events*. The grouping must be effected by some relation which is characteristic of the sort of phenomena we wish to call "mental". We may take memory as typical. We might—though this would be rather unduly simple—define a 'mental' event as one *which remembers* or is *remembered*. Then the "mind" to which a given mental event belongs is the group of events connected with the given event by memory-chains, backwards or forwards.

347. (18) It will be seen that, according to the above definition, a mind and a piece of matter are, each of them, *a group of events*. There is no reason why every event should belong to a group of one kind or other, and there is no reason why some events should not belong to both groups; therefore, some events may be neither mental nor material and other events may be both.*

* Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy p p. 673—684. (extracts by the author.)

348. In this connection it is worth while to consider the position of another modern philosopher, Alexander (Born, Sydney, Australia 1859; died 1938). Alexander's is the radical converse of Berkeley's subjectivist theory of knowledge. Not that all *esse is percipi*. But that all *percipi is esse*. Berkeley says that all that exists does exist as "perceived by some mind," not independently of the perceiving mind. Alexander says that a mind can perceive only that thing which exists independently of and therefore out of the mind. There are no ideas which are not things or at least do not belong to things. This applies not only to perceptual contents or to Hume's impressions, but also to everything which Hume included under the term "idea", and therefore to the presentations of memory, of expectations, of imaginations and, fancy, and to fictions and illusions, and finally even to all conceptual constructions, such as abstractions, universals, logical and mathematical symbols etc. We may illustrate this by memories and illusions.

349. "Wherein consists the essence of knowledge ?" asks Alexander. *A relation* between two entities, a subject and an object or a concsiousness and a thing. What kind of relation ? *Compresence* or togetherness* as, between the table and the floor. Knowledge comes into existence only when one of the two components which is compresent with the other is a subject endowed with consciousness. It makes no difference to the relation whether a subject confronts an object, or whether two

*This *compresence* or *togetherness* is the same as *Sannikarsha* (संनिकर्ष) in Gotama's *Nyāya Sūtra* (I. 1. 4,) and Kanada's *Vaisheshika* (III. 1-18), or *sambandha* (सम्बन्ध) in Jaimini's *Pūrva-mīmānsā* (I. 1. 5) or Kapila's *Sānkhya Sūtra* (I. 89).

objects or two subjects confront each other. The sole point is whether the two components are *together*. The knowledge relation, therefore, has no special dignity or peculiarity; it is the simplest relation that we can imagine, just that of compresence.........The object is completely independent of the subject or the mind with which it can enter into a knowledge relation. *It is a non-physical entity* which is not further affected or modified by the presence of a consciousness. It is existent or real, whether it stands in the knowledge-relation or not; this makes no difference to its being. On the other hand, the subject is dependent upon the object as its original material *consciousness is always consciousness of something*, *of an object*. This little word *of* is the expression of compresence. When I perceive a tree then I and the tree are together. The togetherness of the tree with myself is experienced by me as my togetherness with the tree. Everything which in any way confronts the subject or which is the act of knowing is given as compresent, is put "outside of mind" and assigned to the physical world of things.

350. Berkeley's main object was to oppose *materialism* and he tried to achieve this end by denouncing *matter* itself and thus got involved into three main inconsistencies:—(a) confusion about percept and perception, (b) solipsism along with the doctrine of spirits or spiritual substances (c) mal-adjustment between theory and practical life—even Christian view of life, he being a Christian bishop.

351. Several centuries before Berkeley and philosophers of his type, similar efforts were made by Indian philosophers, some of them mighty thinkers, who have left a great mark on Indian thought.

352. When Greek philosophers were busy with their speculations which in time to come developed into great philosophical systems of Plato, Aristotle and others, in India there arose three heterodox philosophies all atheistic, *Charvaka's* simple materialism, *Buddhists'* philosophy of flux with its numerous variations, and anti-theistic dualism (pluralism) of *Jainas*. It was to meet these enemies of orthodoxy that several philosophers of mighty capabilities founded monistic systems the most important of which is Shankara's *Maya doctrine*. Their aim was to condemn materialism by denying *matter*. The monotheistic language of the *Vedas* and the *Upanisadas* was given monistic interpretation and Kapila's *Sankhya* system which posited *Prakrti or* matter was drastically criticised. The Vedantist schools of India, of which, we have seen something in the foregoing pages, though differing on many vital points, have all combined against the *Sankhya Prakrti* and material atoms of Kanada's *Vaisheshika*. It is on this point that Svami Dayananda has given a new orientation.

353. The first great departure from the popular thought is Svami Dayananda's conviction that Kapila's *Sankhya Sutras* do not favour atheism. When Kapila accepts the authenticity of the Vedic revelation, it would have been as absurd on his part to deny the existence of God, as of a man who takes zest in reading the *Paradise Lost* while denying the existence of Milton. "Whoever," says Svami Dayananda, "calls *Kapila* an atheist is himself so and not Kapila."*

The following questions and answers given by Svami Dayananda are worth noticing :—

* **Light of Truth, VII. 32.**

354. *Question.*—

(1) *Ishvarāsiddheḥ* (*Sankhya Sutra*, I. 92.)
(2) *Pramāṇābhāvānna tat siddhiḥ* (*Ibid*, V. 10).
(3) *Sambandhāvān nānumānam.* (*Ibid*, V. 11).

(1) God cannot be proved by the proof called perception.

(2) When perception is inadmissible, inference and other proofs are out of question.

(3) The relation of pervasion being absent, inference is impossible. Then again, without perception, the testimony of authority cannot be applicable. Therefore the existence of God cannot be proved.

355. *Answer.* Here the first aphorism means that the evidence of perception (as defined in the foregoing aphorism) is not applicable as a proof of God's existence. Moreover, God is not the material cause of the universe (the 2nd and 3rd aphorisms simply disprove God's being the material cause). There is a distinction between *Purusha* the God and *Purusha* the soul. God is called *Purusha* because he pervades all things. And the soul is called *Purusha* because it resides in the body. To this very context refer the following aphorisms:—

(1) *Pradhānashaktiyogāchchet sangāpattiḥ* (*Sānkhya* V. 8).
(2) *Sattā mātrāchchet sarvaishvaryam.* (*Ibid* V. 9).
(3) *Shrutirapi pradhānakārytvasya.* (*Ibid* V. 12).

1. If God's combination with matter be the hypothesis, God would be subjected to the same fault as matter. Just as matter combined becomes gross, so shall God. Therefore God is not the material cause of the universe.
   He is *its efficient* (*rather, agental*) *cause*.

2. If the universe were made out of the intelligent God, the whole world would have been almighty like God. But it is not the case. Therefore God is not the material cause.
3. And because the *Upanishad* also holds that matter is the material cause of the universe and not God.

356. The following verse also says the same-thing:—

*Ajāmekām lohitshuklakrisṇām bahvīḥ prajaḥ srajamānām suarūpāḥ.**

Prakrti is unborn and has triple nature, *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It being changeable is transformed into various objects of the world. But *purusha* or God being unchangeable is never transformed to any other form. He remains always the unmodifiable same. The *Sankhya Sutra* V-12 contains the word *Shrutih*, meaning *Vedas*. When Kapila accepts *Vedic* authority, he can not be called atheistic.

Whoever calls *Kapila* an atheist is himself so and not *Kapila*.†

357. Here the objector produced aphorism V. 10 and V. 11 against God's existence. But in reply Svami Dayananda has supplied three more, *i. e.*, V. 8, V. 9 and V. 12, Thus by reading the five aphorisms V. 8-12, it is clear that all these aim at proving that God is not the material cause of the universe. They do not touch the subject of God's being efficient cause. This is proved by other aphorisms of the same book *e. g.* III, 56, 57, V 116 etc.

* Shvetashvatar Upanishad, IV. 5.

† Light of Truth, VII. 30, 31, 32.

358. The first aphorism produced by the objector (*i. e.* I. 92) is irrelevant. It was never meant to prove or disprove God's existence. It was simply discussing the definition of perception as given in I. 89. It says that perception is the proof of the contact of the senses with the *outer* objects. God is not the outer object and therefore the contact necessary for perception is impossible. Secondly God has no senses, therefore His knowledge does not depend upon perception. In this sense, too, the evidence of perception is invalid. In both cases the objection is misplaced and misapplied and therefore invalid. There is one more point which has been totally overlooked. In the aphorism the word is *siddheh* (सिद्धेः) in the *ablative* case and not *siddhih* (सिद्धिः) or *nominative* case. The author does not say that God *is unproven.* He simply means that "in that case, God's existence *would remain unproven.*" It makes all the difference.

359. In the *Vijnanamrita Bhashya* of *Vedanta Sutra* I. 1. 5 Vijnan Bhiksu discusses at length that the *Sankhya* conception of *Prakrti* is not anti-Vedic and that Kapila is not atheistic. But Bhikshu's pleading is not so forceful and clear as Dayananda's.*

360. The *Sankhya Sutra* V. 12 contains the word *Shruti* (श्रुति) or *Veda*. A system accepting the authority of the Vedas can never he called atheistic.

361. The second important role which Svami Dayananda plays in strengthening the foundations of realism is his refutation of *anti-matter* theories of ancient Indian philosophers. To the student of Indian

*Cp. Das Gupta's Indian Philosophy Vol. III, pp. 472, 73, 74.

philosophy, Berkeley's "*all esse is percipi*" seems to be a mere echo.

362. Commenting on the ancient *Karika* of Gaudapada,

Na nirodho na chotpattirna baddho na cha sādhakaḥ,
*Na mumukṣur na vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā.**

Shankaracharya writes :—

Yastu punar dvaitasam-vyavahāraḥ sa rajju-sarpavad-ātmani prāṇādi-lakṣṇaḥ kalpita it-yuktam Nahi mano-vikalpanāyā rajju-sarpādi-lakṣṇāyā rajjvām pralaya utpattir vā. Na cha manasi rajju sarpasyotpattiḥ pralayo vā na chobhayato vā. Tathā mānsatvā-visheṣād dvaitasya. Na hi nīyate manasi suṣupte vā dvaitam grihyate.

Ato manovikalpanā-mātram dvaitamiti siddham. Tasmāt sūktam dvaitasyāsatvan nirodhādyabhāvaḥ parmārthateti.†

Gaudapada and on his authority Shankaracharya maintain that really speaking there is no outer world, nor the phenomena called creation and dissolution, or birth, death, bondage and emancipation, *not even depending on perceiving mind as percepts*, but appearing to exist due to mental mis-apprehension or illusion, as a rope appears a snake in dim light. Here what we call matter in common parlance, is denied

* न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥
(माण्डूक्योपनिषद् गौड़पादीय कारिका, वैतथ्यप्रकरण श्लोक ३२)

† यस्तुपुनर्द्वैतसंव्यवहारः स रज्जुपसर्पवदात्मनि प्राणादिलक्षणः कल्पित इत्युक्तम् । नहि मनो विकल्पनाया रज्जुसर्पादिलक्षणाया रज्वां प्रलय उत्पत्तिर्वा । न च मनसि रज्जुसर्पस्योत्पत्तिः प्रलयो वा न चोभयतो वा । तथा मानसत्वाविशेषाद् द्वैतस्य । न हि नियते मनसि सुषुप्ते वा द्वैतं गृह्यते ।

अतो मनोविकल्पनामात्रं द्वैतमिति सिद्धम् । तस्मात् सूक्तं द्वैतस्यासत्वान् निरोधाद्यभावः परमार्थतेति ।

(देखो गीता प्रेस माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, पृ० ११४)

not only *external* existence as in case of Berkeley, but even mind-based existence as *mere illusion.*

363. Such controversies have been going on for at least twenty five centuries in India in various forms, and Indian thinkers have either supported or counter-acted them according to their tastes and abilities. The Buddhist *yoga-charas* and non-dualist Shankarites both have been thoroughly criticised by Indian realists on the lines argued by Svami Dayananda.

364. Berkeley denies an independent existence of non-spiritual substances or outer-objects. He perceives qualities only and does not find any substance in which those qualities may reside apart from the sum total of those qualities. Similar is the position of Shankaracharya who does not distinguish between the qualities and the substance which supports these qualities. The Buddhists also maintained that any substance apart from qualities is a thing which is not perceived and therefore has no grounds for acceptance. Svami Dayananda agrees so far as that only qualities are apprehended by senses and not the substance. But he holds that the substance is something other than a mere sum total of qualities and therefore the substance is something real and self-existent, *i. e.*, it exists irrespective of the perceiver.

365. Svami Dayananda's position gets a great support from the arguments of Venkatanatha which he has given in his famous treatises *Nyaya-Siddhantanjana* and *Tattvamuktakalapa* at least as far as the existence of substance is concerned.

366. Buddhistic view:—There is no substance and all things are but a momentary conglo-meration of separate entities which come into being and are destroyed the next moment. The *Vaibhashika* Buddhists say that there are four ultimate sense-data, viz, colour, taste, touch and smell, which are themselves qualities and are not themselves qualities of anything. These can be grasped by our specific senses. The *Vatsiputriya* school includes sound as a separate sense-data which can be perceived by the ear.*

367. Venkatanatha's reply: —(1) In all perception we have a notion *that we touch what we see;* such a perception cannot be false, for such a feeling is both invariable and uncontradicted in experience (*Sva rasika-badhadrshter ananyatha-siddheshcha*). Such a perception implies recognition (*pratyabhijna*) involving the notion that it is a *permanent entity in the objective field* which is perceived by a constant and unchangeable perceiver, and that the two sense-qualities refer to one and the same object. This recognition does not refer merely to the colour sensation, for the colour sensation does not involve the tactile; nor does it refer merely to the tactile, as that does not involve colour. Perception, therefore, refers to an entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong.

368. (2) Such a perception of recognition also repudiates the Buddhist view of the conglomeration of entities. For such a view naturally raises the question

* *Evam āhur vaibhaṣikāḥ nirādhārā nirdharmakāṣcha rupādayash chatvāraḥ padārthāḥ*

एवमाहुर्वैभाषिका :—निराधारा निर्धर्मकाश्च रूपादयश्चत्वारः पदार्थाः ।
(तत्वमुक्ताकलापे सर्वार्थसिद्धिः)

Cp. Berkeley's Philonous.

as to whether the conglomeration is different from or the same as the entities that conglomerate.

369. (3) In the latter case, (*i. e.* if the conglomeration is the same as those entities), there cannot be any recognition of the object as one entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong.

370. (4) If conglomeration is different, such a conglomeration must either be positive or negative.

371. (5) If positive, the substance is proved.

372. (6) If negative, that is, if the conglomeration (*samghata*) is non-existent, it cannot produce recognition.

373. (7) If conglomeration be defined as absence of interval between the perceived qualities, then also, since each sense quality has an appeal only to its own specific sense-organ, it is impossible that the perception of two different sense-qualities by two differnt organs should point to a common entity.

374. (8) Conglomeration can not also be defined as *spatial* identity, for it must also involve temporal identity in order to give the notion of conglomeration.

375. (9) It can not also be said that time and space are identical, for such a view which is true of momentariness will be shown to be false by the refutation of momentariness.

376. (10) It cannot also be urged that the tactile sensation can be inferred from the colour-sensation, for such an inference would involve as its pre-condition the knowledge of the con-committance of

the colour-datum and the tactile, which is not possible unless *they are known to belong to the same object*.

377. (11) Neither can it be urged that the tactile and the colour-data are mutually associated; this gives rise to the notion that *what is seen is touched;* for the two notions are known to be different in nature and originate through different sense-organs.

378. (12) We intuit the fact that the objects are endowed with qualities. No one perceives a jug as being merely the colour-datum, but *as an object having colour*. Therefore our ordinary experience *that the object as the substance is the repository of various sense-qualities* cannot be invalidated.

378. (13) It is also wrong to suppose that since the colour-datum and the tactile are grasped together they are identical in nature, for in the case of one error where a white conch-shell appears as yellow, the conch-shell is grasped without its white character, just as the yellow colour is grasped without its corresponding object. And it cannot be said that a separate yellow conch-shell is produced there; for such a view is directly contradicted in experience when we perceive the yellow colour, and assert its identity with the conch-shell by touch. So, by the simultaneity of perception, *coherence of qualities in an object is proved and not identity.**

380. The denial of the material aspect of the universe was originally hypothesized to controvert materialism which thought that every phenomenon of the universe can be explained in terms of matter

* History of Indian Philosophy by S. Dasgupta, III. p. 251-54.

and without any reference to non-material spirit. Material philosophy was bound to result in certain forms of moral turpitude, to ward off which the Buddha and other similar reformers in different ages and countries set up their own theories. One of these hair-splitting theories was the denial of objective existence of material 'substance' by bringing in the confusion between qualities and substance, of which we have seen something in these pages.

381. Later on, the followers of the Buddha propounded the theory of flux or momentariness which also gave a death-blow to 'substance', killing at the same time the doctrine of permanent spirit. This theory of flux invoked several forms of counter-attacks in the realm of Indian philosophic thought. If there is nothing but flux or momentary phenomena, there remains nothing, either gross matter, or spirit or even abstract permanent laws. Svami Dayananda's philosophy admits the existence of both matter and spirit. To him change and permanence are both real and the advocates of no-change and all-permanence as much in error as those who assert that it is all-change and no-permanance.

382. In controverting the theory of momentariness Svami Dayananda says:—

"The object and its cognition can not be momentary, otherwise how will you explain *recognition* ? It will be impossible to remenber that we did such and such thing. It is a fact that we do remember things seen and heard. The theory of momentariness is therefore untenable."*

*Light of Truth, XII, II

383. Then again,

"If all things are momentary (and nothing abides) then there should be no recognition of an object seen long ago, saying "It is the self-same object." If that object had been momentary, it would not have been in existence. Whose recognition was possible then ?

If momentarianism is the doctrine of Buddhism then their salvation will also be momentary."*

384. These remarks of Svami Dayananda, about momentariness put in our mind the discussion given in Venkatanatha's Sarvartha-Siddhi on this subject. Let us give a relevant part of it here:—

385. The Buddhists:—The theory of causal efficiency proves that whatever is existent must be momentary; for the same efficiency cannot be produced again and again. So, in accordance with each efficiency or the production of effects, a separate entity has to be admitted. Since the efficiency at two different moments cannot be identical, the entities producing them also cannot be identical. Since the different characters that are supposed to belong to the same object represent different efficiencies, their attribution to the same object is also erroneous. Therefore there are as many different entities as there are different character-points in a particular moment, (*yo yo virudha-dharma-dhyasa-van sa sa nana*).

386. Venkatanatha:—Things are not associated with diverse opposite characters, and that though in certain cases, *e, g.* the flowing river or the flame of a lamp, changing entities may show the appearance of an unchanging whole, there are undeniable cases of

* Ibid, XII-15

true recognition in all such cases where we perceive that it is the same thing *which we both see and touch.*

387. B.—Recognition is a mere affair of memory.

388. V.—Recognition is a case, where perception predominates, or at the worst it may be said to be a joint complex of memory and perception.

389. B.—The presence of memory falsifies recognition.

390. V.—No, not all memory is false.

391. B.—Memory is only subjective and as such cannot lead us to an objective determination.

392. V.—Memory is not only subjective. It has also an *objective reference invoking the time character of the objects as past.*

393. B.—The association of many characters to an object is wrong, for each character-point represents the efficiency of a momentary unit, and that therefore, the association of many characters in recognition is false.

394. V.—If each momentary unit is by itself capable of producing any effect, it ought to do 'it' by its own nature, and it ought not to wait for the assistance of other accessories. Following the same analogy, even the unique nature of any momentary unit would not be the same with any other unique nature of any other moment, and thus the idea of identity would be impossible. It is therefore wrong to suppose that there

is a separate entity corresponding to each and every character-unit.

Viruddhānām desha-kālā-dya-samāhita-virodhatvena sva-lakṣaṇasyāpi viruddha-shata-kṣuṇṇatayā nānātve tat-kṣodānām cha tathā tathā kṣode kinchidapy ekam na siddhyet tad-abhāve cha kuto naikam iti mādhyamika-matāpātaḥ.

395. B.—The experience of recognition is impossible.

396. V.—Though it would be absurd to connect a past moment with the present, there is no incongruity in associating them with an entity which has lived through the past and is also persisting in the present moment. Even the concept of a successive series of moments would be in-admissible, since the notion of successive moments implies a reference of before and after, and hence in some way or other, it brings together the past, the present and the future. If this be not admitted the very concept of momentariness would have to be sacrificed.

Kāla-dvayasyānyonyasminn-abhāvepi tadubhaya-sambandhini vastuny-abhāvābhāvāt yas-tu tasmin vastuny asambaddha kālaḥ tasya tatra sadbhāvam na brūmaḥ.

*Pūrvā-para-kāla-yogo hi viruddhaḥ svenopādhināvachchhinnasyaikasya kālasyāvāntaropādhibhir nānātve pi tat-tad-upādhīnām eva tat-tad-avāntara kāladvayānvaya-virodhaḥ anyāpekṣayā pūrvāpara-kālayor anyasya viruddhatve kṣana-kālasyāpi anyāpekṣayā paurvāparyāt tat-kāla-vartitvam api vastuno viruddhyeta.**

397. B.—Perception refers only to the present moment. It can never lead us to the comprehension of the past. Our notion, therefore, that things existent in the past are persistent in the present is an illusion due to the operation of the sub-conscious root-

* Sarvarthasiddhih, pp. 66-68.

impressions which ignore difference between the past and the present, and impose the former on the latter, as silver is imposed on conch-shell.

398. V.—Perception demonstrates only the presence of an object in the present moment as against its absence, but *it does not on that account deny its existence in the past*. Just as '*this*' indicates the presence of an object in the present moment, the perceptual experience "*that is this*" demonstrates the persistence of the object in the past and in the present.

Yathā ·idam iti tat-kāla-sattā grhyate, tathā tad idam iti kāla-dvaya-sattvam api pratyakṣenaiva grihītam).

399. B.—Perception reveals its object as a present entity.

400. V.—It will, then, contradict your own theory of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyaksha*) which cannot reveal the object as qualified by the temporal character as *present*.

401. B.—Perception reveals the existence of the object at the moment of the perceptual revelation.

402. V.—This also contradicts your doctrine. The momentary object with which the sense organ was in touch has ceased to exist by the time knowledge was produced. Since the sense-contact, the object as associated with it, and the temporal element associated with them, are continuous, the mental state is also continuous and as such the perception reveals the object as that with which the sense was in contact. Even after the cessation of the sense-contact, the mental state, indicating the perception of the object with which the sense was in contact, is comprehended.

*Asman-mate tv indriya-samprayogasya tad-vishiṣṭa-vastunas tad-upahita kālāmshasya cha sthāyitveṇa dhīkṣanānuvṛttau tad-viṣayatayā pratyakṣo-dayāt samprayogā-nantara-kṣaṇe dhīr api nirvartyate.**

403. Thus momentaristic theories fall flat. Venkatanatha tries at full length to analyse the very concept of momentariness. There can be six meanings attached to it. (1) An entity is associated with a moment (*ksana-sambandhavattvam* क्षण सम्बन्धवत्त्वम्). (2) Association with a momentary unit of time (*ksana-kala-sambandhatvam* क्षणकाल सम्बन्धत्वम्). (3) Existence for only one moment (*ksana-matravartitvam* क्षणमात्र वर्तित्वम्. (4) Absence of relation with two moments (*ksana-dvaya-sambandha-shuny attvam* क्षण-द्वय-सम्बन्धशून्यत्वम्). (5) Identity with the moment of time (*ksana-kalatvam* क्षणकालत्वम्). (6) Being determinant of the moment character (*ksana-padhitvam* क्षणपाधित्वम्).

The first alternative is out of question; for even those who believe in persistent entities admit that such entities associate with a moment, since they persist in time. The second alternative has no meaning for Buddhists who do not believe in a separate category of time apart from the *kshana*. (*Kalamevanichchatas te ko' sau ksana kalah kashcha tasya sambandah*). If you believe in the category of time you will have to admit an entity of time as apart from *ksana*, which falsifies momentariness. The third alternative is directly contradicted in *the experience of recognition* which testifies to the fact *that we touch what we see.* The fourth alternative is also similarly contradicted in experience; and if any supposed entity which is not itself a *ksana* is not associated with two time-moments, then it can have only a chimerical existence, and, curiously enough the Buddhists often compare all existent entities with

* Ibid, p. 70

chimerical objects (*kha pushpa* or *sky flower*). The fifth alternative is equally contradicted in experience, for just as an entity exists in a unit of space and can not be identical with space, so also it cannot *be identical with the time in which it exists*. The sixth alternative is also inadmissible. If objects were in their own nature determinants of moments, then there would be nothing to explain our notion of temporal succession, and all our experiences depending on such a succession would be contradicted. If things did not persist in time and were absolutely destroyed without leaving any trace (निरन्वय-विनाश) then the ordinary experience of the world in which things are done for the purpose of reaping their benefits could not be explained. We cannot even say that such and such Buddhist author wrote such and such book in such and such year; nor a thief can ever be caught and punished for the theft.

404. If the momentariness of entities means that they are modified or conditioned by moments, then also the question arises if they are not themselves momentary, how can they be conditioned by moments? Time being unlimited in its nature cannot be parcelled out in moments. The supposed moments can be attributed to an operation or an existing entity only for specifying particular states or conditions for practical purposes, but an entity that exists, exists in time, and thus outgrows the limits of a previous or later moment. So, though a specific unit of time may be regarded as momentary, the entity that exists, therfore, is not momentary in the nature of its own existence. Since the Buddhists do not admit time, they are not justified in speaking of momentary time in which things are supposed to exist. Nor are they justified in holding that nature in itself suffers change in every moment,

for that virtually amounts to the existence of a permanent entity which suffers modification.

*Sarva-kṣaṇikatvam sādhayitum upakramya sthira-dravya-vrtti-kṣaṇikavikāravad iti katham dṛṣṭāntayema tesu cha na tvad-abhimatam kṣaṇikatvam pradīpādi vad' āshutara-vināshitva-mātreṇa kṣanikato-kteḥ.**

405 The Buddhist assumption that things are destroyed entirely and there are no elements in them that persist (*niranvaya vinasha*) on the analogy that flames are destroyed without leaving any trace of their existence, is false. For, from various other instances, *e. g.* the case of jugs, cloth etc. we find that their destruction means only a *change of state*, and not entire annihilation, and from this analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the elements of the flame that are destroyed are not completely annihilated but persist in invisible forms. In another context Syami Dayananda says :—"No substance can perish in its entirety" (Chapter III. para. 20). Even when a flame is destroyed, the tip of the wick is felt to be slightly warm and this is certainly to be interpreted as a remnant of the heat possessed by the flame.†

406. As regard *existence* itself, quoting the Vaisheshika, Svami Dayananda says :—

"*Sad-iti yato dravyaguna-karmasu sā sattā.* (*Vaisheṣika Sutra* I. 2. 7).

The use of the word 'is' (present tense of the verb 'be') in connection with a substance, attribute or action signifies existence. It holds good in case of all existent objects."

The meaning is : *whatever is exists.*

* Sarvarthasiddih, p. 77

† Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy pp. 274-76 adapted.

Then further :—

Bhāvo-nu-vrittereva hetutvāt sāmānyameva. (*Vaisheshika*, I.2.14)

Existence is co-existent with all existent objects. Therefore it is called "Mahasamanyam or Super-generality." (Light of Truth III. para 70).

407. Radhakrisnan has explained it in this way :—"There are two kinds of generality, higher and lower. The highest generality is *that of being* (satta). It covers the largest number of things. It includes all, and is not included in anything. It is not a species of any higher genus. *While being is the only true universal, the true particulars are the individuals themselves* (antya-vishesa) and between the two we have universal particulars, such as substance and the rest, which cover a limited number of things. These latter serve as bases of inclusive as well as exclusive cognitions, since they are both species and genera. The extension determines the grade of generality."*

408. Allied to the question of *momentariness* is the problem of *change*. The *substantiveness* of the substance (and therefore of matter) has been as well denied by the *momentarists* as by *changists*. Both maintain that nothing persists, and therefore there is no such thing as material substance. But the changists reserve for themselves one thing. They say that only changeful things do not persist and therefore they do not exist. But behind all changes there is a changeless entity (in Shankara's terminology '*Brahma*'). Shankara maintains that all changeful things are unreal, (*mithya*, false). If change and

* *Cp. Saptapadārthī 7 : Sāmānyam paramaparam parāparam.* Radhakrisnan's Indian Philosophy Vol. II. p. 210.

momentariness are identical in meaning there remains nothing to hold that all changeable objects or phenomena have a changeless reality behind. And if you hold that chageableness of an object itself carries us to the conviction that there is some reality behind, then *ipso facto* we shall have to maintain that there is matter that changes.

409. How? 'Change' as is universally admitted is not the replacement of one thing by a totally different thing. For instance if you take away a horse from his tether and tie a goat instead, nobody would say that the horse has been changed into goat. But if the horse remains there and you chop off only an ear of his, or break his leg or colour his skin, everybody would say that the horse has changed. The reason is that change always implies *continuity* or persistence of certain factors.

410. Following this, we shall have to admit that the matter which we find changing constantly is something real, something that is amenable to change. But this argument does not validate Shankara's doctrine that the world is a transformed *Brahma*; because *Brahma is* not amenable to change. Shankara denies momentariness, accepts change, but does not realize that change implies the persistence of *that very thing which changes*, and not something of a quite different nature, of which it is not proper to predicate change.

411. That there is a change in the world nobody can deny. To deny change is to deny experience and everything that 'experience' implies. Change involves continuity but that continuity is

different from persistent sameness or eternality. Therefore if reality is one, indivisible one in the sense of monism, it cannot change. Change means temporal and spacial adjustment and re-adjustment between a plurality of objects and therefore you cannot adequately explain change without hypothesizing plurality. Those who do not believe in the plurality of objects have ascribed *the appearance of change* to an illusion. But they have not cared to ascertain that illusion is, and ought to be, inadmissible in monism. They have further erred in finding a definite meaning of illusion. *Illusion is a change, but all change is not illusion*, and where ever illusion occurs it is subjective and not objective. If a rope appears a snake, the change is not in the object but in the mind that mis-sees. When water is changed into ice and what we saw water yesterday we see ice today, the change is objective. The seer or his capacity to see remains unchanged, only the object has changed. But when a piece of ice looks cotton, it is the change in the subject, that is, in the act and nature of seeing. It is change, but that type of change which is different from the former change. It is *illusion*. Both kinds of changes are parts of our experience. They should not be confused, nor the words should be used equivocally. Had there been one and only one thing, there should have been neither subjective illusion nor objective transformation. Even illusion involves objective plurality. We happen to mis-see one thing for another, because both of them had been the parts of our experience before this occurance of illusion. If I have never seen snakes and ropes, I can never misperceive a rope for a snake. The snake is absent in the rope, but is present in my memory which recollects what I actually saw.

412. To understand this clearly Svami Dayananda has asked the seeker to realize the *negative* aspect of the substances also. While dealing with different kinds of *negation* discussed in the *Vaisheshika sutras*, he has written a significant sentence :—

"This is the description of the *positive* aspect of the substances. The *negative aspect* is of fives kinds."*

Thereby Svami Dayananda means that unless you understand both the positive and negative aspects of things, you shall not be able to escape error. He further explains those type of negation.

413. (1) *Kriyā-guṇa-vyapadesh-abhāvāt pragasat (Vaisheṣika IX-1-1.)*

The first is called *pre-negation* (*pragabhava*) *i. e.* the negation of an object, before its coming into being, due to an absence of a particular action or attribute, *e. g.* the pot and the cloth did not exist before their production.

414. (2) *Sad-a-sat* (*Vaisheṣika IX 1. 2.*)

The second is *post-negation* (*viddhvansabhava*) *e. g.*, the negation of an object, which is now no more, *e. g.* the pot perished after its production.

415. (3) *Sachchāsat* (*Vaisheṣika IX 1. 4*)

The third is *reciprocal negation* (*anyonyabhava*) *e. g.* the horse is not the cow and the cow is not the horse, *i. e.* there is the negation of 'cow' in the horse and negation of horse in the cow, while there is the '*positing*' of cow in the cow and horse in the horse.

* यह क्रम भाव रूप द्रव्यों का है। जो अभाव है वह पांच प्रकार का होता है।

(Light of Truth, III. 71.)

This last sentence of Svami Dayananda is very significant.

416. (4) *Yachchānyadasadatas - tad-asat.* (*Vaisheṣika IX. 1. 5*)

The fourth is *absolute negation* (*atyantabhava*) which is different from the above mentioned three, *e. g.* horns of a man, flowers of the sky, the son of a sterile woman, (such things exist nowhere and nowhen).

417. (5) *Nāsti ghaṭo geha iti sato-ghaṭasya geha-samsarga-prati-ṣedhaḥ (Vaisheṣika IX. 1. 10).*

The fifth is *relative negation* (*Samsargabhava*) *e. g.*, the pot is not in the house; it is elsewhere. Here is the negation of the pot in connection with the house.*

418. Svami Dayananda has emphasized the meanings of negations for the main purpose of showing that various anti-matter theories which have been propounded by nihilists, illusionists and absolutists have taken only one kind of negation, (whichever might have suited their purpose) and ignored others. Thus the results have always been one-sided and therefore erroneous.

419. These five kinds of negations are all justified by universal experience and to falsify them is to falsify experience. All these negations prove plurality of things both subjective and objective, spiritual and material, psychological and logical. For instance, those who prove the nothingness of the things by the argument 'that a cow is *absent* in a horse and a horse is absent in a cow, therefore the horse and the cow both are non-existent', forget that this negation is only a

* Light of Truth, IX. 71.

negative aspect of the reality and that we should not forget that the horse is present in the horse, and the cow in the cow. This kind of negation would not have been experienced unless there had been objective plurality. This is quite clear in the case of four negations. Even the fourth in the above series, *i. e. absolute negation* does not prove nihilism. It shows the absurdity of imagining a connection which has never been experienced between the two objects which have been separately experienced elsewhere. When we speak of the *absolute negation* of a man's horns, we do not negate the existence of man, nor of horn, but only of the *connection between* the two which has never been experienced.

420. It is generally believed that the *Vedanta* and the *Sankhya* are two antagonistic systems of Hindu philosophy and while the *Vedanta* vehementally opposes *Prakrti*, the *Sankhya* denies the existence of God. Svami Dayananda, as we have seen above, differs from both the views. He holds that the *Vedanta* as much allows. *Prakrti* to be the material cause of the universe as *Sankhya* allows God to be the agental cause (or potter-cause) of the universe. The anti-*prakrti* view of the *Vedanta* owes it origin to Shankara's peculiar commentary of the *Vedanta Sutras* which has been almost copied at least in this respect by Ramanuja and other commentators also.

421. But Vijnana Bhikshu's exposition of the *Vedanta Sutras* appears to be in agreement with S. Dayananda's view. In his *Vijnana-mrita Bhashya* of Sutra I. 5, "Bhikshu quotes a number of passages from the Upanisads to show that the idea of *prakrti* is not unvedic. *Prakrti* is spoken of in the *Upanisads* as the cause of the world and as the *energy* of God. *Prakrti*

is also spoken of as *maya* in the *Shvetashvatara* and God is spoken of as *mayavi* or the magician who holds within Himself the magic power. The magician may withhold his magic, but the magic power lies all the same in him (*Mayaya vyapara-nivrttirevavagamyate na nashah*). The ordinary *prakrti* is always undergoing change and transformation, and it is only the special *satva* stuff associated with God that is always regarded unchanging."*

422. The quotation which we have given here from Das Gupta's book raises so many questions in the reader's mind. Irrespective of the fact whether the *Vedanta* admits or does not admit *prakrti* or whether it agrees with *Sankhya* or not, the main question is what '*prakrti*' means. *Shvetashvatara's maya* and Das Gupta's translation of it as '*the energy of God*' or 'magic power,' are very confusing. If *Prakrti* is only the energy of God or magic power, it will be different from *Sankhya's· prakrti* and "*change*" and "*transformation*" would not be applicable to it. Here, too, Svami Dayananda is much more definite than Bhikshu. It is he and he alone who after several centuries of guess work has cleared the equivocation. In fact the word '*prakrti*' and the word *maya* have been variously used at various places. The word *prakrti* has two meanings ; one *nature* or *evergy* and the other *material cause*. It is wrong on the part of the Sanskrta commentators to use *prakrti* rather loosely and on the part of English translators to translate it as *magic* or *energy* or *nature*. *Shvetashvatara* clearly says '*mayam tu prakrtim vidyat mayinam tu maheshvaram.*' Here he means that the word *maya* has

* Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, III. 472.

been technically used in the sense of material cause (materia-radica) and God as one that has this matter under His sway. *Maya* here does not mean *magic*, nor God *magician*. What is magic? An art of creating illusion. That is certainly no complement to the conception of God. Nor it can explain *vyapara nivrtti* or *nasha*. What is the meaning of "Satva-stuff associated with God."? 'Stuff' is not energy or power. It is something different, a separate entity, the material cause. Energy or nature is the very attribute of a maker and not another entity.

423. The introduction of the idea of magic has vitiated the whole thing. It has led to several unnecessary and unwarranted difficulties. Just after the above quotation, Das Gupta asks:—

"A question that may naturally arise in this connection is, if God is Himself unchangeable and if the *sattva*-body with which He is always associated is also always unchangeable, how is it that God can have a desire to produce the world at any particular time?"

424. The question, I say, has *naturally arisen* only because the word *prakrti* has not been clearly understood. If '*prakrti*' means *matter* as Svami Dayananda says, then there is no room for any question whatsoever. But if *prakrti* is taken in the popular sense of an attribute, or property, or power of God, then not only one difficulty but several arise which are insoluble. It is not to admit *prakrti*, but an indirect way to deny it.

425. Shankaracharya's is the school of *Vivarta*-

vada (विवर्तवाद)* or illusion-theory. Illusion always arises through defect in the seeing agent. Thus when Shankarites say that there is no such thing as *prakrti*, they mean that God is the material cause of the universe and not matter. They are justified in such a thesis, because they look upon the universe as an *illusion* and no reality. A dreamer is the material cause of all his dream-universe. Here one difficulty seems to be obviated, but a much greater difficulty has arisen. They have denied *prakrti*, they have also denied the actual existence of the universe. But this denial has proved too dear. *It has made God a dreamer or a seer of unreality*. All *Vedic* texts which sing of the glory of the Lord have ended in a fiasco. God is the author and creator and governor and what not, of all that was, is and shall be. But this all never *really was, nor is*, nor ever *shall be*. We made castles in the air with all the imagination at our command and then dashed them down with one stroke.

426. The *Ramanuja* school is *Parinama-vada* (परिणामवाद) or theory of transformation. They also deny *prakrti*, (thus, in a way walk in the footsteps of Shankara). Ramanuja's commentary of the *Vedanta* though different vitally from Shankara's, exhibits no depth as far as *prakrti* is concerned. But Ramanuja himself and his disciples later on, have had to confront an insurmountable difficulty

*तात्त्विकोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामः ।
अतात्त्विकोऽन्यथाभावो विवर्तः ॥

When a thing *becomes different* from what it previously actually was, it is called *Priṇāma or transformation*.

When a thing *appears different* without any real change, it is *Vivarta or illusion*.

in explaining the creation of the universe without materia-radica or root-matter. How can God be the material as well as the instrumental cause?

427. We here give a specimen of the efforts to reconcile such a position :—

(1) Shri Shaila Shrinivasa, in his *Siddhanta-chintamani* discusses the nature of *Brahma*-causality.

(2) *Brahman* is both the instrumental (*nimitta*), and the material (upadana cause) of the world.

(3) Such a *Brahman* is the object of our meditation (*dhyana*). An object of meditation must have knowledge and will. A mere quality-less entity can not be the object of meditation. In order that *Brahman* may be properly meditated upon, it is necessary that the nature of his causality should be properly ascertained. It is no use to attribute false qualities for the sake of meditation.

(4) If the world is an illusion, the causality of *Brahman* is also illusory, and that would give us an insight into His real nature.

(5) If God is the real cause of the world, the world must also be real.

428. So far so good. Let us examine the argument of Shri nivasa as regards the material causality of God—the crux of the whole thing.

(6) It is sometimes said that the same entity cannot be both a material and instrumenal cause (*samavaya-samavayi-bhinnam karanam nimitta-karanamiti*). The material cause of

the jar is earth, while the instrumental cause is the potter, the wheel etc.

(7) To this, the reply (of Shri Shaila Nivasa) is that such an objection is groundless.

(8) Since the wheel of the potter, though an instrumental cause in itself is also the material cause of its own form, colour etc.

429. This defence is woefully poor. The *Nimitta-karana* is not confined to instrument only, but it includes *agent* also. God is not an instrument like the *potter's wheel*, but an agent, a real maker like the *potter* himself. Besides, the wheel is not the instrumental cause of *its own form*, *colour etc.* The fallacy is too obvious.

430. Let us go further.

(9) It may further be contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and instrumental cause with *regard to the production of another entity*.

(10) To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its destruction in association with other entities.

(11) Thus Brahman as *chit* and *achit* forms the material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The two-fold causality of Brahman thus refers to two-fold conditions which exist together in *Brahman*.

Sarva-sharira-bhūta - vibhakta - nāma-rūpāvasthā - panna - chid achid-vishiṣṭā-veṣeṇa brahmaṇaḥ upādānatvam

Tad-upayukta-samkalpādi-vishiṣṭa svarūpeṇa nimittatvam).*

431. A little analysis of this position betrays the flaw. Here God is taken as an entity which has the universe as its body or *sharira*. No effort is made to distinguish between the body and its possessor or inmate. God is both *sharira* and *shariri* (*body* and *bodied*). God as the body is the material cause and God as the will or the idea (*samkalpa* etc.) is the intrumental cause. So much about the *cause*. What about the effect ? Is this universe the cause or the effect ? And how different is the cause-universe from the effect-universe ? Is it the denial of *prakrti* or *affirmation* of it ?

432. Let us mention one more school of Vedanta, of Nimbarka, generally known as the *Svabhavika Bheda-bheda-vada* (स्वाभाविक भेदाभेदवाद) or the theory of the absolute as *Unity-in-difference*. We hear so much of unity-in-diversity in common language, Nimbarka's philosophy may be mentioned in nutshell as this. "The nature of Brahman is regarded as such that it is at once *one with* and *different from* the world of spirits and matter, not by any imposition or supposition, but as *the specific peculiarity of its nature*."

433. It is difficult to understand this. This specific peculiarity can be brought into play in the defence of any theory, reasonable or otherwise. All sorts of religious absurdities find their support in such meaningless enunciations. It no doubt brings about a sort of reconciliation between different Upanisat Texts which, some of them, speak of the difference and others of the identity between God on the one hand and

* Das Gupta's Indian philosophy, pp. 388-391.

spirits and matter on the other. But such a reconcilia-tion is forced and irrational. Why not admit once for all that *prakrti* is a separate entity ?

434. There is one more point which will interest those who wish to examine the original Sanskrta texts of *Upanisads* and other *Vedantic* literature. The question is rather linguistic than philosophical. But as it has been made much of by Indian philosophers of orthodox schools, it is not proper to let it go unnoticed. Das Gupta has put the point in these words:—

"In the Vedantic texts we have expressions in the *ablative case* (पंचमी विभक्ति) indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of *Brahman* as the material cause (*upadana*). The ablative case always signifies the materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality. (Such as *yato va imani bhutani jayante*)".*

435. The Ramanuja school, as quoted by Das Gupta defends its position by saying that the concep-tion of the material cause or the signification of the ablative case does not necessarily mean that the effect should *come out* and be spatially and temporally different from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may well be conceived that there are ***subtle parts*** in *Brahman* corresponding to *chit* and *achit* in their manifested forms and it is from these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely outside the cause, for when the *entire causal substance is trans-formed*, the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause".

Upādānatva-sthale pi na sarvatra loke' pi viṣhleṣaḥ, krtsna-pariṇāme tad asambhavāt kintv eka desha- parināma eveti tad abhiprā-

*Ibid p. 391

yakam pratyākhyānam vāchyam. Tachchehāpi sambhavati. Vishiṣṭaikadesha pariṇāmāngīkārāt. Ato na tad-virodhaḥ kincha sūkshma chid-achid vishiṣṭam upādānatvam iti vakṣyate. Tasmāchcha sthūlāvasthasya viṣhleṣo yujyate, vishleṣo hi na sarvātmanā kāraṇa-desh-parityagaḥ"—Siddhānta Chintāmani.

436. As Svami Dayananda also accepts the authority of the Upanisad texts, we have to find out his defence. He does not see eye to eye with the defence held out by Shailanivasa. His conception of God does not admit of either His *subtle parts* or *causal transformation* of Him. His clear answer is that the ablative case is not confined to material cause only, but at many places in Sanskrata literature ablative case has been used in the sense of instrumental case. It is very common in Sanskrata language to use one case-ending in the sense of another case (कारक व्यत्ययः). It is the sense that has to be seen and not the form. To take an ablative case in the sense of material cause when there are so many other reasons for interpreting it otherwise is a great mistake*.

437. In Ramanuja's philosophy we generally come across such phrases as "*the body of God*". This body is often said to be the *prakrti* of God. But the meaning of '*prakrti*' has not been fully made out. If *prakrti* is the body of God, it cannot be other than *matter*. *Upadana* or material cause can

* आदित्याज्जायते वृष्टिः
(Manu III. 76). "The sun gives rise to rain".
यस्माद् ऋचो अपातक्षन्
(Atharva Veda X. 7. 20).
The Rg Veda was revealed from God.
In both these cases, the ablative is used, but not in the sense of material cause.

never be spirit. If God is spirit, if it is not the name of a composite entity, then God can never be the material cause of the universe. In the latter case, the separate existence of matter is obviously proved. By the word 'the body of God' is not meant 'God himself' but another entity which stands with God in the relation of the soul of the man with his body. In Sanskrta scriptures the word '*purusha*' (पुरुष) has been used sometimes in the sense of man who resides in the body and sometimes of God who is pervading through *prakrti*. One thing should be kept in mind. Here the simile indicates only pervasiveness and not further relations.

438. In the Kathopanishat the body of a man is metaphorically called chariot (ratha रथ) and the soul charioteer (rathi रथी). Here the metaphor indicates nothing more than the duality of matter and spirit with the subordination of matter under spirit. That sense can be extended to God's body also. But it is pernicious to lose sight of the metaphorical aspect of the term.

439. When we observe 'life' we find a clear duality, that is, composite thing consisting of spirit and matter, neither spirit alone, nor matter alone. Mere spirit cannot explain the phenomenon of life. The interference of *matter* is visible everywhere. For instance, knowledge is the property of spirit. But the *knowledge* has limitations. Error, illusions, hallucination, dreams, unconsciousness etc. all these are caused by the limitations which *matter* puts in the way of the knowing spirit. Without positing *matter*, all these psychological experiences would be meaningless. If there were only spirit without matter, the spirit should have had pure and undiluted

knowledge. The perceiving agency is the spirit. But the forms of perception are limited and variated according to the material organs through which the perception is obtained. For instance, when the spirit perceives through one material modification called 'eye', the perception takes the form of colour or shape, and when the samc spirit takes another material organ called 'nose' it smells. Had there been only spirit and not material vehicles, we should not have perceived differently by different senses. Similarly illusions and dreams can be easily traced to material obstructions called *avarana* (आवरण).

440. From the ancient philosophers of the east, let us turn to modern thinkers. Scientific progress of these times is the progress of matter. All sciences deal with *matter*. They go even so far as to deny *spirit*. We are not concerned in this chapter with the claims of *spirit*. Svami Dayananda's philosophy admits of spirit and matter both side by side. But since physics has advanced and the old solid and indivisible atom has been analysed into electrons and positrons, certain advocates of spirit have entertained hopes that matter would abdicate the throne of scientific realms and that science is going back to ancient or medieval monism. But Svami Dayananda's *prakrti* still holds its sway. Matter however rarifield is still matter. It has not become *spiritual*. "The world of all-embracing matter against which" writes Joad, "the vitalist wages war today is a wider, an emptier, a more elastic, a more mysterious, world than it was in Huxley's and Tyndall's times, but it is still material."*

441. "We may, however, reflect," writes Julian

*Joad's Matter, Life and Value. p, 5.

Huxley, the living scientist of today and the grandson of famous Professor Huxley, "that the term *atom* is still in current use and the *atomic theory* not yet rejected by physicists inspite of the supposedly indivisible units having been divided. This is because modern physicists still find that the paticles called atoms by their predecessors do play an important role, even if they are compound and do occasionally lose or gain particles and even change their nature."*

442. We have seen so far that in Svami Dayananda's philosophy *prakrti* (matter) is an entity independently existing and distinct from spirits or sentient beings and the supreme spirit God, and this *prakrti* is the *upadana* or material cause of the Universe.

443. Now the question is "How to define it ?" Definitions are a way to express certain concepts in the form of words. Many criteria have been given in books on logic to formulate definitions, but they are all defective in as much as human language is susceptible to change of forms, usages and applications. Most criticisms of matter are based upon the equivocation of words. When one school criticizes the doctrines of another school, it takes up the definitions of terms, analyses them and finds fault with them mostly ignoring the delicate shades of meanings to which the words are attached. Shankaracharya's *logical forks* are well-known specimens of this sort of criticisms. Whenever Shankara criticizes a doctrine, he points out two possible alternatives and dashes both down, thus disproving the validity of the entire doctrine. In doing so most often a wrong fish comes into the grip and is crushed while the real one escapes, deluding the friends and some-

*Evolution 28.

times enemies of Shankara also. This sort of fallacies are too common in Shankara and especially in those cases where he criticises the doctrine of atoms and *prakrti*.

444. If you just read Shankara's commentary of the Vyasa sutras of *Vedanta* without comparing them critically with the wordings of the sutras, it will appear that Vyasa meant to criticize the *Sankhya* doctrine of *prakrti* vehemently. But if you divest the sutras of excrescenses loaded upon them by the commentator, you will be surprized to find that Vyasa never meant to criticize the *prakrti* doctrine. Vyasa's theme is Brahman or God. It seems that during Vyasa's times antitheistic tendencies began to pop their head and many Vedic or Upanisadic words lost their theistic significance on account of certain misinterpretations and wrong usage. It was felt necessary to clear the equivocation. For instance *Antah* अन्तः (I. 1. 20), *Akashah* आकाशः (I. 1. 22) *Pranah* प्राणः (I. 1. 23) *Jyotih* ज्योतिः (I. 1. 24) *Daharah* दहरः (I. 3. 14) as used in certain Vedic texts stood as synonyms of God while at other places they signified other things also. To prevent misunderstanding Vyasa pointed out the reasons why in those particular texts these words meant God and non-theistic sense popularly attached to them was wrong. Thus Vyasa's main purpose was to emphasize the existence and attributes of God, as the agental cause (potter-cause) of world's creation, sustenance and annihilation (I. 1. 2) and not to disprove the *prakrti* or matter as its material or clay-cause. The *sutras* which Shankara's commentary makes appear as anti-*prakrti* have not even a semblance of that nature. His criticism of *prakrti* (as given in the commentary, not in the Sutras) may hold good only if the existence of *prakrti* had meant the total denial of spirit and the creation, sustenance and

annihilation of the universe were explained purely on material basis. Such claims were as much made by ancient Indian philosophers like *Charvaka* as by Tyndall (section 227) and his contemporary scientists. But Tyndall's hopes have been belied and modern philosophers and scientists look for a deeper meaning in the *inevitable march* of evolution.*

445. This, however, does not imply the denial of the existence of prakrti or matter. Matter is the subject of science. Had there been no matter, there should have been no science, no physics, no chemistry, no biology even, as life is a composite thing, and the material aspect of life cannot be explained without positing the existence of matter.

446. Shankaracharya's master mind has exerted much to deny the existence of *prakrti* and to prove the counterpart of Tyndall's claim that all phenomena of the living and life-less world can be explained by positing the existence of God or *Brahman* alone. He has exercised all his knowledge of polemics to adjust scriptural quotations to his thesis. But at places the weakness of his doctrine is too apparent. For instance in commenting upon the aphorism I. IV. 3 (*Tadadhinatvad arthvat.* तदधीनत्वादर्थवत्), he has to admit :—

"(Such a previous seminal condition of the world) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason."

This is the literal translation of the *sutra*,

*Cp "Marx professed himself an atheist, but retained a cosmic optimism which only theism could justify." (History of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell p. 816.)

English being Thibeaut's. The admission is clear. The *seminal condition* of the world cannot be God himself. It must be the prakrti or matter. But Shankara felt that he was caught. It was not possible for him to translate the aphorism otherwise. The words are characteristic of their brevity and precision. But Shankara glossed over it. He writes :—

(1) "If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the *independent cause* of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the *pradhana* doctrine. (*Pradhana* means *prakrti*). What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state."

(2) "A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted since it is according to sense and reason."

(3) "For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the potentiality of action."* (Thibaut's Translation).

447. Here Shankara has tried to escape the charge by laying emphasis on the word 'dependency'

* यदि वयं स्वतन्त्रां कांचित् प्रागवस्थां जगतः कारणत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छेम, प्रसञ्जयेम तदा प्रधानकारणवादम्। परमेश्वराधीना त्वियमस्माभिः प्रागवस्था जगतोऽभ्युपगम्यते न स्वतन्त्रा। सा चावश्याभ्युपगन्तव्या। अर्थवती हि सा। नहि तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिद्ध्यति। शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः।

(शांकर भाष्य १।४।३)

For the detailed criticism of the subject vide our शांकरभाष्यालोचन।

(अधीनत्वात्). But this subterfuge is too weak; because those who posit the existence of matter (*pradhana* or *prakrti*) do not hold that the matter is omniscient and omnipotent. They admit that matter is after all matter. It is under the control of the lord as much as clay is under the control of the potter. Vyasa means only this much. Shankara admits that it is reasonable. He also admits that without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as be could not become active. How can a potter be active if there were no clay to act upon ?. But Shankara is wrong in identifying this *seminal condition* with God's own potentiality (shakti). No actor is an actor without his own capability. But the actor's capability is no substitute for the seminal condition of the product. What Shankara calls undeveloped or *avyakta* in this and the previous aphorisms can by no stretch of imagination mean God. And if there is any thing else than God, it must be *prakrti*, self existent, but not independent of God's control. If *prakrti* has no existence of its own, apart from God's existence, it cannot be even dependent upon God; because that which depends and that upon which the dependent depends must be separate entities. The word *adhina* (अधीन) in the Vyasa sutra simply means '*under*' or '*under*'-*control*', which must be a clear condition of the production. No potter can produce a pot out of clay unless clay is perfectly under his control. The seminal condition of the world (जगतः प्रागवस्था) cannot mean God or any condition of God. God is unconditioned or above conditioning. It is not a condition, but an entity in the condition of transformation, undergoing a change which is later on to assume the condition of a creation. Thus Shankara while following Vyasa does not follow him,

but only drags the great sage after the chariot of his own imagination.

448. We above raised a question of defining *prakrti*. The question is yet to be answered. The language which we use implies concepts which belong to the world already created. And therefore some sort of logical fallacy (formal) may appear to be lurking in a definition, however cautiously it might have been worded. But it is not difficult to explaim an idea which may adequately lead to further thought. The word *avyakta* (अव्यक्त) has generally been used to express the idea. This may roughly mean 'unmanifested', though a still nearer word would be *unindividualized*. Svami Dayananda borrows in toto Kapila's definition of *prakrti*, *i. e.*, (साम्यावस्था) samyavastha, a condition in which the act of manifestation or *individuation* has not yet commenced. We find in a potter's shop scores of pots of different shapes, different sizes, and different utilities. They are *individuated*. You can name them separately and recognize them separately. They are so many individuals. But what were they in the seminal condition? A jug, a cup, a plate? None. There was clay. But what was clay if not the unmanifested and unindividuated condition of those articles? The different shapes and sizes of the jug, the cup and the plate have come out of the skill of the potter, but the material cause is something else which you may call matter or clay. Similarly you can define the created things of the world, but the seminal condition has to be defined as only *some*thing *un*-individuated. The words 'some' and '*un*' (non) vitiate no doubt the *form* of the definition, but the concept is as clear as anything. The Sankhya terms *prakrti* and *pradhana* (प्रकृति, प्रधान)

and the Rg Vedic term Svadha (स्वधा Rg Veda X. 129. 5) are equivalent. *Vikrti* means creation, or something transformed. *Prakrti* means condition previous to this (seminal condition). So much about the formal definition.

449. Now the question is as to what should be the nature of *prakrti*, in order to be a fit material cause of the universe. You put yourself in the position of a man who has before his eyes the products but he has no chance of seeing the material of which these products have been made. You will naturally deduce the nature of the material from the products themselves. You will trace the cause from the effect. Suppose you see a hardwares' shop. There there is a variety of objects, all made, perhaps, of the same clay, but of different shapes and sizes corresponding to their different uses. Your first idea goes to the users who satisfy a variety of wants and purposes. A plate is differently used from a jug or a cup. These users had no hand in producing the articles, but it was in view of the purposes of the users that some other agent who was conversant with these wants produced them. Had there been no users, there would have been no potting, nor the potter. The next thing which these articles point to is the potter who has a knowledge of shapes and purposes and the relationship between these, and who also knows how to give these shapes to the matter. The third thing, which is by no means negligible is the material whose transformed condition we see in the forms of the articles. The users of the articles must be sentient beings or spirits, as dead matter would have no purpose or use. The maker must be much more intelligent. He must know not only the nature of the articles and the nature of

the use into which these articles are brought, but he must also know the nature of the material of which the articles are made. His must be a higher intelligence. But the material must be inert. It should be perfectly under the control of the maker, and susceptible to all changes. It must obey the master, unflinchingly and blindly too. It must be perfectly blind. This is what we find in the clay.*

450. But then there are other characteristics also. The clay must not be one undivided and indivisible. It must inhere plurality. No indivisible unity is susceptible to change and no unchangeable thing can be a material cause of anything else. Therefore when we speak of *prakrti* or *pradhan* (materia-radica) we do not mean one indivisible and unchangeable unity. Modifications may be various in nature and in kind, chemical or mechanical; but even chemical modifications anticipate plurality of the material. This is obvious from all laws physical or chemical. Even now discoveries of physics can not contradict it. *Prakrti*, therefore, is not the name of one indivisible substance.

* Rev. William A. Williams in his book, "Evolution Disproved" writes :--

"Many evolutionists are atheists. Some believe in the eternity of matter. This cannot be. Both mind and matter cannot be eternal. *Mind controls matter* ; and not matter mind. Hence the mind of God created matter. (p. 48).

It is a funny argument. If mind *controls* matter, then matter must be something *distinct*, not having sprung from mind, and therefore not created by mind. Eternity of matter is no bar against its being controlled by a superior intelligent and controlling agency. If matter is not eternal, it must have either sprung *from mind*, and therefore mental (or immaterial) or *from nothing* which is still more absurd,

Just as the clay of which the jug is made and which even now exists in the effect form of the jug is different from the clay of which the plate is made, similarly the *prakrti* or *matter* of which various things of the universe are made and which even now exists in the effect form in those objects is different. *It is many and not one.*

451. This *manyness* is vouchsafed both by the description of *prakrti* as given in the *Sutras* of Kapila and the interpretations of them by Svami Dayananda. *Satva-rajas-tamasam samy-avastha prakrti.* (सत्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः Sankhya I. 61) has been translated by S. Dayananda as follows:—

"*Prakrti* is the name of a collection of three things called *sattva* or pure, *rajas* or middling, and *tamas* or inert."*

452. This is true of all material causes. The first or most original condition is *static or inert*. When the material cause receives contact or shake from the agental cause, it produces motion. This is *rajas* or *middling condition*. When the thing is fully manifested, it is called *sattva*, pure or white. For a rough analogy we can take an iron ball. It is originally black and cold. Its particles are static. Its contact with fire produces a shake or motion and the ball turns red. Fire has lent its dynamic nature to the ball. But when the acme is reached the ball turns white. This is the complete state. Now the thing is produced. The cause has been transformed into effect.

453. This analogy of white, red and black

* (सत्व) शुद्ध (रजः) मध्य (तमः) जाड्य अर्थात् जड़ता तीन वस्तु मिलकर जो एक संघात है उसका नाम प्रकृति है।

(Light of Truth VIII, 7.)

colours has been rather poetically alluded to in the well-known verse of the *Shvetashvatar Upanishat* which has been quoted by S. Dayananda as well as glossed upon by Shankara and other commentators. The verse is as follows:--

Ajāmekām lohitashuklakṛṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjmānām sarūpāḥ. Ajo hyeko juṣamāṇonushete jahatyenām bhuktabhogām ajo-anyaḥ. (*Shvetashvatar upaniṣad IV*·5).

454. "*Prakrti*, soul and God are all the three *aja e. g.* they are never born. These three are the cause of the universe. They have no cause of theirs. The beginnigless soul is snared into the meshes of the beginningless *prkarti* when it tries to enjoy·it. God neither enjoys it nor is snared into it."*

455. As we have remarked above, the description is rather poetic. There is a pun on the word अजा (*aja*). In popular language '*aja*' means a she-goat. The goats are white, red and black in colour. Here *aja* means unborn or eternal, and what Kapila termed as *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are called here as white, red and black. But the sense is quite plain. It has been made still plainer by *Patanjali* in his *Yoga Sutra* (II. 18) when he terms them as *prakasha* (luminousness), *kriya* (activity or motion), *stithi* (or inertness). Inertness of the material cause receives *motivity* when the process of creation begins. Svami Dayananda calls it the *middling* condition. It is something between unmanifested and fully manifested state. The complete state is *prakasha* (light or complete manifestation).

456. Shankaracharya while commenting upon the *Vedanta sutras*. I. 4. 8-10, has referred to the

* Light of Truth, VIII, 6.

above *Upanishat* text and while accepting the authority of the text has tried to show at a great length that the text is not meant to support the *Sankhya* doctrine of *prakrti*. From Shankaracharya's gloss, it is at least clear beyond doubt that during Shankara's times the text was generally taken to allude to *prakrti* doctrine, otherwise Shankara would not have taken so much trouble to discuss it. But from Shankara's refutation it is also clear that Shankara has totally failed to defend his cause (*i. e.*, his *anti-prakrti* campaign). Instead of arguments he has had recourse to futile innuendos. His treatment of the subject is lengthy, tortuous and conjured-up.

457. We give here important excerpts from Dr. Thebaut's English translation of Shankara's commentary.

(1) "Here the advocate of the *pradhana* comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the *pradhana* is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (Sve. up. VI-5) "There is one *aja*. red, white and black producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one '*aja*' who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'—In this mantra the words 'red', 'white' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, *i. e.*, influencing property. Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of light. Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements,

i. e., the *pradhana* is denoted by the attributes of its parts and is therefore called red-white—black. It is futher called Aja, unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the *fundamental matter* out of which everything springs, not a mere effect."

458. This is Shankara's enunciation of the position of his adversary—the advocate of the doctrine of *prakrti* or *pradhana*.

(2) Now Shankara says in his reply :—
"But has not the word *Aja* the settled meaning of she-goat ?".

(3) The rejoinder of the adversary :—
"The ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject matter."

(4) "To this argument we (Shankara) reply that the quoted mantra by no means proves the *Sankhya* doctrine to be based on scriptures. *That mantra taken by itself is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine.* For by means of any supposition or other, the term *aja* etc. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the *Sankhya doctrine only is meant.*"

459. The defence is amazingly poor. The very fact that Shankara first suggests the popular meaning of she-goat and when he is dislodged from that position, suggests something indefinite and vague shows that Shankara tried to snub his adversary by his lengthy and labyrinthal verbiage. Needless to say

that Shankara's. commentary of these sutras is quite off the text.

460. The later Sankhyists who in their *Karikas* and glosses aberrated from Kapila and in their anti-theistic zeal looked upon *prakrti* as the sole efficient cause of the universe (Cp. Huxley and Tyndall) tried to fill the gap of *Brahman* or agental cause by several subterfuges which, of course, the Vedanta hollowed out. But Shankara went to the other extreme. It was a fight between two *monisms*, material monism and spiritual monism, which both positions lead to absurdity and Svami Dayananda's great contribution to philosophy is to clear this position and bring about true reconciliation between different *Upanishat* texts.

461. We shall, here, give one more instance in which Shankara clearly shoots off the mark in criticizing the *prakrti* or *pradhana* doctrine. In commenting on *Vedanta Sutra* II. 2, 1. he says :—

"The Sankhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows:—Just as jars, dishes and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (*e.g*, inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain and, dulness have for their causes pleasure, pain and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain and dulness in their generality together constitute the three fold *pradhana*. This *pradhana* which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications in order thus to effect the purposes (*i. e.* enjoyment, release and so on) of the intelligent soul. The existence of the *pradhana*

is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like.

462. Against this doctrine we (Shankara) argue as follows:—If you *Sankhyas* base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which, *without being guided by an intelligent being*, spontaneously produces effects capable of sub-serving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure grounds, and the like—things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the points of their various action, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say, if a non-intelligent principle like the *pradhana* is able to fashion it ! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the *pradhana* also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle."*

* Dr. Thibaut's Eng. Translation.

463. From these lengthy passages the following things are quite clear :—

(1) The world is so beautifully made that it wonder-strikes even the most ingenious workmen.

(2) That such a world cannot emanate *spontaneously* from a non-intelligent principle.

(3) That this *pradhana* is to be ruled by some intelligent principle.

464. Now this is the position of S. Dayananda and the *theistic Sankhya* as *Kapila* and not of Shankara or later non-theistic Sankhyas to which Dr. Thibaut in his footnotes have referred, for instance, *Sankhya Karikas* 12, 13, 15 and 3.*

465. Shankara's world is unreal, false, dreamlike and caused by nescience. If Shankara really believes in such a world, the above passage of Shankara controverts the thesis, as here the world is depicted as real, beautiful, useful and full of super-eminent wisdom. This is Swami Dayananda's world , the common sense world, the world of realists and not the world of which Shankara has spoken throughout his works as unreal, fiction, nescience etc.

466. Secondly it does not controvert the thesis that *prakrti* or *pradhana* is the material cause and is ruled by an intelligent principle, as non-intelligent clay is ruled by the intelligent potter.

467. Thirdly it is more consistent with Svami Dayananda's pluralism than with Shankara's monism.

* Dr. Thibauts, Translation, footnote under Sutra II. 2. 1.

468. Anyhow, it is quite clear that in demolishing matter Shankaracharya commits woeful fallacies.*

469. It is popularly believed that Kapila's *Sankhya* is a materialistic system and perhaps Shankara exerted so much to denounce it on that account. This is obviously a wrong notion. From the very outset Kapila is biological. He takes life in its entirety and sets to examine the dualistic nature of life as composite of matter, spirit and non-spirit. The very first aphorism sets to examine the nature of summum bonum of man's life (*Purushartha*, or end of *Purusha's* life) which consists in diminishing the three-fold pain. No inert matter can pursue an object. Pain is no property of inert matter, nor pursuit of a purpose can proceed blindly. Then again Kapila holds that pain is due to ignorance or wrong knowledge (not *absence* of knowledge, but erroneous knowledge) which is the non-material aspect of life. Further, the evolution of the materialistic side of life starts and proceeds in direct inter-action of spirit or *purusha* with it. The end of material evolution is *parartha* (परार्थ) or for the sake of the other, *i. e.*, non material spirit. (Sankhya Sutra 1, 141) (Cp. also Yoga Sutra IV-24). In this respect Sankhya is different from modern Naturalism, be it materialism, energism or positivism. It does not take human life (or for the matter of that, any life) as accidental or trifling. The very evolution of material world is inter-dependent upon life. And therefore Sankhya does not refusc to go beyond the visible nature, nor ignores 'next-life' or anything supernatural. The weakness of early evolutionists and naturalists consisted in doubting the

* Vide our Shankarabbasyalochana IV pp. 101-261.

logical validity of the Law of Causality and totally ignoring the law of Purpose. The latter flaw has been to a great extent amended by *Emergent Evolution.* Emergent evolution implies much more than the law of causality. Causality seeks to determine the event from *behind* the time; while purpose the "determining of events from *ahead* in time." Emergent evolution implies purpose and therefore *intention.* Thc purpose may not be visible just as the very action of the cause is also not visible. But "it is logically possible that every event *has both a cause* and *a purpose or meaning*".

470. And it is also logically possible that those features of the world which causality leaves unexplained, such as the highest natural law, the amount, proportion, distribution of the matter and motion of the world, have a meaning and thus a possible purpose.

"Purpose may be appealed to to explain *quantities.* Thus the bow of William the conqueror. Why is it just so large? There is no mechanical answer; but purpose explains it at once. It must be stout enough to defy all other arms; it must be not so stout as to defy his own. The quantities of the world may have a meaning."*

471. Professor Henderson in his book "*Fitness of Environment*" has clearly shown that the present universe is the fittest for the production of organism and that any imaginary universe "with slightly different proportions of the same materials—let us say a little more nitrogen, and a little less carbon or oxygen" would have rendered not only the

* Types of Philosophy by Hocking, pp. 110-111.

existing organisms but any organisms impossible.† The universe is so to speak *biocentric*.

472. To put it in the modern language the Sankhya System is *biocentric*. All events have a cause. All events have a purpose. The purpose is the interest of the *purusha* (sentient being). This interest needs certain processes which only causality can bring about. The Sankhyists often use an analogy, which though gross serves the purpose. It is of the collaboration between the lame man and the blind man. The blind man cannot see but can walk. The lame man can see but cannot walk. If both have to move on, they should collaborate. The lame man should sit on the shoulders of the blind man and should guide his movements. The *inert matter* (*prakrti*) of the Sankhyas is the blind man. It can be made to move, but it cannot look forward. Their *purusha* (living and sentient entity) is the lame man. It can look forward but is unable to move. The destination to which the lame man looks forward is the *purpose* of life. But mere '*purusha*' without the help of the matter can achieve nothing. I can look forward to a chair which I shall use as a seat. I have wood of which a chair can be made. But neither the wood has an idea of the purpose, nor I can get a seat without the wood. There is a need of a third agency which may be conversant with the qualities of the wood and the purposes of the *purusha*. Svami Dayananda holds that that third agency is God, the Supreme Spirit of which the later *Sankhyists* omitted to take cognisance, and which the original analogy clearly aimed at. The ordinary *purusha* of the Sankhyas is *lame*. He has eyes so far that he

† Ibid p. 115.

has certain desires. But through his internal weakness he cannot completely guide the blind man. The result is the miseries of the world of which the removal is the main purpose of life. God can direct the creative process, but unless the *purushas* cooperate efficiently, the pain cannot be over-come.

473. We may mention, by the way, that in the quotation from the *Shvetashvatar Upanishat* three words have been used. (1) *Aja* (feminine gender) meaning *prakrti*. (2) *Aja* (masculine) meaning *purusha* who enjoys the *aja*. (3) The third *aja* (also masculine) who does not enjoy *prakrti*.

474. If you read the above passage, in the light of the Rg Vedic Mantra (*Dva suparna*),* it will be clear that this third '*aja*' is quite different from the second '*aja*'. The latter enjoys but the former does not. He simply guides. (*Tayoh anyah pippalam svadvatti, anashnan anyo abhichakashiti.* One of these enjoys the fruit, while the other does not taste it but simply oversees, supervises or guides it).†

475. Ordinary commentators including Shankara have interpreted this third '*aja*' as those souls who after enjoying the '*aja*' (she-goat in the form of *prakrti*) have quitted it ; thus ignoring the importance of the Supreme Being. Svami Dayananda interprets this third '*aja*' as a quite different entity—the Supreme Being who does not taste the fruit enjoyed by lower spirits. That Svami Dayananda's interpretation is more reasonable, is evident from the very fact that the three '*ajas*' should stand for three distinct categories

* Vide section 276.
† Rg Veda.

and that is possible only under Svami Dayananda's interpretation. Those who interpreted the third '*aja*' as liberated souls forgot that the liberated and unliberated souls both belong essentially to the same category. Those *Sankhyas* who think that their system of philosophy is traditionally atheistic were compelled to take the third '*aja*' in the sense of liberated souls as they appeared to have no other alternative. Shankaracharya simply beat about the bush, trying to silence his adversary any how.

476. About the Rg vedic verse "*Dva suparana*" etc.* also there is a serious misinterpretation which Svami Dayananda has cleared. There in the place of '*aja*' the world '*anyah*' has been used. Just as the Upanisadic two '*ajas*' stand for two distinct categories, so do these two '*anyah's* of the Rg veda. But Rg vedic verse is more clear in making out the distinction. The first '*anyah*' has for its predicate '*atti*' (अत्ति) 'enjoys', while the second '*anyah*' has '*abhichakashiti*' (अभिचाकशीति) thus leaving 'liberated souls' out of question. Even Shankara is constrained to interpret these two "*anyah's*" as God and soul (Vide his commentary on *Vedanta* I. 3. 7). But what does "*abhichakashiti*" mean? Shankara translates it as औदासीन्येनावस्थानम्† "The condition

* Rg. Veda I, 164. 20.

† ताभ्यां च स्थित्यदनाभ्यामीश्वरक्षेत्रज्ञौ तत्र गृह्येते ।

(शांकरभाष्यम् १।३।७)

अनश्नन्न्य इतर ईश्वरो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वाभावः सर्वज्ञः सर्वसत्त्वोपाधिरीश्वरो नाश्नाति, प्रेरयिता ह्यसावुभयोर्भोज्यभोक्त्रोर्नित्यसाक्षित्वसत्त्वामात्रेण ।

(मुण्डक ।३।१ शांकरभाष्यम्)

Also Shankara's commentary of Mundakopanisat :—

Here प्रेरयिता (guide) is more appropriate and is contradictory to औदासीन्येनावस्थानम् or *inactive presence.*

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of mere inactive presence." (Vide Thibaut's translation). This conception is not innocent in its nature. It has given rise to a very significant doctrine that God is inactively present ; *i. e.*, He is a mere distant spectator looking down upon the different phenomena of life below as if from the top of a mountain. Svami Dayananda believes God to be an actively creative agency and not a passive spectator. Even in *Upanishats* He is said to be कर्तारं ईशं (creator and governor) (vide *Mundaka Upanishat*—I. 1. 3). Thus the word '*Abhichakashiti*' should relevantly mean *overseeing*, *supervising*, guiding and governing. Monier William's Dictionary translates the word *Abhikash* अभिकाश as 'illuminate', 'irradiate', 'look upon' or 'perceive'. If God is a mere inactive on-looker and has nothing to do with the universe or lower souls then what is the necessity of a belief in God's existence ? He may or may not be. The universe does not justify or warrant His existence. This is no theism. Thus Shankara's *Vedanta* practically comes to atheism. Svami Dayananda gives a wholly new orientation to the problem and brings out the true meaning of the *Upanisad* texts.

477. Svami Dayananda's *prakrti* (and so of Kapila) does not work by itself. It is like the blind man of the fable. Nor it proceeds to work exclusively through the agency of souls, though the purpose is exclusively of souls. It works through the guidance of God, as the potter's clay by that of the potter. In the Rg Veda God has been called as वशी (*Vashi*) or Governor. (X. 191. 2). This makes the universe bio-centric, never destitute of life, never purely mechanical, always pulsating with life, always hormic, dualistic in the sense that it serves the purpose of some one which has a

distinct existence. Kapila's treatment of the world's evolution all through implies life.

478. It is this life element (in Kapil's language, the *purusha* element) which always created a difficulty in the way of pure materialists and even Darwinian evolutionists. Russell Wallace who was a contemporary of Darwin always reminded the great naturalist of the mind element and its significance in the evolutionary process of the world (Section 233). And later on vitalism sprang up, though not actually on the ashes of materialism, but as a strong protest on this basis. Vitalism, Joad describes as a view that "life exists ; exists, that is to say, not as an offshoot or temporary emanation of something that is not life, but as an ultimate, an irreducible factor or principle"*.

479. This is what Kapila means by *Purusha* principle. "The evidence against materialism" (not of course, *matter.*) "belongs chiefly to the two departments of science, from which materialism derived its main strength, namely, biology and psychology. (1) The behaviour of living organisms, such as purposive action, adaptability to changing environments, in the endeavour to maintain constant environment and maintenance of appropriate form and structure. (2) If the mind itself has been envolved in the struggle for existence, if it is a provisional and practical faculty which develops and changes, even in the life-time of a single individual, why should it be credited with the capacity for grasping absolute truth or for giving us correct information about the nature of reality."†

* Joad's Life, Matter and Value, p. 1.
† Ibid p. 17.

480. One thing should be borne in mind. When we speak of Kapila's *purushas*, the word should not bc confused with human beings or human spirits. Those who take 'purusha' (person) in the sense of human spirits reduce life to the ridiculous circle of, say, a few thousand millions, who inhabit our terrestrial globe. But when we find that our earth is only a very tiny thing in the vast universe, a small drop in the vast ocean of existence, then life becomes but a trifling accident. *Purusha* which Kapila takes as a vital supplement of *prakrti* or matter includes all sentient life, of whatever form and type, throughout the universe. Narrow-minded theology of the west, including all the philosophy which rose in its wake failed to realize this feature of life. They thought that man was the only living creature and that all other life, animal world or insect world, was nothing more than a certain adjustment of elements of matter. Descartes, for instance, maintained that animals are automata. They have no super-material spirit or soul like man. This was quite contrary to Cartesian spirit. But Descartes was compelled to think so, because of the prevalent prejudices of Christian Theology. Kapila was quite free from the virus. Indian thought has always believed in the universal kinship of the animal world, and the word 'animal' has been used for all sentient beings. The later philosophers of the eighteenth century of Christian Era were compelled to extend the Cartesian principle of animal automata to human soul also and make the system a consistent materialism. But, as I have said above, materialism whether consistent or inconsistent could not satisfy later physiologists. For instance Bichat (1771-1802) "held that there was in life a conflict between vital forces and those of physics and chemistry, which

after death resume their undivided sway and destroy the body".*

And Majendie thought that "some phenomena of living bodies were due to an *inexplicable vital* principle." Cuvier, Kuhne, Latour, Schwann, Pasteur, Koch, Laveran and all other scientists of the age were surprized at the interaction or interference, of some vague and unintelligible type, of something non-material in the working of material forces. This though not clearly defining the domain of spirit, at least proved the insufficiency of matter in explaining all the phenomena of the universe and the necessity of hypothesizing some dual element which Kapila calls "*purusha.*"

481. It, no doubt, hurts the philosophical vanity of man to put bacteria or enzymes in the same bracket with him, or, as some theologians contemptuously ask if dogs and cats have the same souls or similar souls as man. But such vanities of men have no place in philosophy. If we want to adequately understand the phenomenon of life, we shall have to consider life in all its stages from the lowest and most contemptible to the most highly developed form.

482. After this casual digression let us now come back to the matter-cum-spirit (*prakrti*-cum-*purusha*) of Kapila's dualism which has found a very strong and eminently illuminating exponent in Svami Dayananda. The *Sankhyists* to whose hands came Kapila's legacy of the *Sankhya* philosophy were swept away by the atheistic or anti-theistic tendencies of the age and

* Whetham's History of Science, p. 274.

made Kapila a pure atheist. In this respect Svami Dayananda made Kapila's position clear, as we have mentioned above. But not only that. Neither friends nor enemies of Kapila have so understood him as Svami Dayananda.

483. It will be interesting here to quote the opinion, on this subject, of *Yogi* Rama Charaka of Masonic Temple Chicago (United States, America).

"There are," says the Yogi, "many points of difference between the various conceptions of the real nature of *Purusha* and *Prakrti*, particularly on the part of western writers on the subject, some of which are totally at variance with the beliefs and conceptions of the advance *Hindu adherents* of this philosophy". He considers the three leading conceptions.

484. I. The first conception of the nature of *Purusha* and *Prakrti*, and the one which is favoured by the majority of western writers on the subject, is that which holds that Kapila's theories are atheistic and practically materialistic, in as much as he ignores the existence of a supreme power, *Brahman* or *That* and postulates a dual eternal thing, one half of the *dual* being matter. This view interprets the teachings of Kapila to mean that there are Two Eternal things the first of which is matter, and the second of which is spirit, divided into countless atoms—both *Purusha* and *Prakrti* being held as eternal, infinite, and immortal, and both of which are self-existent and sustaining, requiring no supreme power as a basis or back-ground."

485. "This conception," proceeds Rama

Charaka, "is decidedly in error and the spirit of the philosophy has been lost to those who so hold. The error regarding the discarding of the belief in That or *Brahman*, however, is easily explained. In the first place there is nothing in the teachings of Kapila or of his *early* followers, in which the existence of That is denied or condemned—there is simply a silence regarding it, just as in the case of Buddhism, and the cause is the same in both cases. Both Kapila and Buddha accepted the centuries-old doctrine of That which no Hindu philosophy had questioned, and both then proceeded to account for the phenomenal universe. Had Kapila attempted to discard the universal conception of That he would have certainly attacked the doctrine, and have set up arguments against it, accompanied by illustrations, parables and analogous proofs, with which the Hindu philosophers always have been so well supplied and which they have used so freely. But *Kapila* does not mention the matter, but calmly proceeds to elaborate his system, explaining the phenomena of the universe. To those who have penetrated beneath the surface of the *Sankhya System* and who are familiar with the Hindu methods of thought and teachings, it readily will be seen that there *is nothing atheistic or materialistic* in the conceptions of the *Sankhya system.* Among the Hindu the charge of atheism made against the *Sankhyas* comes principally from the followers of *Patanjali*, the Yoga, who hold to the existence of a Supreme *Purusha* or universal Over-soul, and who, consequently, resent the *Sankhyas'* failure to recognize their favourite conceptions. And the charge of materialism comes from the Vedantists who deny the existence of matter, considering it as *Maya* or delusion. In fact *Prakrti* is rather the source of matter than

matter itself."*

486. Here Yogi Ramacharaka defends *Sankhya* in almost the same terms as a few decades before him Svami Dayananda had done with a greater force and more cogent arguments. Svami Dayananda does not say that Kapila is silent about the Supreme Being, or that "He found no need for one—his conception of *purushas* was deemed sufficient to explain the ensouling of matter, under natural Law."† Kapila does mention the over-soul, as Svami Dayananda has pointed out by specifically quoting *Sankhya Sutras* (III. 56, 57 and V. 8). The very fact that Kapila has expressed very clearly his allegiance to the *Vedas* goes a long way to defend him againgt the charge of atheism. (Vide Sankhya V. 51, and V. 12). Ramacharaka is not right, at least in the eye of Dayananda, in attributing the charge of atheism to Patanjali, as Patanjali's *Yoga* and Kapila's *Sankhya* have been almost unanimously recognized as mutual supplements to each other. The opposition of *Sankhya* by the *Vedantists* is no doubt too well known, but Svami Dayananda has proved that the *Vedanta* of Vyasa did not oppose the doctrine of *prakrti* and that the erroneous notion of *Maya* or delusion was imposed upon the *Vedanta* by Shankara and his followers.

487. Again to Ramacharaka :—

"The conception of the nature of *purusha* and *prakrti* is in the nature of a half-truth which is also a half-error. It holds that *Purusha* and *prakrti* must be regarded as "aspects" of That or *Brahman*, and which

* Philosophies and Religions of India by Yogi Rama Charaka, pp. 54-56.

† Ibid, p. 59.

cannot be withdrawn into That or *Brahman* as emanations may be, but which are fixed aspects or 'natures' of That, which always have been, and always will be, in periods of activity and periods of non-activity between the cycles of activity. The error of this conception consists in ascribing eternal and real existence to these two principles, thus ascribing a duality to That instead of a Oneness."*

488. Svami Dayananda would agree with Ramacharaka so far that the conception is a half-truth and a half-error, but which part is the exact error and which the exact truth, is a question. Svami Dayananda allows, as well as Kapila does, an eternal and real existence to the two principles, namely *Purusha* and *Prakrti*. If they are non-eternal, or unreal, it becomes Shankara's Vedanta or some other type of spiritual monism.But he does not say that they are two aspects of the same entity or that it "ascribes duality to That."

489. Now Ramacharaka gives the third conception, the one which appeals to him as the most satisfactory.

(a) That both *Purusha* and *Prakrti* are "emanations from or appearance" of That or *Brahman*, both having equal substance and degree of reality, but both being finite, and *being destined* to pass away in time, that is to be withdrawn into their common source—That—at the end of the great cycle period of activity, when the great period of "cosmic rest" begins, which in turn is followed by a subsequent period of activity and so on.

(b) In this conception the fundamental principle

*Ibid p. 56.

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of the Hindu Philosophy—the existence of That as the only Reality—is recognized as a necessary basis for the teaching, and as a necessary back ground for the doctrines concerning the phenomenal universe.

(c) And *Purusha* and *Prakrti* are seen to be but the primal forms of the two great principles of phenomenal activity, Spirit and Body, which are apparent in all phenomenal things, from atom to man, and beyond man.

(d) And both these principles are emanated from, or cast into apparent being by That or *Brahman*, in the process of world-making.

(c) Instead of their being "aspects" of That, they are merely manifestation, appearance, or emanations or even 'thought-forms' in the mind of the one."*

490. I do not think that Ramacharaka has done justice to Kapila. Perhaps he has not acquainted himself with S. Dayananda's thought. In order to reconcile Vedantic idea of That with *Sankhya* dualism, he has made the confusion worst confounded. The basic idea of the eternality of *purshas* and *prakrti* has been given up and a funny interpretation has been imposed upon it. The very basis of the conception of the material cause or materia-radica which the doctrine of *prakrti* carries with it has been flung to winds. Ramacharaka goes still further. He gives a false meaning to the conception of eternity.

491. (a) "In many cases the term (eternity) is used as in the western sense, that is to say, in the

* Ibid pp. 56-57.

sense of 'duration' without beginning or end; a condition of infinity and time."

(b) But in as much as the true Hindu Philosopher ascribes and attributes this quality only to That, and *denies it to all else,* it may be seen that outside of That, the word is meaningless to him and cannot be employed.

(c) But, finding the *need of the word* in the secondary sense, he applies it to things having a *continuous existence* during the entire period of cosmic activity, which extends over *great spaces* of time, but which *ceases to be* when all is finally withdrawn into That, and the cycle of activity ceases and is succeeded by the cycle of non-activity—when all manifestations, appearances, emanations and phenomena or ideas are withdrawn into That, which then dwells alone until another period of cosmic activity begins.

(d) "As H. P. Blavatsky says in a foot-note to her 'The Voice of the Silence' 'Eternity' with the orientals has quite another signification than it has with us. It stands generally for the one hundred years or age of *Brahman*, the duration of a *Maha Kalpa*, or a period of 311,040,000,000,000 years."*

492. I do not deny that here is a genuine effort to reconcile the conflicting conceptions of certain philosophic and theological systems. But this does not solve the basic difficulty. Whether the life time of the *Purusha* and *Prakrti* and therefore of the Universe be extended to a *Maha Kalpa* or it may last but a moment as certain Buddhist philosophers hold, the question is

*Ibid p. 58.

why and how (with what purpose and in what process) the *actually unreal* and *phenomenally real Purusha* and *Prakrti* spring up and continue to live during a particular period of cosmic cycle. Essentially there is no great difference between the totally fortuitous creation and the creation which begins fortuitously and continues according to an evolutionary law ceasing to exist in the end with the same fortuitousness as it had begun. This was never the doctrine of Kapila, nor of ancient ·Vedic sages of pre-eminent importance. Svami Dayananda supplies to these details a background which is of special significance and puts the whole doctrine on a solid footing.

493. He says that the *Purushas* and *Prakrti* are really eternal plural entities. They do not spring up from That or *Brahman* either as pots and plates are made out of clay, or as magic flowers rising up from the wand of a mgician. *Brahman* is a co-existent and co-eternal Supreme Being, a *Purusha* or *Maha-Purusha*, who governs the lower *purushas* and *prakrti* and gives a start to the cosmic cycle for the sake of the purushas. God or *Brahman* is One, without the second, infinite in power, infinite in knowledge and infinite in goodness. He is a unity without any germ or potentiality of diversity or many-ness in Him. But the diversity which is found in the universe is not due to any-potential diversity in the nature of *Brnhman*, but it is due to the diverse natures of diverse *purushas* or souls. They are really many and so they appear many. A soul or purusha needs a physical body for its own sake and this body is provided by God through a law of evolution out of *prakrti* which again is not an indivisible whole, but a compact of many entities, say, atoms or nucleii. Svami Dayananda says that the Mahakalpa of which Madam Blavatsky has spoken, is only

the cycle of our present universe called *Brahma-dina* or Divine Day comprising of 311, 040, 000, 000, 000 solar years. This *Mahakalpa* though tremendously huge for our conception of time is only a drop in the ocean of eternity.

494. Now let us see what is the place of *Brahman* or Ishwar (God) in the cosmogony of Kapila and what part do lower *purushas* play.

Suppose the governor of a certain people wants to provide his subjects with lodging and other comforts. There is an ample material with him which the subjects are too weak to utilize for themselves. He gives a start and introduces into the material a force, a plan, whereby the material may be given a shape. This plan will be worked according to a law. This law has been called *rta* (ऋत) in the vedic terminology. It emanates from *Brahman* or That. It is eternal. When it begins to work, it gives a pull or shake to the *prakrti*. This *pull* has been very often named as *tapas* (तप:). This *tapas* or great law brings the first modification in *prakrti*. It is called *Mahat* or Great. This is the first condition which *prakrti* assumes in the cosmic evolution. Kapila calls it *Mahan* (*mahat* or great) because this pervades through all subsequcnt modifications, determining the general plan of all phenomena of the universe, physical or mental, and never leaving them alone.

495. But after this first modification the *prakrti* is capable enough to give elementary provision to the *purushas*. They begin their activity which manifests itself in the form of *Ahankara* or ego-consciousness.

496. There are certain thinkers who say that

every atom of *prakrti* is ensouled by a *purusha*, and thus *purusha* and *prakrti* work hand in hand. This (Hylozoism) does not appear Kapila's view and is certainly not the view of Svami Dayananda. This is also not corroborated by experience. If every atom were the body of a distinct soul, there should have been no difference between an animate and an inanimate object and the distinctive term of 'sentience' would have been meaningless. Nor should there have been any meaning of human soul. But we do find that a living organism acts differently from an inanimate object. The molecules of oxygen and hydrogen act differently in a drop of water from the same elements in the body of an ant or an insect. The fact is that there are not only one lame man with eyes and one blind man with legs. There are myriads of *purushas* or lame men with eyes and there are myriads of *prakrti* elements with only legs and no eyes. When the myriads of eyeless legged elements bear upon their shoulders lame but seeing entities, the behaviour of the former is coloured by the seeing capacities of the latter, thus giving rise to multifarious objects and bodies. These lame seers have wills of their own, but they have to work under certain limitations. They are not all-powerful, otherwise they should not have been lame. Their free wills go a certain way but find themselves further hampered by a bigger law, which though allowing autonomy to the lower spirits keeps them within bounds and renders them powerless to interfere with other spirits. Had every spirit been so free as to have its own way in all matters, our universe should have been woefully multiversal and all activity should have come to stand-still. What we actually find in the universe is a certain kinship behind all warring events, a hand of an invisible law which maintains the balance of powers.

497. Kapila's classification of twenty-four *tattvas* or categories show clearly :

(1) that purely physical or material evolution is impossible without the interference or collaboration of an intelligent element; the inert *prakrti* begins to work when tinctured by sentient souls;

(2) that the classification of world-objects into physical, physiological and psychological is mainly based upon the action of the souls upon matter.

498. *Ahankara* or self-consciousness discriminates between I and not-I.

499. The five Tanmatras or subtle elements of nature namely the Aethereal, the Aerial, the Igneous, the Aqueous, the Terrene, and arising therefrom the five gross elements, *akasha*, air, fire, water and earth all aim at building something which will later on serve to the working of five senses, namely seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling and five instruments of action, namely, the speech organ, the hands, the feet, the excretory organs and the genitals. The bodily organs are not purely physical. The eye though an organ made of matter inheres within itself physiological as well as pyschological element. And the *igneous* element in the earlier stage of evolution so to speak anticipated the formation of the eye. Similarly other elements and their corresponding bodily organs and senses. This classification sounds ridiculous or whimsical when we find the discovery of many elements recognized by modern scientists. But the peculiarity of Kapila's technique lies in the uniqueness of the blending together of the working of *purushas* and *prakrti*, the five senses corresponding to five bodily organs and the five

bodily organs corresponding to the five elements of matter, gross as well as root-ones.

500. Mere material elements without the share of intelligence could not have given us the world in which we find ourselves, with all sorts of mental activities, sentiments, aspirations and love for not only higher knowledge but a desire for liberation. This last named aspiration, the desire for liberation (मुमुक्षत्व) has been the corner stone of not only *Sankhya System* of Kapila but of all philosophical investigations in India. This is the be-all and end-all of all philosophy—love of wisdom. And this liberation depends, as Kapila holds, upon our realization of our true self and of our true relationship with other entities. In the last aphorism (VI—70) he sums up the thesis, which has been the one theme pervading through the whole system that the end of all the activities of the *Purusha* lies in successfully obtaining liberation from pain by any means whatsoever.

501. It has been an almost insoluble problem for theists to consistently explain the duality of *purusha* and *not-purusha*, I and not-I. Yet it is equally difficult to ignore the distinction which stares at our face every thinking moment of our life.

502. Bertrand Russell has beautifully described the efforts of the Cartesian school to explain the situation. He says, :—

"My arm moves when I will that it shall move, but my will is a mental phenomenon and the motion of my arm a physical phenomenon. Why, then, if mind and matter cannot interact does my body behave *as if* my mind controlled it ? To this, Geulinex invented an answer, known as the theory of the "two

clocks". Suppose you have two clocks which both keep perfect time: Whenever one points to the hour, the other will strike, so that if you saw one and heard the other, you would think the one *caused* the other to strike. So it is with mind and body. Each is wound up by God to keep time with the other, so that on occasion of my volition, purely physical laws cause my arm to move although my will has not really acted on my body".

503. "There were of course difficulties in this theory. In the first place, it was very odd; in the second place, since the physical series was rigidly determined by natural laws, the mental series which ran parallel to it, must be equally deterministic. If the theory was valid, there should be a sort of possible dictionary, in which each cerebral occurrence would be translated into the corresponding mental occurrence. An ideal calculator could calculate the cerebral occurrence by the laws of dynamics, and infer the concommitant mental occurrence by means of the 'dictionary'. Even without the 'dictionary' the calculation could infer words and actions; since these are bodily movements. This view would be difficult to reconcile with Christian ethics and the punishment of sin."

504. "These consequences, however, were not at once apparent. The theory appeared to have two merits. The first was that it made the soul, in a sense, wholly indpendent of the body, since it was never acted on by the body. The second was that it allowed the general principle :—'One substance cannot act on another.' There were two substances, mind and matter, and they were so dissimilar that an interaction seemed inconceivable. Geulinex's theory explained

the *appearance* of interaction while denying its reality."*

505. Such makeshifts not only deny the reality of interaction between two substances, but the reality of those substances also, and ultimately that of God Himself. Whatever timely purpose, they might have served, their philosophical value is very doubtful. The merits of the *Sankhya* system as illuminated by Svami Dayananda, are first that *Prakrti* and *Purusha* are not so independent from each other that no interaction be possible or conceivable. Secondly the two clocks of mind and body or *purusha* and *no-purusha* are not purely the hand-maids of God, having no interest of their own. God's winding of the two clocks reduces all ethics to a farce, besides leaving all the diversities of the universe unexplained. The differences in all phenomena of life, mental or physical, are so many, so real and so un-ignorable that instead of two there are so many clocks, not two of which exactly tally with each other. If God is the actual winder or wire-puller, then the distinction between *purusha* and *no-purusha* is unreal and it is very doubtful whether winding itself has any meaning. Svami Dayananda holds that the *Purushas* are not play-dolls in the hand of another player. They are the centre of all world activities. However finite and powerless, they possess a great share in the moulding of their destinies and therefore of the destinies of the world. They are free to exercise their part, and if they fail, as most often they do, it is not because some power compels them to do so, but because of their intrinsic freedom they neglect their part. God oversees or governs them only in their own interest and not for any purpose of His.

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 584.

506. The chapter on *prakrti* cannot be properly closed without mentioning, however briefly, Kanada's *Vaisheshika* and Svami Dayananda's attitude towards it. The *Vaisheshika* philosophy of Kanada is generally known as "Hindu atomism." And though atomism has, of late, lost all importance it was pre-eminently in the mind of the thinkers of Svami Dayananda's age. Even now there are certain principles which atomism involves and they are of permanent value.

507. In introducing *Vaisheshika* Radhakrishnan remarks :—

"The *Vaisheshika* system takes its name from *Vishesha*, or particularity. It insists that it is in the particulars of the world, pre-eminently in the particular imperceptible souls and atoms that true individuality is to be found. Though the particular selves have cosmic and social relations, through which alone they can realize themselves yet they retain their self-hood in spite of all these relations. The *Vaisheshika* is essentially a philosophy of distinctions, since it does not tolerate any attempt at dissipating the independence of selves and objects in a supposed more perfect individuality".

"...........it argues that souls and substances are solid facts, and cannot be dismissed as fancy pictures of a faery tale, supposed to be enacted behind the scenes."*

508. "The category by which the *Vaisheshika* pits itself definitely against all idealistic systems is that of substance. Even the unthinking admit that substances are. Objects in the external world come to us as real, in and for themselves, present actualities with a

* Indian Philosophy Vol. II., chap. III. pp. 176-177.

subsistence of their own. Substance denotes the feature of the self-subsistence of things out there. What we vaguely call being is nothing more than a series of things variously conditioned in time and space and distinguished from one another by different properties. The Buddhist view that there is no substance apart from its qualities, or a whole apart from its parts contradicts the testimony of experience.* Reality presents us with substances marked by the possession of qualities and parts. We are able to recognize the jar we saw yesterday, which would be impossible if the jar were a string of sensations.† It is a matter of common experience that qualities occur in groups, which are invariable in character and sufficiently marked off from others. An apple always consists of the same group of qualities and invariably grows on the same kind of tree. The unbroken continuity of the mummy or the mountain, which has a continued existence for several millinniums is unintelligible apart from the assumption of substances in which qualities inhere. 'That which contains in it action and qualities and is a co-existent cause' (I. 1.15) is a substance. It is the substrate of qualities."‡

509. This is the most sensible and common-sense view of things, and Svami Dayananda accepts it in outline. Trifling details which are often filled in order to overcome seeming inconsistencies are out of question. They need not be too much emphasized. Svami Dayananda's realistic pluralism does not *tolerate any attempt at dissipating the independence of selves and objects.* If any philosophy does dissipate this independence, it does it

* Nyayavartika, 1-1-13.

† Nyayasutra, II. 1 30-36.

‡ Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, pp. 187-188.

at the peril of all human progress, nor does it lead to the attainment of true knowledge. Distinctions found in particulars can not be ignored. Svami Dayananda has emphasized the point at several places, such as :—

510. (1) "*Question*—Why do you controvert the identity of God and soul, when both of them have the same qualities *i. e.* existence, cognition and happiness ?

Answer—Partial similarity is no proof of identity. E.g. earth, water and fire are all inert and visible. But they are not identical. Their *peculiarities prove their distinctiveness.* For instance earth has odour, dryness, hardness, etc.; water has taste, fluidity softness etc., while fire has shape, combustibility etc. Those different attributes prove that earth, water and fire are not the same. Men and ants see with eyes, eat with mouths and walk with feet. But they are not the same, because men have peculiar shapes, and two feet, while ants have a different shape and more than two feet."*

511. (2) *Question*—Are God and soul always distinct ? Or do they ever become one ?

Answer—This question has been partially answered above. They become one in the sense of being similar. For example a bodily object is akin to aether, because both are inanimate (inert), besides they can never be separated therefore in the above two senses of likeness and inseparableness, aether and bodily objects can be called one. But they are different as well, because aether is pervasive, fine, formless, infinite, and the bodily object is finite, visible etc. Just as earth and other objects are never separate from aether because nothing can subsist without aether, but at the same time they are distinct because of their distinctive

***Light of Truth, VII, 50.**

attributes, similarly God being all-pervasive, souls and other objects like earth, cannot be separate from God but at the same time, can never be identical, on account of their different characteristics. Before the building of the house, clay, wood, iron and other building articles though scattered in different places, were actually subsistent in aether. When the house has been built, even then they are in aether. And when the house is demolished and all its particles have been scattered, they still subsist in that very aether. This means that these objects can never be separated from aether (neither in the past, nor in the present nor in the future) yet *being different in their nature, they are never one.* The same analogy holds good in this case too. Being pervaded by God, souls and other objects of the world can never be séparated from Him, but being of different characteristics, they can never be one. The Neo-Vedantists, like a one-eyed man, see only one aspect, *i. e.* likeness (अन्वय), and lose sight of the other aspect, *i. e.* unlikeness (व्यतिरेकभाव). There is no object which has either no qualities, or all qualities, no likeness, or no unlikeness, or no dissimilarity or no relation whatsoever.*

512. (3) Then again,

"As regards the learning of *Nishchaladasa*, here is a sample. He writes in *Vrtti-prabhakara* that the soul is God, because it is conscious. *Jivobrahmabhinnashchetanatvat*. This is a childish inference. *No two things can be identical only by agreement* (साधर्म्य). Difference (वैधर्म्य) stands in the way. *E. g.*, if a man says 'earth and water are identical because they are both lifeless, it will be an invalid inference. The same holds good in the case of *Nishchaladasa*. Finiteness, imperfection of know-

* Light of Truth, VII. 58.

ledge, fallibiliy etc. are the attributes of the soul and they distinguish it from God."*

513. Here we have given three long paragraphs to prove Svami Dayananda's agreement with the *Vaisheshika* view that particulars should not be swept away in the zeal of establishing oneness and explaining away the diversity of the universe. Whatever be the philosopher's solution of the problem, the diversity is real and implies a manifest pluralism which cannot be denied or explained away.

514. Svami Dayananda's line of argument is scientifically simple and simply scientific. You take the wall of your house. It is composed of bricks. You have seen it being built, bricks laid one upon or by another in a particular fashion. You can break the wall into bricks and then rebuild it. It is a fact, a hard fact, an event of experience. You can not deny it. No scientist can deny it, no philosopher should deny it. You have similarly seen that the brick is made of grains of sand combined or put together in a certain fashion. You can break the brick into the component entities and remake the brick out of them. You can further analyse the grains of sand, though with some difficulty. Take a glass of water. It is composed of several drops put together in a certain fashion. You can separate the drops one by one and again put them together and restore it to its former position. You can chemically analyse these drops of water in:o molecules composed of hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms and then again make water out of them. These atoms can be further subjected to scientific examination in order to find their number and

*Light of Truth, XI. 4.

properties. This is also a hard fact—a scientifically observed truth. In this way the whole universe can be reduced to its component parts infinite in number though indefinite or undefinable in properties. *Number* is obvious. Properties are undefinable. Not because they have no properties but because we have no adequate means to investigate them, our measures being too gross. Our inference that they are many is quite obvious. There is no logical flaw or fallacy there. As to what the properties of those parts are and how they combine upto the stage when we are able to comprehend them, there may be a question. There, perhaps, we pass beyond the realm of experimentation into that of conjectures. But no stretch of imagination can melt these numberless into airy nothing or strict unity. Both *Sankhya* and *Vaisheshika* cry halt there and express their inability to proceed further. They call that stage atom or *avyakta*; (unmanifest), further unbreakable and unscrutable by human intellect or human means.

515. Svami Dayananda, commenting upon *Vaisheshika Sutra* I. 2, 3. (*Samanyam vishesha iti buddhya-peksam*) says :—

"Generality and particularity are relative to intellect. For instance, among men-individuals, humanity (man-ship) is general, but it is special from animality etc. Similarly in male-ship and female-ship, *Brahmana*-ship, *Kshatriya*-ship, *Vaishya*-ship and *Shudra*-ship are special. Among *Brahmana* individuals *Brahmana*-ship is general. But *Kshatriya*-ship is special. And so on."*

516. Radhakrishnan's note is worth noticing :—

* Light of Truth, III. 67.

"When we admit a plurality of substances, it is evident that there will be relations among them. The substances will be similar to one another, since they are all substances ; they will be diverse from one another, since they are separate substances. When we find a property residing in many things, we call it *samanya* or general ; but if we regard it as distinguishing these objects from others, we call it *vishesha* or particular."*

517. Radhakrishnan says "*When we admit.......*". But is it possible not to admit this plurality ? Shankaracharya and men of his thinking say that it is. But by effacing all the experiences of mankind and hypothesizing that all is illusion and that all the wakeful experiences are nothing but dreams. But is there any direct evidence of its truth ?

518. "What idealism so far offers us is simply a theory ; it proposes an hypothetical source of phenomena, behind the phenomena, inaccessible to us. It may be a good theory, but is there any direct evidence of its truth ? Must the world-spirit be like electricity something we acknowledge because of its effects, but of whose nature we are and shall remain ignorant ?".

"Metaphysics remains unsatisfying so long as it offers only theories of unknown powers, even though these views may be reached by a compelling logic. In my own judgment, this is an incomplete sort of metaphysics, for the Reality, whatever it is, is that with which we are dealing all the time; it is around us and in us."†

* Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 209.

† Hocking's Types of Philosophy, pp. 314-315.

519. But without satisfying this genuine demand for evidence, simply on the basis of a theory Shankara has vehemently criticised *Vaisheshika* pluralism by merely formal logic. We here propose to examine Shankaras' criticism.

520. Shankara :—It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action, again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about, for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, impossible. For in the *pralaya* state endeavour, which ls a quality of the soul, cannot take place because *nobody exists* then. For the quality of the soul, called endevour originates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes, such as impact and the like. For they are all possible only after the *creation of the world has taken place*, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original action.*

521. *Our Counter-criticism.* Shankara has for criticising the position of the *Vaisheshika* accepted those assumptions which his theory of illusion does not justify. If the world is unreal like a dream, then the

* Thibaut's Translation of Shankara's commentary of the Vedanta. II, 2, 12.

conditions demanded by Shankara for the original action in atoms are also unwarranted. It is criticising a particular doctrine not directly by attacking the reasons on which that doctrine is based, but merely by pointing out certain inconsistencies in filling the details. For instance Shankara does not deny those experiences on which the existence of atoms has been inferred. He rather accepts them and borrows his weapons of attack from them. How can he on the basis of his own doctrine say that atoms require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ?

522. As to *'the operative cause'* Shankara forgets that *Vaisheshika* believes in God, whose pervasive-ness through the atoms is quite sufficient to bring about motion in the atoms.

523. Similarly Shankara's objection to *"adrshta"* (अदृष्ट) or unseen principle is untenable, as this *'adrshta'* does not operate itself, but through God, who gives to the souls the fruit of their action according to the *adrshta*.

524. Shankara:—How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be *imagined*? Is it to be total inter-penetration of the two, or partial conjunction ? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist ; moreover it would be *contrary to what is observed*, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (*pradesa* प्रदेश). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts. Let, then, the atoms be *imagined* to consist of parts. If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be non-inherent cause of real things.

525. *Our Counter-Criticism.* This argument has been considered the most potent by the adversaries of the "atom doctrine." But here too Shankara has used the weapons of his attack without examining their own strength. We see that the things combine to produce a bulk; as for instance, bricks to make a wall. Shankara accepts the fact. He simply says that a brick has parts. If the things to be combined have parts, Shankara takes them as valid to produce bulk. He has no objection in bricks making a wall by combining. But he does not take his argument further. Suppose for instance that Brick A is combined with Brick B and can produce Bulk C. How does A combine with B? Shankara allows that they combine by parts. What parts? The part P of Brick A is to be combined with part R of Brick B. The question is how the thing P combines with the thing R? By themselves or by parts? If by themselves, Shankara's objection falls flat. If they have further parts say S and T respectively, regresssus infinitum will take place and there will be no end of it. Thus the objection raised by Shankara goes directly against the human experiences. The last part of the link of parts of Brick A is to be combined with the foremost part of the link of parts of Brick B. and thus increase the bulk. This is our daily experience. Now the question is whether these parts combine *partially* or *wholly*. The first alternative is absurd as they are the extremest parts and have no further parts of theirs. The second alternative gives another difficulty, the difficulty of their unfitness to create a new bulk. How to avoid it? Should we say, as Shankara expects us to do, that they do not combine at all and therefore they do not produee a new bulk? If we do so, we shall throw to winds all experiences. It will not be the world in which we live, the world in which myriads of objects are made and unmade by combining

(संयोग) and separating (वियोग). Shankara wishes to take us to a new world of his own, though he funnily asks us the question how such a conjunction can be imagined. Why say *imagined*? We daily experience it and on the strength of these experiences can imagine also an analogous situation in the beginning of the cycle of a creation and the same explanation will hold good in that case as it does in our daily occurring cases.

526. But, then, what about Shankaracharya's logical fork by which he sweeps away the possibility of both the alternatives, that of total interpenetration or partial? I wish to simply point out that this fork was forged by Shankara not in any factory of human experiences, but in an arbitrarily imaginary forge and put the whole thing in such a masterly fashion that the thinkers were over-awed and those who were already antagonistic to the doctrine of matter offered a sumptuous reception to the argument. *Vaisheshika* has used the word *Samyoga* (संयोग) or combination and not *pravesha* (प्रवेश) or penetration. Shankara has confused the two words. The question of bulk arises only in case of penetration, wherein a finer thing enters into a grosser thing and occupies the space already available between the parts of this grosser thing. In such cases there will arise no new bulk, as the bulk of a waggon remains the same, though hundreds of men enter and occupy the space left vacant. It is a case of penetration (प्रवेश) and not of combination (संयोग). If a passenger instead of going into the waggon, hangs on the window of the waggon, then it is a case of combination (संयोग) and the bulk will.be increased. Just as we do see that two bricks combined increase the bulk or two pieces of rope combined together make up a bigger rope, similarly two atoms or more combine and produce the bulk.

527. The production of a bulk is a fact. It cannot be denied. We have simply to find a philosophical explanation of it. Shankara's fork breaks down the two alternatives ingeniously thought out by him. But there can be a *third alternative* under which though interpenetration or *pravesha* is impossible yet *samyoga* (संयोग) or combination can be validly thought of. It is by investigating the characteristics of *Akasha* or space and explaining the phenomenon of combination. The configurations of worldly objects which are the distinctive features of those objects all depend upon the process of combination and separation. The particles of a toy-cow can be broken up and rearranged in the form of a toy-dog or a toy-cat. How can this take place unless we separate and combine? And how can this separation and combination take place unless *Akasha* (space) is endowed with certain characteristics which make the process possible ?

528. Even Shankara himself had to admit such characteristics in *Akasha* in commenting upon the *Vedanta Sutra* II. 2. 24 '*Akashe cha avisheshat*' (आकाशे चाविशेषात्). Shankara says :—

(1) That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages such as "space sprang from the self."

(2) The real existence of space is to be inferred from the *quality* of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and other qualities.

(3) Moreover if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied —there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time.

(4) And if you would reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that *that something* by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies."

Thibaut gives a foot-note :—

"What does enable us to declare that there is *avaranabhava* (आवरणाभाव) in one place and not in another ? Space, which, therefore, is something real."

529. Here Shankara in trying to criticize Budhist doctrine has used all the weapons which he borrowed from the *Vaisheshika* armoury and which he so flourishingly tried to smash while criticizing *Vaisheshika atoms*, *qualities*, *samyoga*, *samanaya* etc. Shankara has to his credit the ingenuity of forging elusive dilemmas and hurling them dexterously at his opponent. But in killing his adversary he most often kills himself.

530. Svami Dayananda in his Satyartha Prakasha Chapter III, has accepted the broad *Vaisheshika* principles which no scientist can afford to lose sight of. As regards a few hair-splittings of the later *Vaisheshika*, such as the question whether atoms differ qualitatively or quantitatively or whether in baking a jar atoms are heated jointly or severally, Svami Dayananda has left them alone, being the pastime conjectures of juggling brains. The fact remains that beyond a certain stage definite thinking about fundamentals is beyond the range of human minds. Fundamentals can be inferred but cannot be handled in a crucible.*

* For details of Vaisheshika technique and their propriety see my Shankarabhashyalochana.

531. In connection with *Vaisheshika* Radhakrishnan has flung an indirect hint which needs a little thought. He says :—"Its (Vaisheshika's) stand-point is more scientific than speculative, more analytic than synthetic, though it is not able to set aside questions about the general character of the universe as a whole. Science sorts out while philosophy sums up. The *Vaisheshika* is not interested in constructing an all-embracing synthesis within whose bounds there is room for all that is bringing all the variety of the world of sense and of thought under a single comprehensive formula. In the spirit of science, it endeavours to formulate the most general characters of the things observed. It tickets different aspects of experience and assigns each to an appropriate pigeon-hole. The resulting philosophy comes to be of *piecemeal characters*, and not an adequate and comprehensive one."*

532. Radhakrishnan may be right. But there are philosophies which synthesize without analysing and try to sum up without sorting, for instance, Shankara's monism. They leave no place or at least no important place for science and scientific progress. They indulge in the world of dreams. Some thinkers may like to soar very high and derisively look down upon actualities as Shankara's attitude towards *Sankhya* and *Vaisheshika* has been. Svami Dayananda's philosophy is more comprehensive. He does not ignore scientific observations but tries to synthesize on the basis of analyses, thus thinning the wall between Realism and Idealism.

* Indian Philosophy, Voll. II. 176-177.

Chapter VI.

ETERNALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF SOULS.

533. It is generally believed that souls are immortal. They do not die with the physical death. Perhaps those who cherish these sentiments do not care to see how far they can go. What does immortality mean ? Survival after death, no doubt; but how long after that ? Upto the end of the eternity, or, more accurately, upto the endless eternity ? Most philosophers are silent on this point. Kant, for instance, is a believer in the immortality of the soul. But he does not examine the conception of eternity. In the last chapter (Sec. 491, d.) we quoted from Madam Blavatsky whose idea of eternity is confined to a practical limit of the *Mahakalpa*. Such periods, howsoever long, do not form eternity because they terminate somewhere.

534. But supposing eternity means some limitless and endless duration, do we mean that the soul will never cease to exist ? If yes, it means denial of mortality, *i. e.*, of death. But this is onesided eternity, a river with one bank, so to speak. If the soul is immortal, does it also mean that it was never born ? Eternality of the soul should mean the temporal endlessness, not only after death, but before birth too ! In Sanskrta, the word "*nitya*" (eternal) has been used for those entities only which are both beginningless and endless. That which is 'anitya' or 'mortal' begins and ends, and what is 'nitya' or eternal neither begins

nor ends. Thus according to all *Bhartiya* philosophers what begins must end and vice versa. Kant and perhaps all Christian philosophers accept the immortality of the soul, without being definite about its beginninglessness. How is such a thing conceivable is a question.*

535. Immortality of the soul, though very vague, has been the belief of many old philosophers. For instance, Aristotle believes that the soul is immortal. But his belief has a loop-hole. "There is in the soul one element that is rational and one that is irrational." The irrational part is two-fold; the vegetative, which is found in every living being, even in plants, and the appetitive which exists in all animals. The life of the rational soul consists in contemplation, which is the *complete happiness of man* though not fully attainable. 'Such a life would be too high for man, for *it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so*, but in so far as something *divine is present in him*.'†

* God, freedom and immortality, he says, are the three "ideas of reason"..........................The argument is that the moral law demands justice, i. e., happiness proportional to virtue. Only Providence can insure this, and has evidently not insured it in *this* life. Therefore there is a God and a future life; and there must be freedom, since otherwise there would be no such thing as virtue.

(Betrand Russell : History of Western Philosophy p. 736).

If "the moral law demands justice" and "only Providence can insure this," the argument should be carried backward too. There is moral law and there is *Providence* too. They have insured happiness proportionate to virtue in *this life too.* If the present life refers forward to future life, it must equally reasonably refer back to past life also, i. e., not only immortality but also eternality.

† Nichomachean Ethics as quoted by Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy p 194.

536. This means that so much of the soul is immortal as is God's part. It is virtually a belief in the immortality of God and mortality of the soul. Averroes* the Moslem philosopher who was a staunch follower of Aristotle interpreted that according to Aristotle the soul, in so far as it is individual, is not immortal; immortality only belongs to the intellect, which is impersonal and identical in different intellectual beings.† If this were the view of all Islamic theologians then there is no room in it for individual sin, individual piety or individual emancipation.

537. Belief in the immortality of the soul has been variously maintained in different times with various reasonings. For instance Epicurus thought "immortality fatal to the hope of release from pain" and to save humanity from the terror of pain, he devised a philosophical system which had no place for immortality. The stoics were always ready to commit suicide because perhaps they vaguely thought that the end of the earthly life was the end of pain, there being no survival.

538. Among the Jews the belief in the immortality of the soul was roused by a quite different reason. In 170 B.C. Antiochus IV persecuted Jews for political reasons. The persecution was extraordinarily inhuman. The Jews were hard hit. Formerly it was believed that virtue would be rewarded on earth; but when the most virtuous were tortured and killed, it was found necessary to believe in rewards and punishments hereafter.

539. Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), the famous

* Ibn Roshd 1126-1198.
† Ibid p. 475.

author of Utopia, had perhaps similar reasons in his mind when he made the city of his wishes contain all people who had firm belief in God and in immortality. Though Decartes admitted three substances, God, mind and matter, yet he thought that God was more substantial and as He had created mind and matter both, He could annihilate them too if He chose. This belief in the immortality was of a very slippery nature. Even this vague sort of Christian immortality was denied by Spinoza. As he believed that individual souls and matter were not *things* but only *aspects* of divine nature, there was no personal immortality but only an imper-sonal sort that consists in becoming more and more with God.* What that definitely means is a question. Kant's belief in immortality was based more on his conception of morality than upon his reason, possibly because his pure reasoning would detect inconsistancy in *immortality without beginninglessness*.

540. In Gita we find a very strong advocacy of the immortality of the soul.

नैनं छिन्दन्ति शस्त्राणि नैनं दहति पावक :
नैनं क्लेदयन्त्यापः न शोषयति मारुतः ॥ (Gita II 23)

"Weapons cannot pierce it, fire cannot burn it, waters cannot melt it, and air cannot dry it out."

But then does Gita speak of soul or God? There is another verse in the same context:—

वासांसि जीर्णानि यथा विहाय
नवानि गृह्णाति नरोऽपराणि,
तथा शरीराणि विहाय जीर्णानि
अन्यानि संयाति नवानि देही । (Gita II, 22)

"Just as we cast off our old garments and put on new ones, similarly an embodied soul (देही) quits the

* Bertrand Russell p. 594.

present body and acquires a new one after death". It is clear that the immortality of the soul is meant here and *not of God*. It is the soul that transmigrates from one body into another.

541. One thing more is clear. There is no direct mention of the beginninglessness of the soul, but this verse implies that there is life-before-birth as sure as life-after-death, and if every present life has its past, then, the soul is not only immortal but eternal also. Ramanuja in his *Shri Bhasya of Vedanta* II. 3. 18.

नात्मा श्रुते र्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः

quotes two authorities for the unborn (*i. e. eternal*) nature of the soul :—

न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चितः (क० २।१८)

"He is neither born, nor he dies". and

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजवीशानीशौ (श्वे०—१।६)

The sentient soul and the insentient matter (*prakrti*) are both *aja* (uuborn or eternal), one that which *governs* and the other that which *is governed.*

आत्मनो नित्यत्वं च ताभ्यः श्रुतिभ्य एवावगम्यते ।

All these scriptures testify to the eternality (*nityatva*) of the soul.

542. Shankara also, though differing on many other points, gives the same interpretation to the above aphorism and adds a few other authorities to those mentioned above.

543. Ramanuja also clearly states that even the liberated soul (मुक्तात्मा) is different from God:—

एते च जगत्पतित्व-जगद्विधरण-सर्वेश्वरत्वादयः
प्रत्यगात्मनि मुक्तावस्थेपि न कथं चित् संभवन्ति

"The three attributes of God, *i. e.* He is the Lord of the universe, He maintains the universe and He is the Governor of all can never be predicated of soul, even when liberated."

544. There can be following alternative conceptions of a soul :—

(1) It is a temporarily existing entity ; created or born at a certain time and annihilated some times after.

(a) This may have been created by God or some supernatural divinity and annihilated after sometime.

(b) Or this may have appeared fortuitously or in accordance with some laws of nature at a particular evolutionary stage of matter and may cease to exist in obedience to those very laws either just after bodily death or some-times after.

(c) Or its appearance may be due to some illusion caused somehow and may cease to appear as soon as the agency under illusion is dis-illusioned.

545. All these alternatives fail to explain the teleology of the world or life. They also render meaningless all progress either worldly or ex-worldly. They do not afford any philosophical basis to life, *nor do they account for the philosophic urge in man to find out the reality*. If cessation of life at whatever stage, means *Nirvana* (nibbana) as some Buddhist schools vaguely describe it, then life is neither worth living, nor worth striving for. Apart from the ethical value of the conception, even the rational part of our being remains dis-satisfied by such conception.

546. (2) The soul is a spiritual entity created by God, who bestows upon it a free and immortal life either of interminable hell or of heaven or changeable at certain stages according to some divine law.

547. This conception also does not account for the teleology of life. A created being has no purpose of its own and if there is any purpose of such a creation, it belongs to the creator only. What sort of God will that God be who serves his own purpose by creating a world like ours and us as we find ourselves to be?

548. (3) The soul is a spiritual entity which from a beginningless time has felt itself as a separate entity through the spell of some nescience. When this nescience goes off through a right knowledge, the soul would realize its eternal nature and will identify itself with the Supreme Self or *Brahman*.

549. This conception involves many philosophical complexities. A beginningless thing can never be terminable. It implies not the immortality of the soul, but of some super-being which was never a soul and is no more a soul.

550. (4) The soul is unborn and immortal. Life, as we understand it in this material world, means simply an embodied soul, soul or spirit coming into contact with a material vehicle called body; this contact having both beginning and end, beginning being termed as birth and end as death and duration there-between as life.

551. Under this conception the soul is eternal, beginningless and deathless, but the embodiment of the soul is subject to both birth and death. This is the conception of Svami Dayananda, as the following passages show :—

Question :—Does this universe originate from God or from anything else ?

Answer.—Its agental cause is God ; but its material cause is *Prakrti* (materia radica).

Question :—Did not God create the *Prakrti* ?

Answer :—No. It is beginningless.

Question :—What is the meaning of the word "beginning"* ? and how many things are beginningless ?

Answers :—God, soul and the material cause (materia radica) of the universe are beginningless."†

"The agental cause is of two kinds :—The chief agental cause is God who makes the universe out of the materia-radica, sustains and dissolves it, and governs everything. Then there is another '*agental cause*', the soul which is an agent in an ordinary sense. It takes the articles out of God's creations and fashions them into different forms. The materia-radica consists of atoms or material for the creation of the world. This cannot make or unmake itself because it is not sentient. It is made if some one makes it and is unmade if some one unmakes it. Sometimes an insentient effect is (appears to be) made or unmade by an insentient cause, *e. g.* God-made seed, if thrown into the soil, and watered, germinates and grows into a tree, and is burnt to ashes if brought into contact

* Here there is a question, whose answer seems to have been either left through clerical over-sight or through some press mistake ; though the omission does not stand in the way of understandability.

† Light of Truth, VIII, 3.

with fire. But the organized creation or dissolution of these things depends upon God and souls. When a thing is made, it requires knowledge, insight, power, hand and other tools, time, space etc.; agental and auxiliary causes, *e. g.*, if a pot has to be made it needs the agental cause, potter; material cause clay; and auxiliary causes, wheel, space, time, light eyes, hands, knowledge and activity. Without these causes, nothing can be made and unmade."*

552. We have quoted these passages to show that the soul is a self-existent entity, uncreate and immortal, an agental cause with certain limitations. The teleology observed in the universe implies the purpose of the soul. That is, the universe is made by God and is made and unmade in a limited sense by the soul, for the purpose of the soul only, God's action being self-less and due to His love for the soul. The following quotation will make it clear :—

553. *Questions*.—What is the object of God in creating the world?

Answers.—What would have been His gain, had He not created the world?

Questions.—Had He not created the world He would have been saved so much botheration (remained happy) aud the souls would have been free from the turmoil of pleasure and pain.

Answers.—These are the ways of idle and inactive and not of energetic beings. And what pleasure or pain is there for the souls in the state of dissolution? If you compare the pleasure and pain of the world, *happiness many times exceeds pain*, and many pure souls earn the bliss of salvation by *constant practice of virtuous*

* Light of Truth, VIII, 12.

actions. In the state of dissolution they lie unconscious as in sound sleep. Besides the actions done by the souls in the creation last preceding would remain un-rewarded and the souls deprived of the enjoyment of their fruit. If anybody asks you 'What is the object of your eye ?', you will naturally say, 'seeing'. Well, when God possesses the knowledge, the power, and the potentiality of creativeness, how can He justify himself except by creating the world. ? You have no answer to this question.

Besides, justice, power of sustenance, mercy and other attributes of God cannot find their justification unless God makes the world. His infinite power can justify itself only through creation, sustenance, dissolution, and government of the universe. Just as seeing is the natural functioning of the eye, similarly it is the *natural function of God to do good to the souls* by granting them innumerable objects after creating this world."*

554. The passage is embued with a significant clarification of the purposiveness of the universe without tarnishing God's nature with selfishness. The question herein put is not imaginary. Such questions often rise in man's mind especially in troublous times. And by putting a counter-question Svami Dayananda has *elicited* the reason which gives rise to such questions. The answer brings into prominence the distinction between the *purpose of the souls* for whom the world is made and the *motive of the creator* in creating it. We invariably experience sentient beings, men and lower living creatures, doing something in order to fulfil some want, to make good some deficiency. That is the purpose of the activity. But

* Light of Truth, VIII, 16.

such activities are possible only under certain environments. An artist expresses his art, but for doing so there is a need of a canvas. A bee stirs to gather honey. There is some purpose in it. But this purpose cannot be fulfilled, nor the bee can exercise its efforts unless it is provided with wings and there be flowers from which to suck in honey. This analogy holds good in every case, with no exception whatsoever. Now these environments are provided by God with pure and unalloyed selflessness. Such an act is not unthinkable. Charitable persons often provide for the needy a field where, by exercising their own choice and intelligence, they (the needy) might fulfil their wants. That which is done for others through pure love is no selfishness. Such activity (*i. e.*, creation of of the world) flows out of the Supreme Creator out of pure love for souls, spontaneously. Svami Dayananda quotes in the support of his thesis a verse from the Yajur Veda (XXXI. 2).

Puruṣa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yachcha bhāvyam. Uta amṛtatvasyeshāno yadannenālirohati.

and translates it thus:—

555. "O man, that very Lord is the creator of all the past, present and future universe, who is perfectly pervasive through everything, who is the Lord of the *imperishable* causal matter, and soul, and yet who transcends all the inanimate world (the earth etc.) and the soul."*

556. If the souls were *created beings*, their purpose would have ultimately meant the purpose of the creator and the charge of selfishness would have stood unanswered. The doctrine which Svami Dayananda has

* Light of Truth, VIII, 1.

set forth fully accounts for the creation without laying charge of selfishness, cruelty or other lower motives at the door of the creator, and explains fully the activities of all sentient beings observed in the universe.

557. Now the question remains: Why do the sentient beings work at all? Can they change their nature? Can they improve their lot? How can they get anything which is not by nature theirs? To give the answer of this question we must observe nature. It is our everyday experience that we strive and strive with purpose and in most cases our purpose is fulfilled and we get what we desire. This shows that we are *imperfect* and *progressive*, imperfect because we have certain wants, and progressive because these wants are satisfiable under certain circumstances.

"He is the finite soul that is ignorant conditioned and localized."*

558. The following series of questions and answers throw ample light on the problem :—

Question—What is emancipation?
Answer—Emancipation means 'release'.
Q.—Release from what?
A.—That from which all souls wish to be released.
Q.—From which do they wish to be released?
A.—That which they need to be released from.
Q.—What do they need to be released from?
A.—From pain.†

That is, all souls *desire* to be released from pain

* "अज्ञान परिच्छिन्न एक देशी अल्प अल्पज्ञ जीव होता है"
(Light of Truth, IX, 12.)

† Light of Truth, IX, 13.

and also they *need* so. That is, there is something wanting in their nature and their *desires are compatible with their* needs.

559. These facts are not to be proved. They are axiomatic truths. They need no proof. Simply they are to be accounted for. And the best way of accounting for them is to refer to their nature. We feel hungry. There is a *desire* for food. Why? Because there is a *need* for food. The need is engrained in our nature, That is the ultimate answer.

560. In this connection, note the following:—

Question—Who can not get salvation?

Answer—He who is in bondage.

Q.—Who is in bondage?

A.—He who is engrossed in vice and ignorance.

Q.—Are bondage and emancipation inherent in the very nature of the soul (spontaneous) or are they due to some cause?

A. Due to some cause. Had they been inherent in the nature of the soul, they would never have come to terminate.*

"The soul is *finite* and is liable to be covered up. (*i. e.* bondaged). It assumes a body, which means its birth. It comes into bondage by being compelled to enjoy the fruit of its good or bad action. It tries to use the ways and means to be free from the bondage. It tries to get rid of pain. When it is free from pain, it realizes God and attains salvation also.†

561. Svami Dayananda has stated all this as the Neo-Vedantist (Shankarite) School denies the soul

* Light of Truth, IX. 4.

† Ibid IX, 5.

the following qualities—Covering, birth, bondage, doer-ship, desire release or salvation. Svami Dayananda shows that all these belong to the soul as distinguished from *Brahman* :—

Na nirodho nachotpattir na baddho na cha sādhakaḥ
*Na mumukṣhurna vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā.**

If the soul were God, it could not have been subjected to the covering of ignorance, it should not have desired anything, it should not have acted anything, nor would there have arisen the question of bondage and emancipation.

But we do find all these things in every sentient being. And it is these things that are in the bottom of all this worldliness.

562. Let us quote further to make the point clearer.—

Questions.—These (wishing, doing, etc.) are the functions of the body and the internal organ, *not of the soul.* The soul is free from vice or virtue and is the mere spectator. Heat, cold etc. are the functions of the body. The self is alloyless.

(This is the position of the Neo-Vedantists who identify soul with God—Monism).

Svami Dayananda answers :—

The body and the internal organ are inanimate. They cannot feel or experience heat and cold. Heat and cold can be experienced only by a living entity—man or animal who tries to touch them. Vital airs (*Pranas*) are also inanimate; they cannot feel hunger or thirst. Hunger and thirst are felt by him who is the possessor of these vital airs. Mind is also inanimate : it cannot feel joys or sorrows. Joys and sorrows are felt by the soul through the mind. The

* Gaudapadiya Karika, II. 32.

soul is happy or sorrowful by perceiving pleasant and unpleasant shapes, sounds, odours, tastes, hardness, softness etc., through the external senses, eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin; similarly, through the four fold internal organ—the faculties of feeling, knowing, willing and egoing, the same soul receives the internal experiences of ideation, determination, memory, egotism etc. and is honoured and disgraced. Just as the man who commits murder with the sword, is punished and not the sword, similarly the soul which does good or bad deeds by means of the body, the senses, the internal organ, and the vital airs gets pleasure or pain as the fruit of these deeds. The soul is not the spectator of the deeds, but *their doer* and *enjoyer* of their fruits. The seer of the deeds is only God who has none second to himself. The soul that does the deeds is engrossed in them, and not God, the seer.

Questions.—The soul is the reflection of God. Just as the breaking of the mirror does no harm to the reflection, similarly the soul which is God's reflection in the internal organ (*antahkarana*) lasts only so long as the internal organ lasts. When the internal organ is destroyed, the soul becomes free.

Answer.—It is all puerile. Only a bodied (corporeal) object casts reflection in another bodied object of separate existence. The face and the mirror both are bodied objects and are apart from each other. Hence their reflection is possible. God's reflection is meaningless for two reasons, first that He is formless, and secondly He is all pervading.*

563. Svami Dayananda has said all this to prove the separate and eternal existence of the soul, on

* Light of Truth, IX 6-7.

whose activities is centred the whole universe. The soul is the chief explanatory factor of the world.

564. But granted that life is the most important factor of the universe, the question is whether this life is one or many. Joad has pointed out two alternative possibilities.—

(1) Life as sum total of individual monads.

(2) Life as a principle transcending the monads. Both the alternatives have certain difficulties. For instance, if the whole world of living organisms were to be suddenly extinguished, not only would nothing possessing life remain but life as a source of energy, the fountain-head and animating principle of living organisms would itself be abolished........... the life force would go out of existence and it will no longer remain a principle of force. Secondly individual responsibility does not become conceivable and it is difficult to explain abnormalities. Under the second view, the individuality of the monads cannot be accounted for. If there is a fountain or reservoir of the life energy flowing through innumerable channels or a mass of fire from which several sparks shoot out or as Bergson thinks, rockets shoot out from a centre of force, then freedom of action altogether disappears and the purposiveness of life also remains unexplained. If life is something else than these monads and transcends them, then these monads are nothing more than the material atoms which are somehow ensouled by the life force. Both these alternatives are too materialistic.

565. Besides if we hypothesize a Life-force instead of living beings or living substances, as there is a fashion with modern thinkers, such hypothesizing not only totally rejects the common-sense view, but fails to explain our daily experiences and reduces to airy nothing the very existence of the thinkers themselves. If there are no individual living monads and if all the life that appears is only a localized manifestation of some one life-force, then why should our thoughts differ vitally? This plurality of living monads or in Svami Dayananda's language *Jivas* (souls) cannot be contradicted by mere abstractizing. The life-force which makes itself felt as something transcending the living monads is not denied by Svami Dayananda. This is the Supreme Living Being, not mere force, but an entity in which this force resides and from which it streams forth to inspire and affect the whole universe. But what Svami Dayananda contradicts is the belief that the individual living monads have no force of their own and are simply centres of the manifestation of that one force. Such a belief first dissipates free will and freedom of action, secondly replaces life-kinship by life-identity, thirdly, does not account for numerous erroneous thinkings, such as idiocy, lunacy and other mental aberrations. The most difficult point for philosophy to solve is life-dualism which stares at our face all-round and cannot be ignored. The phenomena of birth and death can only be explained satisfactorily by plurality of individual souls. Svami Dayananda has made it very clear at several places.

566. We have said above that the *jivas* or souls are eternal and immortal. Their material lives are mere bivouacs of an everlasting or, say ever continuing journey. They begin and end and then begin

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and end and so on and so forth. This is called transmigration or re-incarnation, going from one material body to another or associating with matter again and again. We refer to the following questions and answers.—

567. *Questions.*—Are the souls in human and animal bodies alike? Or do they belong to different species?

Answers.—The souls are the same. But they are pure or impure according to their good or bad deeds.

Q.—Does the soul of a man pass into the body of an animal and that of an animal in the body of a man? Similarly does the soul of a female go into the body of a male, and that of a male into the body of a female?

Answers.—Yes it does. When vices wax and virtues wane, then the soul of a man assumes a lowlier body of lower animals. When virtues predominate over vices, then the soul takes up a nobler body, *e. g.*, of a learned man. When vice and virtue are equal, the soul is born as an ordinary man. Even in human lives, there are gradations, high grade, intermediate grade and low grade, according to the nature of actions. When the punishment for excessive sins has been suffered in animal lives the soul comes back to the life of an average man; similarly when the fruit of excessive virtue has been enjoyed, the soul comes again to the body of an average man. When the soul leaves the body, it is death. When it again takes the body, it is birth. When the soul leaves the body it goes to '*yamalaya*' or abode of '*yama*'. '*Yama*' is the name of air, in which sense it has been used in the Vedas, "Yamena vayuna." Here '*yama*' does not mean "God of death" of the "*Garuda Purana*"..........When

the soul leaves the body, it passes into '*yamalaya*' or atmosphere. Then the Lord of Justice, "*Dharmaraja*" sends it to a body suited to its merits. According to the provisions of God the soul passes through air, food, water or through some crevice into the body of another man. Gradually it passes into the semen, then to the womb of the mother and there it gets body. Thereafter it comes out and takes its birth. If the past deeds deserve a male body, it is born as male; if a female body, as female; if neuter, then neuter. Eunuchs are born when at the time of conception the male and female genital fluids are of equal power. Now this cycle of births and deaths continues, on and on, until the soul secures the emancipation by dint of good deeds, devotion and growth of knowledge. Good deeds win better sort of human lives and superbly noble actions are conducive to the release from the succession of births and deaths and the happiness of beatitude lasting for the very very long duration of the Grand Cycle (*Maha Kalpa*).

568. *Question*.—Is the salvation the result of one life or of many lives?

Answer.—Of many lives for,

Bhidyate hṛdaya-granthish-chhidyante sarva-sanshayāḥ,
*Ksīyante chasya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare.**

When the soul's knot of ignorance is solved and its doubts cleared, its evil actions are consumed and it dwells in God which pervades both in and out of the self.

569. *Question*.—In salvation, does the soul become one with God or does it remain distinct?

Answer.—It remains distinct. If it were to become

* Mundaka Upanisat II. 2. 8.

one who would enjoy the happiness of salvation? Then all the efforts done to achieve emancipation will go useless. That will not be *release* (*mukti*) but the *annihilation* of the soul. The soul gets emancipation only when it obeys the injunctions of God, does virtuous action, keeps good company and practises Yoga.*

570. Some of the small details may not appear interesting or relevant to the reader, but Svami Dayananda makes his views and thereby the views of the holy Vedic scriptures clear on the following points :—

1. Souls are eternal, *i. e.*, unborn and immortal.
2. They are many.
3. They are finite in knowledge and power.
4. They are imperfect as well as progressive. This accounts for their *desire for being better* and *efforts* to fulfill this desire.
5. Their bodies, or physical lives, are but short stages in their journey towards progress and the duration of these stages varies according to the capacity, suitability and need of the particular individual so striving.
6. Male or female, animal or man, bird or insect are not the names of the souls, but of embodied souls given to them according to the physical investments called "*lives*" and beginning with birth and terminating with death. This is a never-ending cycle, *rising or falling* in the scale of progress according to the efforts put forth by the individuals, slightly analogous to the

* Light of Truth, IX. 57-60.

children's game of *Snake and ladder*, till the final release is attained.

7. Emancipation or final release according to Svami Dayananda is only relatively final, relative to this cycle of life and not as ultimately final. On this point Svami Dayananda parts company with most thinkers, eastern and western, present and medieval, who all claim that there is no returning backward of the soul from the emancipation once gained. It is not a place to discuss this point in full detail. I shall refer the reader to a small pamphlet (in Hindi) of mine which has been published by the International Aryan League Delhi. Svami Dayananda claims that the eternality of the soul is broken if it is allowed a perpetual stationariness at any particular stage. The soul (and for the matter of that all life) is *dynamic* by nature. By postulating a perpetual condition of release, we shall make the soul absolutely *static*. Besides it will be too hedonistic if the attainment of happiness be the sole goal of a life. The soul is much more than a mere bundle of pleasures, whether qualitative or quantitative. It has other attributes which will be totally atrophied if the soul becomes mere enjoyer of pleasures and nothing else. This is, of course, a super mundane question and may be variously treated by philosophers of various temperaments. Those interested in the question may read the ninth chapter of Svami Dayananda's Satyartha Prakasha or "Light of Truth".

571. The doctrine of metempsychosis or trans-

migration of soul has always found favour with all schools of Eastern thought, (Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina etc), with perhaps one exception, Charvakist who thought that there was no such thing as soul and that life was only a material phenomenon due to a particular way in which material elements combine into a body. But western philosophers, especially those who have been under the traditional influence of Christianity have all along ridiculed the belief as profanely heathen. But religious presuppositions have a greater share in this attitude than any scientific investigation or philosophical insight. When Descartes denied soul in the lower animals, the basis was by no means scientific. The same can be said, to a certain extent, of Kant too. If our life is not meaningless, if it has any purpose to achieve, then the short duration of our present earthly life is too short for any undertaking. Some of us die as soon as they are born, some live a few years, and those who complete a normally full course of eight or nine decades also cannot say that they have reached the acme of perfection, whatever the measure of progress may be. Therefore it is quite rational to believe that we progress very gradually, bit by bit, not in one life but in a succession of lives. What we are, at present, either physically or mentally, is the result of a long series of acquisitions, not poured upon us by some miracle, but earned gradually.

572. Those theologians who do not believe in the eternality and un-create nature of the soul think that whatever we are, we have been made by a divine fiat, as willed and ordained by the divine overlord, without any reference to our intrinsic merits or earnings. This superstition was given a great shock by Darwin ond other evolutionists who professed that there is a close kinship between all grades of life and

different species can be so arranged in a graduated order that we can see how we begin at the lowest rung of the ladder and grow up in a serial order. This is more reasonable. "The old notion of eternal unchangeableness, with occasional upheavals, the static view, has given way to a newer idea of progressive development in nature. Gradually, within the last half century, this new interpretation, which regards all things, from the evolutionary or dynamic point of view, has extended from one field of human enquiry to another, creating everywhere, fresh interests, giving novel aspects to old problems—nay colouring and transforming the whole purpose and meaning of modern life."*

This is quite true of the western theology and western philosophy. But we do find that the idea of evolutionary progress was not new to ancient Indian thinkers. The doctrine of the Transmigration of the soul is evolutionary in its character. It is not static; it is dynamic. Let us see how.

573. Evolutionism has to deal with three spheres of existence and to account for the relationship that ties these spheres together:—

(1) The *Cosmosphere* of non-living things and forces ·from dew-drops to stars, from electricity to gravitation.

(2) The *Biosphere* of living organisms.

(3) The *Sociosphere* of human society, its institutions, their progress and ultimate value.

574. The evolution theory as propounded by Darwin and improved upon by later scientists essays to find the relation between these spheres. The *socio-*

* The First Principles Of Evolution by Herbert p 1.

sphere is connotatively the largest circle within which lies the *biosphere* and within the latter the innermost *cosmosphere* We begin with cosmosphere and rise gradually in the scale till we come to man and whatever is human. Let us start with the findings of Darwin. His main discovery is that the upper grades of existence are only descendants of the lower grades inheriting all their characteristics from their ancestors plus something which is peculiar to them, but which somehow springs from the older characteristics. Thus all that is true of cosmosphere is also true of biosphere, though biosphere exhibits certain peculiarities which originate from the parent characteristics. The same thing can be said about socio-sphere. If the characteristics of cosmosphere are a those of biosphere are $a+x$ and those of sociosphere are $a+x+y$. Thus an animal is nonliving matter plus life. And man is non-living matter plus life plus intellect. The old theory, the theory of old theologians was that God made first the non-living things, then he put into some of them *life* which made them *organisms*. Later on into some of these organisms, he put soul or *intellect* (some thinking substance) which made them *man*. According to old theories, life and intellect were some external elements thrust into the older things, just as we enter a railway train. Evolutionists discovered that neither intellect nor life is something extrinsic. It is only the *changed* condition of the parent stuff. Evolutionism is an effort to explain why and how this change has come about.

575. It must be remembered that each of the three spheres we have hinted at above have within them myriads of sub-spheres. There is not one non-living thing, nor one organism, nor one man. There are individuals, species and genera—a mass of pluralities,

each demanding an explanation of their existences from a scientist or a philosopher. Old theologies also admitted evolution to a certain extent. They did not deny it altogether. For instance, Christians believed that the first parent of all living races of man was Adam. Racial distinctions are obvious. How did these distinctions arise ? How did all men become different when they had the same root ? There must have been some such causes as have been extended further by evolutionists. The Christian philosopher-theologians would maintain that the history of man from Adam upto the latest thinker of today as given in the Bible and other books, is an account of these changes. It explains how not only the *physical* man of today has sprung from the *physical* Adam, but *mental*, *moral* and *spiritual* man of today has also sprung from mental, moral and spiritual Adam. How ? Adam rebelled. The vice descended down in the form of antagonism between Abel and Cain. The vice again descended into several forms and bifurcation continued, till we came to the present mutually fighting races and individuals. Religion is an effort to check this disunifying or rebelling process and emphasizing unifying element. What was the ultimate nature of this sin has not been explained. But the descent of sin has been fully described. It involves certain processes. Evolutionists say that the same processes can be traced back aud back from sociosphere to biosphere and from biosphere to cosmosphere, till we come to a certain point beyond which we could not go as yet. So the difference between an evolutionist and a non-evolutionist is of degrees aud extent and not of nature.

576. The history of biology is the history of this tracing back and linking the newer generations with the older ones. For instance William Harvey (1578-1657)

examining the circulation of blood demonstrated that some activities of the living body may be in some measure described in terms of mechanics. He held that in the apparently simple germ, from which an animal, such as a chick, is developed, "no part of the future organism exists *defacto*, but all parts inhere *inpotentia*".

577. Lavoisier (1743-1754) rendered a great-service to biology by his recognition of the oxidation process that all living involves. "He saw that the burning candle and the panting mouse were both illustrating combustion". This was the discovery of kinship between the mouse and the candle.

578. Then was discovered the process of *photo-synthesis*—the most important vital process in the world—by which green plants use part of the energy of sun-shine to build up nutritive carbon-compounds from carbon dioxide and water.

579. Liebig (1803-73) showed how the elements, *e. g.*, carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, iron, *pass from one chemical linkage to another in endless cycles*.

580. In 1838-39 Schwann and Schleiden formulated the *cell-theory* with its three propositions :—(1) all organisms have a cellular structure, being either single-celled (the protozoa or simplest animals and the protophytes or simplest plants) or multi-cellular (the metazoa and the metaphytes), (2) every multi-cellular organism begins as a fertilized egg-sell which develops into an embryo and young creature by *continued division and differentiation of cells*, (3) the life of the multi-cellular organism is the *regulated and unified sum of the lives of the component cells*.

581. Later on, the biologists discovered that *all organisms have protoplasm in common, specific though it is for each particular type.* All living creatures are built up of similar material, and yet it has an *individuality for each definite kind.*

582. This shows that while all creatures come of similar material, their individuality has to be accounted for. Biological investigations have established one thing, *i. e., kinship.* The distinctive features remain to be explained.

583. Perhaps there might be a suggestion that some super-material entity was responsible for this distinction. But this was summarily rejected, because Wohler in 1828 succeeded in building up chemically urea, thus breaking down the blockading wall between what goes on in non-living nature, and what goes on in the living body. But that would not help further. Psycho-biosis or the mental aspect of life had to be recognized. Lamarck had a vivid appreciation of the share that an *insurgent, wilful,* struggling organism, full of need or 'besoin' may have in its own evolution. Charles Darwin and Russel Wallace propounded the theory of natural selection and "discerned the scope and subtlety of the *unconscious sifting* that is involved in the struggle for existence."

584. Lloyd Morgan's (1852-1936) study of Animal Behaviour has led him to recognise the role of "*mind*" as a *vera causa* in organic evolution and in unending Drama of Life from day to day. His theory is known as *Emergent Evolution.* It means that the features of the emergent cannot be anticipated from the stage out of which it appears and that before its appearance no operative causes can be seen which

could bring it into being. It is an insoluble knot in the old theory. Why this emergent emerges has to be explained.

585. The great difference between the theological view and evolutionist scientific view is that first of all there is no linkage between Adam and his non-human predecessors. Even after Adam, it is Adam's *sin* that is responsible for the continuance of his race, struggling in various forms and through various channels. We are all *literal descendants* (descending ones or falling ones) of Adam, not rising in ascending scales but falling down in descending order. Evolutionists have established a linkage between a dew-drop and an eminently wise man, say, Darwin, each succeeding generation rising higher and higher, thus proving us to be ascendants of all that have had their existence between the primeval amoeba and ourselves. With evolutionists it is not sin, but an inexorable law of Nature which is responsible for the existence of the three spheres we have mentioned above. Julian Huxley in his book "Evolution", has put the whole thing in an easily understandable form. Darwin based his theory of natural selection on three observable facts and two deductions from them. The first fact is—tendency of all organisms to increase in a geometrical ratio..................offspring in the early stages of their existence are always more numerous than their parents; this holds good whether reproduction is sexual or asexual, by fission or budding, by means of seeds, spores or eggs. The second fact is that the numbers of a given species actually remain more or less constant. From these two facts Darwin deduces "*struggle for existence, rather for survival*". The third fact is *variation*. All organisms vary appreciably. From the first deduction (*i. e.*, struggle for existence) and the third fact

(*i. e.*, variation) Darwin makes the second deduction, *i. e.*, Natural Selection. That is, a higher proportion of individuals *with favourable variations*, will on the average survive; a higher proportion of those with *unfavourable variations* will die or fail to reproduce themselves. Since a great deal of variation is *transmitted by heredity*, these effects of differential survival will in large measure accumulate from generation to generation. Thus natural selection will act constantly to improve and to maintain the adjustment of animals and plants to their surroundings and their way of life.*

586. Svami Dayananda's philosophy which has for its basis ancient Indian thought does not deny either the three observations made by Darwin or the two deductions which he derived from them. Svami Dayananda was not a scientist, by which I mean that he neither collected science-data, nor examined them in any laboratory. Natural selection is a dignified name for struggle for existence or survival. The struggle lies in selection, rejecting the unfavourable and letting live the favourable. Natural selection is a struggle. All selection implies struggle, an effort to choose out of two or more things. There will be no struggle, if there is nothing to reject or no will to reject. Thus all selection is cognitive plus conative, the *cognitive* element being predominant. And all struggle is also cognitive plus conative, the *conative* element being predominant. The predomination is not in the thing, but in the description. According to ancient Vedic cosmogony nothing is created by fiat, everything evolves gradually; finer things gradually developing into grosser ones, till we come to the material world

* Extracts from p. 14 of "Evolution" by Julian Huxley.

we are in. The most primeval substance, whatever its name or nature, *did not spring from nothing*. Nor it abruptly assumed a particular shape. Everything moved on, bit by bit. This we have amply shown in the foregoing chapters from Svami Dayananda's writings. In this upward march from the root to the branches and leaves, there was constant sifting, accepting one thing and rejecting another. Darwin is right so far.

587. But then there are certain assumptions which create difficulties. For instance, Darwin assumed that the bulk of variations were inheritable while any which were not inheritable *were irrelevant*. In his "*Origin of Species*" (6th ed. one vol. ed. p. 9) he says "...........any variation which is not inherited is unimportant for us. But the number and diversity of inheritable deviations of structure, both those of slight and those of considerable physiological importance, are endless. No breeder doubts how strong is the tendency to inheritance: that like produces like is his fundamental belief."*

588. The difficulty does not lie in the inheritable variations, but in the rejection of un-inheritable portions. Any explanation which leaves them *as irrelevant* will be inadequate and may be misleading too. In nature there is no waste. What is not used in the formation of one thing is used in the formation of another thing. Mendel perhaps means this when he says that recombination of existing genetic units may both produce and modify new inheritable variations.

589. Against the doctrine of natural selection,

* Julian Huxley on p. 15 of "Evolution".

it is often said that a great deal of mortality found in nature is accidental and non-selective. Julian Huxley has remarked on this that "the very fact that it is accidental and non-selective ensures that the residue shall be a *random sample* and will therefore contain any variation of selective value, in the same proportion as the whole population."

590. But *random* is a word which hardly justifies the position. What is called 'accidental' and 'non-selective' may not be found entitled to such damaging epithets, when viewed at more broadly. Scraps of bread thrown to dogs are neither accidental nor non-selective. The dogs are, of course, invisible and therefore un-cognized in the laboratory of the evolutionists. In his book 'the Ascent of Man' Henry Drummond rightly remarked :—

"The whole mistake of naturalism has been to interpret nature from the stand-point of the atom, to study the machinary which drives the great moving world simply as machinery, forgetting that the ship has any passengers, or the passengers any captain, or the captain any course. It is as great a mistake, on the other hand, for the theologian to separate off the ship from the passengers as for the naturalist to separate off the passengers from the ship."*

591. In fact, scientists, (biologists, and psychologists including) have entertained such a woeful chagrin for super-physical entities that their researches have not gone as far as they should have gone and the stumbling blocks which this omission involved had to be dealt with with short cuts or makeshifts. Efforts made to reduce psychology and biology to

* Page 12.

pure chemistry have failed. Psychology is still a science of 'psyche' or soul and biology still a science of 'bio' or life. Here comes in the question of Transmigration of soul. Svami Dayananda's doctrine of Transmigration, if duly honoured and understood by biologists and scientists will go a long way to explain the knotty points which biological theories give rise to.

592. Svami Dayananda holds :—

(1) That all the laws of nature which science claims to investigate work in the way they work under the governance of the Supreme Intelligent Being (God).

(2) That all the work that we see in nature is for the benefit of souls, (*i. e.*, fulfilling the needs) which are lower intelligent entities.

(8) That the souls are not will-less and freedom-less inert entities. Natural phenomena help them in their actions without depriving them of their freedom.

593. These three postulates explain all the diversities and observations which create difficulties in the way of scientific investigators and theorisers. Scientists have tried to eliminate (or at least ignore) these two important factors, Supreme Intelligent Being and lower souls, and the result is that theories established to-day have to be abandoned tomorrow. For instance the activities of living creatures cannot be fully understood unless we recognize the marvellous power that bacteria or enzymes exercise in accelerating chemical changes. Pasteur's discovery of these non-chemical or super-chemical factors was simply the discovery of petty souls working within their own spheres. They play as great a role in the economy of nature as

petty labourers or domestic animals in the society of man. They do something and something is being done for them. The great mistake of theologians has been to confine the idea of 'soul' to man only and to treat all else as soul-less and non-living. The doctrine of Transmigration holds that the souls, by themselves, being alike, have individual needs and individual tendencies and numerous species are only different material bodies in which they satisfy their wants and make further progress. This doctrine does not contradict, but supplements the labours and findings of scientists and puts their discoveries and inventions on a sounder philosophical basis. Biology, for instance, helps man to grow "two blades of grass where only one grew before. And all flesh, however carnivorous, is in the long run grass. Biologists have discovered the secret of the success of leguminous plants, that they have partner-bacteria in their root-tubercles which are *somehow able to capture* the free nitrogen in the soil air or soil water. These friendly symbolic microbes add to the plant's nutritive reserves of nitrogenous carbon-compounds, and if the crop is systematically dug in or ploughed in, then poor soil will become good soil, and there will be more food for man and beast".*

594. It is analogous to saying that if a man or a class of men wants, for their interest, to turn an arid land into a flourishing garden, they should invite friendly agriculturists to settle there. These agriculturists will satisfy their wants as well as the wants of their masters. They are all men, though of different status, different wants and different tendencies. Systematic digging in or ploughing in means nothing more

* An Outline of Modern Knowledge p. 217.

than creating conditions in which the bacteria may be transmigrated from one place to another. And what are these bacteria ? Living creatures in living bodies. They are not mere physical things.

595. You may perhaps ask, "What about unfriendly germs ?" The answer is simple. It has been recognized "that some very important diseases, such as malaria and sleeping sickness were caused not by Bacteria, which are generally regarded as of the nature of single-celled *Plants*, but by Protozoa, that is to say, by intruding microscopic *animals* which destroy or poison the living cells of the body."* Thus these animals are just like a portion of a population which has antagonistic interest. They are souls with a different species of bodies.

596. Just as there are enemies, so there are friends. Honey-making bees are a typical example. They provide man a delightful food at a minimum cost.

597. Biological researches open for us a panorama of Animate Nature or activities of souls, "life-histories, linkages, endeavours, subtleties, comedies, tragedies, anticipations." "Sojourning with living creatures in Nature brings home to us the deep impressions of growing, multiplying and developing, of varying, inheriting and sifting. These form indispensable parts of a well educated man's mental furnishing and they can not be replaced by anythtng else. The fact is that life-lore is essential if our life is not to be impoverished."†

* Ibid p. 219.

† Ibid p. 223.

What is this life-lore, if not the soul-lore? and what these living creatures, if not souls in different bodies? The analogy holds good. "The biologist is always seeing the three sides of his prism:—Organism, Function and Environment; the Living Being, its Doings, and its Surroundings. These obviously correspond to the three chief concepts or coordinates of the sociologist:—Folk, Work, and Place."*

598. This life-lore has also another significant side, ethical side:—

'It is easy to make too much of the cruder forms of the struggle for existence, of Nature red in tooth and claw, with rapine, of the Hobbesian warfare—each for himself and extinction take the hindmost; but *more accurate Biology* discloses not only the large proportion of time and energy involved in parental care and mutual aid among kindred, but the *great rewards that have gone to those animals* that show other-regarding endeavours and what amounts to self-subordination. In the success of birds and mammals we see what has been called 'a materialised ethical process;' for such activities as are illustrated by the long-tailed tit's gathering of 2,379 feathers to quilt its nest, or by the prolonged nurture, protection and education which the mother otter gives her cubs, have survival value just as much as those which are seen when the golden eagle lifts the grouse, or the tiger launches itself on the young deer. There was a genuine insight in giving to the higher class of animals to which man is affiliated, the name of mammals, so obviously suggestive of mothering."†

599. This all suggests, rather proves, that the ani-

* Ibid p. 223.
† Ibid p. 224.

mals possess, besides their physical bodies, something akin to man, which is congnitive and conative as well as ethical. "There is an evolution of ethics, but there is also an ethics of evolution." "No doubt, there are seamy sides in Animate Nature, such as parasitism; and lurid warnings, such as may be seen without a microscope in the servile state of ants and bees, and with one, if we inquire into the fatigue-degeneration of the brain of the short-lived worker-bee ; yet on the whole, it must be allowed that Animate Nature is condemnatory of the unlit lamp, and the ungirt loin. There are some difficult cases, but Animate Nature is almost always for health, unless man interferes with the conditions of life, as in domestication and cultivation. It is easy enough for any one so inclined to travesty our thesis, and to say that the very best to be found in Animate Nature is a pageant of lusty animals ; but that is not accurate. *The higher creatures are psycho-biological beings, as we ourselves are* ; and proud man has much to learn from the courting of birds. Moreover every one who has reflected knows that our degree of healthfulness from day to day is often a subtle and rigorous criterion of our morals ; and Animate Nature is almost all for health".*

600. Beautiful ! But behind all this, there is one thing which has not received due respect. We are told of 'survival' and 'survival values'. But it has not been explained as to what it is whose 'survival' is hinted at. Survival there is and what is the value of evolutionism if no survival is discovered. Evolution means survival which in simple english would be outliving certain conditions which have to be struggled through. But there must be some thing definite, some-

* Ibid p. 225.

thing permanent which survives.

601. Let us take a concrete example. There is Mr. X, an upto-date specimen of humanity—highly evolved, physically, mentally and morally. What is that which has survived in him and through what struggles? Is it not worth while to trace his history backward? Evolutionists have so far been doing the same. In discovering the old linkages, they have explored old fossils and dived deep into the obscurest abysses of the past with all the stretch of imagination at their command. This Mr. X of today is the result of all the evolutionary processes through which the surviving element has worked up. What is this element? What does survive? Is it as mere idea in the sense of subjective idealists? Or a *pattern* of the type of Plato's ideas? Or some substances, concrete and permanent? It is obvious that Mr. X is a descendant or ascendant of his parents. The history of immediate past is spermatozoa which originated in his father's body. Nothing further is traceable in biology. The tendencies which later on exhibited themselves in the life of Mr. X can all be traced to that spermatozoa in potential form. But is it definitely certain that the spermatozoa *contains nothing* which is *not traceable* to the parent body? Lloyd Morgan's discovery of 'emergent evolution' makes us highly sceptic.

602. Then, again, there is one more point. Can mental peculiarities be retained for a considerable time and conveyed further by inert matter through chemical processes only? Let me clear my point. Is it possible for insentient matter to hold or transmit sentient tendencies without the instrumentality of some sentient substance? You can say that the thoughts of ancient people have come down to us through sheets

of books which are no more than dead, lifeless and insentient matter devoid of any thinking whatsoever. And we convey our thoughts to distant places through telephone which is nothing but lifeless waves of aether etc. But in these cases too the real deliverer, the conveyer, the holder and the receiver are all sentient beings connected with each other by sentience, insentient matter playing only the role of an instrument. Mere sheets of paper or mere waves of aether are meaningless. The meaning comes from something super-material. Therefore for those sentient potentialities which the spermatozoa contains and which are not traceable in the body of the parent or parents, we shall have to postulate something super-physical.

603. Earlier biologists and evolutionists had a long sustained prejudice against such postulations. We shall not enter into that controversy. But later evolutionists have changed at least the trend of thought.

604. Herbert Spencer, for instance, "tried to reduce all phenomena, those of the physical world as well as those of life and society to one underlying principle,——————that of the 'persistence of force.' ....'Vital force', 'mental force' and 'social force' were to Spencer, manifestations of the universal force, all being in their last source due to physical force, and being proportionate to the amount of physical force that is transformed into them."*

605. Professor William James sees neither consistency nor clearness in such an assumption. "What on earth is 'social force' ? exclaims Professor

* Herbert's First Principles of Evolution, p. 314-315.

James, "Sometimes Spencer identifies it with 'social activities' (showing the latter to be proportional to the amount of food eaten), sometimes with the work done by human beings and their steam engines, and shows it to be due ultimately to the sun's heat. It would never occur to the reader of his pages that a social force proper might be anything that acted as a stimulus of social change—a leader, for example, a discovery, a book, a new idea or a national insult; and the greatest of *forces of this kind need embody no more 'physical force'* than the smallest. The measure of greatness here is the effect produced on the environment, not a quantity antecedently absorbed from physical nature."*

Professor Henri Bergson has gone still further. He characterizes this as 'false evolution'. He "sees in life a phenomenon *sui generis*, which cannot be accounted for by mechanical causes...........Life is, according to this view, not a series of successive states, but a single flux, an indivisible continuity——duration itself."†

606. I call it only a change in the trend. It only demonstrates the negative importance of the doctrine of 'soul'. 'An indivisible continuity' of a 'single flux' has much in common with the uncreate and immortal soul with its constant migrations (Transmigrations) from one body into another. But Bergson's '*elan vital*' fails to explain the duality underlying the natural selection and the struggle for existence. If by natural selection is meant 'selection by nature' and there is nothing but nature, then who will struggle against whom and why ? There should be some

* Ibid p. 315.
† Ibid p. 316.

element which does not submit submissively. If a carpenter is the sole artisan in his factory and chooses one wood and rejects another, there will be no struggle at all. But if the same carpenter holds a school of carpentry and trains subordinate intellects to do the same work, the struggle will naturally arise. There will be constant errors and corrections. In nature we find the same. Different species of living beings are different stages at which the Drama of committing errors and correcting them is being played. They are the *yonis* (योनि) or lives of that living substance called soul which though in constant flux, due to intrinsic limitations is always the same (*nitya* or eternal). This soul receives impressions from the surroundings and retains them in order to build up future organisms or bodies which may suit future surroundings.

607. Clifford has aptly remarked that "it is the peculiarity of living things not merely that they change under the influenee of surrounding circumstances but that any change that takes place in them is not lost, but retained, and, as it were built into the organism to serve as the foundation for future actions."*

608. The most regrettable omission which one finds in one's biological studies is a due regard to death. No researches in '*light*' are complete without appreciating the phenomenon of '*darkness*'. Similarly no researches in biology or life-science are satisfactory without going into the nature of '*death*'. Death is not merely *absence of life*, as darkness is of light. It is much more. The worst that can be said of it is that it is *cessation of life*, though truly speaking it is a turning point in the endless journey of life and there-

* An Outline of Modern Knowledge p. 225.

fore an adequate regard for death is essential. We find that biologists and evolutionists admit the continuity of life; they admit that the present is the father of the future just as it is the child of the past. But, then, however hidden from our sight, this future casts its shadows on the present and all the deductions we make from our observations should be coloured by these shadows. To speak concretely, biologist-scientists begin from the amoeba. This amoeba is the first speck of life. It has the potentialities to evolve. It evolves and through very long processes evolves into different kinds of organic life including the topmost of them, man. Suppose there is a great scientist with all the qualifications of head and heart which a man can possess. He is also a result of evolutionary processes. All the laws of natural selection, struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest have so successfully functioned that the achievements is this man. Now this man dies childless, like Herbert Spencer or hundreds of men, past or present. Why does he die and what does he leave behind? Or suppose after begetting and bringing up a few children, a man survives long long years and dies. This period was not without its evolutionary achievements. What was the future of these achievements if nothing survived death and death meant only a dissolution of the material vehicle ? After all this abundance of beautiful life-phenomena, if the result is dissolution or annihilation, or even absolute cessation of life, is not science and all that science unfolds a mere humbug ? If the tiny amoeba can possess the potentialities of unfolding a big scientist out of itself, does this acme of perfection mean only a step this side cessation of life ? The biologist-scientist can say that he is only a scientist and that pre-amoeba conditions or post-death conditions are not within his jurisdiction, as they can not be observed or experi-

mented upon in the laboratory and that speculation is unscientific. But it is a wrong plea. We have seen above that biologists* had to postulate 'life' as something super-material in the interest of biology itself. If it is so, then it should not terminate with the dissolution of the body. If it survives, the question is 'in what form ?' If a biologist-scientist can afford to lose sight of it, a biologist-philosopher cannot.

609. It may, perhaps, be said that a scientist or a philosopher who dies childless leaves behind him a store of knowledge for his race which may help in the furtherance of future evolution. It may also be said that nature as a whole should be taken into consideration and not individualities. But it is an argument in circle. What is nature ? and what its achievements ?

610. Then again, the law of heredity as universally acknowledged by evolutionists, proves that life is *transmitted* from the parent to the progeny. "The continuity of the germ-plasm means that when a fertilized egg is developing into an embryo, part of the germinal material is not used in body-making but remains apart to form the beginning of the reproductive organs of the offspring."†

611. This is the material description of heredity. Body begets body. What about life ? The child is a

*E.g. Alfred Russell Wallace, Bergson.

Cp. also. "The Vitalists of the eighteenth century, as the neo-vitalists of our present times (Sir Oliver Lodge, Hans Driesch etc.) maintain that while life is bound up with matter, there is a *special vital principle*, which being super-added to and animating the physical frame makes life possible."

(The First Principles of Evolution by Herbert p. 44.)

† An Outline of Modern Knowledge, p. 212.

living thing, so is his parent. Life in the parent is super-material. Life in the child is also super-material. The body is divisible. Its divisibility has made it possible to beget another body. But the life or purely living element in the parent is not so divisible and can not beget another life. The parent life-element is not transmitted to the body of the child as the parent is still living and fully living. How to account for the living nature of the child ? Then again, all the characteristics (physical or mental) are not inherited by the child; as is evidenced by Emergent Evolution. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to infer that the soul of the child which is being transmitted by the parent body has come there from somewhere else and has had its past. If I am pushed from one compartment of the train into another by some established processes and if I possess some characteristics not traceable in those environments, it is natural to conclude that I have a past history and I have come there from somewhere else. It is a matter of common knowledge that most children are born with qualities quite foreign to their parents or grand-parents and not traceable to environments or education. The only reasonable conclusion is that they must have been acquired by the soul in its past life somewhere. The protoplasm which is the vehicle of this soul may have originated and might be a part and parcel of the parent's body. But the new living being must have come from elsewhere by some un-known process.

612. It has been suggested by Lord Kelvin and also by Helmholtz that life may have come to our earth from other cosmic bodies.* This hypothesis has, of course, not found favour with other scientists. But

* The First Principles of Evolution, by Herbert p. 47.

one thing is clear. 'Life' is such a complex phenomenon, that scientists find it difficult to make a definite opinion about this. Herbert admits that 'the possibility of such an occurrence cannot be totally denied.' Similary it is not impossible that life might have come to a germ-plasm from another body. When a man or an animal dies, what becomes of this life-principle ? Can it co-terminate with the body ? How can it ? It is something super-material. It has left the body. It must go somewhere. With what process ? With any process, not quite clear to us. But we are compelled to posit some such thing. Nobody wants to die out and be extinct, much less the most developed and highly evolved man. To believe that such a man would die unmourned and unsung without any remorse on his part or on the part of natural forces which so assiduously bred and brought him up would be highly unpsychological and regrettably unscientific. Those who refuse to think except on absolutely materialistic lines on the ground of their researches, discoveries and inventions, forget that however praiseworthy their data-collecting labours may be, their conclusions are not what their premises should logically lead to. For instance, "since 1827, when Wohler synthesized urea in his laboratory in Giessen, confidence had increased that the special processes of physiology can be understood as extensions of chemical law. Grape sugar, oxalic acid, indigo, and other organic products can be manufactured." True. But does it point to materialism ? In looking at the synthetic process we have totally onerlooked the synthesizer, the main factor, Wohler, his long training, his intellectual capacity, his wisdom to analyse, select, recombine and synthesize. Had we given a due credit to Wohler and his intelligence, we should have realized that even behind chemical laws, there is a mighty

intelligence, whose wisdom, lesser intellects than his could not detect and discern. In comparison with the stupendous workings of that intelligence our inventions only pale into insignificance. The scientist is quite justified in his pride that he could discover so much and with the help of his discoveries, invent so much. But his pride degenerates into reprehensible vanity when he thinks that he has succeeded in demolishing the wall between life and no-life. Why should scientists allow science to throw scientists into back-ground? If so much intelligence is required to *discover* a thing, how much more should it not, to *originate* it? The very fact that there are certain substances which can be produced only in *organisms* or can be produced outside organic bodies, *with special care and special labour*, goes a long way to prove that the organisms have a very important factor called life, and whose functions *can be substituted by living beings of highly developed nature only*.

613. That was by the way. The main point is that behind the germ-plasm, there is the real living being, the soul, spirit or psyche (in Sanskrata *jiva*) which originates, controls and furthers the triad function of the germ-plasm called by evolutionists as mutation, recombination and selection and without which neither the working, nor the purpose of those functions can be accounted for. This soul did not originate in the parent's body. It simply found a home, a nucleus for further journey. It came from elsewhere and its residence in the parent's body was a mere sojourn purposely made to get a supply of some necessary provision.

614. The Vedic philosophy as re-oriented by Svami Dayananda propounded that a living animal has

three bodies. One *sthula sharira* or *gross-body* which is externally visible and is subjected to anatomical analysis or microscopic observations. This is the main field in which anatomists, physiologists and biologists work. But the very behaviour of this body including neurosis betrays symptoms which point to another finer and invisible body called *Sukshma sharira* or astral body, "the *subtle body* consisting of five breaths, five senses (not sense-organs), five fine elements, mind (not brain) and intellect (seventeen factors). The subtle body remains with the soul even at birth and death. (This means that the subtle body does not die with the death of the gross body). This subtle body is of two kinds, one physical, made of five fine elements, second natural, *i, e.*, consisting of soul's own nature. The second non-physical body remains with the soul even in emancipation and it is with this body that the soul enjoys the bliss of the beatitude. Third the *Karana Sharira* or *Root-body* in which takes place the sound sleep. This being the essence of materia-radica is all pervasive and common to all souls." ...."It should be very clearly recognized that the soul is distinct from all conditions and all envelopes. When death takes place, all say, 'the soul has gone out.' Now this very soul is the energiser, sustainer, seer, doer and enjoyer."*

615. The scientists may say that it is all too foreign for sciencc, quite beyond the scope of science and even of psychology. But there are a few very common phenomena, *e. g.*, dream, deep sleep, memory and death which cannot be adequately explained except with these postulates. Neurosis, biosis and psychosis are so inter-connected with each other

*** Light of Truth, IX, 35-37.**

especially in every day life that it is difficult to distinguish one from another and extricate them from out of the tangle. But they force their recognition on our thinking. We cannot afford to lose sight of them. The history of the scientific progress of the last two centuries in which materialism is notoriously predominant is full of believing and disbelieving cross-currents, simply because of the studious avoidance by scientists of any thing super-material.

616. Now this subtle-body can help the evolutionists also in solving many knotty points. Our experiences which we get through our gross body filter down and are deposited in this subtle body. Real mutation takes place there. It is in the mental cauldron that the experience-material is, so to speak, cooked and made psychically digestible. Conceptual confection of percepts takes place in the subtle body. Actions done by the bodily organs and apparently finished then and there are preserved in the form of habits in the subtle body. And here it is that deep rooted habits are distilled down to instincts also. Evolutionists have taken great pains in collecting data from the animal world and investigating the causes of instincts found among various animals. For instance, the bee constructs its hives with a dexterity hardly reached by well-trained engineers. Many arboreal songsters sing with mysterious enchantment. These are all instincts and have been reported as different from actions done by men with conscious deliberations. Sometimes they are traced back to the environments of their ancestors and held as inherited. But how can dead matter inherit habit and instincts ? 'Heredity' is a term which more belongs to bio-sphere and psycho-sphere than to purely physico-sphere. The phenomena of heredity can be better explained if psycho-factors

are included and emphasized while making investigations. In the words of Ernest Haeckel life is a 'riddle' and its riddleness has been heightened by not what scientists have done, but by what they have not done. Their labours are marvellous. They can help immensely in unravelling many mysterious points, if they give up the stubbornness to refuse the consideration of some very reasonable psychic hypotheses.

617. Why should we hypothesize 'subtle' or 'causal' bodies? What are the proofs for their existence? The answer is simple. The grosser bodies fail to explain the phenomena of memory and dreams. They fail to account for the formation of instincts in man or in lower animals. They point to something deeper. Any action that we do perishes as soon as it is complete. But it leaves its impression on our bodily organs as well as on our minds. For example, when, for the first time, we began to write we took up our pen and put something on the paper or the slate, that action was over. When we repeated similar action again and again, our hand as well as our mind began to move in a particular manner. When our practice increased, it produced a habit and we could write with amazing swiftness. How did this habit grow? By constant practice? Thus we made the habit. We could have made another habit quite different from this habit. Habits are rarefied forms of activities. When these habits are very very old, they go to form instincts. When we first did an action, we did it at some pain. We had to make efforts. When a thing became a habit, it could be done easily, though with some sort of intention or consciousness. When the habits beeame permanent, they gave rise to instincts. A thing done instinctively needs no efforts. Upto the stage of habits we made some calculations. When the

stage of instincts is reached, the question of calculation disappears. We do it automatically. Why? Because our causal body has been so moulded by our actions that the outer bodies have to obey its behests. It is not difficult to see that our instincts do not belong to grosser bodies. They find their expression through them."*

618. Can you find out whether I can write swiftly or slowly by dissecting my body or even my brain? Can you discern the instincts of a bee, a butter-fly or a tiger by examining their grosser bodies? If not, then, you must hypothesize the existence of some *finer* bodies where these instincts reside and undergo the processes of mutation or modification.

619. "It is for the philosopher to help the biologist to ask aright the question of the relation between 'Body' and 'Mind' ", "while, 'it is for the biologist to keep to the facts of the case and to make it clear that the organism is very often almost entirely physiological, with just traces of the psychological, while at other times it is *conspicuously psychological* with an under current of the physiological."†

620. Why so? Because what you call 'physiological' deals with the gross-body and what you call 'psychological' belongs to the subtle body. There are cases where even "this under-current of the physiological" is also absent, as in the case of *deep sleep* where there are neither bodily actions, nor desires or deliberations, but something very subtle, which tells us when we are awakened that we *slept a happy sleep*. This

* "Life after Death", by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya pp : 57-58.
† An Outline of Modern Knowledge p. 236.

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apparently trifling feeling of "having slept a happy sleep" has played a very prominent part in the hypothesizing of *the causal body.* Sound sleep is not the absence or suspension of the conditions of our grosser body. It is a very deep feeling of happiness which is a speciality of sound-sleep and which cannot be accounted for if there is nothing except and beyond gross bodies.

621. To revert to the question of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls. It is easily intelligible if we understand the workings of the subtle and causal bodies. Just as germ-plasms are transferable from the parents' bedies to the bodies of the offspring, or to speak more accurately they leave the parent's bodies to make nucleii for the bodies of the offspring, similarly finer bodies can leave the parents' bodies and seek newer situations to make newer bodies. For an ordinary man it is difficult to understand how what was an ape could become a man through a course of lengthy evolutionary processes, because these processes are not a part of his direct experiences and can only be inferred by highly complicated biological calculations. Almost similarly for an evolutionist it is difficult to understand how a subtle body of a man can become the starting point of a dog's or a tiger's body and vice versa because the inner workings of the soul are not examinable in biological laboratories. You cannot say that all the findings of the evolutionists are purely the results of their actual experiments. There is a good deal of them which is speculative. We quote below an extract from Prof. Sir J. A. Thomson's essay on "Biology and Human Progress" :—

622. (1) "One of the central problems of Biology is the origin of the new, it is by the sifting of the newnesses or variations that the ascent

of life has come about. In other words variations and mutations supply the raw material of evolution; and this has been for the most part *progressive or integrative*, though from time to time in diverse types, *retrogressive and degenerative* as in the familiar case of parasites."

623. (2) "One of the things we are tired of hearing is that Darwinism *accounts for the survival, not for the arrival of the fit;* but Darwin was quite clear that Nature's sifting or Natural Selection operates on the novelties or variations that are *submitted to it*, and these are of very frequence occurrence in nature. Natural Selection prunes the new shoots on the *arbor vitae*, but neither Darwin nor any careful biologist ever supposed that the pruning-hooks accounted for the tree or for its new shoots. Darwin began the scientific study of variations in regard to which he said, with usual frankness, that *our ignorance is immense.* We may say the same today, yet considerable progress has been made."

624. (3) "To Weismann in particular, we owe the clearing up of the idea, obscure to Darwin, that variations have *a germinal origin.* The newnesses may not find visible expression until embryonic life is over, or even until adult life begins, but the originative change is to be looked for in some permutation and combination within *the complex germplasm of the egg-cells and sperm-cells*—either in their making, or in their maturing, or in their union at fertilisation."

625. "(4) If we compare the hereditary initiatives, techieally called "factors", "genes", or 'determinants', to the cards of a pack, many opportunities for shuffling are afforded by the intricate manoeuvres of the nuclear rods or chromosomes in which the genes are located in each germ-cell."

626. "(5) Very important, for instance, is the reduction-division or me-iosis which occurs at the ripening or maturation of the egg-cell and of the sperm-cell; for in this peculiar mode of cell-division the number of chromosomes is reduced by a half, the normal number being restored when a 'reduced' egg-cell, and *a reduced sperm-cell* unite in fertilisation—which may be defined as the intimate and orderly union—which is the beginning of each new individual organism, if reproduced in the ordinary way. In the halving of the number of the chromosomes in maturation, and in the restoring of the normal numbers in fertilisation, there are opportunities for novel permutations and combinations—in other words for *the origin of the new.*"*

627. We have divided the paragraph into parts in order to draw the attention of the reader to each item. Biological investigations begin at a particular stage which cannot be called the very start of existence. It is just like catching the train at an intermediate station and describing the journey, ignoring a long journey which has passed behind. There is a marked

* An Outline of Modern Knowledge pp. 237-238.

difference between the *survival* and the *arrival*. The newnesses or variations cannot be adequately explained without taking a note of arrivals. A thing survives when it clings to a system, combating all the forces which try to kill it. When new arrivals take place, it means that they were not in the system, but some where else and their history cannot be traced in that very system, but has to be referred to some other system. Weismann may be right when he says that variations have a *germinal origin*, but has the germ no past history? Did it not arise from some finer form which possessed variation-potentialities? Just as small seeds blown away by wind can germinate in distantly placed soils and give rise to new plants, similarly "subtle bodies" or "causal bodies" can leave the older homes and by some natural process, mysterious to us, find a new home in the body of other parents; even of different species. Mind that the subtle body is neither a tiger, nor a man, neither a rat nor a bee. These species will be specified later on after the stage of embryonic development. They do have certain potentialities, which need favourable surroundings for actualization. But those potentialities did not necessarily originate in the body in which they have now been placed to develop. They can as reasonably be supposed to have originated elsewhere and to have been transplanted here. Natural Selection, according to this hypothesis, is not only a pruning hook; it is a transplanting agency as well.

628. *But*, pray, *what is Natural Selection*? Selection there is. It is evident. But who selects and why? If 'nature' is a sum total of all the countless events, past, present, or future, then selections referred to here are a part of nature and we have to account for them. In books on evolution, the nature of selection has been

described, but neither the meaning of *nature* has been made clear, nor the 'who' and 'why' of selection has been investigated. "The term Natural Selection," says Julian Huxley," is thus seen to have two rather different meanings. In a broad sense it covers all cases of differential surrival, but from the evolutionary point of view, it covers only the differential transmission of inheritable variations",* Then again according to Mendelian analysis, "recombination of ex sting genetic units may both produce and modify new inheritable variations,"†

629. This is all descriptive and not at all morphological. Admitted that there are inheritable variations. Admitted that they are differentially transmitted. But is there any super-natural agency which selects and decides as to which variations are inheritable and which not and what purpose would they serve? When we hint at 'intelligence' and 'purpose', and therefore intelligent and purposive entities, we incur the displeasure or at least a concealed contempt of the scientists. "There still exist," says Julian Huxley, "those, who even while rejecting the view of Paley and his school that adaptation is a proof of *divine design*, continue to approach evolution in a rather reverential attitude and to attach some sort of *moral flavour* to natural selection. They should be reminded of adaptations such as those by which the ant-parasite *Lomechusa* obtains its food, or the orchid *Cryptostilis* ensures its reproduction."‡ *Lomechusa* produces a substance which the ants so dote npon that they not only feed the adult beetle in return, but allow its

* Evolution, p. 16.
† Ibid p. 16.
‡ Ibid p. 467.

grub to devour their own larvae—a sacrifice to a gin-producing moloch (Wheeler 1910); *Cryptostilis* practises an *ingenious variety* of prostitution, by resembling the females of a fly both in form and in odour, it induces the males to attempt copulation with its flowers, thus securing its own pollination (Coleman 1927)".*

630. Here Julian Huxley has given two illustrations of *cheating* and *prostitution* found among lowest types of life which militate against *divine design* and *moral flavour*. Specimens of this type of moral aberrations can be collected from human individuals also, though by no means characteristic of the whole human race. But ingenuity (cleverness) and purpose both are discernible, and are a proof that there is a struggle between *Lomechusa*, and *ants* in the first case, and between *cryptostilis* and male flies in the second case, just as human cheats and their victims illustrate. The cheats and the victims both come under nature. If 'nature' is one intelligent being, moral and intelligent both, like God, such things should not occur. If nature is blind, without intelligence and purpose, there is no room left for science and its wondrous findings. But if there are lower souls, intelligent and purposive, but with limitations in mental and moral capabilities, and their behaviour can be traced to their past lives, as envisaged by the law of transmigration, then evolutionists have nothing to fear. This can offer explanation in those cases of "*accidental* and *non-selective*" variations also which create headache. For instance, "the destruction of the great majority of eggs and larvae of prolific marine animals," which is attributed to nature's 'non-selective elimination' may turn out to be as selective as many other things which are

* Ibid 467.

undoubtedly selective. Paley's metaphysics allows reality only to God and to nothing else. This does not account for divine design. God is *divine* and he *designs* too. But if there is only one Being, pure and wise, and nothing else, the very purpose of design is left unaccounted for. The difficulty is much enhanced if you reject the idea of God and confine yourself to the vague '*nature*' only.

631. The headache which is troubling evolutionists may be estimated from the following explanations which have suggested themselves to the theorists.

632. "It is clear that a continuous change of environment leads to a constant readjustment of the organisms affected. Those *best adapted* to their surroundings survive, while those *unfit* to meet the new contingencies are eliminated. But it may be asked: If the surival of the fittest has led to the transformation of the lower, more primitive forms into the higher, more complex species, how is it that any simple forms have survived at all ? *Why did not all species evolve* ? The answer to this question is two fold. In the first place the terms 'high' and 'low' with reference to the scale of organic beings are merely relative. The amoeba is by no means so simple as would appear; it is a very complicated, highly organized piece of living mechanism. We arrange the successive branches of the tree of life according as we *imagine* them to have evolved in the course of time, and look upon man as the highest offshoot of this tree. But, after all. this is a *sort of anthropomorphism*——— viewing the evolution process from a human stand point. Secondly it must be well understood that the survival of the fittest only insures that those best

adapted to a given environment propagate and leave offspring, while those ill-adapted succumb in the struggle for existence. On the whole the continuous change and increasing complexity of the environmental conditions made for *progress*—the advent of a new species formed each time in itself an additional complicating factor—but wherever conditions remained stationary there *arose no need* for new adaptations and the old forms continued their existence unchanged."

633. "The fittest, then, to survive are by no means always the highest—the best in our sense approaching nearest to the tree of life—but are those best adapted to their conditions of existence. So long, as the conditions become more complex and varied, there results progressive organic evolution. If they remain stationary the organisms too, being well fitted to their surroundings, do not alter; while if the conditions of life become less complex, those organisms will have the best chance of surviving which can adapt themselves to the new environment by becoming themselves less complex. In the latter case we have the *phenomenon of degeneration*. Retrogression, therefore, is under certain conditions as much a phase of evolution as progress. *The term 'evolution' must not be taken to cover progressive evolution only.*"*

634. "Degenerate processes are not confined to morphological structures, but may affect also intellectual and moral traits. It is in the domain of man's mental progress that we must specially guard against confusing the 'fittest' with the 'best.' The fittest to survive may be the best, if the environing conditions

* "The First Principles of Evolution by Herbert pp. 160-61.

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are such as to favour the most highly developed individuals, physically, mentally and morally. On the other hand, even the worst may prove to be the fittest if conditions prevail which tend to encourage parasitic habits of mind. It is all a question of adaptation to environment."*

635. "While natural selection is able to account for the useful traits to be met with in the organic world—there is left a whole group of characters which cannot be explained in this manner. These are the secondary sexual characteristics of the animal world. In addition to their distinctive sex-glands, differentiating the male from the female, most animals possess further sex distinctions characterising the two sexes, as size, colour, or various structural appendages. Horns, spurs, grasping organs, etc., are to be found in the male, while the special organs of the female consist of pouches, mammae, etc. Some of these special organs, as the copulation apparatus of the sexes and the mammae of the female, have direct connection, with the act of pairing, and of rearing the young, and can be explained as the result of natural selection, since it is clear that they are essential for *the survival of the race*. Selection does not imply only survival of the fittest, but also their reproduction. It is otherwise with such features as ornamentation, the power of song, etc., which are sex characteristics of many male animals; and, further, with certain distinguishing traits of the races of man, as the colour of the skin, hairiness, the form of the face and so on. These cannot possibly have had any survival value in the struggle for life and therefore *cannot have been developed by natural*

* Ibid p. 162-63.

selection. It is for these cases that Darwin propounded his theory of *sexual selection*."*

636. "While *natural selection* accounts for the useful in organic nature, *sexual selection* is intended to explain the beautiful. As natural selection picks out the fittest to survive in the battle of life, so sexual selection seizes upon the most beautiful individuals for propagation. But while in natural selection the selective factor lies in the general conditions of life leading to a struggle for existence, in sexual selection the choice is made by the females. It is they, who, attracted by the strongest, most prepossessing or ornate males, mate with them, and thereby lead by a continuous repetition of this selective process to a progressive enhancement of the selected types. That in many cases, the males enter into a contest among themselves for the possession of the females is beyond doubt. The battles of pugnacious birds and mammals, or even lower down in the scale among spiders, during the love season, are too well known to need description here."†

637. We forbear to multiply further statements. It is sufficient to show that the spheres of selection differ. Broadly there are selections called "natural selection". Then again there are sexual selections made by individuals. Environment first and then the *adaptation* to the environment. This is the way of living and reproduction. This clearly shows the existence of finite designers under the governance of the Divine Designer, with innate free-will to work within certain limits, selection within selection which accounts for the

* Ibid p. 163-164.
† Ibid pp. 166-167.

individuals and their species. Broadly speaking *species and genera** are relative terms, anthropomorphic, or conveniently designated by man for distinguishing purposes. Species are mainly the groups within which individuals have been observed to find an ease of work, the fields for their activities. The individuals are the chief things for which the whole show is meant.

638. This aspect has been very lightly treated by theologians and evolutionists alike. Let us give a few examples how they have essayed to overcome the difficulty and with what success.

639. "How do we account for the existence of each individual soul? It cannot be the product of the arrangement of the material of the brain, as the materialists do vainly teach. It cannot be the product of evolution, nor a growth from the father or mother. The soul is not transmitted to be modified or changed. It is *indivisible*. The soul of the child is not a part of the soul of either parent. The parents suffer no mental loss from the new soul. *It must be created before it can grow*. God created each soul without doubt, and so God created the souls of Adam and Eve."†

* It is well known that Linnaeus was the first to establish the species as a unit of classification, believing them to be the *permanent entities originally created*. Before his time the *genera* held this *rank*, and the species and sub-species were supposed to be derived from them. It is a commonplace now how Darwin demonstrated the gradual evolution of all organic beings, showing that species originated from varieties, the latter being but "beginning species." It is clear from this that species, as originally conceived by Linnaeus, are merely *conventional taxonomic units* which comprise a greater or smaller number of subspecies or varieties."

(The First Principle of Evolution, by Herbert p. 208).

† "Evolution Disproved" by Rev. William A. Williams D. D. p. 89.

640. Here the protagonist of Christian theology has disproved the material origin of the soul. Other theologians are also likely to share his views. But the task here performed is only one-sided. To prove that the souls could not have originated from matter does not prove that they have originated from God, as much as to prove that A is not the son of B does not prove that he is the son of C. If the soul is *indivisible*, as Rev. Dr. Williams admits, then it is meaningless to say that it has been created. He would not support the view that it has come out of *nothing*, as such a proposition would jeopardise his whole theology. He would equally deny the birth of the soul *out of God* as that would lead to other complications. *Growth*, as we take it to mean in the material world, is hardly applicable to an *indivisible* spirit. How can a spiritual being come out of another spiritual being? It is *spiritual individuality* that has to be explained. We cannot ignore it. Let us see how the evolutionist solves the knot.

641. "An analogy can help one to understand evolution, or at least, to visualize its development. Let us suppose that a lake high up in the mountains gives birth to a number of streams flowing in all directions. These streams will encounter thousands of obstacles on their way, stones, trees, gullies, which will decide their course, and their configuration. Drawn on by gravitation, the water will always flow towards the bottom of the valley. Some of the streams *will* unite with others and grow larger. Some will lose themselves in rock fissures or in marshes. Others will form small lakes and will go no further. Rocks will create waterfalls. No stream will exactly resemble another, for none of them will have been faced by the same difficulties. *Yet, all of them are actuated by the same*

force, the same necessity, that of reaching the foot of the mountain.,'............"This example shows a force, gravitation, acting with respect to the stream as would *a final cause.* All the variations, all the intermediary episodes which give their shape and aspect to the streams (adaptation) depend on *chance*, but the apparent efforts of the water to *combat aud surmount* these obstacles are imposed by the external eonditions and the *sole necessity of reaching the bottom* of the valley. *The goal was set, but not the means to reach it.*

If, instead of studying the particular mechanism of evolution corresponding to the individual course of each rivulet, we try to understand the *very fact* of evolution, we are completely lost unless we bring in some kind *of finality*. Chance alone, as we said before, is radically incapable of explaining an irreversible, *evolutive* phenomenon. If we accept the idea of evolution, we must recognize the fact that *on an average*, since the beginning of the world, it has followed an ascending path, always oriented in the same direction. The objection has been made that many transformations of animals did not constitute a progress ; the exaggerated development of the antlers of certain Cervidae, for instance. This is true; and that is the reason why we suggest the hypothesis of a *finality* comparable to gravitation in the above analogy, that is to say a "telefinality" directing evolution as a whole. There is no doubt that there have been trials of all sorts, sometimes successful and sometimes unsuccessful. If we imagine a goal to be attained, acting like gravitation, *once the start was given*, all possible combinations had to be tried and their interest or their value proved by their reaction to the environment. If the new forms *were badly adapted*, incapable of serving as a starting point for a new stage of evolution, if they were surpassed by other strains, they disappeared

progressively, or vegetated, cut off from the principal effort. *The fate of the species itself thus becomes a secondary issue.* What matters is the fate of the species *considered as a link in evolution as a whole.* Prodigies of adaptation were hardly more important than extra ordinary performances in the circus."*

642. The reader can easily see that if the analogy of the stream, with the end fixed and means left hanging loose on the string of *chance* holds good in the case of evolution, if evolution is a process of experimentation with now success and now failure, like the work of an amateur engineer, it is as disappointing as the doctrine that God creates fortuitously, and repents when man does not fulfil His purpose. The evolutionist believes neither in God nor in souls and yet proclaims that the stream of evolution is heading towards an end. The theologian believes in a God who though proclaimed as perfect creates whatever he likes and sustains it with all imperfections attributed to the flaws of those on whom God thrust an imperfect existence without any sufficient cause or purpose.

643. But there is an other way in which both evolutionism and theology can come nearer each other and explain both progress and retrogress, rise and fall, success and failure, without any reference to *chance*. Chance is the arch enemy of all systematic thought. It strikes at the very root of law and turns the whole thing to gambling. Chance is to be deprecated, whether as an end or as a means; whether in the end or in the middle. Those who hold that the *end* of Evolution is inexorable, while much that precedes that

* "Human Destiny" by Lecomte du Nouy pp. 64-65.

end is only a matter of chance make the whole theory meaningless. The doctrine of Transmigration or changing of physical bodies by the souls under certain definite conditions goes a long way to obviate the difficulty without disturbing divine dispensation or freedom of souls.

644. Physical evolution means that under certain definite laws (whatever they be) the things of the world have grown gradually out of some primordial matter. Svami Dayananda believes that matter is eternal unindividuated homogenous something out of which the world is made into individuated hetrogenous objects. In this respect both agree. Neither believes that things come *all of a sudden*, *out of nothing*, simply by *the will of autrocratic God.* The difference between Svami Dayananda and modern scientific evolutionists is only this much that while the former admits the need of a supreme law-enforcer, the latter confine themselves to only laws and abstain from advancing further to an intelligent invisiblo entity. That this shortcoming creates perplexities has been made evident in the foregoing pages. That the theologians who, sheer out of devotion and sentiments, attribute everything to the mere will of God, have gone to other extreme of absurdity, has also been fully dealt with. The law of *Karma* within which falls the doctrine of transmigration, holds that there is a supreme being the Governor of the world, who in consonance with inexorable laws, gives fruit of the Karma to the Karma-doers.

645. Theologians and evolutionists both hold that man is a free agent. He does *right* (virtue) and succeeds. He does *wrong* (vice) and fails. All theologians

allow moral laws and so do all evolutionists. But the former allow souls which have been created out of nothing, by an all-powerful God, with no past history and without any reasonable cause, a very narrow span of life (*i. e.* period of action) followed by an indefinite interminable destiny, while the latter hold that man is the result of incessant graduated experiments, failures and successes, selections and adaptations, of nature upon some insentient primordial matter. But the question as to how irresponsible unintelligent, insignificant matter has become a profoundly responsible and glorious man, has failed to receive due attention from them. The law of Karma answers to all these difficulties. According to it the souls are eternal and eternally free. They have neither received their freedom as a matter of charity from God (such a freedom is after all borrowed and therefore extrinsic), nor any unintelligent process of evolution has thrust this freedom upon them. They have innate freedom. They are free to work, *i. e.*, free to handle the environment intelligently and foresightedly with reference to their own good, *i. e.*, to make their own destiny. The failures observable are neither due to a merciless God, nor a dead chance. The Perfect God governs by perfect laws, laws which give perfect freedom of action to the actors, who according to their innate nature are neither omniscient nor omnipotent and therefore *liable to err.* And as they are infinite in number, their judgments differ and hence their activities. This is the reason why the surroundings of action differ or even the same surroundings are treated differently by different actors. The stumblings which are observable in the working of the world and which are difficult to be explained by monism, theology, or evolutionism are not an offspring of chance, but due to the deliberate activities of the souls.

646. Prevalent theology does not admit any kinship between man and animals. According to it, only man has soul. Other animals are only a kind of inanimate objects, perhaps higher than stones and earth but holding only material superiority meant for the uses of man. Evolutionists have improved so much that they have allowed a kinship between all species and established a link between the lower and higher grades. But while perfect God could have or should have no *purpose* of creation, no purpose is conceivable in case of matter or spiritual substances evolved out of matter. If unspiritual matter can give rise to such an advanced spiritual being as man, then spirit can also give rise to matter and *anything can give rise to anything*, which is absurd. Causeless purpose and purposeless cause both are incomprehensible in a thoughtful system.

647. The question whether all animals possess a soul like man has been the centre of a long-continued and furious controversy. As we have seen above Svami Dayananda believes that the same soul occupies after death sometimes the human body and at others it can assume the body even of a lower animal and vice versa. All Indian philosophers and theologians (whatever their metaphysical doctrines) hold the same belief. Even heterodox religions of India such as Buddhism and Jainism think likewise. In the west Pythagorus had a similar belief. "Most of the heretics (in the sense of Christian Church) were attached to this belief. For example Simonists, Basilidians, Valentines, Marcionists, Gnostics and Manicheans. The Jews themselves have in part fallen into it, as Tertullian and Justinus, inform us. In the Talmud it is related that Abel's soul passed into the body of Seth and then into that of Moses. Even the passage of the Bible, Matthwe

XVI, 13·15 only obtains a rational meaning if we understand it as spoken under the assumption of the dogma of metempsychosis."*

648. But somehow the Christian Church contradicted this belief as heathen. This legacy came down to scientists and philosophers also. We have hinted somewhere that Kant believed in the immortality of the soul but negatived transmigration, though the same logic if duly pursued could have compelled him to infer prenatal life as well as posthumous. "The moral requires", Kant means, "not alone this act and that : It is concerned with what we are. It is not satisfied with anything short of perfection. For how could conscience acquiesce in imperfection ? So long as I find that my duty is contrary to my inclination, I am not perfect. I cannot change duty. I may change my inclination. But to reach perfection or holiness, will require infinite time, Kant argues. *It will certainly require more than one life time.* Hence, either the moral law requires the impossible (and is invalid), or else we must have the necessary time to fulfil its demands. Immortality is thus a second 'postulate of practical reason.' "†

Thus if moral law ensures immortality on the ground that the present life is so short, why should it not trace back the life before birth ? If such a brilliant man as Kant found his present life too short for his task, how could such a life have sprung up all of a sudden, without any past period for its growth? But Christian tradition was in his sub-consciousness, as of De-scartes before him.

* Schopenhauer "The World as Will and Idea".

† Hocking's Types of Philosophy p. 149.

649. "In pre-Darwinian times a sharp division was made between the brute creation, supposed to be endowed with instinct only, and man, who was guided by reason. This facile interpretation, which saw life from the static point of view—every thing being determined by a final decree of providence—has had to give way to a more thoroughgoing analysis of mental phenomena."*

650. There has been a good deal of discussion on the nature of *instinct*. It has been admitted by all that lower animals such as dog, cat etc. have all instincts. But is instinct exclusively material? Some say that it is not a *special* faculty of mind : it is merely the *psychic* expression of the structural organisation. Prof. J. Loeb in his work on "The Helio-tropism of animals" (1890) showed "that the movements of lower animals can be accounted for in the same manner as the movements of plants; and that therefore no special psychological factor is needed for the interpretation of their behaviour. What we have to assume as the fundamental quality of the living organism is the *excitability of protoplasm*".† But "lately these mechanistic theories have received a decided check by the investigations of Prof. H. S. Jennings on 'The Behaviour of Lower Organisms (1906). By his beautiful painstaking researches on the actions of unicellular organisms (bacteria, amoebae, infusorians, etc.) he has come to the conclusion that even the lowest living beings show a behaviour which he has characterized as that of 'trial and error' ".‡ But G. Bohn¶ still clings to Loeb and suggests "differential

* The First Principles of Evolution by Herbert p. 235.

† Ibid p. 227.

‡ Ibid p. 230.

¶ Ibid p. 231

sensibility." to come to the help of tropism inorder to explain the behaviour of higher animals, which clearly resembles that of man. Henri Bergson thinks that there is "no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence."* "Professor Mc Dougall has shown in his "Social Psychology" that the main social characteristics of man are based on instincts which have been inherited from his animal ancestry. Indeed, according to this view 'the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity,' 'and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but the instrument by which these (instinctive) impulses seek their satisfactions'."†

651. Thus we see that "instinct" does not much help those who resent the appellation of '*animal*' for them and their species. They may as much hate to be called an animal and put within a bracket with dogs, cats or hogs, as a white man of South Africa hates to pray in the same church with the black aboriginese but the fact is that these animals as much come within the. definition of life given by Shankaracharya (choice of doing, not doing or doing contrarily) as any man, savage, half savage or civilized. Our pet dogs and cats every day evince this characteristic. Even ants and bees do. How can we shut our eyes against these obvious facts ? and how can we compare them with the working of such mechanical forces as gravitation ?

652. Christian scientists and naturalists have

* Ibid p. 239.

† Ibid p. 240.

found it difficult to reconcile their love for truth with their love for traditional dogmas and have tried to deny any part of intelligence in lower animals on flimsy grounds. Alfred W. Mc Cann LLD. in "*God or Gorilla*" says :—

"The bee is a skilled builder from the start. Man cannot bequeath his architectural skill in such fashion to his son. By slow process the builder must learn his trade and the artist the principles of his art. The bee does all *instantaneously*".*

From this he concludes that man has intelligence and the bee, no intelligence but a mere instinct. What a funny argument? A *skilled* builder with no intelligence! *Skill without intelligence*? A bewildering paradox.

653. The mason-bee's skill is so evident that it has received special attention from those who were bent upon monopolysing intelligence for mankind exclusively. The French entomologist, J. Henri Fabre "made a hole in the cell of the mason-bee while she was building the cell. She stopped to repair the hole. He made many holes. As long as her instinct directed her building operations *she plugged* them all. With the completion of the cell her instinct directed her to gather nectar with which to provision it. Fabre made another hole in the bottom of the cell. The bee was now engaged in provisioning, not in building. She *observed* the hole, but went on with her provisioning, letting the honey ooze through".†

Is it all an evidence against deliberation and intelligence or in favour of it? Can you not put man to such tests and find irregularities in his actions? But

* "God or Gorilla", p. 226
† Ibid p. 223-224.

Fabre is quite sure that he is the master of the bee-psychology and he has fully understood the workings of the bee-brains.

654. We shall not discuss this point further. Suffice to say that Svami Dayananda believes that all living beings have souls, or rather, are souls with different degrees of development. The difference between Svami Dayananda and the evolutionist is this. While the Evolutionist believes that lower lives are in an upward march from the mere speck of life (amoeba, e. g.) to the uptill-now evolved and therefore highest form of life, i. e., man; Svami Dayananda holds that the world is an eternity with no beginning and no end, that the drama of life was never begun and will never end.

Man may come and man may go,
But I go on for ever.

In this endless cycle, the soul of the bee might have been the soul of man in former lives and may still become 'man' in some future life.

655. The theory of evolution began with physical bodies only. Darwin's initial observations were all concerned with bodily constructions of different animals. Moral, mental, social or spiritual evolutions are simply ingenious deductions of later evolutionists whose main efforts have been to explain or explain away the difficulties in the universal acceptance of the theory or to make the theory helpful in political, economic, or social aspirations of man. They have refused to examine the foundations. God and soul are still a bugbear for them. They are afraid and not without reason, that if they once allow mysterious entities to enter into their domains, they will be enmeshed into the same difficulties as theologies

before them have done and the progress of science will be retarded. But if man has to be given the status he deserves, it is necessary that he should not be desouled. Max Planck was perfectly right when he remarked "that the religious element in his nature must be recognised and cultivated if all the powers of the human *soul* are to act together in perfect balance and harmony."*

656. S. Radhakrishnan speaks in the same strain. "Civilization is a way of life, a movement of the human *spirit*. Its essence lies not in any biological unity of race, or in political and economic arrangements, but in the values that create and sustain them. The politico-economic structure is the frame work intended to give expression to the passionate loyalty and allegiance of the people to the *vision and values of life* which they accept. Every civilization is an expression of a *religion*, for religion signifies faith in *absolute values* and a way of life to realise them. If we do not have a conviction that the values a civilization embodies are absolute, its rules will become dead letters and its institutions will decay. Religious faith gives us the passion to persevere in the way of life and, if it declines, obdience degenerates into habit, and habit slowly withers away."†

657. Scientists, and Evolutionists do not *seem* to agree. I use the word 'seem' advisedly, because I find that even in those quarters there is a lurking fear that there is something wrong with their way of working. Julian Huxley closes his book "Evolution" with the following remarks :—"The ordinary man, or

* Whither is Science going ?
† Religion and Society, p. 21.

at least the ordinary poet, philosopher and theologian, is always asking himself what is the purpose of human life, and is anxious to discover some extraneous purpose to which he and humanity may conform. Some find such a purpose exhibited directly in revealed religion ; others think that they can uncover it from the facts of nature. One of the commonest methods of this form of natural religion is *to point to evolution as manifesting such a purpose.* The history of life, it is asserted, manifests guidance on the part of some external power ; and the usual deduction is that we can safely trust that same power for further guidance in the future."

"I believe this reasoning to be wholly false. The purpose manifested in evolution, whether in adaptation, specialization, or biological progress, *is only an apparent purpose.* It is as much a product of blind forces as is the falling of a stone to earth or the ebb and flow of the tides. It is we who have read purpose into evolution, as earlier men projected will and emotion into inorganic phenomena like storm and earthquake. If we wish to work towards a purpose for the future of man, *we* must formulate that purpose ourselves. Purposes in life are made, not found."*

658. But who are *we*, if not the product of evolution ? and how are we to formulate that purpose ? Is the evolutionary process still in action ? Or has it stopped.? If the same process is still going, the process of "blind forces", who can cure ourselves of this blindness ? The writer tells us :— "But if we cannot discern a purpose in evolution, we can discern a direction—the line of evolutionary progress. And this past direction can serve as a guide in formu-

* Evolution, p. 576.

lating our purpose for the future"......"The future of progressive evolution is the future of man."............... "Human purpose and the progress based upon it must accordingly be formulated in terms of human values ; but it must also take account of human needs and limitations, whether these be of a biological order, such as our dietary requirements or our mode of reproduction, or of a human order, such as our intellectual limitations or our inevitable subjection to emotional conflict".

"Obviously the formulation of an agreed purpose for man as a whole will not be easy".

"None the less, the demonstration of the existence of a general trend which can legitimately be called progress, and the definition of its limitations, will remain as a fundamental contribution of evolutionary biology to human thought."*

The sentiments herein embodied show that the writer's head is of a modern biologist, but he possesses a common man's heart and shares with him the aspirations of life.

659. This was an episode. We were dealing with the eternality of the soul and its journey through different cycles as postulated by the doctrine of Transmigration. According to this doctrine all animals are kinsmen, be they lower or higher, aquatic, terrestrial or any, living on the earth, in the moon or in any other place. Svami Dayananda calls the stars, the worlds or abodes, in Sanskrat *Vasu*†, places where living beings reside. This is not improbable, as such a stupendous

* Extracts from pp. 577-78.

† Eight *Vasus* or abodes of the whole creation (*i. e.*, creatures), viz earth, water, fire, air, ether, the moon, the sun and the stars. (Light of Truth. VII. 2).

universe cannot lie uninhabited and unused, without any life whatsoever. If men living in the remote regions of the terrestrial globe have been found sprung from the same stock, and if all living creatures of the earth can be traced to have a common kinship, why should not the denizens of all globes be presumed to have a universal kinship? I do admit that it is a presumption beyond any easy verification. But will it be more reasonable to presume that father God or mother nature during their infinite and immeasurable time of existence should populate only this tiny globe of ours with a few hundred millions of men and them also within these six-thousand years or so,* or if the

* As pointed out by Prof. Piper in *Science* for July 28, 1922, if we accept the Chronology of Archbishop Ussher, that the world was created in 4004 B. C. and that Adam and Eve were the *only* progenitors of the present races of mankind, "White, Yellow, red, brown and black..............the diversity of their supposed progeny illustrates what the biologist means by Evolution................" But no Scientist, he adds, "will admit for a moment that human evolution has proceeded as rapidly as the story in Genesis necessarily supports", *i. e.*, that such enormous progress could possibly have taken place in only 6000 years——or rather much less than 6000 years, for we know historically that these various coloured races of mankind have existed, for many centuries. "The Biblical story makes Darwin's ideas seem exceedingly conservative. Really, Mr. Bryan (Prof-Piper humorously suggests) ought to attack Darwin as a hide-bound reactionery, instead of a radical innovator whose motions regarding the slow rate of modification in species seriously challenge the truth of Evolution as taught in the Bible.

("I believe in God and Evolution" by W. W. Keen M D. pp. 9-10).

And also,

"In the Newtonian world, the earth was a minor planet of a not specially distinguished star; astronomical distances were so vast that the earth, in comparison, was a mere pin-point. It seemed unlikely that this immense apparatus was all designed for the good of certain small creature on this pin-point".

(Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy p. 559).

law of evolution holds good, then with the living beings of a comparatively wider range, culminating in man who has appropriated for himself the name of the Lord of Creation ? The doctrine of Transmigration applies to *all* life of *all* types living in *all* abodes or *Vasus* and during *all* times, without any limitations of past, present or future. Eternality has to be presumed whether of matter or of spirit or of both. Nothing contrary is conceivable. In Sanskrťa we use the word *Sansara chakra* or a *cycle* of the universe with no beginning and no end, though any arc of the circumference may be taken as a part for convenience's sake. The doctrine of Transmigration holds that the whole cosmos can be taken as one. There is nothing beyond the range or control of the Omniscient, and Omnipotent God. All souls are under him and within His Government. There is nothing near or remote for Him. He can and does transfer them from one abode to another abode, from one *form* of life to another *form*, according to their desert. If a ray of light can be made to start from the sun which is 186000 miles away from Allahabad, that it might help my poor eye to see, what obstacle is there in sending my soul at my death, to a place whose distance is beyond my calculation and whose conditions of life are beyond my ken ? In modern times we are trying to establish connection with the moon. Will this connection be with her mountains, rivers or lakes only ? And if there is life there, will it have no kinship with the life of this earth ? Our modern evolutionists cannot go beyond a particular point in the past. But the Doctrine of Transmigration deals with eternalities, with cycles and not with their segments.

660. The reader may call these, flights of imagi-

nation. But considering the stupendousness of the universe, as discovered and duly acknowledged by scientists of repute, there seems nothing herein to bewilder us. Rather it is a credit to the wisdom of ancient sages that what they professed instinctively or intuitively has been found correct by scientific calculations. The idea of eternality of life is one such point.

661. According to the beliefs of Svami Dayananda as he has stated in connection with the doctrine of Transmigration, man is not at the highest rung of the ladder of life, though he has an opportunity to be so. In this respect he occupies a central position. All other lives revolve round him. You cannot arrange all species of living beings in such a graduated series that you may specifically point out that this species is so near humanity and that species so far. The series which evolutionist biologists have prepared is wanting in many respects. They have taken only one aspect of physical formation as the basis of division. For instance, if you arrange all the living organisms in order from the tiniest forms upto man, where will you put the mason-bee? Will you arrange birds according to the physical structure or colours of plumage or their songs? Will there be no cross divisions? Will you not be ignoring one factor as trivial or unimportant simply because you have hit upon one particular aspect as important and others as subservient? The skilfulness of the bee (even if it is instinctive) and the structure of its body are two different factors and each will claim as basis of arrangement. You cannot say that all factors taken severally or jointly always give you the same gradation. If you take physical, intellectual, moral, social all factors together it will be difficult to pronounce

definitely whether an ape is nearer man or an elephant or a dog, or an ant, or a bee.

662. This fact and several others of allied nature have crated division amongst evolutionists. Under the heading, "The Heterogeneity of Evolution" Julian Huxley remarks, "With the reorientation made possible by modern genetics evolution is seen to be a joint product of mutation, recombination, and selection. Contrary to the views of the Weismann school, *selection alone* has been shown to be *incapable* of extending the upper limit of variation, and therefore incapable by itself of causing evolutionary change. Contrary to the views of the more extreme mutationists and the believers in orthogenesis, *mutation alone* has been shown to be *incapable* of producing *directional change*, or of overriding *selective effects*. The two processes are complementary. Their interplay is as indispensable to evolution as that of hydrogen and oxygen to water. And, as we shall see in detail later, the *third process of re-combinaiion*, is almost equally essential, not only for conferring plasticity on the species and allowing for a sufficient speed of evolutionary change, but also for *adjusting the* effects of mutations to the needs of the organism."*

663. This is all a plastic language, an effort to bring about adjustment on the part of an *intelligent* author, without positing an intelligent adjusting agency or any intelligent beings in whose favour the adjustment has been found essential. Evolution has been going on for millions of years and is still going on either fortuitously or by some agency, intelligent or blind, but modern evolutionism cannot definitely locate the

* **Evolution, p. 29.**

purpose of evolution or find a cause, why the purpose remained unrealisable so long, before it reached the man-stage, or even when the man-stage has arrived, in producing the ideally perfect man. But if you ask Dayananda, he will say that the production of even a tiny insect fulfils the purpose of the soul which has been endowed with that tiny body, according to that soul's needs exhibited by the acquirements which it had made in past lives. This adjustment is done by the evolution-governing intelligent agency in accordance with the tendencies and requirements of the soul. Selectionists, mutationists and ortho-genesisists plus recombinationists all can combine and reconcile themselves under this doctrine. The real heterogeneity lies not in the honest efforts of the evolutionists, but in the plurality of the souls, who on account of their innate nature are different and are on different levels of development. They think differently, work differently and feel differently at different times and therefore their requirements also differ. If the modern evolutionists believe that there will come a day when the ideally evolved being (whoever he may be) will reach the acme and none other will be left to disturb the perfection, they are sure to be disappointed. Svami Dayananda does not believe that there will ever come a day when all souls will attain emancipation and there will be an end to the universe. That is not possible. That is unwarranted by historical evidence or by reason. Imperfect souls will never be equal to the Perfect-God. Even Shankaracharya whose monistic philosophy leaves no room for a distinct individual soul has to admit that the liberated souls (souls which have obtained salvation) are akin to Brahma only so far as things other than the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world are concerned. That is the work of

Brahma alone and not of souls (whatever perfection they might attain).*

664. Yes, then, the ant or the bee is as near man for purposes of transmigration as a dog or an elephant. Do not think that the soul of an elephant is a huge substance and that of an insect a tiny thing, or the soul of a just born baby is small and his soul becomes bigger and bigger as he grows up. Even a small atom of matter does not get bigger unless other atoms combine with it chemically or mechanically. And the souls are not material atoms to combine and become bigger. The soul is an extremely fine thing, finer than any conceivable material unit, a point of spiritual force, if you so like to term it, and it inhabits and governs as much the body of a rat as of a big camel. The material bodies, huge or tiny are but abodes, for the souls to work, to get experiences and to conserve their earnings in the subtle or astral body (*the Sukshma Sharira*). These subtle bodies have no material magnitudes and can be transfered from one form into another.

665. What takes place is this. When one dies, the soul with its subtle body leaves the grosser body. It is called death. The animal has died, that is, his soul with its subtle body has left the gross-body. You can burn it, bury it or leave it to rot, without any concern whatsoever to the departed soul. The departed soul has left the physical belongings and kept securely with it all the psychical or rather

* जगदुत्पत्यादिव्यापारं वर्जयित्वाऽन्यदणिमाद्यात्मकमैंश्वर्यं मुक्तानां भवितुमर्हति जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैवेश्वरस्य। कुतः—तस्य तत्र प्रकृतत्वादसंनिहितत्वाच्चेतरेषाम्। पर एव हीश्वरो जगद्व्यापारेऽधिकृतः।

(Shankara's Commentary on the Vedanta IV, 4, 17.)

spiritual earnings conserved in the subtle body for its use in the next body, just as we leave a railway compartment with only the most essential and unavoidable personal luggage, to be used in another train. These belongings are called *Sanskaras* (impressions, in a sense, though more rudimentary). These *sanskaras* determine the line of working of the soul as much as our purse determines the line of our action in a foreign place. If you are very poor, you have no place in a grand hotel. If you are well-to-do, you can be put in the best surroundings. Similarly if your former earnings in the form of *Karmas* (actions and their residues) are poor, you get a poor body, if better, better. This is another birth, it may be a bird, a fish or a man, a good man or a bad man; a puny body or a strong body. Thus the next birth is decided by the earnings of the preceding life. God or Divine laws arrange the transaction, as a centre of exchange, and not arbitrarily. This is why we find souls born in differently circumstanced bodies. As your purse; so your hostelers; as your *Karmas*, so your parents. The subtle bodies are conveyed through some divine arrangement first to the body of the father and then are transfered to the body of the mother for further development. The father's body is the first hostel, the others the second. It is in the father's body that the evolution of the subtle body begins with all the processes of adaptation, selection, assimilation, elimination, mutation etc. There is first the *arrival*, then a struggle for *survival*. The *survival of the fittest* is the law but the *fittest* means that which is the most helpful considering the potentialities of the subtle body. The soul with its potential yearnings collects as much from the father's body as it can. It is allowed a stay therein for some suitable period, during which it receives all that which we call *hereditary*, physical

features, habits, propensities, even diseases if the *Sansakaras* are susceptible to embrace them. When a due stage has been reached, the subtle body so developed is transferred to a subsequent hostel called the mother's womb. Here the subtle body is not the same subtle body as it was when it had come to the father's body. It has become grosser, it has crossed a further stage of evolution. In this hostel too, the processes take place; selections, adaptations etc. Only the surroundings in which the struggle takes place are different. It all depends upon the earnings which the soul brought from the past life, amplified and enriched by what it got in the father's body. This process goes on from stage to stage *mutatis mutandis* and continues throughout the whole life. Thus the subtle body which was brought from the past life is further modified, improved or deteriorated according to the opportunities availed of by the acting soul which has a freedom of choice to do, not to do or to do contrarily.

666. "Here there is another mistaken notion. Some think that the foetus in the mother's body gets the soul only when it is advanced enough to quicken; and that before that, the foetus was lifeless. It is wrong. Had the foetus been lifeless or soulless, how could it so far have carried the pyschic traits of the father? To remain unmanifested does not mean to non-exist. The foetus has the soul even in the fluid state. Even the fluid in the egg has the soul. The formation of the gross body in the mother's womb has different stages in different species. For instance, the bird-mother forms in the womb only the egg-form of the body. It hatches the egg outside. It appears that nature has not made bigger space in the bird's womb. The man-mother makes the full body minus teeth.

There are certain species in which even teeth are developed."*

667. "When the required stage has been reached in the mother's womb, the body comes out. This is the birth of the individual in the common parlance. This is not the real birth. You can call it social birth; i. e. the coming of the child gets recognition by the society. Our birth-day does not mean the day when we begin to exist. We existed even before. It is the day when our existence has been recognized by the society. Now we enter the *formal* social life."

668. "Thus it is clear that we do not enter the ready-made body. We make the body and grow it further and further and while in our journey from one life to another, without breaking continuity anywhere".

669. "The story of the passage we have narrated. here will appear novel to some. But the following quotations will show that much earlier than to day people had this kind of belief:—

(1) That which is spermatozoa is the first pregnancy in the body of thc male. Extracting from all the members of the body a quintessence, it holds in the self another self. When this is put into the body of the female, and borne there, it is called its first birth (i. e., conception).†

* This equally holds good in case of a sexual reproduction.

† पुरुषे ह वा अयमादितो गर्भो भवति यदेतद् रेतः। तदेतत् सर्वेभ्यो-ऽङ्गेभ्यस्तेजः संभूतमात्मन्येवात्मानं विभर्ति तद् यदा स्त्रियां सिञ्चत्यथैनज् जनयति। तदस्य प्रथमं जन्म।

(Aitareya Upanishad Ch. II.)

(2) Prof. Erdmann observes in connection with Aristotle's doctrine that in the act of generation "the altogether more imperfect female supplies the matter in the menses and the male the form in the seed, which contains an ether-like breath. And as in the act of generation, so in the product also, the corporeal element is to be derived from the maternal and the psychical from the paternal element."*

(3) Some North American Indians believed that children receive their soul from their father and their body from their mother.†

(4) "The Coroados even are of opinion that a child is exclusively indebted to its father for the existence, the mother only preserving and taking care of it."‡

(5) "Remember that children inherit not *from* their parents, but rather *through* their parents."¶

"Dr. Sadler's distinction between '*from*' and '*through*' is very illuminative and points very clearly to the life previous to our embarking upon our new journey *through our parents*."§

670. While dealing with the doctrines of eternality of souls and of Transmigation or re-in-

* Barua's Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy.

† La hontan : New Voyages to North America p. 461, Canadian Indians."

‡ Treschauer in Anthropos, IX—22.

For these two vide, History of Human Marriage by Westermarck; Vol. I.

¶ The Mind at Mischief by Dr. W. S. Sadler.

§ Life After Death by the present author, pp. 68-71,

carnation as it is sometimes called, we have mostly talked of innate freedom of the souls, which is the key of all *Karma* philosophy. If there is no freedom, no *Karma* and therefore no reward or punishment. But there is a great obstacle in our way. The world is divided between two sets of beliefs. There are those who say that we are free and therefore makers of our destiny. And there are others too, quite opposite, who hold that there is no freedom. We cannot do what we do. Our will is obstructed all along and all round us. Even our will is guided by our physical environment or heredity. We are compelled to will in one way and not in another. Every thing has been predestined. A bird can fly not because it wills to do so, but because its body and nature have been so constituted as to suit flying. A fish cannot. And as for man, his constitution is quite different. We feel hide-bound all round and our talk of freedom and free-action is only a myth.

671. If it is so, then there is no distinction between life and no-life, between a moral being and an unmoral being, between a virtuous man and a sinner. If everything is pre-destined, then all *Karma* theory falls flat and with it the question of Transmigration of souls too. Even struggle for existence is no longer a struggle, as struggle implies choice in action. It will be a strange world where different forces struggle against each other with all ferocity and still there is a pre-destination. If there is one single agency which *pre-destines* everything then there should be no clashes, while we find they actually are and cannot be ignored or explained away. If there are different agencies which pre-destine different clashing activities, then those warring agencies should have freedom of choice or their predestined difference

should be accounted for by postulating another pre-destining agency and thus we come to *regressus infinitum*. A very complex riddle indeed!

672. To come to Svami Dayananda's beliefs, he holds that there is an all-governing God and there are free souls. Are these two ideas not inconsistent? Let us consider the following questions put by somebody and Svami Dayananda's answer to it.

Question.—God is *Tri-kala-darshi* or the seer of all the three times (past, present and future). He knows what will happen in future. *As God will determine, so the soul will do.* Therefore the soul is not free. God should not punish the soul, as it has done just the same, as God had through his knowledge pre-determined it.

Answer.—It is foolish to call God the seer of the three times. The past is that which *was* and *is not*. The future is that which *is not* and *shall be*. Is there any knowledge of God *which was* and *is not*.? Or *is not* and *shall be*? The knowledge of God is always the same, imperishable and indivisible. Past and future are only from the view point of souls. Yes, from the point of the actions of the souls, there is seership of three times in God, not from God's point of view. What the soul does through freedom that God knows through omniscience. And as God knows so the soul does. It means that God is independent as regards the knowledges of the past, the present and the future and as regards the awardal of the fruit; and the soul is partially independent in doing actions in the present. God's knowledge being eternal, he knows the action as well as the punishment. Both these items of knowledge are true. Is it possible that the knowledge of the action be true and the knowledge of the punishment false?

Therefore there is no flaw in the principle.*

673. Svami Dayananda appears to mean that the knower *as knower* is not affected by the thing known if he knows the thing exactly as it is. God as the knower will know the actions of the doers as they are actually done. These actions do not transcend the three times. They have temporal limitations. And God as the true knower should know them as such, *i. e.*, as temporally limited. He also knows that the actions have been done under a free choice. Therefore *doing* of actions on the part of the souls and *knowing* them on the part of God are two different spheres and do not come into clash with each other. Should God know as things happen? Or should things happen as God knows? If the happenings depend upon God's knowledge, then the happenings should be as unchangeable as God himself. But that is evidently not so. Therefore the question is much more a conun-drum than a genuine question. God governs and does not dictate. An ideal government should so govern as to safeguard the freedom of the doers. And if we take that view then there is not much difficulty in understanding the principle.

674. Predestination is the weakest link in the chain of theological conceptions. Its protagonists have been either rigid scientists who try to reduce all psychic flexibility to laws of mechanics, or political exploiters who for reasons of their own made the masses to believe that the affairs which fall in within their scheme were predestined and preplanned by God. "The Old Testament abounds in parables of predestination. It seems that there were always men destined

* Light of Truth, VII, 42.

to be kings and others to be the everlasting meek."* The mythology that centred round the Ramayana attributed all the sacrifices and achievements of Rama to the pre-ordained scheme of gods in heaven. But no man has ever been a true and consistent fatalist. The very nature of man abhors this. His life begins with a struggle. He cannot but struggle. If tired, he, no doubt, feels hampered and is cowed down by circumstances which means that he is not free in doing everything. But this phase of his thinking is only temporary. He again wakes up from the deep slumber and renews his struggle. Svami Dayananda is against this pre-destination principle. For him, man is free, so are all living beings, within their sphere, of course. Man is free in actions, *i. e.*, he has choice, but not in reaping the fruit of action. The Gita says, "Thou hast a freedom of action only. When the action has been done, thou art not free in obtaining the fruit thereof. The fruit is predestined, *i. e.*, destined by thy own action and not by the whims of any divinity." S. Radhakrishnan writes :—

675. "The free-will element in the doctrine of *Karma* may be stated as follows. Nothing, it is agreed, can efface our past Karma; it persists as an element in our present, and, so persisting, *conditions* our future. It *conditions but it does not predetermine*, for man is an embodiment of a spiritual principle which is by its very nature a principle of freedom. And to say that his spirit is or includes freedom is to say also that he can at any moment transcend the limits imposed by his Karma and *break the chain* which his past lives and

* "Heredity, Race and Society" by L. C. Dunn and Th. Dobzhansky. p. 9.

actions have forged." "While it regards the past as determined, it" (the doctrine of *Karma*) "allows that the future is *only conditioned.* The spiritual element in a man allows him freedom within the limits of his nature. Man is not a mere mechanism of instincts. The spirit in him can triumph over the automatic forces that try to enslave him."*

676. Then again, "Once the soul has made its choice of life, it has chosen its destiny; thus a man's own will becomes his destiny in the sense that he can never reverse what he has once chosen or the consequences of his choice. Moreover, in making his choice, his will is influenced, although never determined by his past life and past choice."†

677. "Our demand for freedom must reckon with a universe that is marked by order and regularity. Life is like a game of bridge. The cards in the game are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to past *Karma* but we are free to make any call as we think fit and lead any suit. Only we are limited by the rules of the game. We are more free when we start the game than later on when the game is developed and our choice becomes restricted. But till the very end there is always a choice. A good player will see possibilities which a bad one does not. The more skilled a player, the more alternatives does he perceive. A good hand may be cut to pieces by unskilful play and the bad play need not be attributed, to the frowns of fortune."‡ Radha Krishnan's 'Idealism' and Svami Dayananda's realism meet at this point.

* The Hindu View of Life, p. 75, Joad's Counter-attack from the East, p. 188.

† Plato's Myth of Er. Counter-attack from the East. p. 189.

‡ The Idealistic View of Life p. 279.
Counter-attack from the East p. 182.

See also "Jivatma" (जीवात्मा) in Hindi, by the present author.

Chapter VII

ETHICS OR BASES OF MORAL LIFE

678. While Metaphysics deals with reality and its various aspects, the jurisdiction of Ethics is much more limited. Its subject is the actions of man—the actions which he is free to do, to do, not to do or otherwise.*

679. Ethics is a branch of philosophy and is inter-related with metaphysics. Man is a part of the universe—say of nature. His activities cannot be studied apart from nature. Therefore ethical theories are everywhere found coloured by metaphysical tendencies.

680. Svami Dayananda's Ethical Teachings are based upon the following metaphysical doctrines :—

(1) The soul is a non-material, eternal (uncreate and immortal) substance.

(2) It is sentient, *i.e.* it is endowed with affection, cognition and conation. It works, it works thoughtfully and therefore it must work sincerely.

(3) The soul is free to work. Freedom is its intrinsic property. It is free by nature. Freedom has not been conferred upon it by some external agency as a matter of charity.

* कर्तुं, अकर्तुं अन्यथा कर्तुम्।

(4) The soul is not infinite. Its knowledge and action are all limited. It is liable to err. It is subject both to progress and retrogression. Therefore it has to execise its will and intellect both to make progress and avoid deterioration.

(5) Man is on the highest rung of the ladder of progress. Therefore his scope of responsibilities is the widest. He has to choose out of many alternatives, and the science which helps him in his choice is called Ethics or *Achara Shastra* (आचार शास्त्र).

(6) Man is free to work, but in obtaining the fruit of his labour, he is rigidly controlled by God's will, manifested in the form of Laws of Nature. He can do whatever he likes, but he *must* bear the consequences. God's laws are inexorable. No mercy. No concession.

(7) Not man alone, but all souls are the *purpose* of the Universe, i. e., all creations are for the sake of souls. Nature is infinite and Infinite is the number of souls. All the activities that are going on on the material plane are meant for the progress of the souls. Nature's laws do not obstruct man. They help. Ethics proposes to discuss the judicious ways of availing of this help.

(8) Soul is dynamic; not static. So is the universe. Ethics asks man to accommodate and cooperate.

681. Dayananda's Ethics is a protest against many prevailing notions. The most important of them is the theologian's view that God is the centre of the universe. He created the world out of nothing,

according to his sweet will and governs it as weil as he desires. According to this view the soul is either bound to do as nature bids it, —a rigid determinism; or God has, out of mercy, lent it some freedom. The former view leaves no room fot ethics,—no choice, no responsibility. According to the latter view, freedom loses its value. Borrowed freedom is no freedom. It is always in the danger of being snatched away.

682. Svami Dayananda protests strongly against this view. God, as He is the most perfect God, needs nothing for Himself and is not justified in creating for His own sake and exposing the lives of so many creatures to danger. A truly merciful God should not first create a sentient being under miserable conditions and then pretend to shower His mercy upon him.*

683. Svami Dayananda also protests against the view that the world is an abode of miseries and souls are prisoners in material gaols. This view deprives the world of all its beauties, looks upon God as the jailor and prompts man to rebellion. No ethical system can tolerate this view, nor this view can encourage ethics,

684. Svami Dayananda has also condemned the rival view that as theological doctrines lead to a chaos, God and super-material souls are a mere fiction. In the foregoing chapters we have said enough on

* A Persian Moselm poet protests in the same strain,

درمیان قعر دریا تخته بندم کردئی -
باز میگوئی که دامن تر مکن هوشیار باش -

It is Thou who hast bound me to a plank in the middle of the ocean. Still thou sayst, 'Do not wet thy clothes. Be careful.'

this view. Besides, this view cannot afford a good support to ethics. You can not demand responsibilities from the creatures which are basically material. Materialism, of whatever type, could not give a satisfactory alternative to the theological view criticised above. All ethics built upon materialism has proved shaky. It has stultified the moral sense of man.

685. There is another view—mid-way between the two. That has been given the name Pragmatism. It tries to look upon things from practical point. We must live and live well without going into needless why's and wherefore's of the hair-splitting philosophers. Pragmatism appeals "*to the will*" to achieve conclusions in matters of belief. "We think in order to live". "Our ideas, our beliefs are to be regarded as working tools in the business of living well." There are two main streams of Pragmatistic thought. One is opposed to *rationalism.* There are no eternal or *a priori* truths. We can work out a thoroughly adequate set of beliefs by simply extending and enlarging the well-tried methods of empirical science. The other stream is opposed *to agnosticism.* "They reject its life-laming indecisiveness.........Such thinkers are likely to take the direction of *voluntarism* pleading the right of *the active self* to reach out for a positive metaphysics. They are more interested in the sources of belief than in the methods of testing belief."*

686. Pragmatism is more popular in the western countries. In India too we find the same thing. It appears that people are tired of intellectual pursuits and they wish to make the best of the life, without

* Types of Philosophy by Hocking, pp. 141-143.

wasting any time or energy. We do not care for this theory or that, this religious system or that. We want progress. William James, Bergson, Dewey—they are the sponsors of this thought. Many modern leaders of India share this view.

687. Svami Dayananda does not agree with these two. To speak as we Indians are accustomed to speak he does not want to have "*Karma marga*" (the path of action) at the expence of *Jnana marga* (path of knowledge). Bertrand Russell's fling is not insignificant when he says that "Practical philosophies........ which regard action as the supreme good, considering happiness an effect, and knowledge a mere instrument of successful activity........would have been common among western Europeans if philosophers had been *average* men."*

688. William James, the great protagonist of Pragmatism says, "We cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it." "If the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true." "We may well believe, on the proofs that religious experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to save the world on ideal lines similar to our own". Bertrand Russell takes exception to this view. "I find," he says "great intellectual difficulties in this doctrine. It assumes that a belief is 'true', when its effects are good. If the definition is to be useful——and if not, it is condemned by the pragmatist's test——we must know (a) what is good, (b) what are the effects of this or that belief, and we must know these things before we can know that anything is 'true', since it is only

* History of Western Philosophy, p. 820.

after we have decided that the effects of a belief are good that we have a right to call it true".*

689. Svami Dayananda holds similar views. Throughout his whole *Satyartha Prakasha*', (Light of Truth) he has shown the hollowness of such popular beliefs which take their stand on the weak prop of "*bhavana*" (भावना) and drift away from the rationalistic way of life. People in general wish to live well even in a dilapidated house without caring to get the foundations examined, in the hope that a few repairs here and there will do for the time being. Political and social reformers whose aim is simply to overcome the difficulties of the moment and cure the symptoms of a disease, do not want to overhaul. Pragmatism is just like that. Svami Dayananda offers a radical treatment. Therefore it is that he tries to base his ethics on more unshakable grounds. He examines the reality and wishes to base on that reality, the rules of human conduct. He takes a due stock of the philosophies of Shankaracharya, Ramanuja, or later Buddhists who tried to preach dualistic ethics, one for philosophers and the other for man in the street and thus gave rise to absurd mythologies, non-sensical superstitions and pernicious rituals.

690. Moral philosophers differ on the principle of standardization of rules of conduct. Sometimes there arise specific cases where it is very difficult to choose a right course at the moment or to pass a verdict afterwards. In India it is a common thing to quote the puzzle when a cow is running away and the butcher who pursues her asks you to tell him the

* Ibid p. 844-45.

direction the cow has gone. If you tell the truth, you help the butcher and indirectly abet the slaughter of the cow. If you want to save the life of the cow, you have to tell a lie. Which is, ethically speaking, the better of the two alternatives? Wilbur Marshall Urban of Dartmouth College in his book, "Fundamentals of Ethics"* has cited a similar case of "*The Bollenger Baby*". The case is as follows :—

691. "In November of 1915, a Chicago surgeon, J. H. Haiselden, contrary to accepted medical ethics, refused to operate on a baby boy, four days old. This he did, he affirmed, "in the interest of the human race and more particularly of American Manhood. He explained that the boy was extremely defective and would probably remain so throughout life. He believed the infant to be dying, but there was no doubt that his life would be prolonged if an operation should be performed. His position was that with the consent of the parents (which consent was willingly given), 'nature should be allowed to take her course.' No other doctor in the hospital would intervene and no nurse attempted to alter the program. The result was that the child was allowed to die."

692. "These are the facts of the case. The moral reaction was immediate and wide-spread. News of the program caused a great stir throughout the country. Meetings of the Anti-cruelty League and of the Illinois Humane-society were held. Threats of court action were made, but to the surprise of the many the two societies announced themselves in line with Doctor Haiselden. The immediate result was that the physician was exonerated by a coroner's jury. A precedent was thus set which, there is every reason

to believe, has had its influence both in medical practice and in law ever since."*

693. But for students of philosophy the case did not end there. We have to look into the reasons given, *pro* and *con*. Miss Jane Adams of Hull House says, "Life can be taken away only by the One that gave it, and should be prolonged at any cost." "What right," she asks, "has the doctor to take a human life. Everything is born into this world with an inherent right to *have a chance to live*. The letting of that baby die when its life could have been saved, is a crime against the race instead of the benefaction claimed".

694. One specialist in Children's diseases, writes; "When an animal is disabled, it is shot. So when a child takes all the pleasure out of life for the parents, and is not beautiful or even good to look at and is helpless, I think that such a person should not be allowed to give unhappiness to the living."†

695. Here are two extremely antagonistic opinions. One the rigorously *formalistic*, the other *hedonistic*. I do not know what verdict Svami Dayananda would have given, if he had been alive and the case were referred to him. I also fail to pass my judgment to-day on the basis of Svami Dayananda's philosophy. But these are extreme cases. Many cases have to be decided then and there without giving a minute's notice and the factors involved therein are not all clear at the time when passers of the judgments take

* pp. 41-42.

† p. 43.

51

them up. Yet philosophers too have their responsibility to investigate all the aspects of the case.

696. Ethics of the modern days has been classified into Formalism and Teleologism ; the latter again into Hedonism and Perfectionism. *Formalism* "assumes that good or value is a quality, an essence, or a form, inherent in objects or acts themselves. *Teleologism* holds that no act or thing is inherently right or wrong, good or bad. Even life itself—this most precious of all goods of God or nature has only relative value. That value is determined by its utility, whether we define that utility in terms of its capacity to produce happiness either individual or social, or in terms of the capacity or potentiality of that life to develop in itself, or to contribute to the development of society or the race. There is, therefore, no absolute obligation to maintain life at all costs. The obligation is merely conditional."*

697. To which school does Svami Dayananda belong ? I should say : to neither. These schools take a partial view of life. Just as in nature we find some element which is permanent, while much of it is ever-changeful, or just as an ever-revolving body revolves round its stationary axis, similarly there are some goods which have permanent and intrinsic value, while others are relative. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" which is the guiding principle of hedonism is a vague term. There are so many factors involved in it that for a man who has to decide at a particular moment whether an action is right or wrong, it is almost impossible to reach at a definite decision. How can

* p. 45.

the happinesses of a large number be so added together as to out-weigh the individual happiness? And why should a single man be held responsible for contributing to the happiness of a large number at the cost of his own happiness?

698. Then again, how can a man ascertain whether a particular action at a particular moment and at a particular place is good in its essence without being relative to outer circumstances? Is such a judgment not relative to the capacity or the education of the doer?

699. The main difference between modern philosophers of the west and Svami Dayananda is that of the out-look. While Svami Dayananda's starting point is man, that of others is society. Svami Dayananda holds that man is a unit and society is a collection (inter-related collection, of course) of these units. Modern philosophers think that society is one organic whole and individual man is a part of it.* Therefore

* "One form of the argument runs more or less as follows:—

Evolution has involved a succession of organic levels, with progressive complication and perfection of coordinated structure and function on each level. The protozoans and other one-celled (or non-cellular, or cellularly undivided) organisms represent a lowest level. The next level is that of multicellular individuals, metazoans, with increasing differentiation of the cells and their grouping into organs with increasingly specialized functions. There follows another level, the highest, in which metazoan individuals are aggregated into hyperzoan organisms. The hyperzoan, or "epi-organism" *is society, into which individuals are to merge*, and be integrated as subordinate parts of a higher whole. It is, in fact, the so-called organic state; considered as having an individuality and life of its own. In such a state individuals, or "persons" as some adherents of this view prefer to call them,

in ethical questions, while Svami Dayananda starts with the interest of the individual, other ethical schools start with the interests of the society. For Svami Dayananda *man* is primary, *society* is secondary. For others *society* is primary and *man* is secondary. For Svami Dayananda society is for the sake of man. For others, man is for the sake of society. This is the clear-cut distinction between the two. The reason for this difference is to be sought in metaphysical doctrines. It is true that whatever be the *nature of ultimate reality*, man has to live. He must live at all cost and for living well, he should have some rules of conduct, *i. e.*, ethics. It is why in daily routines of life there is very little difference between the persons of different schools.

exist for the state the good and rights of which are separate from and superior to those of the individual composing it.

The whole argument and its ethical implications.......... are thoroughly erroneous. When the state or any other social structure is called an 'organism' the word is being used in a way fundamentally different from its use for a biological organism such as an ameba, a tree or you. The state is not an individual or a person in anything like the same sense that these organisms are individuals. The parts that contain it retain, and indeed intensify, their organic individuality. Their relationship to the social unit is entirely different from the relationship of cells or organs to a metazoan individual. Calling a state an "organism" and concluding that it is therefore comparable with a metazoan organism is a glaring example of the fallacy of the shifting middle term. Use of the comparison as an analogy provides an interesting descriptive metaphor, but its use in support of an aggregation ethics is a particularly egregious misuse of analogy, confusing it with equivalence and extending it as an interpretive principle far beyond the point to which it is valid even as metaphorical description."

"........merging of the individual into a higher organic unit is not a common trend in evolution, and specifically, is not at all a trend in human evolution."

('The Meaning of Evolution' by G. G. Simpson. pp. 152-153.)

Even the most agnostic Hume had to admit that he dined, he played and he conversed like other men, even when he did not believe about his own-self as others believed. "Most fortunately," says he, "it happens that, since reason is incapable of disputing (dissipating ?) these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation and lively impression of my senses which obliterate all these chimeras."*

700. Shankara who holds that all is dream-like unreal except absolute Brahman also posits the *Vyavahara dasha* (व्यवहार दशा) or practical world in order to justify common rules of conduct. But it must be admitted that philosophies are at the root of all divergences which disturb the world peace. The actions of even individuals are coloured by their philosophical doctrines. When Descartes doctrinated that animals have no souls, his followers became awfully cruel to animals and tortured them in various cruel ways simply because, they thought, the animals could not feel like men.

701. Thus we see that Svami Dayananda's emphasis on individual man is an important factor in his ethical doctrines. In this respect Svami Dayananda is typically *ancient* as well as *oriental*. In his philosophy is the echo of *Yajnavalkya* of the *Upanishad* period when the sage gave the famous dissertation to his wife, *Maitreyi* on the importance of self-realisation or acquiring the true knowledge of the soul. Inspired by same thoughts does Svami Dayananda give the following quotation from the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* :—

* Alkin's "Philosophy of Hume."

"O Maitreyi ! God exists in the soul, but is distinct from it; the foolish soul is unaware of His existence within itself; the soul is, so to speak, the body of God. (Just as the soul resides in the body, just so does God reside in the soul). Being distinct from the soul, He watches the good and bad actions of the soul, awards it their fruit and governs it. The same imperishable God is the soul of thyself also, *i. e.*, He pervades thee ; *Him thou shouldst realize.*"*

702. Thus the realization of one's soul and also of God who resides within the soul is the real basis of Svami Dayananda's ethics. All sentient beings have souls in their bodies, or to speak more accurately, are essentially souls themselves and within all of them resides God, the Supreme Soul. But they lack the realization of this fact and therefore ethical norms are not applicable in their case. But this lack of knowledge is a great stumbling block in their progress. They are machine-like (not literally machines). Ethics begins with the advancement of knowledge. First we know what we *are*, then we determine what *is our right conduct.*

703. This dictum holds good in all departments of life. For instance, if a magistrate wants to know his rules of conduct, you would naturally say that he should first know those qualities by which he is a magistrate. That will determine what he ought to do and what not. Similarly if a Post Master puts the same question, you will give the same answer. Our 'ought' is always determined by our '*is*'. Which means we should realize the self before determining what we ought to do. Why is the knowledge of God essential ? Because He is the model. His actions are manifested

*Light of Truth, VII, 47.

in the Universe and by realising our 'self' and our place in this universe we can determine what we ought to do. A verse in the Rg Veda says :—

"Observe the actions of God, that you might determine your rules of conduct."*

704. Most of the tangles of ethics began in the very soil of India when the soul was dethroned from its high pedestal and became subservient to other non-soul elements. Gotam Buddha wanted to reform certain social and ritualistic evils. His common-sense philosophy did admirable service to humanity by formulating certain rules of conduct, which though not novel, had been mostly forgotten or neglected. But his followers propounded a philosophy of *Anatta* or non-soul and thus let the ethics hang loose in the air without any strong foundation. The doctrine of flux is a dangerously hanging bridge over a dangerously deep stream. Buddhism has since then tried to keep the super-structure any how with artificial means without any strong foundation.

705. The philosophies that grew up on the ashes of Buddhism did little justice to the soul. In their zeal to establish monistic theism, they smashed to airy nothing the soul which was the centre of the universe, for which the universe was created and which had to fight the struggle for existence or survival. Monism of whatever species it may be is not a fit philosophy for ethical foundations. If the world is an illusion or a mere result of perpetual, vague and meaningless nescience, then any or everything can be done without

* विष्णोः कर्माणि पश्यत यतो व्रतानि पस्पशे

(Rg Veda I, 22 19,)

any discrimination of right or wrong.* It was Svami Dayananda who endowed the soul with substantial existence, its unborn-ness and immortality its inherent freedom to work, its as substantial field of work, and its capacity to come out successful if it chose. For Svami Dayananda, the world is a school (not a prison, at least) with God as the teacher and souls as the students. The school is real, perfectly equipped for all

* "The general idea," says Radha Krishnan, "pervading Gaudpada's work, that bondage, and liberation, the individual soul and the world, are *all unreal*, makes the caustic critic observe that the theory which has nothing better to say than that unreal soul is trying to escape from an unreal bondage in an unreal world to accomplish an unreal supreme good, may itself be an unreality. It is one thing to say that the secret of existence, how the unchangeable reality expresses itself in the changing universe without forfeiting its nature, is a mystery, and another to dismiss the whole changing universe as a mere mirage. *If we have to play the game of life, we cannot do so with the conviction that the play is a show and all the prizes in it mere blanks.* No philosophy can consistently hold such a view and be at rest with itself. The greatest condemnation of such a theory is that we are obliged to occupy ourselves with objects, *the existence and value of which we are continually denying in theory.* The fact of the world may be mysterious and inexplicable. It only shows that *there is something else* which includes and transcends the world, but it does not imply that the world is a dream."

(Indian Philosophy Vol. II. p. 463).

Cp. also, "As to why the divine should have permitted this particular plan, we can understand it when we *cross the barrier of our limited intelligence*, and see things from the supreme identity that lies behind the terrestrial process. From where we are, we can only say that it is a mystery (maya), or is the divine will or the expression of his creative force. Maya does not mean that the world is *a vain illusion*, mere smoke without fire. The purpose of human life is to cross the line, to emerge from insufficiency and ignorance of fulness and wisdom".

(Radhakrishnan's "Religion and Society" p. 104).

Are the two statements consistent ?

stages and all temperaments. The students are free to work their own destiny, under the guidance and strictly non-interfering vigilance of the teacher.

706. The teleology which western philosophies have postulated is a lame teleology. It does not recognise the rights of individuals as against the society. What survives is only the racial types. Individuals die out as unfits, with no recognition whatever of the struggle which they have all along sustained. What consolation shall I have in the survival of my racial type, if my death either extinguishes the flame of my personal existence altogether or merges it into some other existence ? If personal ethics only contributes to the survival of the race at the expense of personality, then how far consistent is the fact that in worldly matters it is always the person that is held responsible ? For instance, the Criminal Penal Codes of all peoples deal with personal crimes and deal out punishments on personal basis. In all schools and colleges the students receive individual treatment not on class basis, but on personal basis. In all these cases societies are only auxiliary. Schools are meant for students and not students for schools. Theft, violence, perjury are crimes not only because they disrupt the society but also because they tamper with spiritual development. A boy who disturbs the class-work spoils his own career also. Therefore it is that he is punished. The thief who steals the property of others does more harm to himself than perhaps to those whose property is stolen. Ever since we have given undue importance to social considerations and under-rated the development of the personal self, the pendulum of attention has swung to the wrong side and the morality nurtured under these circumstances is forced and not spontaneous. It is the plants that make the garden and not the garden that

makes the plants and the rules of the garden ought to be such as might ensure free and unhampered growth to all plants. No plant should be weeded out at the sweet will of the gardener or for the sake of other plants unless it is adequately proved that the plant retards the growth of other plants. "Live and let live" (co-exist) is the universally acknowledged golden rule.

707. It does not mean that the importance given to individual personality makes ethics too self-centred and unsocial. A charge has often been brought against Hinduism that it is too personal and reprehensibly unsocial. The charge is not altogether unfounded. In order to secure a niche in the heaven a Hindu would indulge in all sorts of social evils. But it is true of all faiths. A Christian who burns a heretic or a Moslem who kills a non-believer is not a whit better. But the old *Upanishad* philosophies which Svami Dayananda has unearthed from under the *debris* hold a due balance between the individual and the social, rather between one individual and other individuals. If I count myself as one individual, the rest of the society has to be counted as other individuals. As I love and respect my individuality, I have to love and respect other individualities because it is with their help that I can preserve my personality. Thus my regard of the self saves me from the pollution of selfishness by paying due regard to the interests of others. In making sacrifices for the society I only forego my narrow interests and give more enduring stability to my broader interests. It is self-development and not selfishness. Selfishness is self-killing. It is like betrayal to the enemy of the fort, by a bribed citizen, who will lose his freedom after losing the freedom of the city. As long as I realize that others' interests as much safeguard my interests as my interests safeguard theirs, there is no danger either

to my person or to the person of others. Thus under Svami Dayananda's ethics, if a man seeks his own salvation, he must remember that such salvation cannot be attained as long as there is a tinge of selfishness left. Self-denial is not self-immolation but a denial of lower interests only.

708. In one sense this is the only way to be really socialistic. By being yourself good you can inculcate goodness in others; by being yourself righteous you can make the society righteous. Thus howsoever much the society be instrumental to the well being of the individual, the distinction between the means and the end gets thinner and thinner, till it is practically reduced to almost zero. The most ethically developed man cannot distinguish between his own good and the good of others, as the old Sanskrta verse says :—

"This is my own. That is an other's. This is the calculation of petty-minded persons. For the magnanimous the whole world is their family."*

709. The question has often been put whether man is free or unfree. Long discussions have taken place on this subject. For instance, is it possible for a man to make a triangle whose two sides may be equal to or less than the third side ? Is a man free to make water otherwise than by obeying the formula H_2O ? If not, then the man is not free in action and the question of vice and virtue does not arise. But freedom of action as it is understood within the domain of ethics does not mean freedom to override the laws of nature. Everybody knows that a man speaks with tongue and cannot speak otherwise. But it is open to

* अयं निजः परोवेति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।
उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ।

him whether he speaks this word or that. God has so ordained the world that there is always a choice open to a doer. This makes him a responsible doer. The following questions and answers will clarify Svami Dayananda's position:—

Question.—Is the soul free or dependent ?

Answer—It is free in the performance of its duties, but dependent on God's government for the fruits of actions. Panini says in one of the *sutras* of Grammar, that the doer is he who is a free agent.

Question.—Whom do you call "*free*" ?

Answer.—Him who controls the body, the vital airs (*pranas*), senses and the brain. If he were not free, he would not deserve the fruit for his virtues and vices. Just as the soldiers who kill many men in the battle under the orders or insinuation of the commander-in-chief are not guilty of murder, similarly if the souls were to do actions at the suggestion of or under compulsion from God, they would not be accountable for their good or bad deeds. Only God would deserve their fruit. Hell and heaven, pleasure and pain should also be the lot of God. If a man kills some one with a weapon, that man is arrested and not the weapon, similarly the dependent soul should not merit the fruit of good or bad action. Therefore the soul is free in doing the deeds which are within its power. But when it has done them, it becomes bound by God's government to enjoy fruit.

Therefore the soul is free in the performance of its duties but bound to suffer for its evil deeds".*

710. One thing may be noted here. Svami Dayananda all along uses the word 'soul' (जीव) and

* Light of Truth, VII. 38.

not *man*, which means that the responsibility is not confined to 'man' only, but it extends further according to the capacity for judgement. On this, later on.

711. With this, we may compare Schiller. Though his metaphysics does not warrant his ethical themes, they are very much similar to Svami Dayananda's.

(1) He has an un-reserved acceptance to some form of indeterminism.

(2) He makes many concessions to determinism.

(3) He reconciles scientific postulates of determinism with the ethical postulates of freedom. The former is as indispensable for science, as the latter for ethics.

(4) For a completely good man, he could dispense with the postulate of freedom, but not for an incomplete or bad one. To him we must grant the freedom of action—the possibility of improvement, *i. e.*, the possibility of choosing from two alternatives the good rather than the bad. But as our lives are almost entirely determined by habits and other circumstances, and free choice occurs only in relatively few cases, Schiller holds that an extremely small degree of freedom is enough to establish the moral responsibility of man.

(5) Freedom must therefore be limited to a minimum, because a world which was free completely, or in a high degree, would be dis-advantageous to our action and would be found uncomfortable.

(6) Freedom, however, need not interfere with the order and rationality of the universe. It

is no uncontrollable power which upsets all our calculations.

(7) The question 'freedom' or "no freedom" cannot be settled from the standpoint of "all or nothing". The *determinist* has no occasion to fear that a small quantum of freedom will dislocate his whole theory and an *indeterminist* does not need such an excessive amount of freedom as would threaten the order of the world.

(8) Determinism has a subjective need—calculating the future. Intellect reasons future. *Will needs full freedom to act.**

712. Roughly speaking, Schiller's view is akin to that of Patanjali's following Yoga Sutra :—

For a perfect *Yogi* the action is neither white (good) nor black (bad). But for others it is of three kinds; good, bad or middling.†

713. The commentator has glossed as follows:—

"Action is of four kinds—(1) Black, (2) White-black, (3) 'White', and (4) Neither-White-nor-black. (1) Of these, to the 'black kind' belongs the action of the wicked-minded. (2) The 'white-black' are those actions that are performed through external accessories, and as these cause the suffering or happiness of other persons, there is an accumulation of *Karmic* residue. (3) The 'white' act is that done by persons given to austerity, study and meditation; this kind of action being confined solely to the mind, cannot be performed

* "A Hundred Years of British Philosophy" by Rudolf METZ pp. 470-71.

† कर्माशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनः त्रिविधमितरेषाम् ।

by external means, and, as such, it cannot be a source of pain to other persons.

(4) The 'neither-white-nor-black' act is that done by *renunciates* whose impediments have been destroyed and who are occupying their last physical body."

714. 'Of these, the action of the Yogin is 'non-white' because he has renounced all desire for fruition ———and is also 'non-black' because there is no substratum for it. Those of other beings, the actions are of the former three kinds."*

715. On different kinds of actions and their consequences, Svami Dayananda writes in a different context as follows :—

Question.—Does the soul of a man pass into the body of an animal and that of animal in the body of man ? Similarly does the soul of a female go into the body of a male and that of a male into the body of a female ?

Answer.—Yes, it does. When vices wax and virtues wane, the soul of a man assumes a lowlier body of lower animals. When virtues predominate over vices, then the soul takes up a nobler body, *i. e.* of a learned man. When vice and virtue are equal, the soul is born as an ordinary man. Even in human lives, there are gradations, high grade, intermediate grade, and low grade, according to the nature of actions. When the punishment for excessive sins has been suffered in animal lives the soul comes back to the life of an average man; similarly when the fruit of excessive virtue has been enjoyed the soul comes again to the body of

* Dr. Ganga Nath Jha's Translation of the Yoga Darsbana IV-7.

an average man. When the soul leaves the body, it is death, when it again takes the body it is birth."*

716. This description appears to be too mathematical and is liable to be an object of carp criticism on that account. But let it be understood that Svami Dayananda is discussing only general principles of the doctrine of *Karma* without playing the role of a dispenser of justice. Very delicate is the problem of actions and their fruits though no dictum is so universally recognised, honoured and adhered to as the principle of "As you sow, so you will reap". The actions that a man does, (and it is not by nature that he may do nothing), are of various types, some are like particles of dust resting on your clothes when you are passing through a sandy place. They leave no mark and can be easily shaken off. Some are more durable and serve as strands in the formation of rope of habits. The terms black, white and black-white are applicable to these actions. They result in the transformation of our subtle bodies and determining the species of our future life. Man (an average man) is the centre of these species. It is a junction-station where two lines meet and diverge or converge. But the Yogi adept by his continual practices reaches a certain stage of spiritual life, where lower considerations cease to affect. He is above the clutches of *Karma*. His actions are neither white nor black. Schiller appears to have in mind such men, whom he calls "completely good men". For them he "dispenses with the postulates of freedom," which expression does not sound very happy. The fact is that by a long course of training, their nature has been so purified that they cannot even think of leaning to the wrong path. Not that they have been deprived of

* Light of Truth, IX, 58.

freedom. Not that the postulate of freedom has been dispensed with in their case. They are free, quite free, absolutely unhampered. They have fully realized the value of freedom, and have out-grown the necessity of police vigilance. Whether it is minimum or maximum of freedom depends upon the way in which we describe it. This is the luck of only the top-most souls which have reached the threshold of salvation or *Mukti.* Human ethics does not apply to them. They have out-grown the stages. Just as the *common* rules of police and court are not applicable to High Court Judges; though they too are not above laws; similar is the case of *mumukshus* or adepts. In chapter IX of his Satyartha Prakasha, Svami Dayananda has given some description of these conditions, as he found them in old scriptures or in his experience. But a very long journey has to be crossed before we reach that stage and we forbear making any further reference to it in this book.

717. Yes, then, ethics is the science of morals. It teaches us how to choose the right from the wrong. But why all this botheration? Some Indian philosophers posited that the soul is naturally pure, and remains always so, needing no action and therefore no ethics. Svami Dayananda protests against this theory in the following :—

718. *Question—*

Na nirodho nachotpattir
Na baddho na cha sādhakaḥ
Na mumukṣur na vai muktir
*Ityeṣa paramārthatā**

*Gaudapadiya Karika, II, 32.

This is a commentatory verse on the *Mandukya Upanishat*. It means that the soul is God. Therefore it is never subject to concealment, nor to birth, nor to bondage. It is not the doer of anything. It is not desirous of emancipation and it is not emancipated. When there is no bondage in the real sense, how can there be emancipation ?

Answer—This statement of the Neo-Vedantists is incorrect. The *soul is finite* and is liable to be covered up. It assumes a body, which means its birth. It comes into bondage by being compelled to enjoy the fruit of its good or bad action. It tries to use the ways and means to be free from the bondage. It desires to get rid of pain. When it is free from pain, it realizes God and attains salvation also."*

719. The Neo-Vedantists denied the soul the following qualities—Covering (आवरण), birth, bondage, doer-ship, desire of release, release or Salvation. Svami Dayananda has in the above passage controverted that position and pointed out that the question of actions and right actions is not irrelevant in the case of soul. It is the justification of the science of ethics. The soul is *inherently* (by nature) *finite*. "Finite" means 'weak." "Weak" means liable to err. 'To err' means to choose the wrong path. If once the wrong path is chosen, there is a likelihood of going farther and farther from the goal, unless the realization of mistake takes place with a strong will to retrace the steps. While the right path is only one, the wrong paths are many, one evil habit giving birth to many others, till one finds oneself in a forest of entanglements. The mistakes which one commits thicken the veil of ignorance and darken the subtle and the causal bodies which weave round them-

* Light of Truth, IX, 5.

selves various sorts of lower lives referred to in the above quoted passage of Svami Dayananda. God's universe provides them with provisions to correct themselves. There are always two paths open, the one offering them chances to crrect, and the other which they have wrongly taken and which leads to gradual deterioration.

720. In an above given passage we drew the attention of the reader to the fact that Svami Dayananda has used 'soul' (जीव) instead of man. The reason is that this choice of right and wrong is given to lower animals also, though in a very rudimentary form, according to the thickness of their veil of ignorance. All sentient beings even the lowest ones which do not, or very little, receive the attention of man, possess some sense of choosing. They use all sorts of cleverness to find the path which might lead them to their goal. They exhibit pleasure or a sense of gratification, when they are successful. They feel remorse when they fail. These emotions do not belong to the life-less or inert world. They are the sentient being's own. In kind, they are similar to those found in man. The difference is in the environments in which they find their play and the way in which they are exhibited.

Hunger, sleep, fear, sex-tendencies, in all these men are like animals. The sense of Duty is their *speciality*. If they lack that, they are like lower animals.*

This is a common saying, but this is based on the truth of philosophy of *Karma*. The researches of

* आहारनिद्राभयमैथुनं च
सामान्यमेतत् पशुभिर्नराणाम् ।
धर्मो हि तेषामधिको विशेषो
धर्मेण हीनाः पशुभिः समानाः ॥

evolutionists have opened a vista of marvels in the domain of these similarities. They have without doubt, established a universal kinship among all sentient beings higher and lower. They have given a scientific basis to the truth which Indians had inherited from bye-gone ages. They have also shaken off the apathy for the principle of metempsychosis which Semetic religions had engendered. Many western thinkers have begun to believe that transmigration of soul is not so ridiculous a principle as it was once supposed to be. But the strength which the doctrine of eternality of soul gives to it has to be explained and made clear. Ethics belongs to all walks of human life but its activities have to be interpreted in their bearing with the spiritual development of man and the attainment of final emancipation. Just as to reach the highest peak of a mountain, we have to go by many zigzag paths, now ascending, now descending, now turning this way, now that way, similarly all moral virtues are directed towards that one end, the attainment of emancipation or *Mukti*. In discussing the practical side of the worldly life we generally close our eyes against the parts which lower animals play, or, sometimes it appears unnecessary to soar so high and strain our eyes, to see the invisible goal. But there is a danger of being unjust to the kinsfolk of the lower order, or being satisfied with the trash and also of going astray, if that goal is altogether ignored.* The *Upanishad* says:—

* Cp."The meaning of Evolution", by George Gaylord Simpson :—
(1) ....Fallacies arise from what Julian Huxley calls the "Nothing-but" schools (vide Touch-stone for Ethics 1893-1943 by T. H. and J. Huxley). It was felt or said that because man is an animal, a primate, and so on, he is *nothing but* an animal, or *nothing but an ape* with a few extra tricks. It is a fact that man is an animal, but it is not a fact that he is nothing but an animal (It is not a fact that man is an ape, extra tricks or no,

"The goal to which all the Vedas point, which all the austerities aim at, desiring which sages live a life of strict chastity, that goal I wish to explain to

and so, of course, all the less a fact that he is nothing but an ape). Such statements are not only untrue but vicious for they deliberately lead astray enquiry as to what man really is and so distort our whole comprehension of our selves and our proper values." (p. 137).

(2) "It has also been shown that *purpose* and *plan* are not characteristic of organic evolution and are not a key to any of its operations. But purpose and plan are characteristics in the new evolution, because man has purposes and he makes plans. Here purpose and plan do definitely enter into evolution, as a result and not as a cause of the processes seen in the long history of life. The purposes and plans are ours, not those of the universe, which displays convincing evidence of their absence" (p. 143).

(3) "Man was certainly not the goal of evolution; which evidently had no goal. He was not planned. In an operation wholly planless. He is not the ultimate in a single constant trend toward higher things, in a history of life with innumerable trends, none of them constant, and some towards the lowest rather than lower". Is his place in nature, then, that of a mere accident, without significance? The affirmative answer that some have felt constrained to give is another example of the 'nothing-but' fallacy. The situation is as badly misrepresented and the lesson as poorly learned when man is considered nothing but an accident, as when he is considered as the destined crown of creation. His rise was neither insignificant nor inevitable. Man did originate after a tremendously long sequence of events in which both chance and orientation played a part. Not all the chance favoured his appearance, none might have, but enough did; not all the orientation was in his direction, it did not lead unerringly human-ward, but came this way. The result is the most highly endowed organisation of matter that has yet appeared on the earth——and we certainly have no good reasons to believe there is any higher in the universe. To think that this result is insignificant would be unworthy of that high endowment which includes among its riches a sense of value". (p. 143-144).

thee. That is the realization of Om or God."*

721. There is one more point which needs elucidation in this connection.

What is the place of pleasure in Dayanandian ethics? Dayananda harps throughout his works on the release from *pain*, which means attainment of pleasures, as if the soul is a bundle of pleasure-seeking tendencies only. It gives a tinge of piggishness to ethics.

"*Question*—What is emancipation (*Mukti*)?

Answer—Emancipation means '*release*'.

Q.—Release from what?

A.—That from which *all souls* wish to be released.

Q.—From which do they wish to be released?

A.—That which they *need* to be released from.

Q.—What do they *need* to be released from?

A.—From pain.

Q.—After being released from pain, what do they get and where do they live?

A.—They get happiness and live in God."†

722. The pig is an animal. It has a soul, as a man has. It loves pleasure as all men love. It wants to escape pain as all men want. In this respect all pigs and all men are alike. But tastes differ and with them the nature of pleasure and pain. There is a difference between 'pleasure' and '*means*' of pleasure. Similarly between 'pain' and '*means* of pain.' What is

* सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति,
तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद् वदन्ति ।
यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति,
तत् ते पदं ब्रवीम्योमित्येतत् ।।
(Kathopanisat II, 15)

† Light of Truth, IX, 13.

meat for one is poison for another. When we say "tastes differ." what do we mean thereby? A child who derived all pleasures from his dolls finds them quite stale in an advanced age. What pleasure a mathematician derives in the solution of mathematical problems is no pleasure at all to a trader. It means that tastes differ because of the mental training which one receives. Thus the feeling of pleasure or pain is only one phase in the spiritual life of a being and the development of the entire soul is necessary to be free from pain and to get happiness. Kapil's Sankhya sutras begin with the aphorism. :—

"*Atha trividha-dukha-atyanta-nivrti-ratyanta-puruṣarthaḥ.*"*

This means that the entire release from the three kinds (i. e. all kinds) of pain is the highest achieve—ment of a man's life. Ordinary pleasures, as we common men know them, have only a tinge of happiness. But the serpent of pain lurks behind all of them. They are meat containing poison. The discipline of life means that all poison should be distilled out of them; the serpent should be killed. This needs wisdom. The pig lacks it, or has a very little quantum of it. Only knowledge can provide this wisdom. And therefore Svami Dayananda says that the souls have to return to the life of an average man in order to progress further and attain true release from pain.

723. Needless to say that Svami Dayananda's philosophy is optimistic. In some quarters the objection has been raised that the vedic philosophy or, say, Hindu philosophy is pessimistic. I do admit that most religious systems have been pessimistic in their

* अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृतिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ।
(Shankhya Sutras I. 1.)

outlook. They have also exaggerated the existence of pain in the world. But Svami Dayananda's philosophy eliminates pessimism altogether. To admit that pain exists in the world is a truth and not pessimism. If there is a hospital containing patients suffering from all sorts of diseases and there are adequate equipments for cure, it is not pessimism but optimism sure and certain. The doctrine of transmigration of soul teaches that the soul has no ground for hopelessness even at the time of death, as death is not the death of the soul, but of the present conditions. A child who dies unborn, a babe who dies just after a few days of his birth, a young man who dies when he is in his full youth; all have a chance of progress; nay, their next life is given them only to try again and achieve better results.

724. To quote Svami Dayananda :—

"*Question.*—Is the salvation the result of one life, or of many lives. ?

Answers.—Of many lives, for,

Bhidyate hrdayagranthish,
Chhidyante sarva sanshayāḥ.
Kṣīyante ehāsya Karmāṇi.
Tasmin dṛste parāvare *

When the soul's knot of ignorance is solved, and its doubts cleared, its evil actions are consumed, and it dwells in God, who pervades both in and out of the soul."†

725. This means that salvation is an acme of perfection, (परम पद Parama Pada) a result of long continuous discipline of not one life, but of many lives.

* Mundaka Upanishat II 38.
† Light of Truth, IX, 59.

It is not the result of the intervention of a mediator or of any *deus ex machina.* Those who do not believe in the doctrine of transmigration, make the life of numberless people hopeless. What consolation is there for those who die young or ignorant, to find their way barred for ever? Westaway is perfectly right when he says :—

"Clearly a life, which stretched on indefinitely without death would in many respects be fundamentally different from our present lives. Any attempt to imagine how our present lives would be transformed if neither we ourselves, nor our fellow men had any chance of death will make this clear.

If we end our present life in a state of imperfection, as we must, it is not illogical to assume that there remains a further improvement and advance to be made in the next life, and that future death can only be regarded as improbable when at last we have reached absolute perfection. The natural inference, therefore, is that this life will be followed by *others like it*, each separated from its predecessor and successor by *death and re-birth*, otherwise we shall have to fall back upon the hypothesis that a process of development begun in a single life bounded by death would be continued as an indefinitely long life not divided by birth and death at all. And to suppose, without any reason, such a change from the order of our present experience seems impossible to justify."*

* "Theology and Religion" by Westaway pp 390-391.

Chapter VIII

MORAL VIRTUES.

726. After briefly discussing the bases of morality which Dayanandian Philosophy propounds, it is necessary to give in detail an account of moral virtues which are the flesh and blood of Dayanandian Ethics. Svami Dayananda claims no credit for their newness. They are as old as civilization itself. Svami Dayananda has only given a new form to the old things. His main service lies in the removal of the bushel under which the lamp lay hidden, so that humanity might benefit thereby in first attaining worldly prosperity, then ex-worldly (or say, super-worldly) bliss. Broadly speaking this is the aim of Dharma or ethics. It was, in the sutra period of Indian literature, enunciated by Kanada the author of *Vaisheshika* in these words :—

यतोऽभ्युदयनिश्श्रेयससिद्धिस्सः (धर्मः) । (I 1.2.)

Dharma* is that (set of rules of conduct) by

* यस्याचरणादभ्युदयः सांसारिकमिष्टसुखं सम्यक् प्राप्तं भवति, येन च निःश्रेयसं पारमार्थिकं मोक्षसुखं च, स एव धर्मो विज्ञेयः । अतो विपरीतो ह्यधर्मश्च ।

(Svami Dayananda's *Rg Vedadibhāshya Bhūmikā*, *Vedokta dharma-viṣaya.*)

By which conduct worldly prosperity is satisfactorily obtainable and by which is also attained the exworldly bliss, *i. e.* the happiness of Salvation, that is called *Dharma*. Its reverse is *Adharma* or sinful living.

Cp.—(१) अभ्युदयस्तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसमात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः तदुभयं यतः स धर्मः । अभ्युदयद्वारकं निश्रेयसमिति मध्यपदलोपी समासः, पंचमी तत्पुरुषो वा । (शंकरमिश्रकृत वैशेषिक सूत्रोपस्कारः)

which one first obtains worldly prosperity and then exworldly bliss. Here two things have been emphasized. The first test of Dharma or morality is, that it should be conducive to worldly prosperity, which means *living well*. But the worldly prosperity is no end by itself. Our life does not end there. It is a means to another end. There is a difference between the goal and the road. The road is essential for reaching the goal. If there is no road, or a bad road, or a wrong road, no journey is possible. But that road alone is the right road which takes us easily to the goal. If there is well cemented first-class road and it does not lead to the goal, it is no road at all and no sane man would like to travel by it. Similarly worldly prosperity is essential, but only so far as it is helpful in achieving our goal. Following this principle Svami Dayananda does not ignore the worldly value of ethics. His philosophy cannot be called asceticism, though it is just the opposite of what is commonly known *Epicurianism*. He lays due emphasis on living well, with of course, one reservation, that it should not lose sight of the end in view. The word 'ex-worldly.' (निःश्रेयस्) is not used in chronological sense. It does not mean only post-death condition. It means inner spiritual development as distinguished from gross fulfilment of physical needs. Superficial things die away. Deeper things are more abiding. It is they that make the future destiny.

727. "There are *four determinants* of right conduct:— 1st the *Veda;* 2nd the *Smrtis*, (स्मृति) made by master minds and in agreement with the Vedas such as the *Manusmrti* ; 3rd the conduct of the *righteous persons*, which has come to us as tradition, from the beginning of the universe, *i. e.*, conduct enjoined by God through

the Vedas; 4th that which conforms with our conscience, *e. g.*, truthfulness. These are the criteria of virtue. Impartial justice, acceptance of truth, total abandonment of untruth,——such conduct is Dharma. And whatever is reverse of this, *i. e.*, partiality, injustice, disregard of truth, and acceptance of untruth —all this is *adharma*, vice or unrighteousness."*

728. Here four determinants are given. The foremost is the Vedas or Divine Scriptures. They give principles of universal application. But it is not easy for ordinary persons to decide with exactitude what is proper to do under particular circumstances. Therefore to make the things easier sages have from time to time glossed over these principles and described in details the do's and don't's. They are called *Smrtis*. The code of Manu (called *Manusmrti*) is held in the highest respect by Dayananda (omitting, of course, later interpolations, which have now to be sifted out).† Then, bare rules being insufficient for the guidance of the general population, the 3rd determinant is "the lives of great men", which serve as illustrations. Example is better than precept. The truth of a principle is much better realized when we see it actually carried out in living. The fourth and the last court of appeal is one's own conscience. Svami Dayananda has extraordinary regard for conscience. He calls it God's voice within oneself.‡

* Light of Truth III. 45. and Manusmrti II. 12.

† The author of this book has done this sifting work in his Hindi book "Manusmrti" which contains a comprehensive introduction plus Hindi translation of the authoritative texts.

‡ Cp. "This idea—that conscience is the voice of God, a witness, in man, of a moral order that transcends him——is as old as philosophic thought. We find it in Socrates' idea of the Daimon within him, so beautifully developed in Plato's Phaedo.

"When the soul sets its mind, and through the mind, its senses to some object, and begins to do an evil thing, such as theft, or a good thing, as benefaction, then all the desires and cognitions of the soul are centred on that action. At that very moment *spring up from within* the emotions of fear, hesitation or shame if the action is bad ; and fearlessness, determination and joy, if the action is good. *These emotions come not from the soul but from God.*"*

We find it in the Stoics and finally in Christian Theology and philosophy, especially of St. Thomas."

"The essentials of the moral argument—in its simplest form—is that conscience is a witness to the Divine ; that our consciousness of moral values, as embodied in our sense of obligation or duty, in our acknowledgment of claims or rights, and in our ideal of self-hood or character, reflects a moral order that transcends the natural order, and which implies that both its origin and its consummation is in the Divine".

"If one believes that moral sense or moral axioms are innate in the crude sense of inborn, one would naturally think of them as 'implanted' in us, as it were, by the "Creator." It is also easy to see that if one holds, as did Kant, that the moral imperative is categorical and absolute, and cannot be derived empirically, either by associations in the life of the individual, or by natural selection in the life of the race, he would naturally look to *some transcendental source* for its explanation and interpretation.'

"Like many others in the past, he (William James) is impressed with the universality of the religious 'instinct'. He thinks that it would be passing strange if, it being true, that wherever there is a fundamental drive or instinct in man, there is an objective correlate for it in the environment, there would be no such object for an instinct so universal and fundamental as the religious".

(Urban's Fundamentals of Ethics pp. 456, 457, 458).

* Light of Truth, VII. 8.

Also Cp. 'Moral judgments may conflict with one another. Two conflicting moral judgments cannot be both right. This does not mean that the *moral intuition itself* is subject to error, but merely that we

729. Svami Dayananda highly appreciates and incorporates in his code of conduct the ten virtues prescribed by Manu (chapter VI, verse 92). Adding one more, i. e., *ahimsa* (non-violence), he makes them eleven. In his book, Sanskara-vidhi, Grihashrama, he enumerates the eleven virtues as follows:—

(1) *Ahinsa* (non-violence). Never try to injure any one through ill-will.

(2) *Dhrti* (perseverance). Never swerve from the right path under the influence of pleasure or pain, profit or loss, but persevere in righteousness.

(3) *Kashma* (tolerance). Do the right without caring for praise, dispraise, honour or dishonour.

(4) *Damah* (control of mind). Draw the mind away from evil and direct it to right action.

(5) *Asteya* (non-stealing). Do not covet the things of others either in mind or in word, or in deed.

(6) *Shoucha* (purity). Keep your soul and mind pure by shunning the feelings of fondliness or enmity and keep the body clean by water.

(7) *Indriya-nigrah* (control of senses). Let not your senses of hearing etc. go to wrong ways.

(8) *Dhi* (wisdom). Always develop your intellect by acquiring the knowledge of the Vedas

may fail to disentangle the intuition itself *from irrelevances*, or may unconsciously *pretend* to have an intuition when we actually have it not."

("Philosophy and Living" Vol. I. by OLAF Stapledon. Pelican Books-p. 206).

etc. by controlling sexual indulgence, by keeping good company and by avoiding bad company, and evil habits such as drinking.

(9) *Vidya*, (study). Aquire true knowledge of all things from the earthly objects upto God.

(10) *Satya* (truth). Be true in mind, word and deed.

(11) *Akrodha* (non-anger). Avoid the evil passions such as anger and keep equilibrium of mind.

730. In another context in the Rg Vedadi-bhasya-bhumika (Introduction to the commentary of the Rg Veda etc.) Svami Dayananda enumerates ten virtues of almost the similar type on the authority of the *Shatapatha Brahmana* (XIV. 4) :—

(1) *Kama*, a keen desire to acquire good qualities.

(2) *Samkalpa*, a resolution to acquire them.

(3) *Vichikitsa*, deliberation.

(4) *Shraddha*, faith in God, truth and righteousness.

(5) *Ashraddha*, non-faith in atheism and unrighteousness.

(6) *Dhrti*, or firmness of faith in God and righteousness in prosperity as well as in adversity.

(7) *Adhrti*, hesitation in going on a wrong path.

(8) *Hri*, mental abhorence for forsaking righteousness and leaning to unrighteousness.

(9) *Dhi*, an earnestness of mind to adopt good habits.

(10) *Bhi**, fear of God in doing evil deeds.

731. This dry cataloguing of virtues may appear too boring and therefore unpardonable to the men of this pragmatic age. Why talk of Plato and Aristotle or Yajnyavalkya or Patanjali, when Athens and Kashi both have undergone a great change ? Of what value is *Ahimsa* (non-violence), or truth or sexual chastity in this age ? Can we do without violence ? Can we afford to cling to absolute truth-speaking ? Are not the greatest among us, on whom the world depends, sceptic about the intrinsic values of these virtues ? The best moral code is that which is conducive to economic betterment and political glorification. To say that certain virtues, if pursued literally and sincerely will lead to *Mukti* or final release, is to talk nonsense. We care a fig for *Mukti*. That is the attitude of the age.

732. Then, there is another difficulty raised. 'Nothing', says Montaigne, 'in the world varies so greatly as law and custom. A thing is called abominable in one place and in another is praised, as in Lacedaemonia clever thieving was admired.' That which is "virtue on one side of the Pyrenees is vice on the other." Thus if virtues differ from place to place and from age to age, ethics has no firm ground to stand upon. Svami Dayananda should not have wasted our time by recommending to us a way of living, justifiable thousands of years ago.

733. Nevertheless, few moralists have been content with this ready and impressionistic view of the

* कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृति-र्ह्री-र्धी-र्भीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव तस्मादपि पृष्ठत उपस्पृष्टो मनसा विजानाति ।

(शतपथ काण्ड १४, अध्याय ४)

situation. Underneath, or through, the changing conceptions of virtue, and of character, they have felt—and rightly—that there are certain more or less constant human qualities that are not only admired everywhere, at all times and by all men, but which remain in their essence *constant*, despite their change in form."

734. "Greek life is not our life, and the description and classification of the specific virtues adequate for their times and conditions, may not be adequate for us. But there is, after all, what Chesterton has called *The Everlasting Man*, and both Plato and Aristotle have caught something of his everlasting character."*

735. Speaking of five *Yamas* or restraints, *i. e*, Benevolence, Truthfulness, Abstinence from misappropriation, Sexual restraint and freedom from Avarice, Patanjali says that these virtues are above the consideration of *Class, Place, Time and Occasion*; which means that they are constant.†

736. Mahatma Gandhi has emphasized the same thing in our times. In no circumstances can we afford to ignore the law of *Ahinsa* and *Truth*, and our living well holds good proportionately to our abiding by these virtues. It is true that sometimes in our short-sightedness we are satisfied with things which are either ephemeral or of lower values. But this does not lower the value of virtues. It only shows that our capacity to estimate correctly is faulty. "There can be no doubt" says Urban, "that on more developed moral levels virtues have intrinsic value. Not only does the possession of

* Urban's "Fundamentals of Ethics" pp. 333 and 338.

† Yoga II, 31.

these character values bring a direct and immediate satisfaction to those that possess them, but they bring a similar joy and satisfaction to those who behold them."*

737. There is one more point which has important bearing upon some vital theological questions. If these virtues are of constant type, how is it that there is a clash between them ? It is intelligible that a vice should clash with a virtue. But why should one virtue clash with another and especially an important one ? For instance, mercy and justice both are cardinal virtues. God is said to be Just and Merciful both. But if God is Just, how can He be Merciful ? And if Merciful, in what does His justice lie ? To call God unjust is a blasphemy. If God is truly just, what will be the fate of the sinners ? Who will get salvation if our actions are strictly weighed in the scale of dispensation ? It is not an academic question. In most religions salvation is based not upon justice, but upon the mercy of God. The law of Karma is often flouted on this account. The corner-stone of many religions and theologies is the faith, not in one's actions but in the mercy of God, which can be obtained through the mediation of different types of mediators. This idea is so deep-rooted among the religious people that it has given rise to many ethical entanglements.

738. On this point Svami Dayananda's solution is remarkably significant. For him all virtues are coherent with the nature of the soul and can never clash with each other. What is clashing is only a misunderstanding about meanings or implications.

" *Question*—Is God merciful and just both or not ?

* Ibid 339.

Answer—Yes, He is both.

Question—These two attributes are inconsistent. Where there is justice, there is no mercy; and where there is mercy, there is no justice. Justice means the giving of exactly so much pleasure or pain as is one's due on account of one's good or bad actions. Neither a jot less nor more. But mercy means to let the guilty go unpunished.

Answer—Justice and mercy differ only in name. They *both serve the same purpose.* Punishment is given for the purpose of dissuading man from sin and preventing his pain. Your interpretation of justice and mercy is not correct. Justice means that a criminal should be punished to the extent of his crime. If he is not punished it is no mercy. To let off one robber means to give pain to thousands of righteous people. How will it be called mercy when letting off of one man means misery to so many ? To put the robber in the prison, and to prevent him from further evil deeds is mercy to the robber, and to kill the robber is mercy to thousands of other man.

Question—Then why are these two words 'mercy' and justice ? If both mean the same, what is the use of having two words ? One would have been enough. This shows that justice and mercy do not mean the same.

Answer—Is it not true that many words convey the same meaning and many meanings are conveyed by the same word ?

Question—It is.

Answer—Why do you object then ?

Question—Because the world says so.

Answer—The world says right and wrong both. It is we who should discriminate. Well look here. The greatest mercy of God is this, that God has created all sorts of objects, in the world so that the souls may be

benefited thereby. What else can be a greater mercy? Now look at justice. It is evident by the difference in the magnitude of pleasure and pain, due to good and bad actions. The only difference between mercy and justice is of angles of vision. When one wishes that people may be happy, and exempted from pain, it is mercy. But the dealing out of punishment etc., by external actions is justice. *The purpose of both these is the same*—viz, prevention of sin and removal of pain.*"

739. *Brahmacharya* or sexual discipline has received a most shocking jerk from different sections of thinkers. No ethical system can be called healthy if it does not make an allowance for human weaknesses, and most important of them are those pertaining to sex-relations. "The test of a civilization is its attitude towards the inconsistencies and foibles of human beings."† But just as God's mercy and God's justice have to be brought into a line with each other, inorder that we may truly understand the significance of both the virtues in our life, similarly social justice and social mercy have to be made consistent in dealing with sexual delinquents. Dealing with marital relationships under the caption "Marriage and Niyoga"‡ Svami Dayananda has made a reasonable allowance for all sorts of human weaknesses. But he is against loose and unlicensed marital relationships under the cover of sophistication. Radhakrishnan has discussed this point in his book 'Religion and Society' under the title "Woman in the Hindu Society." Moralists and poets have often chosen different lines and have defended their respective points of views. It may be difficult to

* Light of Truth, VII, 10.
† Radhakrishnan's "Religion and Society" p. 191.
‡ Light of Truth, IV.

reconcile all cases. But much evil can be minimized, if not totally cured, if we give equal rights to man and woman in sexual matters. Svami Dayananda has been very definite on this point. There is not one instance in which he has not given to the woman what he has allowed to the man. In this respect Svami Dayananda stands in bold relief against other moralists.

740. Commenting on modern ways of living among the Hindus and others, Radhakrishnan has emphasized the need for self-restraint in these words:—

"Adultery on the part of the husband is generally regarded as more venial than on the part of the wife. This is because men have had the run all these centuries. They cheat their wives by saying that their lapse is of no importance, it does not alter the fundamental relations, is a passing affair, an act without a sequel. If the wife is bitter and complaining the husband adopts the high and mighty attitude that it is vital for him, that his happiness is more important than all our petty morals. This double standard is due partly to a sense of ownership*. Woman is property.† Adultery is an offence against property. It is an illegitimate appropriation of the exclusive 'rights' which the husband has acquired over the wife‡ Galsworthy has written wonderfully of the

* "A man," says Paul, "is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man."

(1. Corinthians XI. 7-9)

† *Artho hi kanya*..............Kalidasa in Shakuntala IV.

‡ Religion and Society, Page 196.

Cp. Manu. "The seed must not be sown by any man on that which belongs to another." (IX.42).

Forsyte conception of woman as property. In the name of marriage we acquire vested rights in the wife's person. The woman also feels the right of property in her man. If a man commits marital infidelity, he does not introduce any new blood into the family, as women's infidelity does, so the latter is regarded as more sinful. We cannot say, however, that ideas of property are at the root of all sex-restrictions. Sex-jealousy implies more than an infringement of one's personal property. It is a feeling of grief. There is also the idea that chastity and holiness go together."

741. "Discipline, or the imposition of limits on our natural tendencies, is essential for human dignity. Plato in the *Philebus* says :—'The goddess of the limit, my dear, Philebus, seeing insolence and all manner of wickedness breaking loose from all limit in point of gratification and gluttony and greed, established a law or order *of limited being*; and you say this restraint was the death of pleasure; I say it was the saving of it'. If we aspire to life, true, good and beautiful, we must lead disciplined lives. The overflowing violence of passion demands it. Otherwise we will justify, in the name of love, whatever is nasty, gloomy and shameful. Dirt cannot purify us.*"

742. This is just what Svami Dayananda means and says, though in his own way. Let us also clear a a point of difference. There is a school of thought, commonly met with in a few so-called saints, according to which a man may reach a stage at which moral rules do not remain binding. Patanjali's point of view we explained above.† But the view we are, here, hinting

* Ibid p. 196.

† See section 712–714,

at is quite different. Some saints have been found guilty of moral turpitude. They and their disciples proclaim that the outer actions are done by the body or outer physical organs, while the soul inside is pure. Svami Dayananda calls such persons hypocrites, as the primary and responsible actor is the self itself and not the organs. In the above quotation from Philebus, there are words "*established a law or order of limited beings.*" Radhakrishnana appears to interpret the words as follows :—"It is clear that, for normal human beings, compliance with conventional rules is the easiest way to gain the end. Only those who are well disciplined, and have developed the delicacy of apprehension which is conspicuous in the saints, have the right to go beyond the rules."* It appears that Radhakrishnan has tried here to save the delicate situation of criticising the saints in his usual beautiful language. Svami Dayananda is more uncompromising in such matters. He would be reluctant to honour such persons as saints, who think that they *have a right* (and are ready to exercise this right) to go beyond the rules.

743. Building on such concessions Radhakrishnan has written the following paragraph on the modern Russian attitude toward sex-problems, with the obvious intention of saving the Indian youth from the virus :—"There is a notion that free love, in the wrong sense, is advocated in Russia. To give it the lie direct, it will be enough to quote what Lenin wrote to Clara Zetkin as early as 1920. 'The changed attitude of young people to the problems of sex is naturally *a question of principle* and depends on a theory. Some talk of their attitude being *revolutionary* and *communist*. They sincerely believe this to be the case. But this

* Ibid p. 196.

does not impress me at all. Although I am by no means an austere ascetic, this so called *new sexual life* of young people, and sometimes of older people also, seems to me often enough to be a merely *bourgeois* business, an extension of the bourgeois brothel. It has nothing whatever to do with freedom of love as we communists understand it. You know, of course, the notorious theory that in communist society the gratification of sexual passion is..................as simple and commonplace an act as drinking a glass of water. This *glass of water* theory has made our young people totally and utterly crazy. *It has been the doom of many a young lad and lass.* Those who support it say they are Marxist. Thank you ! *But Marxism it is not.* Things are not quite so simple as that. It is not merely something natural to us that is fulfilled in the sexual life, but also something which we have acquired *through culture,* however lofty or low that may be. Thirst must. of course, be satisfied. But is there a normal man in normal circumstances who would lie down in the mud and drink from a puddle.? Or, say, from a tumbler the rim of which many lips have made greasy ? And the fact which is of greatest importance is the social aspect of the problem. The drinking of water is an individual act. In love, on the other hand, two beings are involved. And a third, a new life, may appear. It is just here, in this fact, that the interests of the society are involved. There is the duty to the community. The revolution requires concentration, an increase of strength, both from the masses and from iudividuals. It cannot tolerate such orgies *as are normal to the heroes* and heroines of d' Annunzio. Sexual licentiousness belongs to the bourgeois world. *It is an evidence of decay.* But the proletariat is a rising class. It has no need of intoxicants as narcotics or as stimulants. Self-control,

self-discipline, is not slavery. No; even in love it is not that. (Quoted in Klaus Mehnert, *Youth in Soviet Russia*, ed. by Davidson, p. 207). We must free ourselves from the illusion that primitive lusts are a novel form of advanced thought. Civilization is man's gradual mastery over savage nature. A nation in which chastity and self-control in sexual matters are widely observed will be a strong and creative nation."*

744. Here Lenin has struck a plain and timely note ; and Radhakrishnan's endorsement has added strength to the idea. But the fact is that Lenin deplores the bitterness of the fruit without examining the root which has yielded such fruit. The philosophy of *materialism* on which Marx and Lenin base their ethics must be thoroughly re-examined if we wish to save humanity from such dangerous crazes. The proletariat to whose good sense Lenin has appealed can more easily be swept away by the violence of passion, and seek an excuse for its behaviour in philosophic cavils than to care for the more abstruse aspect of the question. Svami Dayananda and Mahatma Gandhi would favour more out-spoken pleadings.

745. It will not be in the fitness of things if we close this chapter without mentioning another set of virtues which epitomize the Aryan life of yore and on which Svami Dayananda has laid an extraordinary emphasis. In common language they are called "*Maha Yajnas*". But Svami Dayananda's interpretation of them is quite novel.

* Ibid p. 197.

Cp. Aldous Huxley. "The cultural condition of a society rises in exact proportion as it imposes pre-nuptial and post-nuptial restraints upon sexual opportunity--*Ends and means.*

746. It is supposed that Yajnas or sacrifices are certain ceremonials performed to appease gods and goddesses by immolating animals (goats, cows, horses, pigs etc.) and burning their flesh in fire. Svamī Dayananda discovered the error and proved on the basis of Sanskrat grammar, lexicography and usage that the word Yajna means broadly speaking, a due performance of one's duties.

747. There is a verse in the *Manusmrti* :—
"A man should not, as far as lies in his power, neglect these five duties* :—

748. (1) *Rshi-yajna*, (also called *Brahma* Yajna), spiritual duty. It consists in contemplation of God, study of religious scriptures and observance of *godliness*. One should remember that there is a supreme governing power behind this universe.

749. (2) *Deva Yajna*, or *Cleanliness* ; making our surroundings clean, and performing Homa (burning purifying substances such as sandal-wood, clarified butter, sugar etc. in fire). This is to keep the air always pure and free from disease-creating germs. No flesh of any description is to be burnt.* Homa, Svami Dayananda holds, is not any mystic formula to appease a deity, but a scientific way of fumigation. Objectively it is a purely physical purificatory action. Subjectively it expresses the desire to free mankind from the attacks of disease-creating germs.

* ऋषियज्ञं देवयज्ञं भूतयज्ञं च सर्वदा ।
नृयज्ञं पितृयज्ञं च यथाशक्ति न हापयेत् ॥ (IV—21)

750. (3) *Pitri yajna* or duty towards parents and elders, not dead ones but living ones. You can call it ancestor-worship. Svami Dayananda enjoins it as a strict duty that our elders who have during their young days contributed so much toward our welfare should be well looked after, not as a matter of charity, but as a duty, as it is a debt to pay. *Pitri-yajna* is generally taken to mean to offer libetions to the dead. Svami Dayananda disbelieves all this humbug. We do not know where our dead elders are and we are at a loss to find the ways to help them. The Shraddha and Tarpana done by the Hindus on certain occasions of the year are simply a gross superstition engendered by ignorance and fraud at first, and then kept alive by conservatism and traditional prejudices.

751. (4) *Atithiyajna* or hospitality. This is one of the foremost duties of a house holder. There is a hymn in the Atharva Veda* which beautifully inculcates this.

(a) He who eats before feeding his guest spoils the prosperity and plenty of his family.

(b) He who eats before feeding his guest spoils the food and drink of his family.

* इष्टं च वा एष पूर्तं च गृहाणामश्नाति यः पूर्वोऽतिथेरश्नाति ।
पयश्च एष रसं च गृहाणामश्नाति यः पूर्वोऽतिथेरश्नाति ।
ऊर्जां च वा एष स्फातिं च गृहाणामश्नाति यः पूर्वोऽतिथेरश्नाति ।
प्रजां च वा एष पशूँश्च गृहाणामश्नाति यः पूर्वोऽतिथेरश्नाति ।
कीर्तिं च वा एष यशश्च गृहाणामश्नाति यः पूर्वोऽतिथेरश्नाति ।
(अथर्ववेद काण्ड ९, सूक्त ६ (३), मन्त्र १-५)

(c) He who eats before feeding his guest spoils the glory and growth of his family.

(d) He who eats before feeding his guest spoils the cattle and progeny of his family.

(e) He who eats before feeding his guest spoils the reputation and good name of his family.

752. (5) *Bhuta yajna* or regard for all life. A house holder should not only be a philanthropist or lover of mankind. *He should be humane to all animals*. This kindness is to be shown in many forms. We should first avoid giving pain to animals; then we should administer to their wants as far as it is possible.

753. These five Yajnas in a course of pejoration had assumed among the Hindus, the form of meaningless rituals. Freed from external rituals, they cover the whole range of man's duties. They are not rituals, but ways of practical living. Godliness, cleanliness of physical surroundings, regard for one's own parents, respect for elders in general, and love for all life—these five are the virtues which have commanded the recognition of all ages and climes and even in our days of struggle and strife, their value cannot be under-rated. Home or family is their starting point. But as an individual developes, his sphere of concern widens till it is congruous with the whole cosmos. Mahatma Gandhi's principle of non-violence or Ahimsa, though etymologically negative is ethically positive. It covers the whole field of do's and dont's. The five Yajnas are an actualization of this great principle,

Chapter IX

SOCIOLOGY AND STATE-CRAFT

754. "Sociology," defines Webster, is "the science of the origin and evolution of society, or, of the forms, institutions, and functions of human groups. Comte coined the term *sociologie* (French) in 1838 as the name of the comprehensive, objective study of the associated life of man." Sociology is thus a modern science, having received a great impetus from Herbert Spencer and further development from American thinkers.

755. What recognition sociology received in ancient Indian literature and what place Svami Dayananda has allocated to it in the *philosophy of life* is the subject of this chapter.

756. Man is a social animal. When was he not? Researches of historians have failed to find out the point of time before which man was not social. The theories of "social contract" postulated by certain thinkers, e.g. Hobbes and Rousseau, have proved fanciful and misleading. The Vedas as interpreted by Svami Dayananda do not even claim that all men have sprung from one original man, (Adam). Even if the theories of modern evolution be relied upon, one-ancestor-theory is highly improbable. In such a vast universe, why should only one speck of life (and not more) appear and be held as the common ancestor

of all living beings, irrespetive of the processes of evolution ?

757. "*Question*—Was one man made in the beginning of the universe or many ?

Answer—Many. Whichever souls, by dint of their merits and demerits due to their past actions, deserve to be born in the non-sexual creation, they are born at that time. The Yajur Veda and its *Brahmana* aver that many (hundreds and thousands) of persons are born in the creation. From the present population of the world also it appears, that men are the descendants of many parents."*

758. By denying a common parentage of all men, it has been shown that men are related to each other not on account of their having been born from one parent but because souls are social by nature. Birth, (physical birth) is after all an extrinsic thing and this has given rise not only to casteism, racism or communalism; but has made social integration difficult. People think that they should love only those who are their near relations in blood. Thus the remoter the blood relation, the less the love. The theory of common birth has made man narrow-minded. The Hindu casteism and European racism are both founded on the basis of birth and though the forms may be different, the malady is the same. The affinity which one soul bears to another soul is not based upon the construction of the material body but upon our *innate* nature.

759. But this much is inadequate to show what sociological relation-ship was prevalent at that initial

* Light of Truth, VIII, 42.

stage, and how further development took place. According to the doctrine that in the beginning of every new cycle of creation (कल्प) spring up living beings (men and lower animals) according to their deeds in the preceding cycle, all men are not equally developed, either morally or socially or spiritually. There must have been some doctors (*Rshi* ऋषि) who doctrinated things for their disciples (*Manushya* मनुष्य), thus giving rise to *doctrines* and *disciplines*, and there must have been some unruly souls on whom the laws had to be imposed by persuasion, tact or force. You can call it a sort of *struggle for social construction*, exhibited in old Indian histories as *Devasura sangrama* (देवासुर संग्राम) or warfare between the good and the evil-minded.

760. There are two important factors which consitute the social structure in the ancient India. They are both based upon Vedic scriptures and advocated as the most efficient by Svami Dayananda. One is *Varna-Vyavastha* (वर्ण व्यवस्था) or class-system and the other *Ashrama-Vyavastha* (आश्रम व्यवस्था) or stage-system. The human life is divided into four stages, *Brahmacharya Ashrama* (ब्रह्मचर्य आश्रम) or study-stage, *Grhastha Ashram* (गृहस्थ आश्रम) or family-stage, *Vanaprastha Ashrama* (वानप्रस्थ आश्रम) or forest stage, *Sannyasa Ashrama* (सन्यास आश्रम) or renunciation stage. The whole human *society* is divided into four classes, *Brahmana Varna* (ब्राह्मण वर्ण) or the divine class; *Kshattriya Varan* (क्षत्रिय वर्ण) or governing class, *Vaishya Varna* (वैश्य वर्ण) or industrial-class, *Shudra-Varna* (शूद्र वर्ण) or the lowest class.

761. When we speak of *Varna-Vyavastha* or social structure of ancient India we have to guard against the prevailing caste-system among modern Hindus. The Hindu caste-system has always elicited strong condemnation, not only from foreign critics but also from

social reformers of all ages in India herself. Even saints like Tulsidas, who witnessed the horrors of the caste-hatred of his times had to say :—

"God has given the top-most importance to deeds. As a man does, so does he enjoy."*

762. That was a mild reference. But the strongest condemnation came from Svami Dayananda. With one difference, of course. While other reformers are free-thinkers, Svami Dayananda has tried to prove that the present caste-system of Hindus, is just the opposite of the *Vedic varna-vyavastha*. Gautam Buddha renounced the Vedas outright to reform the caste-system. Shankara and other advocates of Vedic orthodoxy upheld the caste-system; giving a longer lease to the disease. Shankara's philosophy soared too high and left the lower strata of society untouched. The well-known Gita verse† which says that learned men always look upon all creatures, cows, elephants, dogs, and low-caste people with the same eye was never brought into actual application. Svami Dayananda struck at the root of the evil. He preached that the birth-based caste-system is wrong, and that the *varna-vyavastha* of the Vedic age was more or less a *division of labour*, with no rigidity or inflexibility. On this point; he held vehement discussions with contemporary pandits and tried to disrupt the old order, setting up a fresh programme of social reconstruction.

* कर्म प्रधान विश्व कर राखा । जो जस करै सो तस फल चाखा ॥
(Tulsidasa's Ramayana.)

† विद्याविनयसम्पन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि ।
शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः ॥
(गीता ५।१८)

763. What is, then, this *varna-vyavastha*? *Varna* means occupation by choice (from the root *vri*, to choose), and *vyavastha* means organisation. *Varna-vyavastha* thus, means an organisation in which every individual has the freedom to choose his occupation in the society, without being hampered by arbitrary restrictions of birth, class, creed or colour. The greatest blunder which the critics of Hindu sociology, both friends and foes, have made is to confuse the Sanskrta word *varna*, meaning *choice* with its homonym *varna* which means *colour*. The credit of the discovery of this mistake goes cent percent to Svami Dayananda. None, before him, had given such a bold fight on this point. The colour-theory of the Hindu caste-system is a surmise of colour-diseased European mentality. The Hindus have no four colours corresponding to four castes. The Gita says :—

"The four-fold *varnas* have been ordained on the principle of merits and action."*

764. The two main bases of social classification are :—

(1) Men are *not equal* in the capacity or aptitude of mind and body.

(2) They need an *organised cooperation* for their individual and social development.

765. The *varna-vyavastha* is a system whereby we create *adjustment and collaboration* in the midst of differences. There *should* have been no classes if all men had been equal in all respects. There *could* have been no classes if individuals had no need of the

* चातुर्वर्ण्यं मया सृष्टं गुणकर्मविभागशः ।
(Gita IV-13)

society. The question of give-and-take arises only when we are all *unequal* and *incomplete* and need others' help to make good our deficiencies. This leads to classification and if the basis of classification is rationalistic, it will be conducive to progress, while an arbitrary classification will lead to chaos. Classification on the basis of birth (as among the Hindus of today), or on the basis of *colour* (which is also ultimately birth-based) as in some western countries, is too arbitrary and unscientific (and in the opinion of Svami Dayananda anti-Vedic also).

766. Svami Dayananda advises three principles of classification, (1) *Natural tendencies* (Svabhava स्वाभाव), (2) *Acquired qualifications* (Guna गुण) (3) *Actual deeds* (Karma कर्म).

767. When born, men bring with them certain tendencies, either as the resultants of past lives, or inherited from their parents, which are peculiar to each individual and are dominating factors in determining the individual character. They are the *svabhava* or self-leanings, which are the least changeable in human nature, though not entirely unchangeable. Then come the *gunas* or *acquired qualifications*, which are mostly the results of environment and education. They normally decide the status of an individual in the society and can be roughly compared with what is symbolized by public-examination-certificates. *Karmas* or *actual deeds*, constitute the third principle. They are on the surface of affairs. By seeing how a man behaves in his daily actions, you can judge what qualifications the man has acquired and what natural tendencies he has. When a man chooses a particular station in the society, the choice is determined by all the three determinants, taken

as a whole. Natal tendencies effect the qualifications which one acquires and these qualifications colour the actual deeds. But all the three act and react upon each other. They cannot be kept isolated, nor judged as such.

768. Natural tendencies which are at the root of all education and all action have been roughly classified into three types, truth-loving (सत्यप्रियता), glory-loving (यशःप्रियता), and pleasure-loving (श्री-प्रियता). Plato's tripartite division of men into three classes, king-philosophers, warriors, and pleasure-seekers has a great resemblance with the bases of ancient Indian *Varna*-system. The main *varnas* or self-chosen sections of the society are three, first the *Brahmana* or that which chooses the life of truth-seeking with all the self-sacrifice and simplicity of life which that mission of life involves. The Sanskrta word *Brahmana* means one that is connected with *Brahman. Brahman* in Vedic terminology means *God* as well as *divine knowledge*. The task of the Brahmanical class is arduous and therefore it carries with it a number of privileges in the form of honour. Then comes the Kshattriya class. The word Kshattriya means one who is always ready to protect the oppressed from the attacks of the oppressors. This needs bodily strength and prowess. The Kshattriya cares more for glory than for wealth, pleasure or even spiritual advancement. Lower still is love of pleasure and pelf. The *vaishyas* are common people, always engaged in worldly prosperity, production, multiplication and distribution of wealth. A healthy society needs a well balanced adjustment of all the three things, *satya* (सत्य) or knowledge, *yashah*, (यशः) or glory, and *shri* (श्री) or wealth. A society or a nation is healthy or strong to the extent that all the three factors are duly combined,

769. Then there is another section of the people which has no capacity to choose any career for itself. This section has limbs, but no brain. Their ambitions are almost *nil.* They aspire nothing more than that they should live. The society allows them a place, subordinate to the above three. They can administer to the menial wants of any of the three upper classes. For a railway porter it is immaterial whether the box which he has to carry contains the Vedas, or some military weapons or silken clothes. He cares a fig for any thing as long as he gets the wages. For him the most material is the *weight* of the box and not the *nature* of the contents. Such people are called *shudras.* Having no capacity to choose higher things, they have to depend upon others for their means of livelihood as well as for the forms of their occupation. The Sanskrata word Shudra means "pitiable."*

770. This social structure has a direct connection with metaphysical doctrines. The soul is by nature a *free* agent. *i. e.*, it has choice in its actions. But the exercise of this freedom is limited by internal capacity and external environment. Man is a fairly advanced condition of the soul. His self-development depends to a great extent upon his adjustment with others, *i. e.*, the society. Hence the need of a well balanced

* They are to be pitied not owing to their low parentage, but because of their inborn incapabilities. *Shuk* or pity in sociological sense, does not mean crocodile tears but a readiness on the part of those who are more fortunate in their natural gifts to help the unfortunate brethren.

(१) शुचमभिदुद्राव
(२) शुचावाभिदुद्रुवे
(३) शुचावारैक्वमभिदुद्रावेति शूद्रः ।

(Shankara's Commentary on the Vedanta I. I. 34.)

society which might render one the maximum of possible service in one's development. Every individual should work according to *his capacity* to work, and everybody should get for the performance of such work, all that he *needs*. Thus there was nothing absurd in the demand of the Marxists that every man should do according to his *capacity* and every man should get all that he *needs*. But there is all the difference between the extent and methods recommended by the sponsors of *varna-vyavastha* and those enforced by the communists. The two principles, *i. e.*, '*from* every man according to his *capacity*' and '*to* every man according to his *needs*' are the best to ensure the healthiest structure of the society. But the adjustment between the two is the most difficult. How to enforce the first, when ignorance, sloth and selfishness constantly gravitate? And how to administer the second when the first remains un-accomplished?

771. The *Varna*-System provides the best possible mechanism for ensuring an adjustment. The choice of the *varna* is a direct appeal to the nature of the individual. He chooses (वृणोति) his niche. If spiritual advancement is his goal, he should *choose* to be a *Brahmana*, which means that he is in duty bound, to lead a life of austerity, simplicity and poverty, the *plainest living* and the *highest thinking*. In return for such a service, the society will pay him up by allowing him all the facilities and according him *honour* to make up for deficiencies on its parts. It is the duty of the *Brahmana* to demand nothing, *not even honour*. And it is the duty of the society to offer every facility possible.

772. Svami Dayananda says :—

"No body can be a *Brahmana* without following these:—

Indriyānām vichartām viṣayeṣvapahariṣu
*Sanyame yatnamātiṣṭhed vidvan yanteva vajinam.**

Just as a qualified driver keeps the horses in control, in the same way should be controlled the senses which have the tendency to wander among the objects, tempting mind and soul into evil deeds etc.†

Only those persons get the perfect realisation of righteousness, who do not fall into the meshes of gold and woman."‡

"That *Brahmana* alone is the actual knower of the Vedas and God, *who is ever afraid of fame* as of poison, and who keenly seeks ill-name as if it is nectar."¶

It means that a true *Brahmana* should always be ready to swallow even the bitter pills of disgrace and popular ill-fame, if that is necessary in the performance of his duty.

773. Similarly if a man chooses the occupation of a *kshattriya*, he should be ready to sacrifice his all, wealth, pleasure etc. for the protection of the society. He is below the *Brahmana*, in so far that he cannot devote so much time and energy to spiritual affairs. But in one respect he commands the obedience of *Brahmana* also, as it is he who governs the whole society and saves it from the encroachment of those who are non-*Brahmanas* in the garb of the *Brahmanas*. He is the *vyavasthapaka* (व्यवस्थापक) of the *Varna-Vyavastha*. He controls the *vaishya* or wealth-producing class and

* Manu II, 88.
† Light of Truth, III, 35.
‡ Light of Truth, III, 46.
¶ Light of Truth, III, 40.

keeps their aspirations within bounds. And he also controls the *Shudras* lest they should run riot and be an unwholesome burden on the society.

774. Just as there are certain latitudes given to the *Kshatriyas* and the *Brahmanas*, similarly there are rules for the *vaishyas* and *shudras*. Duties and privileges of individuals have their minima and maxima, the ideal principles and the limits to which the society can tolerate the irregularities. Broad ethical principles, *e. g.*, non-violence, truth, non-thieving, sexual limitations are binding upon all. But besides these, there are rules peculiar to their class, which keep the class intact. In the *Varna-Vyavastha*, the notable feature is spontaneity of action, a certain mystic faith in the observance of the duties and an intrinsic horror in the insurgience of those rules. The *Vyavastha* or system is kept intact by a peculiar adjustment of social sanctions and governmental bindings. "A living society must have both the power of *continuity* and the power of *change*",* and both these are ensured in the *Varna-Vyavastha*. "In a savage community there is hardly any progress from one generation to another. Change is looked upon with suspicion and all human energies are concentrated on maintaining *the status quo*. In a civilized community progress and change are the life-blood of its activity. Nothing is so subversive to society as a blind adherence to outworn forms and obsolete habits which survive by *mere inertia*. The Hindu view makes room for essential changes. There must be no violent break with social heredity, and yet the new stresses, conflicts and confusions will have to be faced and overcome."†

* Radhakrishnan's "Religion and Society" p. 113.

† Ibid p., 113.

775. Svami Dayananda's interpretation of the *varna-vyavastha* and his programme of social reconstrution shake up the inertia referred to above and make room for those essential changes which ensure the progress of human society. Here we should not confuse the *varna-vyavastha* with the prevailing *caste-system* of the Hindus which has survived by *mere inertia* and rendered the Hindu society miserably unprogressive and notoriously backward. While many other reformers, including Gautam Buddha and foreign missionaries, insisted upon violent break and tried to enforce a class-less cociety, Svami Dayananda provided for 'continuity and change' both by giving a new orientation. The Hindu caste is a rigid, birth-based *custom* (not *system*) laying too much stress upon 'heredity', ignoring other important factors altogether. The Hindu society is divided into numerous castes and sub-castes, all deriving their sanction from some remote ancestry. They are air-tight compartments, each isolated by rules of co-dining and marriage. The system appears to be a deteriorated and mutilated form of the old *varna-vyavastha*, with all the values lost and mere name retained. Even heredity is in name and not in qualities. Svami Dayananda calls this as unscientific, un-vedic and highly pernicious. He traces the disease back to its very origin and concludes that the present condition of the Hindu society is due to the mis-understanding created somehow and somewhere in the interpretation and application of the Vedic formula. The best analogy that can be conceived for relations between the individual and society is the human body. We have a body with different limbs, each having a distinct place and distinct functions. But they are so interallied that they are conducive to their own development, the development of other limbs and the development of the whole society. The best social system is

that which provides all the three things. And this was furnished by the *varna-vyavastha*. To understand fully what contribution Svami Dayananda made in this direction, we must quote extensively from his book Satyartha Prakasha (Light of Truth).

776. "*Question*—Is only that person *Brahmana* or *Brahmani* (female *Brahmana*) whose parents are *Brahmanas*? Can the children of non-*Brahmana* parents be ever *Brahmanas*?

Answer—Yes, they have been, they are and they shall be. The *Chhandogya Upanishat* quotes the instance of sage *Jabali* who belonged to uncertain family and yet became a *Brahmana*. Similarly, according to the *Mahabharata*, *Vishvamitra*, belonging to a *kshatriya* family and sage *Matanga*, belonging to a very low *chandala* family, became *Brahmanas*. Even now only that man is fit to be called a *Brahmana* who is learned and of good habits, and an ignorant man deserves to be called a *shudra*. The same thing holds good even in case of future.

777. *Q.*—How can the physical body which is the result of the combination of reproductive elements (male and female) of a particular *varna*, be so altered as to be fit to belong to another *varna*?

A.—The Brahmanic character of the body is not due to the reproductive elements. But,

Svādhyāyena japairhomais-traividyene-jyayā sutaiḥ,
*Mahāyajñaishcha yajñaishcha brāhmīyam kriyate tanuh.**

....

The Brahmanical character of a body (life) depends upon the following things :—

* Manusmrti, II. 28.

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(1) *Svadhyaya* or study:—

(2) *Japaih* or thinking, the performances of different kinds of homas, the reading of all the Vedas, fully under-standing the relation between the word and the object, and with proper accents;

(3) *Ijyaya*, performance of full-moon *yajna* etc.;

(4) *Sutaih*, child-breeding according to the already given methods.

(5) *Mahayajnai*, performance of five great daily duties, *brahma yajna*, *deva yajna*, *pitr yajna*, *vaishvadeva yajna*, *atithi-yajna*.

(6) *Yajnaih*, by performing *yajnas*, *e.g.*, *agnishtoma*, association with learned men, good behaviour, truthfuless, doing good to others, good deeds, study of art and craft, avoidance of evil ways and acceptance of noble things.

778. *Q.*—Do you condemn tradition?

A.—No. But we do condemn your ill-thinking.

Q.—What is the proof that you think rightly and we think wrongly?

A.—The proof is quite evident. You call that practice tradition which has been current for five or seven generations. We call only that practice as tradition which has been current since the very birth of the universe, *i. e.*, the Vedas. Don't you see that good parents beget bad children, or bad parents good children, or good parents good children and bad parents bad children?

779. You people are in delusion. See what Manu says:—

Yenāsya pitaro yātā yena yātāḥ pitāmahāḥ,
*Tena yāyāt satām mārgam tena gachchhan na riṣyāte.**

Let men follow the ways of their parents and grandparents ; but only the ways of good parents and grandparents. If the parents or grandparents be bad, their ways should never be adopted. Nobody suffers pain by following the ways of good men.

Do you accept this ? Yes, you do. Then again, what is consistent with the God-revealed Vedas is alone *sanatana* (traditional),† and not what is contrary to it.

Should not all men accept this ? Yes, certainly. If any body does not accept this, tell him, that if the son of a poor man gets rich, should he throw his riches, because he is proud of his parents' poverty ? Should the son of a blind man do away with his eyes ? Should the son of an evil-doer be himself evil-doer ? No, never.

It is the duty of all men to follow the good ways of their ancestors and not evil ways. Those who say that the varna-system depends upon the reproductive elements of the parents and not upon merits or actions may be asked one question :

Why do you not acknwledge that man as *Brahmana*, who abandons the duties of his *varna* and becomes low, or is converted into Islam or Christianity ? You have only one answer. The man has left the duties of *Brahmanas*, therefore, he is not a *Brahmana*. This proves that those born *Brahmanas* who do good actions are *Brahmanas* and those low-born also whose

* Manu., IV, 178.

† Common Hindus believe that their religion is Sanatana (meaning 'eternal' or 'ancient'). According to them all practices of the Hindu religion (whether good or bad) are traditional and hence acceptable. Svami Dayananda controverts this view. (Tr.)

merits, profession and temperament are of higher varnas are of higher varnas. Similarly, high-born persons doing low things should be reckoned in the low *varna*.

780. *Q.*—

Brāhmanosya mukham āsīd bāhū rājanyaḥ kṛtaḥ,
Urū tad asya yad vaishyaḥ padbhyām shūdro ajāyata.

This is the 11th verse of the 31st chapter of the Yajurveda.

This means that the *brahmana* is born out of the mouth of God; the *kshattriya* out of His arms; the *vaishya* out of His thighs; and the *shudra* out of His feet. Therefore, just as a mouth cannot be an arm etc., nor arms etc., can be mouth, similarly a *brahmana* can never be a *kshattriya* etc., nor *kshattriyas* etc. *brahmanas*.

A.—The sense that you attach to this verse is not correct.

Here the reference is to the bodiless God. When God has no body, he cannot have members such as mouth etc. A being with members, *e. g.*, mouth etc. cannot be called Purusha or all-pervading. That who is not all-pervading cannot be almighty, creator, sustainer, dissolver of the world, the ordainer of the soul's destinies after knowing their good and bad deeds, all-knowing, un-born and imperishable.

Therefore, the correct meaning of the verse is that in this world of the all-pervading God, whoever is the most excellent like the mouth, is a *Brahmana*; whoever has bodily power is a *kshattriya*, as it is said in the *Shatapatha Brahmana* that the word *bahu* (ordinary arm) means strength; the part below the loin and above the knee is called *uru*; he who, with the help of his thighs goes abroad and trades is called the *vaishya*; and he who is like the lowest limb of the body and is ignorant is called the *shudra*. In the

Shatapatha Brahmana, too, at one place this verse has been explained likewise, *e. g.*,

Yasmādete mukhyās-tasmān mukhato hyasṛjyanta etc.

As they are most important, therefore, they are said to have been, as if, born out of the mouth. As the mouth is the most excellent of all the limbs of the body, so those who are the most educated and possess most excellent qualities, professions and temperament, among the mankind, are *Brahmanas*. When God is bodiless and has no limbs such as mouth etc., then creation out of these limbs is out of question, like the marriage of the son of a sterile woman. Had the *Brahmanas* and others been born of mouth ete. their shape should have been like the shape of their material cause (moulds). Just as the mouth is of round shape, so should have been the bodies of the *Brahmanas*; the bodies of the *kshattriyas* should have been arm-like, of the *vaishyas* thigh-like, and of the shudras foot-like. But it is not so.

One more question can be asked of you. Those men who were born out of the mouth might have been *brahmanas*. But you are born like every one else out of the womb. When you are not born out of the mouth, how do you boast of being called by such names as *brahmana* etc. ? Therefore your explanation is wrong and ours correct.

781. Elsewhere, we find the same thing :—

Shūdro brāhmaṇatāmeti, brāhmaṇashchaiti shūdratām,
*Kṣattriyāj-jātamevantu vidyāt vaishyāt tathaiva cha.**

If a man born in a shudra family possesses the merits, actions and temperaments of a *brahmana*, a *kshattriya* or a *vaishya*, he becomes a *brahmana*, a *kshattriya*

* Manusmrti, X, 65.

or a *vaishya* as the case may be. Similarly, a man born in a *brahmana*, *kshattriya* or *vaishya* family should become a *shudra* if his merits, actions and temperaments are shudra-like.

It means that a man or a woman should belong only to that *varna* for which he or she is fit.

Dharmacharyayā jaghanyo varṇaḥ pūrvam pūrvam varṇamāpadyate jāti-parivṛttau ;
Adharma-charyayā pūrvo varṇo jaghanyam jaghanyam varṇamāpadyate jāti-parivṛttau

These are the aphorisms of *Apastamba*.

Meaning—A low-born ascends to a higher *varna* by doing righteous deeds. He should be counted of the same *varna*, for which he is fit.

Similarly, by doing unrighteous deeds, a man born in higher classes descends to a lower class for which he is fit and should be regarded as such."*

782. Thus you find that while Svami Dayananda denounces out right the prevailing caste system, he is on principle opposed to the modern socialism, in which the individual has been consigned a very insignificant place and society is all in all. Prof. Radhakrishnan has given a vivid description of the situation in his "Religion and Society".†

783. "For Marx 'the human essence is not an abstraction inhabiting the separate individual. It is the *ensemble of social relations*'.‡

'To the Christian doctrine of the infinite significance of the individual human soul and of personal responsibility, I oppose,' says Hitler, 'with icy

* Light of Truth, IV, 18-23.
† pp. 55—60.
‡ Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach,

clarity the saving doctrine of the nothingness and insignificance of the individual human being, and of his continued existence in the *visible immortality of the nation.*'* In *Mein Kampf* he writes, 'The dogmas according to which the individual personality has a right to its liberty and its dignity can bring nothing but destruction'..........'There will be no licence, no free space, in which the individual belongs to himself, this is *socialism*—not such trifles as the private possession of the means of production. Of what importance is that if I range men firmly within a discipline they cannot escape ? Let them own their lands or factories as much as they please. *The decisive factor is that the state, through the party is supreme over them whether they are owners or workers. Why need we trouble to socialise banks and factories ? We socialise human being*' "†

784. Thus *socialism* deprives man of his liberty, while *Varna-Vyavastha* gives him *full choice*, (*Vri* to choose). "Democracy," says Radhakrishnan, "is an expression of the faith in man and his right and duty to perfect himself, to govern himself and to build a society in which self-perfection is possible."‡ Thus *Varna-Vyavastha* is the solid rock on which democracy can be based. Socialism makes us "behave like performing animals, animated dolls. The soul gets anaesthetised and we have faces without features".¶ "We do not make history, but are made by it. The leaders use all the modern means of compulsion, of excitement and suggestion to throw the masses into subjection."§

* Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (1939) M. 222-3.

† Rauschning, Voice of Destruction.

‡ Religion and Society, p. 55.

¶ Ibid, p. 57.

§ Ibid, p. 58.

785. "Is this the sacred heritage of freedom ?" asks Radhakrishnan. Svami Dayananda's reply would be *an emphatic no*. You can call it scientifie slavery which is worse than savage slavery. An enslaved savage *struggled*. His body was the slave and not his mind. A socialist of modern times loses his individual self. The building of personal character is of no importance to him.

786. "The foundation of all good government, according to Svami Dayananda, is the inner character of man. He says, 'A state flourishes only as long as men are righteous. It perishes when men fall into vice.' The character of the people, and government are inter-connected. Good government raises the level of the character of the people and the character of the people goes a long way in securing good government. History tells us that all forms of Government, monarchies, limited monarchies, oligarchies, beaurocracies, as well as republics have met a failure not because of themselves but on account of the low character of the people to whom the task was entrusted. A government in which every adult of a nation has his or her voice and which should generally be considered the most *popular* and therefore the most excellant form of government is also open to grave danger, if the people are evil-minded, selfish, untruthful, unjust, cruel, avaricious and therefore unworthy of the noble task. A certain minimum of head and heart qualifications is necessary to begin with. Therefore it is that Svami Dayananda lays so much emphasis upon character-building as the most prominent factor in the political progress of a nation. There is a set of thinkers who poohpooh the political value of morality. For them ethics and politics are two different things unconnected and independent. But Svami Dayananda parts company with them.

While discussing the causes of downfall of India, he says, 'In this world of God, the domination of the proud, the unjust, and the ignorant does not last long. It is the natural tendency of the world that the excess of wealth beyond the limit of utility engenders idleness, inactivity, jealousy, hatred, licentiousness and stupidity. This vitiates learning and all system of good education, giving rise to all sorts of vices such as wine-drinking, flesh-eating, early marriage, and unprincipledness. When art of fighting reaches its perfection and military strength is so increased that no other power in the world can vanquish it, then prejudice and pride take hold of the people and they become unjust. When these vices increase then either civil war takes place or some person from an obscure family rises up and defeats them.' "*

787. Here Svami Dayananda has drawn the attention of the reader to a great political truth. The cause of the downfall of India was not the foreign invasions or such extraneous events, but the weaknesses in the character of the people themselves. In the sixth chapter of the Satyartha Prakasha he has given a general outline of the principles of politics or state-craft. This holds good universally. The main theme propounded therein is *character*. It is the beginning and the end of all politics. Political progress is *impossible* without moral foundation and political progress is meaningless if it does not aim at moral perfection. Thus individual character is the seed as well as the fruit.

Svami Dayananda holds that we are the makers of our destinies, whether individual or national.

* Light of Truth, XI, 7.

Political freedom is not an isolated thing and should be looked at from the point of view of the whole life. The character of the individuals of a nation is the real foundation on which the superstructure of true political uplift can be laid. And the character of those counts the most who are the most noteworthy. "*Yatha raja, tatha praja*" (as the king, so his people) is a very old sanskrta proverb and nobody can ever challange its correctness. A licentious king cannot keep his people from being licentious. A king given to drinking, gambling or any bad habit, is the sower of those habits in the soil of his people's hearts. Therefore Svami Dayananda has said, that "a king or an administrator of justice who is given to licentiousness, crookedness. jealousy or pettyminded-ness perishes under the very weight of law."* In the present materialistic age tact, cleverness, flattery, and diplomacy are supposed to be the requisite qualifications of administrators and their private character is mostly overlooked, as if our private lives have nothing to do with our public duties. But we too often forget that a man is without, what he is within. Whatever form of goverment, our governors must be "learned, virtuous and cultured."†

788. Truth and non-violence (*Satya and ahimsa*) are the most essential political virtues according to Mahatma Gandhi. Svami Dayananda had also preached the same half a century before him. If a man is untruthful, he is nothing and if he is truthful, he must be non-violent too, as truth and violence do not go together.

* Light of Truth, VI, 8; Manu, VII, 27.
† Light of Truth, VI, 8.

789. Why Svami Dayananda emphasized this point is quite clear. Political condition of India in 1875 or about, demanded a clear analysis. The freedom of India had been totally extinct. The British Domination had reached its acme in the assumption, in 1877, of the title of the Empress of India by the British Crown. A considerably great portion of India was under the direct control of the British. The survivors of the ancient Hindu ruling houses, cornered in middle ages into Rajputana or western India by the Moslem Emperors lost whatever prestige of independence had been left to them and under new treaties with the British Government were reduced to ornamental vassalage with no real power or independence to exercise and therefore no duties to perform. Svami Dayananda mourns the fate of India, as bitterly as any real patriot could do. "Due to misfortune as well as idleness, vanity and mutual animosities, let alone the possibility of their ruling over other countries, even in India itself the Aryas are not having their undivided, independent, free and fearless government. Whatever there is, is down-trodden under the feet of the foreigners."*

790. Svami Dayananda's wail is somewhat similar to Niccolo Machiavelli's who in 1513 wrote in "the Prince" about Italy in these words, "Our country, left almost without life, still waits to know who it is that will heal her bruises, put an end to the devastation and plunder of Lombardy and to the exactions and imposts of Naples and Tuscany, and stanch those wounds of hers which long neglect has changed into running sores. We see how she prays God to send some one to rescue her from these

* Light of Truth, VIII, 51.

barbarous cruelties and oppressions. We see too how ready and eager she is to follow any standard, were there only some person to raise it."*

791. Svami Dayananda neither invokes God's wrath nor provokes people. He goes deep into the causes of their down-fall. He would not admit that it was a freak of fortune. He would not believe that the Just and Kind God who had in the past ages showered his choicest gifts on Indians should now be so fickle, so unkind and so unjust, as to snatch away without cause all that glory and reduce them to such penury and enslavement. The ancient Aryans did not rise without cause and the present Hindus did not fall without cause. The difference lay in their character.

792. As regards a cut-and-dried scheme of Svami Dayananda about the form of government, suffice it to say that he has none. He lays more emphasis on essence than on form. The world has, so far, experienced scores of forms of government, successful at times, and cast away as absurd at others, most efficacious and therefore most warmly welcomed under certain environments and equally woefully rejected under others. There are so many factors which determine the government of a people or country, and they change so rapidly that it is difficult to say that what is meat today will not be poison tomorrow. Nations have been seen changing not only their geographical or linguistic limits, but also their ethnological and cultural boundaries. And they all have a place in the formation of government. Political *practices* are notoriously changeful, but no less

* History of Modern Europe, Infra p 18.

changeful are political *theories*. From an absolute monarchy with its theory of divine right, upto anarchism and nihilism, (the two extremes of the political pole) there are numerous *isms* vehemently supported as well as strongly denounced by eminent political theorists. Government is after all a human institution, and there are always the chances of over-marking or undermarking. What form of government is the best for all times, all places and all circumstances it is difficult to say; and Svami Dayananda avoids such absurd commitments. But he does strike the G. C. M. (greatest common measure) which pervades all. Government is not an end but a means and that end is the symmetrical development of the society. That government must be the best which is the most conducive of this end.

793. Distinction has often been made between a good government (*su-rajya*) and a self-government (*sva-rajya*). But it all depends upon the sense in which the word 'good' is taken. Easy and peaceful life is not always the best life and it is not impossible that under certain conditions it may be a curse. That 'ease and plenty' which is inclined to make a people indolent, inactive, static and unprogressive is bad in so far that it arrests the evolution of their potentialities. A boy who is fed luxuriously and is carried from place to place in the arms of his guardians is very unfortunate indeed, because he will never be able to stand on his own legs. Such a cripple will never be grown-up. The same holds good with a nation which is under a benevolent foreign rule. The governors fight for the governed, think for the governed, till for the governed, weave for the governed and do every important thing for the governed ; and claim that theirs is the most benevolent rule. They boast that they have fed the

hungry and clothed the naked. But the greatest charge against such rulers is that they have reduced the country into a work-house or orphanage. The stature of the people has been dwarfed and their souls have been enslaved. Instead of active workers they are passive receivers. Compare a pet dog of a prince with a poor peasant. The dog has a velvet cushion to sleep on, an attendent to look to his needs, a cosy room with an electric fan, a prince's hand to lick. The poor peasant has rags to wear, a hovel to live in, ill-fed and ill-clad, never allowed even to enter the palaces of the princes and very often a receipient of their frowns. But is not the dog's life, after all, a dog's life? Which peasant is so foolish as to covet the dog's life and be ready to change places with him? The same difference there is between *Surajya* or benevolent foreign rule and *swarajya* or self government. It is why Svami Dayananda says that a benevolent foreign rule can never be better than indigenous government even when the latter is not so good. Ease and slavery may be the fruits of *Surajya.* Struggle and independence must be the result of *Swarajya.* Peace and order are very charming slogans but they are desirable only so far as they are compatible with the growth of a people. If not, do not peace and order reign supreme in a grave yard?

In the world's broad field of battle,
In the *bivouac* of life,
Be not like dumb, driven cattle;
Be a hero in the strife.

794. When the goal of government is decided, it is not difficult to find the means and discuss details. There are two factors which guide our discussions. When contriving a path it is not sufficient to look at the end only; we should also consider the point where

we start. The place from which we are going and the place to which we are going both are necessary. A path is not a thing of one extremity. It must lie between two ends. And these two ends should be so joined that there should be nothing to obstruct the continuity. For instance, forests have to be cleared, rivers to be bridged and hills to be hollowed out or tunnelled. To clear the metaphor, a responsible government in which every adult has a voice, a free unhampered and rational voice, is an end, to reach which many stages have to be crossed and many difficulties surmounted. It can neither be put off to a remote future when all the individuals are so developed, as if by magic, to shoulder the responsibilities of citizenship. Nor can you give the task of good govenment to those who are hardly superior to dumb and driven cattle and can be easily influenced by selfish exploiters. A few decades past, there surged a wave of democracy over the western countries, but owing to certain shortcomings, the voice of the people was freely bribed, purchased, exploited or even intimidated, so much so, that people became sick of it and began to groan under its weight. The last three or four decades which have seen two great world wars and are foreseeing a third one, still more monstrous, testify to the fact that there is something vitally wrong, somewhere. Karl Marx's most well-known maxim that religion is an opium which has intoxicated humanity has recoiled upon its users. Religion has long lost its hold. Now mammon rules in place of God. Churches, mosques, pagodas and temples lie emptied. Their most solemn votaries have transferred their allegiance from invisible God to glittering gold. We expected that medieval inebriety would go and people would learn how to live more brotherly. But if the religion of medieval ages was an opium, the greed of political power, has proved much worse than

that opium and our intoxication instead of being less has much more increased. By abandoning godliness we have become more dogly. And the fun of it is that each blames others for the unprecedented sufferings the world is groaning under and there seems no way out of the difficulty. The vicious circle goes on and on till we are in the middle of a whirlpool, every minute expecting our doom to be sealed.

795. The reason is that in the application of democratic principles, we have made some mistake and instead of eradicating the disease, we are spending our energy on outer forms. Svami Dayananda quotes Manu Smṛti VIII 12-19 in order to throw some light on the point :—

"If in a council, righteousness wounded by unrightousness comes for redress and no body tries to take the shaft out of her wound, it should be clear that all the members of that council are wounded.

"Either do not enter a council or if you do, say what is the most proper. A man is a sinner who either does not speak, or speaks what is not proper.

"All the members of that council are dead wherein righteousness is subdued by unrighteosness and truth by untruth.

"Righteousness killed kills its killer. Righteousness protected protects its protector. Therefore let not righteousness be killed, lest the killed righteousness should kill us.

"Righteousness is our true friend. It follows us even at death. All else perishes with our body."

796. The tussel between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, nationalism and internationalism has been a very intricate problem for the politician of to-day. The main reason is the metaphysical outlook of our

leaders. Svami Dayananda does not lose sight of the ultimate goal of life in solving the questions of the moment.

As an Indian, he was a patriot. He saw that India was a slave and wanted to liberate her. But he was much more. He was a *man.* As man he has his sympathy for the whole world. He established the Aryasamaja not for India and Indians alone, but for the whole world. His political teachings are also of a cosmopolitanic character. The sixth chapter of the Satyartha Prakasha in which he has delineated his political views is meant for all nations. He does not want that India should be slave to any country, nor he wants that any other country may be slave to India. We often come across the word *Chakravarti Rajya* (World-wide Government) in his books. But it is not "imperialism" that he means. "Imperialism", as we commonly understand by the term, means the subjugation of the whole world by one nation. British Empire, German Empire, Russian Empire mean this. But Svami Dayananda holds that while all nations of the world be independent, there should be an agency above them all, powerful enough to protect their independence and to check one nation from dominating over another. He does not think that isolated nations, however great and powerful, can maintain their integrity. Just as man is a unit in the formation of a nation, similarly nations are units in the formation of *Chakravarti Rajya* or world-commonwealth. Just as the national government is necessary to maintain the independence of man by protecting his rights from the aggressiveness of other men, similarly the world-common-wealth is necessary to maintain the independence of a nation by protecting its rights from the aggressiveness of other nations. All men are not

equally advanced or equally powerful. Similarly all nations are not equally powerful. Just as strong men are tempted to pounce upon the rights of weaker men, similarly strong nations are tempted to pounce upon the rights of weaker nations. And just as national governments are required to keep the ambitions of ambitious men within reasonable bounds, just so is a world commonwealth required to keep the ambitions of ambitious nations within reasonable bounds. *Chakravarti Rajya* or world overlordship, formed on the same representative principle, as national governments and functioning in a similar manner, is necessary to maintain the balance of power and secure the symmetrical growth of the whole mankind. This overlordship must be strong and benevolent ; strong to check and benevolent to stimulate. The strong should be taught to control their strength and the weak should be encouraged to come in a level with the rest of the world.

797. In the Shatapatha Brahmana (a book of rituals, of course), we come across a ceremony called the *Ashvamedha Yajna*. It is generally translated as horse-sacrifice, as according to Katyana and several other Hindu ritualists, a horse is immolated and sacrificed. Svami Dayananda, on the authority of the Shatapatha itself, says that the Sanskrta word 'Ashva' is to be translated as '*rastra*' or common-wealth. If we take pains and try to find a meaning in the ostensibly meaningless chapter on '*ashvamedha*', we can arrive at a wonderful truth which is of immense value in politics. "*Rashtram va ashvamedhah.*" (Shatapatha XIII-1-6-3) is a valuable *key* which Svami Dayananda has unearthed from down the *debris* of Hindu legends or Hindu folk-lore. It can unlock a great political treasure. If following this formula, we translate the

thirteenth chapter of the Shatapatha, and replace 'horse' by "Common-wealth" (*rastra*), we discover very useful seeds of democracy. Even folklore says that the horse-sacrifice is to be performcd by one who is the overlord of the whole world. But what sort of overlord? A Czar, a Caesar, or a Napolean? No. There is a passage of the Shatapatha which has been translated by Eggeling thus :—

798. "But verily, he who *fetters* the *horse* without announcing it to the *Brahman* and the gods, is liable to incur injury. He addresses the *Brahman* (the superintending priest) by saying, 'O *Brahman*, I will fetter the horse for the gods, for Prajapati. May I prosper therewith'. And having made the announcement to the *Brahman*, he ties up the horse and thus incurs no injury. 'Fetter it for the gods, for Prajapati : prosper thou therewith!' thus the *Brahman* urges him, and supplies it (the horse) with 'its own deity.' "*

799. If taken literally, the whole passage is obscure. Even symbolical language should have some meaning. Let Svami Dayananda's torch come and throw some light. Put *rastra* or government (better, *state*) for "*horse*". Then, the fetters are laws. If you fetter a country with a chain of laws without the permission of the representatives of the people (*devas* or the wise, translated as gods by Eggeling), the state is "liable to incur injury". But there is no fear of injury, if the consent of the people has been secured. Just see what the High Priest says. "Fetter it for the gods, for Prajapati : prosper thou therewith". If laws are made for the sake of God and for the sake of people, prosperity is sure to come. For at the very outset it

* Shatapath Brahman XIII—1—2—4.

has been said, "*Prajapatyo ashvah*" (State is a divine institution). All those who ride this so-called horse should remember that they do not ride roughshod but maintain its divine character.

800. It is not our aim to tire the reader with dry quotations from the *Brahmana* or elsewhere. We simply want to show that the imperialism which Svami Dayananda has advocated on the basis of ancient Vedic Scriptures is just the opposite of the imperialism which we are familiar with and sick of. The first primary political unit of Svami Dayananda's state is village with its Panchayata or "council of the five"? That is the *nucleus* of the state. Then comes national government which is *secondary*. Then the world common-wealth, which is *tertiary*. Thus rises the pyramid of government on the broadest possible base. People make laws which by their own consent are binding upon them. This means the surrendering of their individual wills for the sake of common weal. Commenting upon Manu VII—117 Svami Dayananda speaks of *Raja Sabha*, *Maharaja Sabha* i. e. *Sarvabhauma-Chakravarti Maharaja Sabha* which is nothing more than the council or assembly for the whole world. Speaking of the place of people in a government Svami Dayananda says. 'Farmers and others who toil are the Kings of the King and the King is their protector. If there be no people there can be no King."* Which means that the ruler is for the people and not the people for the ruler.*

801. There is one more point which needs consideration. What was Svami Dayananda's attitude towards democracy? We have said above that Svami

* Light of Truth, VI, 23.

Dayanand was an all round reformer. His main object was the revival of Vedism. He kept himself strictly aloof from current politics of his day. He did not like to associate himself with any political creed. Yet on general problems of politics he gave his free opinion. In those days, as now, there was no hard and fast definition of democracy. You cannot say that "democracy is so much, not more." But it can be safely said that Svami Dayananda's opposition to absolutism was a clear indication that he favoured democracy. Caste-System was a prevailing disease of those days and birth-right dominated in every sphere of life. The priest was all in all in all matters of religion. It was sacrilege to question his authority. "*Brahma Vakyam Janardanah*", "The Voice of the priest was the voice of God." The government was in the hands of aliens. Yet wherever there were Hindu kings, they derived their sanction from their birth. The people in general were not trained to think on democratic lines. Svami Dayananda began by questioning the authority of religious despots. He appealed to the Vedas and to the rationalistic interpretation of the Vedas. Rationalism is always against birth right. It instals reason on a high pedestal. And reason means individual freedom. In establishing the Aryasamaj, Svami Dayananda with one stroke of pen did away with one man's absolute right and introduced a system of open discussion and decision by votes. Ever since the foundation of the Aryasamaj in 1875, its administration has been carried on on strict democratic lines. There is no religious High Command in the Arya Samaj.

802. So much about broad principles. As regards minor points, there is a mine of useful knowledge in his writings :—

(1) Every government should have three main councils *Vidyarya Sabha* (Education Council), *Dharmarya Sabha*, (Religious Council), *Rajyarya Sabha* (Political Council).

(2) With the consent of these three councils should be framed the laws of the 'country' which should be binding upon all. (L.T. VI para 1)

(3) In the matters pertaining to the welfare of all, we should be dependent, but in matters of religion, i. e. our individual affairs, we should be absolutely free. (L. T. VI—6)

(4) The ruler ought to be like the sun, helping externally the eyes and internally the minds of all. (L. T. VI—7)

(5) Fools should not be allowed a place on any council. (L. T. VI—9)

(6) The administration of a country should be entrusted to those who can govern themselves.* (L. T. VI—10)

(7) Government should be in the hands of the indigenous people. (L. T. VI—11)

(8) A foe defeated in a battle should be treated respectably and provided sumptuously with all the necessaries of life; he may not feel the want of any thing. Even when put in the prison, he should be treated with due respects, so that he may lead a comfortable life and may not constantly brood over his defeat. (L. T. VI—19).

(9) A defeated foe should never be ridiculed, upbraided or reminded of his fall. He should always be addressed as "brother." (L. T. VI—19).

* Cp. Yet he, who reigns within himself and rules
Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king.
(Milton : Paradise Regained Book II, 466, 467).

(10) The ruler or his lieutenants should not oppose the general will of the people. And the officers and the people should not go against the ruler. (L. T. VI—23)

(11) In settling quarrel between parties tradition and usage should be duly honoured. No partiality should be shown to any one. (L. T. VI—25)

(12) If only intellectual power is cultivated and physical side is ignored then one physically even strong man can vanquish hundreds of learned persons. And if only physical power is developed and not intellectual, then also the work of the government suffers, as no good government can be carried on without brain power. (L. T. VI—34)

Note—Paras 786-802 are culled or adapted from "Svāmī Dayananda on the Formation and Functions of the State", by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya.

APPENDIX

1. Light of Truth (*Translation of Svami Dayananda's Satyartha Prakasha*) by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya.
2. The life and Teachings of Svami Dayananda Sarasvati by Bawa Chhajju Singh.
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16. I and my God by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya (*Aryasamaj, Chowk, Allahabad*).
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21. Life After Death by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya (*Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Delhi.*)
22. Landmarks of Svami Dayananda's Teachings by Ganga Prasad Upadhyaya (*Kala Press, Allahabad.*)

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